



Inside the Fall 2014 EUSA Review:

From the Chair	Michelle Egan	2
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section Essay <i>TTIP: Why Can't the EU and US Reach an Agreement on Genetically Modified Organisms?</i>	Carolyn M. Dudek	3
EUSA EU-Latin America Interest Section Essay <i>EU/Latin American Relations in a Changing International System</i>	Kevin Parthenay	8
EUSA EU and the Developing World Interest Section Essay <i>South Africa's Inconsistent Role in Bolstering EU-Africa Relations</i>	John Kotsopoulos Lorenzo Fioramonti	9
EUSA Political Economy Interest Section Essay <i>Finance, Labor, and the Eurozone's Winner-Take-All Economy: Some Reflections on Law and Regulation in Eurozone Crisis</i>	John W. Cioffi Kenneth A. Dubin	12
EUSA EU Law Interest Section <i>Lessons from the EU Judicial System</i>	Tilman Krüger & Susanne K. Schmidt	16
Book Reviews		18
Sternberg, Claudia Schrag. <i>The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950-2005.</i> Reviewed by Melissa Schnyder		
Telò, Mario and Ponjaert, Frederik (eds). <i>The EU's Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?</i> Reviewed by Tereza Novotná		
Mattelaer, A. <i>The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations : Planning, Friction, Strategy.</i> Reviewed by Eva-Maria Maggi		
Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel. <i>A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System.</i> Reviewed by Amy Verdun		
Mendez, Fernando, Mendez, Mario and Vasiliki, Triga. <i>Referendums and the European Union: A Comparative Inquiry.</i> Reviewed by Nick Clark		
Hartlapp, Miriam, Metz, Julia and Rauh, Christian. <i>Which Policy for Europe? Power and Conflict inside the European Commission.</i> Reviewed by Michael Blauburger		
Hay, Colin and Wincott, Daniel. <i>The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism. Series on 21st Century Europe.</i> Reviewed by Evert Van der Sluis		
Young, Alasdair R. and Peterson, John. <i>Parochial Global Europe: 21st Century Trade Politics.</i> Reviewed by Sieglinde Gstöhl		
Costa, Olivier and Brack, Nathalie. <i>How the EU really works.</i> Reviewed by Alba Ferreri		



From the Chair

We are in the final stages of our upcoming conference in Boston, March 5-7, 2015. We have an excellent set of panels that reflect our continued efforts to strengthen EUSA, and lift our research beyond area studies, drawing in scholars from different disciplines and fields. Our keynote speaker is **Thomas Piketty**, Professor at the Paris School of Economics and author of *Capital in the 21st Century*. Piketty will speak on “Inequality in Europe and What the EU Could Do About It.” We also have a number of roundtables featuring discussions about the future of Europe and the EU. Lady Catherine Ashton will also be on a roundtable with Professors **Peter Katzenstein**, **Kathleen McNamara**, and **Brian Rathbun** as they seek to understand the role of the transatlantic relationship in addressing global challenges.

Our EUSA lifetime achievement award will be given to **James A. Caporaso**, Professor at the University of Washington, and a former Chair of EUSA (1995-1997). We will also award prizes for Best Book, Best Dissertation and Best Paper at the conference. Our thanks to **Craig Parsons**, University of Oregon and **Nicolas Jabko**, Johns Hopkins University who have played a critical role in putting together an ambitious program. We are also continuing our relationship with the Journal of European Public Policy for the third time. Discus-sants on panels are asked to nominate best papers for consideration which will then go through a review process to select a set of papers for a special JEPP/ EUSA issue.

We are again grateful to the Editors of the Journal of Common Market Studies for their support of a reception at EUSA along with other sponsors including the European Commission, European Parliament, College of Europe and Northeastern University. Those interested in different interest group sections are welcome to attend the meetings and network with their respective colleagues interested in similar topics and issues. We also welcome EUSA members to the two receptions on Thursday and Friday at the end of the panel sessions.

Our election resulted in four new members that will join the Executive Committee in March 2015. Congratulations to **Frederic Merand**, **Nanette Neuwahl**, **Abe Newman** and **Waltraud Schelkle**. We are sure they will continue efforts to strengthen the association, both in terms of academic research activities, and policy-relevant research, that simultaneously engages policy-makers in the work of EUSA. Our continued thanks are due to EUSA members who serve in multiple capacities in assisting our organization.

We have a number of book reviews in this issue. We would like to let our members know that we plan on increasing our on-line presence and strengthening the value of our website for members in the coming months. In the works are plans to also work with *europaeuslaw* blog to strengthen our ties with legal research and activities as well as an effort to create a comprehensive list of working papers that have emerged from various collaborative research projects. Increasing our social media presence allows us more flexibility to provide information on both Europe and European Union events and activities, enhance networking and collaborative research. We would like to highlight the recent EUSA Political Economy Interest Section Newsletter https://eustudies.org/assets/files/pecon_newsletters/Newsletter-December-2014.pdf

Finally, I'm pleased to announce that the next conference will be in May 4-6, 2017 in Miami Florida.

Michelle Egan
EUSA Executive Committee Chair

EUSA Public Policy Interest Section Essay

TTIP: Why Can't the EU and US Reach an Agreement on Genetically Modified Organisms?

Carolyn M. Dudek

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is meant to promote economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic and greater trade between the world's largest trading partners. Although the intended goals of an agreement are laudable, completion of an agreement may prove to be quite difficult. One policy area that is highly charged and could put a wrench in the works is the controversy over genetically modified organisms (GMOs). As Vogel (2012) points out, GMOs stand as the most “economically significant” and divergent policies between the US and EU regarding food and agricultural policy. The US is the world's largest producer of GMOs and US corporations hold most patents on GMO proprietary seeds. On the other hand, the EU held a twelve year de facto moratorium on the cultivation of GMOs and has the world's slowest process for approving GMO imports (EuropaBio 2011). Since the creation of GMOs, the US and EU's policies have diverged considerably and it is unclear whether there can be any convergence within the agreement. Why is there such divergence and what factors may inhibit a more far reaching agreement regarding GMO trade?

Major factors shaping the negotiating position on each side of the pond include: 1) the differing evolution of a regulatory framework, 2) the influence of public opinion and economic interests, and 3) governmental institutional structures that impact regulatory policy. Setting the groundwork for a GMO regulatory framework, the US ultimately opted for a preventative approach, whereas the EU adopted a precautionary one. A preventative approach examines the actual risk, whereas the precautionary approach emphasizes probable risk. In addition, the US decided not to regulate the process of GMOs, but rather the product itself. The belief is that a product created with traditional methods, versus a product from genetic modification, are the same; thus, the process utilized to arrive at the finished product is irrelevant. Therefore, genetically modified (GM) and traditional products are substantially equivalent. In contrast, the EU determined that there was something fundamentally different about the process and that the process making a GMO mattered and needed to be regulated. The result of these different regulatory approaches and cultures set the groundwork for the trade

dispute that would follow.

Since the EU deemed GMOs to be regulated differently than their traditional counterparts, the EU created separate legislation to regulate GMOs; whereas, the US did not. Instead, in the US, regulations applied to traditional non-GM foods are used for GMOs as well. As a result of the EU's regulatory approach, one of the fundamental pieces of EU legislation governing GMOs has caused a rift in GMO trade. The Directive on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of GMOs (2001/18) was created to ensure human health and environmental safety with the introduction of GMOs (European Parliament and Council 2001). In particular, the legislation lays out the use of the precautionary principle in order to ensure safety as well as the option of a “safeguard” clause. The safeguard clause enables member states to temporarily stop the production or sale of a GMO if they have additional information determining a GMO to be a hazard to humans or the environment (European Parliament and Council 2001). Six member states have applied the “safeguard clause”: Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Germany and Luxembourg. Most recently, March 15, 2014 France used the clause to ban the sale, use and cultivation of MON 810, the only GM corn authorized thus far for cultivation in the EU.

In 2006 the US, Argentina and Canada brought a case before the WTO in response to the application of the safeguard clause and slow processing of applications for GMO imports. The WTO found the EU in violation of the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, which is based on the Codex Alimentarius (Codex), created in 1963 by the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The Codex was created to “harmonize international food standards, guidelines and codes of practice to protect the health of the consumers and ensure fair practices in the food trade,” which became an international dialogue and later a standard for regulating GMOs (“Codex Alimentarius – International Food Standards” 2013).

The result of the WTO case was that the EU's de facto moratorium on GMO cultivation, application delays and the safeguard clause's lack of “sufficient scientific evidence” was a violation of WTO SPS standards (Europa Rapid Press Release 2010; World Trade Organization 2008). The WTO case put pressure on the European Commission to speed up approval of imported GMO products. Even Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has tasked the Commission to support legislation to allow GMOs as long as they do not present a health or safety risk and noting that science should dictate the decision, in accordance with the WTO's finding (European Commission 2010). It is important to note that the WTO's agreement on SPS has

become the basis for other trade agreements similar to the TTIP (Hansen-Kuhn and Suppan 2013).

Another legislative distinction between the US and EU is that the EU requires mandatory labeling of GMO foods. In the EU any product “produced from GMOs, meaning derived whole or in part, from GMOs, but not containing or consisting of GMOs” must be labeled (Official Journal of the European 2003). In the US there are no federal laws requiring labeling, yet 70% of products sold in grocery stores contain GMOs (Mistler 2014). At the state level only Connecticut, Maine and Vermont have successfully passed GMO labeling laws. However, Connecticut and Maine’s laws will not go into effect until other contiguous states adopt similar legislation. Twenty-two other states also attempted to pass labeling laws, but to no avail. US GMO and food producers utilizing GMOs believe that Europe’s mandatory GMO labeling serves as a barrier to trade.

The regulatory divergence between the US and EU can also be explained by differing public opinion and economic interests. European public opinion has been much more leery about biotechnology in agriculture. A 2010 Eurobarometer opinion poll demonstrated that 66% of Europeans in the EU27 are worried about having GMOs in their foods and drinks (Eurobarometer 2010). In 2006 a Pew Research poll found that 34% of Americans felt that GMOs were basically safe and only 29% felt they were unsafe (The Mellman Group Research Based Strategy 2006). However, a more recent public opinion poll regarding GMOs demonstrates that public attitudes may be shifting in the US. In a recent New York Times Poll conducted in January 2013, 75% of Americans were concerned about GMOs in their food (Kopicki 2013). In addition, the poll found that 93% of Americans felt that foods containing GMOs should be labeled (Kopicki 2013). This public opinion shift in the US is rather recent and has still not translated into policy, whereas in Europe earlier concerns over agricultural bio-technology helped shape the regulatory framework.

Another important difference between Europe and the US is the economic importance of GMOs in the US. The US is the world’s largest producer of corn and the second largest producer of soy (USDA 2013b; Index Mundi 2013); and in 2013 90% of all corn production and 93% of all soy production in the US were GM varieties (USDA 2013a). Some states are heavily dependent upon GMOs. For example, in South Dakota 79 percent of all corn and 95 percent of all soybeans are genetically-modified; in Mississippi, 97 percent of all cotton are GMO varieties; and in Hawaii, 50 percent of papayas are genetically modified (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, the US accounts for 63 percent of the global land area planted in biotechnology varieties (Pew Initiative on Food and

Biotechnology, 2007, p. 2). Since GMOs are such a large industry, inventors of GMOs selling proprietary seeds (such as Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta) have used their vast resources to also ensure that GMO regulatory structures do not change in the US. For instance, in California Monsanto and The Hershey Co. contributed \$44 million to a campaign to vote no to Prop 37, which would require GMO labeling. NGOs spearheading the yes vote were only able to raise \$7.3 million, and the proposition failed (Almendrala 2012).

In the EU, only BASF had created an agricultural GMO, the amflora potato. Even though the potato was one of the two GM crops approved for cultivation, BASF, due to political and popular resistance, moved its biotech headquarters to North Carolina (Deutsche Welle 2013). Thus, Europe does not have significant economic invested interests in GMOs. Although some countries such as Britain believe that GMOs could make European agriculture more competitive, the majority of EU member states are vehemently opposed.

Another major distinction between the US and EU affecting the likelihood of agreement has to do with government structures. In order for the EU to pass detailed regulatory legislation it must go through the comitology procedure. All GMO cases fall under this procedure and require the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to undertake a scientific risk assessment and then report to the Commission. The Commission then submits the report to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, Section on Genetically Modified Food and Feed and Environmental Risk that must either reject or accept a proposal with a 2/3 majority. If a 2/3 vote is not achieved, it then goes to the Council for a qualified majority vote. If a qualified majority is not met, then the Commission can take the final decision. In the case of GMOs, all cases have left the final decision to the Commission since it was impossible to get enough votes to pass or reject a GMO proposal (Contiero 2013). A sufficient number of votes within the Council have not been achieved for political reasons since member states need to count on one another’s support; thus some states are reluctant to vote in favor of an issue that other member states are vehemently opposed. One of the most recent examples of such a vote occurred in February 2014 with cultivation of Pioneer 1507, a GMO corn by Dow Chemicals. Pioneer 1507 was unable to achieve either a majority opposing or even a blocking minority – and at the time of this writing, it seems that the Commission is poised to approve Pioneer 1507 for cultivation (EurActiv 2014).

The structural and political dynamics regulating GMOs is very different in the US. Since there is no specific legislation regulating GMOs, the FDA, USDA and EPA act in the same way as EFSA, without having

to then have Congress approve a GMO product. On the other hand, in the EU the European Parliament, Council and Commission play a role approving regulations once EFSA gives its assessment. Moreover, the US utilizes the USDA, FDA or EPA to conduct risk assessment, communication and management depending on the type of GMO; whereas, the EU separates risk assessment from risk communication and management. In the EU EFSA conducts risk assessment and DG SANCO and member states are responsible for risk communication and management.

Another fundamental structural difference has to do with the regulatory culture in the US and EU. In the US we have seen a much greater practice of revolving door politics with members of regulatory agencies going to work in the industry and vice versa (Smith 2007).

There has been criticism of EFSA regarding revolving door concerns, but measures have been taken to ensure that this does not continue. EFSA announced new implementing rules that took effect in July 2012 related to Declarations of Interest (DOIs), one of the cornerstones of its recently adopted Policy on Independence and Scientific Decision-Making Processes. The DOIs rules are intended to ensure the independence of EFSA as well as provide more transparency of those working directly or indirectly for EFSA to avoid the revolving door.

Also, in May 2012 the European Parliament (EP) delayed approval of three agencies’ budgets for 2010, one of which was EFSA. MEPs were concerned over conflict of interests in EFSA. One of the most notable cases was Diana Banati, the head of EFSA’s board. Banati took a position with the International Life Sciences Institute, a powerful industry lobby group based in Washington DC that was seen as incompatible with serving in EFSA. As a result, EFSA requested her resignation and she complied. Also, as a result of the EP’s actions EFSA also changed members of its panel and management board (interview with Apoteker, 2013). Likewise, in 2012, reviewing up to 2011 the Court of Auditors also called for greater independence and transparency of EFSA. Thus, within the EU there are increased pressures against revolving door actions, whereas in the US there has been little government action or attention paid to the more pervasive revolving door activity regarding GMOs.

With the divergent evolution of GMO policy, public opinion and economic interests, and government structure is there any possibility for an agreement about GMOs in the TTIP? One useful comparison may be the recently agreed EU-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CETA). Canada is the fourth largest producer of GM products (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications 2012). The treaty has not yet

been ratified, but governments have come to an agreement in principle. Regarding GMOs, Canada and the EU have agreed to encourage “cooperation between regulators, to promote efficient science-based approval processes,” and the “EU’s commitment to ensure efficient processing of canola applications” (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2013). In essence, the CETA agreement does not go beyond the SPS rules of the WTO and does not fundamentally change the EU’s regulatory framework.

As the US and EU negotiate TTIP, each side is maintaining their long held beliefs. For instance, Commission President José Manuel Barroso stated the EU will not change its position on GMOs and that the European public supports the EU’s cautious approach (Politi & Chaffin, 2013). Similarly, former Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler noted, “It would be a mistake simply to use these free-trade negotiations to put pressure on the European side that they should agree to get rid of GMO restrictions...I think this will fail” (Politi & Chaffin, 2013). On the other hand, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Montana) and ranking member Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), in a letter to Ambassador Ron Kirk United States Trade Representative, state that “Broad bipartisan Congressional support for expanding trade with the EU depends, in large part, on lowering trade barriers for American agricultural products...including the EU’s restrictions on genetically engineered crops (Baucus and Hatch 2013).

Although the US in principle would like to see the EU change its regulations of GMOs, US representatives also know that this is highly unlikely. One outcome of the agreement may be greater cooperation between risk assessment agencies on both sides of the pond and the EU may try to speed up the timetable for processing GMO approvals. At the moment the Commission often does not even meet timetables the EU has set forth (DG Sanco 2013). In the US there has emerged greater grassroots pressures for changes in labeling of GMOs, but it still has not translated into policy. Thus, divergent practices regarding GMO regulation will most likely not change anytime soon and the TTIP will most likely not go beyond the WTO SPS standards.

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EU/Latin American Relations in a Changing International System

Kevin Parthenay

The European Union / Latin American relations have a great relevance in a context of post-economic crisis and in a changing international system.

EU/Latin American relations after the crisis

The EU/Latin American relations cover a large spectrum of cooperation (among others: education, social, trade, environmental) and the European Union is still one of the major contributors through external aid assistance in Latin America. The EU Regional programmes for Latin America were first launched in the early 1990's. Before, the European Community (EC) participated in the development of Latin American countries, either in matters of economic development or public administration consolidation. The EU has been very supportive – financially and technically – during the waves of democratization (O'Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead 1986). Some countries have nowadays reached advanced levels of development or have even become “emergent powers” while some others kept apart. Central America, for instance, is now paying the price of a belated States modernization. Up to date, the European Union has maintained its financial contribution to the Latin American countries, even unequally among countries.

Across the history of the EU/Latin America relation, the EU has often been promoter of many transformations due to implicit norm transfers – mainly through conditionality or organizational adaptation to the rules of the new public management. Since many years, the EU has been the main promoter for regional integration around the world and in Latin America. As promoter of regionalism, the EU has contributed to transform the decision-making processes with the emergence of a multi-level governance model (Dabène 2009). Many scholars have dedicated books and articles to understand the relation between the European Union and the Latin American regionalism. However, we currently face a deep transformation of regionalism dynamic. As some claim, regionalism might have reached its peak (Gardini, Malamud 2012). This question will be the heart of a research program developed in the Centre for International Researches and Studies (CERI) of Sciences Po in 2015. We claim that regionalism in Latin America is facing heavy transformations, as far as organizations, actors and policies are concerned.

Notwithstanding, heavily impacted by the economic

and financial crisis of 2008 and appearing politically more fragmented than ever, one could legitimately wonder if the EU can afford to continue to be a normative power in Latin America. In that respect, it is one of the major targets of European external cooperation towards Latin America that is put into question and need to be revised. Nevertheless, regionalism is currently at stake in Latin America and the European Union has yet to play a strategic role. Will be the EU able to export its model abroad?

It appears to be the major challenge the EU/AL relations are facing in a context of post-economic crisis. The European governments have been constrained to rationalize their cooperation and to be more accountable for it. In that perspective, many European countries have reduced their national aids towards Latin America. As a consequence, regionalism and sub-regional integration have become recently assets for a “rationalized” and economically constrained type of cooperation.

EU/Latin American relation in a changing international system

A new paradigm of EU/Latin America relations needs to be found. The context in which the EU/AL relations set is also important as a new cold war climate is emerging in the region. While some countries have recently tied closer relationships with Asia-Pacific, some others have increased their dependence with the United States. The United States and China are both increasing their respective influence in the sub-continent.

The international system is in a period of accelerated change that demands new ways of acting and the relation between the European Union and Latin American is not an exception (Freres, Sanahuja 2006). This reality has not yet spread all over the subcontinent. We do not refer to a fierce ideological polarization, considering for instance ALBA countries. What we understand as a cold war context is currently a new opposition between mighty powers that try to increase their respective influence in the continent. This is particularly true in Central America, an area where the United States and China are struggling to increase their respective influence. If there is no rupture of dialogue, the rivalry between the two external powers is more symbolic and lies on a battle of large-scale projects. The ideological and weapon-based opposition are been substituted by a trade battle. Whereas in the past decades the United States was seen as disengaged from the Latin American continent, this diagnostic would nowadays be mistaken. The recent initiative of the Vice-President Joe Biden to invest one billion of American aid to Central America echoes the massive investment of China in the region through the Nicaragua Canal. The last years, China has progressively increased its economic and political presence in the region. After the opening of diplomatic

relations with Costa Rica in 2007 and many presidential visits (Hu Jintao 2008, Xi Jinping 2013). Apart from political relations, some Chinese economic entrepreneurs – like the firm HKDN that will build the alternative Canal in Nicaragua – strengthen even more the presence of the Asiatic giant within the region and the continent. The United States will participate to the expansion of the Panama Canal and try to increase its influence through a new “Alliance of Prosperity Strategy” oriented toward the Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala). Meanwhile, the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) – close to the US government – promotes a project called “Atlantic Coast Road Connectivity” that will represent a road alternative to the new Nicaragua Canal. Here lies between the USA and China a “battle” of projects aiming at ensuring and consolidating their respective interests. The Central American isthmus has always been a geostrategic area and now crystalized the interest of mighty powers.

In that context, the European Union has a strategic role to play and a historical responsibility to endorse. The Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for Latin America 2014-2020 of the European External Action Service (EEAS) already took position on those grounds and issues. The MIP is structured by two main components: 1) a focus on initiatives to be carried out at continental level, 2) a support to Central America's efforts to addressing key developmental challenges. The European Union has always been an important trade partner – with many free trade agreements (Mexico 1997, Chile 2002, CARIFORUM 2008, Colombia and Peru 2012, Central America 2012) – and a close political ally (EU/LAC Summits and EU/CELAC since 2010), the relations between the EU and Latin America need to be more concrete on a political level. As the *Acuerdo de Asociación* (Central America / EU Agreement) underlined, a gap still exists between economic and trade interests and political cooperation.

In this new international system, Latin America will benefit a lot from a constructive political cooperation with the European Union, particularly with triangular cooperation formulas (Sanahuja 2014). As a global player in a gradual decline and in front of rising powers and rising Latin American countries, the European Union needs to think what should be its future role in the continent. The EU needs to reform its model of external aid characterized by a North-South dynamic as well as to seek for a new paradigm and a new stand and political partnership with the Latin American countries. The next Summit of the EU / Latin America and the Caribbean (UE/LAC) – that will take place in Brussels in 2015 – will have to deal with all those challenges.

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South Africa's Inconsistent Role in Bolstering EU-Africa Relations

John Kotsopoulos and Lorenzo Fioramonti

The status of the European Union in Africa is in flux. Limited for decades to a trade and aid relationship with the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, the politicisation and expansion of the relationship has triggered new challenges and questions. Thus, despite the establishment of an ambitious EU-Africa multilateral partnership, as well as the continuation of the EU-ACP accords, the perception is that the EU and the Global North's influence on the continent is on the wane (Fioramonti, 2012). This view is partly derived from the EU's own policy inconsistencies on the continent, but also because of burgeoning links between an increasingly self-confident Africa and other countries from the growing Global South such as Brazil, China and India (Keukeleire & Hooijmaaijers, 2014). To underline this, the United Nations estimates that the joint GDP of China, India and Brazil will surpass the combined GDP of the USA, UK, France, Canada, Germany and Italy by 2020 (UNDP, 2013).

South Africa holds a crucial position for the EU with respect to the latter's relationship with the continent. After all, South Africa in many ways symbolises the aspirations of the new Africa, with membership in prominent associations of the Global South (e.g. BRICS, IBSA) as well as elite North-South clubs like the G20 and the G7+5. It is this unique proximity to North and to South, and of course Sub-Saharan Africa's second largest (but most advanced) economy, which ensures South Africa's continued geo-political and strategic influence.

Much has been said about EU-Africa relations and EU-South Africa relations, but much less so about the trilateral relationship between Africa, the EU and South Africa. This short article focuses on this trilateral dimension, arguing that South Africa as a North-South gateway serves as a lynchpin for healthy EU-Africa relations, particularly because of synergies with the EU in the areas of peace and security, development and norms surrounding governance and the rule of law. However, South Africa's increasing orientation towards the Global South, leadership level indifference towards the EU, fearfulness of being characterised as a proxy for the Global North, as well as sometimes

testy relationship with other African countries, are reminders of the impediments to be surmounted in the quest for healthy multilateral relationships.

South Africa and EU-Africa inter-regional relations

South Africa enjoys both direct and indirect influence on EU-Africa relations. Direct influence manifests itself in contributions to the architecture of EU-Africa interregional relations, including leadership within the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), a prominent voice at the Africa-EU high level meetings, and with respect to relations between the EU and sub-regional organisations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Indirect influence stems from the role of South Africa in supporting African regional institutions, notably the AU, through which EU-Africa relations are conducted.

South Africa's direct contribution to the JAES has been notable. Of the eight thematic "partnerships" which served as implementing tools of the JAES until 2014, South Africa participated in six, easily the most of any Sub-Saharan country (Tywuschik & Sherriff, 2009). Similarly it was the only Sub-Saharan African country to co-chair (with an EU member state) a partnership, the Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Partnership.

Further direct influence comes through the institutionalised process of cooperation between South Africa and the EU. The TDCA, Joint Country Strategy Paper and regular high level meetings and summits allow for discussion on points of convergence. One of the most notable is the area of peace and security, where a commitment was made to "provide joint leadership to prevent and resolve conflicts" (Council of the EU 2012). Target areas included Somalia, the Sahel and Zimbabwe. South Africa's comprehensive approach to security on the continent and its drive behind the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has also been targeted by the EU for funding support. Similarly, President Zuma has spearheaded the African Standby Force (ASF) and its temporary precursor, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The ASF is another target for EU funding.

Beyond peace and security in Africa, the two partners also enjoy convergence on issues of continental importance such as human rights, good governance and poverty reduction (Masters, 2014, p. 6). In the field of science and technology, an area highlighted by the Zuma administration as one of particular importance for innovation in poverty alleviation (Zuma, 2012), South Africa is playing a coordinating and facilitating role for the African-European Radio Astronomy Platform (AEREP). The purpose of the Platform is to further fund and promote partnerships in the field of

astronomy with the purpose of socioeconomic growth (European Parliament, 2011).

Some of South Africa's indirect influence on EU-Africa relations comes from the weight accorded to its views by the EU. Opinions expressed from the President's Office and DIRCO about unfolding events elsewhere in Africa and around the world are explicitly sought out and registered by EU diplomats in Pretoria (EU official 2 interview).

Yet heightened expectations of South Africa – the EU's only official strategic partner in Africa outside of the AU – have also been problematic. South African foreign policy, particularly under the Zuma presidency, has been perceived by the EU as contradictory. The case of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender peoples (LGBT) was cited by an EU diplomat as an example of contradictions in South African foreign policy serving no one: neither providing leadership in Africa nor strengthening cooperation with other partners like the EU (Interview EU official 2). In 2011 South Africa co-sponsored a UN resolution on LGBT rights but subsequently stepped away from it as African countries such as Uganda and Nigeria enacted strict anti-LGBT legislation. While ultimately voting in favour of the LGBT rights resolution South Africa was accused of watering down the document (Feder, 2014).

Africa-Europe relations have also been indirectly influenced by the ambiguities in South Africa's voting behaviour during the country's two recent tenures on the UN Security Council (2007-08 and 2011-12). There had been a demonstrable turn towards prioritising relations with emerging powers, resulting in a voting pattern more reflective of Chinese, Russian and "like minded" group interests than European (Interview EU official 2). Some argue that South Africa had undermined its position as leading voice of Africa in international fora, with its contrarian stances at the UN Security Council on issues such as sanctions on Iran, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and the condemnation of rape as a political and military weapon (Habib, 2011). In its own backyard, South Africa has been accused of using the weaker diplomatic mechanisms of the SADC as a means through which to avoid more explicit condemnation of regional problems, such as electoral irregularities in Zimbabwe (Alden and Le Pere 2009: p290).

South Africa, the AU and EU members (under the auspices of NATO) also found themselves at odds over the Libyan conflict in 2011. President Zuma and the African Union advocated a softer diplomatic stance towards President Muammar Gaddafi, arguing that he be given time to go into exile. Western powers either deemed the AU's response too slow or inadequate and ultimately did not heed its recommendations, pro-

ceeding with an aerial bombardment which ultimately facilitated the toppling and death of Libya's long time ruler. This indifference to "African Solutions for African Problems" remains a point of contention, with Zuma emphatic in his criticism that "[Africa was] completely ignored in favour of bombing Libya by NATO forces". The failure of the EU and Africa to better coordinate their response to the Libyan crisis, despite possessing mechanisms to do so through the JAES, has been characterised as "organised inaction" and indicative of the distance that remains between Europe and Africa regarding conflict intervention (Brosig, 2013).

There is also a prickliness with which South Africa responds to any assumptions -- both within Africa and from Europe -- that it is simply a proxy for the interests of the global North. The Zuma and Mbeki administrations both bridled at EU criticism of, for example, Zimbabwe. Zuma demonstrated his willingness to champion African solidarity over EU-Africa relations by explicitly boycotting the 2014 Africa-EU Summit because President Mugabe's wife had not been granted a visa to enter Europe. This was also indicative of his lack of interest in the EU. Similarly, South Africa has bucked its own constitutional and domestic policies – policies such as toleration of sexual orientation such as the LGBT issue outlined above – in order to maintain continent-wide harmony.

Conclusion

No country can claim to conduct perfectly consistent foreign policy. Endogenous and exogenous variables assure that policies change over time. Since the end of apartheid South Africa has endeavoured to find its footing both within Africa and the world. It has been characterised as either a regional hegemon or a pivotal state – an acknowledgement of its regional power. It has attempted to tread softly in pan-African affairs, mindful of both its historical burden and also the resentment which hegemonic power can illicit. At the same time South Africa has been perceived as privileging its own interests when necessary, particularly in the field of trade.

The duality of South Africa's approach has been no different in terms of its role in interregional relationships: it straddles South-South and North-South lines, maintaining an outward policy of solidarity with the developing world (Habib, 2009, p. 151) and augmenting its relations with emerging countries through BRICS and IBSA, while also maintaining trade and political ties with its largest trade partner the EU. This North-South-South approach is tinged with pragmatism since, as a South African parliamentary committee concluded, "although the country's long-term future lay with the Third World, 'there are certain realities we dare not ignore'." (Barber, 2005, p. 1083).

Ultimately, South Africa plays an influential role in African regionalism even if it can sometimes be deemed "hegemony on a shoestring" (Alden and Le Pere 2009, p 166). An expectations-capability gap is evident. Likewise for EU-Africa interregional relations, expectation is high in the EU for South African leadership which, though often forthcoming, has also been criticised as reactive. Nevertheless, South Africa will continue to be the EU's focal point since political and economic ties between them are deeper for the EU than with any other Sub-Saharan state. However, it is also clear that Africa trumps Europe in the estimation of the Office of the President, meaning that EU diplomacy will continue to navigate the need to engage South Africa on the continent without jeopardising its perceived independence and Global South credentials.

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Finance, Labor, and the Eurozone's Winner-Take-All Economy: Some Reflections on Law and Regulation in Eurozone Crisis

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The Eurozone in crisis has come to embody a new and notably pathological variant of "winner-take-all" politics. Our reading of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson's work on the increasingly extreme concentration of wealth and income at the very top of American society leads us to identify two broad areas where the foundations of the winner-take-all economy can be found: finance and labor relations, along with their related domains of law and regulation. (Hacker and Paul Pierson, 2010) The shifting power relations triggered by the rise of finance and financialization, on the one hand, and the weakening and erosion of unions and organized labor relations, on the other, were the structural drivers of the winner-take-all economy in the United States. These dynamics are now increasingly evident throughout much of the Eurozone. Together, they have produced a fundamental re-allocation of political economic power even more rapidly and dramatically than in the U.S., one that threatens to lock in place dynamics driving increasing inequality.

Leading politicians and policy makers at the national and EU levels have overwhelmingly rejected the possibility of national exit from or total abandonment of the Euro, as well as the fundamental reform of Eurozone monetary and fiscal policy capacities to allow for EU-wide stimulus spending. With these structural features of the Eurozone effectively locked in, thus precluding either recovery through stimulated growth or currency devaluation, "internal devaluation" through contractionary fiscal and wage policies were the only alternative left the peripheral countries. (Arestis and Sawyer, 2014) Ironically, and perhaps perversely, the severe and protracted financial crisis in the Eurozone has served to strengthen and entrench financial sector interests and their political allies, while weakening those of labor. Likewise, the crisis in the EU has further empowered the wealthier core countries, and above all Germany, vis-à-vis the substantially poorer and less competitive periphery.

The global financial crisis (initially an American export) triggered an initial banking crisis that spread to sovereigns faced with potentially massive bank bailout costs, which then reinforced a second-order and

deeper banking crisis as banks were threatened with huge losses on sovereign bond holdings. Stabilization and preservation of the European financial system, and the national banking systems that comprise it, have been the primary imperative of all political and policy responses to the crisis. (Summit of the euro area countries, 2008; European Commission, 2008) Labor law reforms lagged the bailout of peripheral state finances and the rescue of large, overleveraged financial institutions whose solvency was threatened by the possibility of sovereign debt defaults. Labor market liberalization and the weakening of unions came as a still later phase of the broader and longer-term EU project of reforming the governance, law, and governments of the Eurozone in response to the protracted debt crisis. The two areas of policy are inextricably linked in that labor and employment law reform was viewed—at least by many Spanish elites and their allies within the Troika—as essential for longer-term, ongoing adjustment that would fuel corporate profits and enable debt repayments that would channel resources back into the banking system. The sovereign debt and bank bailouts form one part of an economic and policy loop; labor market and employment law reforms closed that loop in order to facilitate the flow of capital for the benefit of banks and banking systems in parlous condition.

The very different and often divergent uses—and abuses—of law by EU and Spanish authorities in the domains of banking and labor relations policy, respectively, reflect this new winner-take-all politics, along with its winners and losers. In the domain of banking and finance, existing regulatory provisions have been consistently relaxed, unenforced, or eliminated with the effect of obscuring the dire state of too-big-to-fail financial institutions. (See, e.g., Bischof, Bruggemann, and Daske, 2010) Regulatory forbearance by banking and securities regulators at the member-state and EU levels, including the exercise of European Central Bank (ECB) banking oversight, protected banks and the banking system as a whole from destabilizing disclosures and allowed temporizing "extend and pretend" strategies to avoid the realization of losses and immediate threats of insolvency. (Bloomberg, 2011; Fleming and Barker, 2013) The ECB has ventured to the edge of its legal mandate under European treaties in conducting financial operations to shore up teetering sovereign finances and banking systems, and in September 2012 arguably went well beyond it in vowing to engage in "outright monetary transactions" (OMT) involving acquisition of sovereign bonds in order to preserve the Euro. (See Draghi, 2012; compare Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2014 (German Federal Constitutional Court decision attacking legality of OMT

as announced))

In the field of labor relations, by contrast, state power has been mobilized to radically reform employment and labor market regulation through formal legal change. Here, we see far-reaching revision of long-established legal arrangements to impose liberalization on labor markets long characterized by organized labor relations and widespread collective bargaining. (Bentolila, 2013; Secretaría de Acción Sindical de CC.OO, 2014; Secretaría de Acción Sindical – UGT, 2014) At the same time, here too we see regulatory forbearance, as authorities overlook employer abuses and limit reporting data that would make evident the full redistributive consequences of the legal changes pursued. The role of law in the Eurozone crisis illuminates the contradictory and disturbing state of legalism and the rule of law in the constitution of the emerging winner-take-all EU political economic order.

Examination of banking and labor relations policies reveals the extent to which the Eurozone crisis has transformed the political and juridical character of Eurozone governance. Looking not only at the substance of policies adopted at the EU and national levels in response to the crisis, but also the form different policies have taken (i.e., whether policies have been implemented through formal legal means, or through the circumvention or suspension of formal legal rules), law and legal change serves as: (1) evidence of which economic and political constituencies are winning and losing battles over policy and power, (2) evidence of the increasing centralization and discretionary character of power and authority in Eurozone governance, and (3) constitutive of a new and still emerging political economic order in Europe at both the EU and national levels with pronounced winner-take-all characteristics.

Both the bailout policies restructuring the Eurozone financial system and national-level labor market liberalization fit together at the intersection of two political logics at two levels of analysis. The first logic is the bailout of sovereign debtors and the cycling of resources back into the major banks of the core EU countries through debt repayment/refinancing. This is largely, if not entirely, an EU-level process, and the legal reforms are consistent with the logic of that financial architecture even as the role of the ECB in this process strain—or arguably overstepped—the legal bounds of its mandate. The second logic is that of partisan politics at the national level in which conservative parties and anti-labor constituencies have taken advantage of the crisis and the political disarray it has caused to ram through fundamental changes in the structure and substance of labor law to permanently weaken organized labor and thereby erode a key historical constituency of the center-left/left electoral

base. As expected, we see labor reforms that jointly satisfy the political and policy imperatives at both levels; but the first logic of the bailout of core country banks and financial restructuring is primary, with labor reforms subordinate to the priorities (and political economic power of the core countries) of maintaining the stability and liberal market character of Eurozone finance.

The differential treatment of domestic labor relations and Eurozone financial markets fits within a unified and coherent, if grim, political economic logic. On the financial side, regulatory forbearance and relaxation, particularly with respect to accounting and disclosure rules, combined with quasi-fiscal monetary support for banks prevented not only sovereign defaults, but also the collapse of the European banking system and thus of the Euro. However, propping up the banking system largely preserved the status quo ante and both confirmed and entrenched the privileged position of finance within the Eurozone. In the absence of EU-wide fiscal stimulus, the ECB was able to stabilize the financial system (for the moment), but not cure its underlying disease of bad debt and downwardly spiraling demand. Internal devaluation remained the only available means of economic adjustment—even though this entailed deflation and collapsing employment, wages, and living standards across the fiscally troubled peripheral debtor states.

Labor law reform in Spain advanced EU-imposed austerity at the member state level, in the service of preserving the Euro, the banking system, and the vast, regressive risk and loss shifting project of internal devaluation. Labor relations and employment law reform facilitated internal devaluation by diminishing legal obstacles and costs associated with slashing wages and jobs. This legal attack on organized labor and increasingly disorganized workers took place within a policy space in which the political interests of Spain's conservative PP overlapped with the economic interests of the EU political and financial elites. (Díez, 19 July 2013, 12 June 2013) The politics and policy ushered in by the crisis have disproportionately shifted economic risk and the costs of adjustment away from finance capital and firms, and onto workers and households.

The constellation of austerity, bank bailouts (even if disguised as sovereign debt rescues), and neo-liberal labor relations reforms has corroded both the idealistic vision of a "Social Europe" and, ironically, the financial integration of the Eurozone, giving way to the repatriation of capital and the reconcentration of debt at the national level. (Acharya and Steffen, 2014) Most, and soon perhaps all, of the Continent is economically decaying in an interminable grinding depression. Under these dire economic conditions, the term "winner-

take-all" may be inapposite. It is increasingly likely that there will be no winners. Before us lies the prospect of nothing but losers distinguished only by the extent to which they bear the costs of austerity, the fundamental structural flaws of the Euro, and the increasingly neo-liberal character of governance within the ever-closer union of the EU.

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EUSA EU Law Interest Section Essay

Lessons from the EU Judicial System

Tilman Krüger & Susanne K. Schmidt

The EU's judicial system remains largely without parallels outside of Europe, due mainly to the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that has, in its role as independent third party, made agreements among EU member states increasingly binding. The ECJ has also repeatedly advanced European law and integration through its interpretations: starting with establishing direct effect and the supremacy of EU law in the early 1960s up until more recent case law easing the access of EU citizens to national welfare state systems. The broad literature on the ECJ agrees on the institutional mechanisms that have allowed the Court to play such a proactive integrative role (Stone Sweet 2010): first, the Commission can initiate infringement procedures against member states, which can lead to fines for non-compliance. Second, the preliminary ruling procedure, through which national courts can refer questions on the interpretation of EU law to the ECJ, grants EU citizens indirect access to the ECJ to actively claim individual rights. Both of these mechanisms have ensured a sufficiently large caseload for the ECJ to incrementally develop its case law. Also, ignoring the ECJ's rulings is not an option for EU member states as domestic courts implement the requirements of EU law in their rulings. At the same time, member states can hardly refute the development of case law collectively. The treaty, on which much of the case law relies, can only be changed unanimously; the joint-decision trap protects the Court (Scharpf 2006).

Beyond its borders, the U.S. does generally not need to worry about potential or actual judicial activism in the international arena. Even though it contains dispute settlement provisions, ad hoc arbitration in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) falls short of creating a densely institutionalized legal system. Yet, there is also the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was equipped with a significantly stronger dispute-settlement system than that of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Most importantly, WTO panels and the Appellate Body (AB) de facto enjoy compulsory jurisdiction; WTO member states need a consensus decision to block the activation of dispute settlement procedures and the adoption of panel and AB reports. The strength of, in particular, the permanent AB is mitigated by the fact

that access to WTO dispute resolution is restricted to member states; as a result, the caseload of the AB remains low, which severely limits its scope for case law development.

Notwithstanding the lack of private access to WTO judicial decision-making, there are strong indications that one can observe parallels to the EU (Krüger 2013). Most significantly, institutional decisions that lack sufficient support in the WTO's negotiation forums are incrementally changed or established through judicial decisions also in the WTO. One striking example is the AB's interpretation of Art. XIX GATT in relation to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which concern member state measures (temporary restrictions of imports) to protect domestic industries from sudden increases in imports that are causing, or threatening to cause, serious injury to the industry. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the U.S. and the EU disagreed over whether a WTO-compatible recourse to safeguards would require a member to provide evidence that the increases in imports were "unforeseen developments". Although included in the GATT provision, the U.S., historically a frequent user of safeguard measures, argued against the inclusion of an unforeseen developments-clause in the safeguards agreement. The EU ultimately agreed to this position, but it did so only in light of the U.S.' threat to walk out on any agreement. Shortly after the adoption of the Uruguay Round, the EU then initiated dispute settlement proceedings against economically irrelevant Korean and Argentinean safeguard measures. While the panels in both disputes relied on the more lenient language of the safeguards agreement, the AB took a different stance: observing a hierarchy between the GATT and the safeguards agreement, it insisted on the importance of unforeseen developments as a threshold for a legal adoption of safeguard measures. Following this case law, the U.S. has found it more difficult to legally apply safeguards measures; at the same time, the EU could achieve through dispute settlement what it could not achieve in negotiations.

Another example concerns the status of precedent in WTO case law, which was traditionally viewed as taking effect inter partes only. While it has been common practice for panels and the AB to refer to earlier judicial reports throughout the WTO's existence, the AB changed this understanding significantly in 2008: after a series of partly conflicting panel reports on "zeroing", a calculation method in the area of antidumping measures, the AB finally demanded from panels to follow AB jurisprudence on similar issues; the AB thus created a legal hierarchy between itself and the panels. The EU had argued in the same direction and welcomed the AB's explicit endorsement of precedent and promotion of a more integrated judicial system in

the WTO. The findings served its case-specific and systemic interests: referring to the former, the EU aimed at eliminating the use of zeroing in the WTO altogether, which is not explicitly addressed in the WTO's covered agreements, after it had itself lost in a dispute against India. Systemically, the EU has been a long-term advocate of a stronger system of precedent in the WTO, which it views as strengthening the WTO's rules-based character. The U.S., on the other hand, lost not only in terms of its material interests ("zeroing") but, as a supporter of a less thoroughly judicialized and a more member-state driven WTO, also on a very important systemic issue.

At least for now, the EU appears more capable than the U.S. to push the development of case law through strategic litigation behavior in the WTO, and to realize political aims that cannot be achieved in negotiations. In exploiting the judicial avenues offered by the WTO, the EU's trade agent, the European Commission, seems much better positioned than the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Compared to the latter, which is tightly controlled by U.S. Congress, the Commission enjoys greater autonomy from principal control in WTO dispute settlement matters. As Krüger can show, this has allowed the Commission to successfully draw and transfer lessons from the role of judicial interpretation and innovation from the EU to the WTO level. The case law resulting from these litigation activities conforms more closely to the EU's preferences than with those of the U.S. It appears, then, that the U.S. still needs to draw important lessons on judicial integration dynamics beyond the nation state.

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Book Reviews

Sternberg, Claudia Schrag. *The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950-2005*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

In its aim of charting the struggle for European Union (EU) legitimacy over a fifty-five year time period, Claudia Schrag Sternberg's book focuses neither on assessing the level of legitimacy in EU politics, nor on analyzing the criteria of legitimacy from a normative perspective – both of which require an initial idea of what constitutes legitimacy in the first place. Rather, she hones in on a lesser-studied and more intangible aspect of legitimacy: what historical discourse suggests it actually means in the context of EU integration. In exploring how Europe's political leaders attempted to influence and connect with public debates in the member states over the value and purpose of integration, as well as what form it should take, she asks questions concerning how the EU was portrayed and what specific meaning legitimacy came to hold in different discourses, how competing discourses grew and took hold, and why some discourses became dominant whereas others resonated less well. Given the Euro crisis of recent years, which she states "has shaken both the EU and its claims to legitimacy to their foundations," (p. 1), along with increasing Euroscepticism and – perhaps worse – levels of public indifference and ambivalence toward the EU documented by such authors as Virginie Van Ingelgom, this comprehensive investigation into the constructed meaning of legitimacy within the EU represents an important and novel contribution to the literature.

Sternberg uses the method of interpretive textual analysis to examine patterns and changes over time in the discourses of the EU's political elites and institutions, and undertakes targeted case studies of how those official discourses were interpreted and deliberated during national public debates in France and Germany involving the controversial negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty from 1991-1993, and the failed Constitutional treaty in early 2005. She relies on an impressive array of sources, including official reports and statements, treaty preambles, political speeches, and newspaper articles, to identify and analyze key themes and positions across a variety of discourses that shape the dynamics by which the meaning of legitimacy is created and recreated over time. Yet the fact that the analyzed documents have been selectively considered as representative leads one to wonder what decision making criteria Sternberg used to determine a key discursive theme (e.g.,

how often must it have recurred? Across how many sources?). The overall approach, however, appears systematic and rigorous, and relies on an iterative process of cross-textual analysis.

All in all, three interrelated tensions permeate the book's chapters: (1) the balance between the forces of politicization versus de-politicization of EU integration and its implications, (2) the interplay of input- versus output-based claims to legitimacy (based on the seminal work by Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe*), and (3) the dilemma over bringing the people in versus keeping them out of the integration process. In highlighting the contested nature of integration from the very inception of the EU, Sternberg adeptly challenges the notion that a "permissive consensus" ever dominated the integration project.

The book begins with an examination of the narratives and arguments used to legitimate integration in its early years (from the 1950s-1970s), with a particular emphasis on the view of integration as uncontroversial and uncontested, as reflected in early discourses. Highlighting the emphasis on safeguarding peace and improving the prosperity of European citizens, Sternberg analyzes several discursive patterns throughout the chapter whose common effect was to depoliticize the stakes of integration and lend credence to the notion of a popular permissive consensus toward it. However, she reminds us that these depoliticization tendencies did not go unchallenged. Chapter 2 examines the dominant counter-discourses that criticized the European project and sought to underscore its inherently political nature. It emphasizes the narratives of democracy as a condition of legitimacy, intergovernmentalism as an alternative to the supranational system of governance, and critiques of the Communities' ability to deliver on promises of prosperity in light of the economic and financial crises of the 1970s. Chapters 4 and 6 turn to the national level in considering the French and German debates on the Maastricht Treaty and European Constitution, which Sternberg analyzes with remarkable detail. Given widespread public indifference toward EU politics, though, one wonders which subsections of the public the views and positions expressed in the national newspapers best represent. Nevertheless, the public debates in these two countries underscore important national differences in the understanding of EU legitimacy and the implications of greater democratic accountability. In defining and articulating these differences at these two important moments, Sternberg highlights the failure of the EU to relate its renewed efforts at becoming more democratic to popular discourses and nationally-rooted conceptions of legitimacy.

In the end, Sternberg concludes that the struggle for legitimacy is a problem that will forever challenge

the EU. What legitimacy it manages to achieve, she argues, is inherently tenuous because EU politics is, at its very nature, controversial. Claims to legitimacy are relative and contextual, and continuously change over time as they are contested. Overall, this places the “crisis of legitimacy” that has plagued the EU into a much broader and deeper context. Because of the dynamics of contestation surrounding it, Sternberg convincingly argues that the problem of EU legitimacy is likely to remain a perennial one. Paradoxically, the EU has decreased its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens by stressing harmony. At the same time, she argues that the EU can strengthen its legitimacy by deemphasizing the more traditional discourses focused on a “common European good” and the convergence of interests while more fully acknowledging the contested and divisive nature of EU politics.

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Telò, Mario and Ponjaert, Frederik (eds). *The EU's Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?* Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.

In his preface to this very timely and insightful volume, Pierre Vimont, one of the top officials in the new European diplomatic service, rightly points out that reforms (both institutional and political) in the area of the EU's foreign policy are one of the most important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. These changes which are crucial for the standing of Europe in the world have nonetheless been rather overshadowed by the woes of the European financial and debt crises both within academia and the public. With the economic situation improving and the crisis in Ukraine evolving, the public attention may perhaps be alerted again. Yet in terms of academic output, with the exception of various more narrowly focused studies, there is a lack of thorough analyses on the subject. The volume edited by two Belgium-based academics, Mario Telò and Frederik Ponjaert, fills this gap in literature on the external role of the EU after the Lisbon and is thus a very much welcomed and needed contribution.

The book is divided into three parts with each part looking at the EU's foreign policy-making from a different angle: Part I examines broader systemic implications for the EU as developing in a nascent multipolar world, Part II explores the most recent institutional changes and what opportunities as well as challenges the new institutional set-up may have brought about and, lastly, Part III investigates both various kinds of tools in the EU's foreign policy toolbox (i.e. strategic partnerships, neighborhood policy and “inter-regionalism”) as well as the EU's relations with selected third

countries (i.e. China, Japan and India). In a way, the book may have benefitted from a clearer structuring by splitting up the last part into two – one focusing on general EU's policies vis-à-vis its partners and the other outlining the three case studies. In any case, Telò and Ponjaert did a great job in assembling authors not just from within the EU, but also bringing non-European authors on board. The chapters by Zhimin (on EU-China relations), Nakamura (on EU-Japan relations) and Bava (on EU-India relations) are particularly revealing, bringing home the fact that the EU still has a long way to go if it wants to be considered a coherent foreign policy and security power by its allies as well as rivals in the globalized world.

From the theoretical point of view, the book convincingly combines scholarship in the field of European studies with International Relations perspectives. Given the fact that despite their proximity these two disciplines rather stay away from one another, Telò's and Ponjaert's effort to bring together these two approaches is another highly valuable strength of the book. Similarly, although the volume is primarily aimed at an academic audience and advanced undergraduate and graduate students, practitioners would certainly also enjoy reading some of the more policy-oriented chapters. For instance, Christian Lequesne's chapter which examines the evolution and setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) uses a mixture of an institutionalist approach with a foreign policy analysis, while policy-makers would be well-advised to read Jolyon Howorth's chapter which argues in favor of a gradual but progressive political and institutional merger between CSDP and NATO. In addition to this controversial policy recommendation, and with the unfolding conflict in Ukraine in mind, Howorth's second proposal for NATO to re-focus back on Europe, including its “hinterland”, is rather prescient.

Although the volume is a highly recommended read for all those who are interested in recent developments in EU foreign policy, its inevitable weakness is in a sense the fact that the authors are seeking to describe and explain a moving target. Since the book's publication (Fall 2013), the EEAS has undergone a review process which may have not produced any immediate changes but does shape internal dynamics both within the EEAS and in relation to EU Member States and the Commission. Moreover, the EU's (and the world's) foreign policy has been facing new challenges (in Syria, Egypt, Mali, Crimea, etc.), while the EU foreign policy machinery experienced full or partial successes, including in Kosovo-Serbia and nuclear negotiations with Iran. None of these events made it, and could have made it, to the book due to its publication date which is evidence that foreign policy is indeed one of the fastest developing areas out of all

EU policies. Perhaps we can hope and look forward to that one of the upcoming volumes in the same Globalisation, Europe and Multilateralism (GEM) series will provide us with updated views and will in fact answer the questions from this volume's subtitle: “what kind of power [is the EU]?” and “What diplomatic action [does the it take]?”

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Mattelaer, A. *The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations : Planning, Friction, Strategy.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Hiding behind this bulky title is a valuable and detailed analysis of the planning process of three European-led military operations planned in coordination with the United Nations or NATO in three different crisis areas: Chad, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Despite its broader focus on European military involvement, the findings of the book are significant for EU studies. Since the establishment of the EU's Common Defense and Security Policy in 2003, little is known about its 28 military operations. Mattelaer fills this important gap with many expert interviews with military as well as political personnel and a focused examination of NATO and European collaboration in Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, and European and EU engagement in Chad. While all three cases examined in the book provide an excellent qualitative analysis of the challenges of civilian and military planning in Europe and beyond, this review focuses on the EUFOR operation in eastern Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic. The analysis of EUFOR holds the most significant insights for what we know about the EU's CDSP military operations and its ramification for the EU's role as a global actor.

Throughout his book, Mattelaer's argues that the design of military operations is shaped by the friction between intergovernmental decision making and military planning. As he notes, this is not a new argument. Already Huntington's seminal work on “The Soldier and the State” in 1957 emphasized the complex relationship between the military and civilian spheres and the frictions between them. According to Mattelaer, his

findings seem to suggest that this friction is an essential characteristic of the EU's military operations, with debilitating consequences. He describes in much detail the clash between political decision-making on the one hand and military planning on the other as something “typically European” in the EU's CDSP, NATO as well as European engagement with UN mandate (p. 2). The EUFOR operation exemplifies the inherent “mismatch in expectations” (p. 43) between the EU institutions in Brussels and the Operation Headquarters within the planning phase of CDSP military operations. While he lays out several factors that lead to the limited success of EUFOR, the lack of a common EU political interest in the operation resulted in a ‘fire and forget’ mentality (p. 71) that compromised long term military planning and success significantly. EUFOR was initiated by France and its operation gained little support by other member states like Germany or the United Kingdom. As a result, operation planning and consequently its implementation remained scattered and lacked a long term vision or common definition of objectives and contingent structure on the ground preferred by military personnel. And here lays the main take away of Mattelaer's book for the practicality of CDSP operations: the degree of friction between political and military decision making is higher within the EU than in traditional planning of military operations because of the significant threshold for common ground between the EU member states. Taking this conclusion a step further, the CDSP's military operations suffer from the inherent challenge of European integration itself, namely the time and political costly process of decision making regardless of the region, timing or political will behind the operations.

Unfortunately, Mattelaer's significant argument that friction between civilian actors and political decision making and military actors and implementation of the operation hinders the CDSP's overall outcome, is too often buried under bulky ‘military speak’. To his defense, military personnel – Mattelaer is a graduate of the Belgian Royal Military Academy – would enjoy reading the accurate rendition of military defense concepts. But the non-specialist reader struggles to follow the findings of the case study and the book could have benefited from more accessible language. The balancing act between military, policy makers and academic audience is challenging and does not always yield successful outcomes. Exploring this contribution further would go beyond the purpose of this review but it is maybe exactly this inherent friction laid out in the book that makes a strong argument for the EU being by nature a more capable civilian than military actor.

Overall Mattelaer wrote a very informative and important book that enriches the current debate on the nature of the EU's CSDP operations with many details

about EUFOR's planning and operation. Future scholars will be able to draw from this study to examine other CDSP military operations and confirm the findings of *The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations : Planning, Friction, Strategy*. This study is highly recommended for experts in EU defense and military policy as well as scholars who wish to understand the internal functioning and decision-making of the EU and its ramification for CSDP operations.

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Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel. *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012.

A Europe Made of Money. The Emergence of the European Monetary System is one of a dozen or so books that have been published recently by Cornell University Press in the excellent Cornell Series in Money that Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner started a few years ago. This book is likely to make some waves, not only in the specific field of European Studies but also in the wider community of International Political Economy scholars.

This book represents the work that Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol did to obtain his doctoral degree at the European University Institute in Florence in the Department of History and Civilisation. It is based on a very wide range of archival material that was collected from eighteen archives in six countries (p. 6).

One might wonder if another book on European monetary integration was really necessary. After all, there are excellent books out there that spell out this very process. Yet most of them focus predominantly on the period that led to the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at Maastricht (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Those that do include an analysis of the earlier period as part of the study of the whole monetary integration process, typically do not involve major archival work and instead draw on interviews with key observers and secondary sources and/or personal experiences (see Dyson 1994; Ungerer 1997; McNamara 1998; Szász 1999; Verdun 2000).

A Europe Made of Money, however, is much more similar in focus to a much smaller number of books that focus much more specifically on the early monetary integration period, concentrating in particular on the European Monetary System (EMS) set up in 1979 (Ludlow 1977; Kruse 1980). In fact, as we read through *A Europe Made of Money*, it is clear that there is definitely a space for yet one more book broadly

on this topic, if only because this author had access to archives – which authors writing in the immediate aftermath did not.

The book commences by stating what we know about monetary cooperation in Europe: European integration had started off well but within the context of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. By the early 1970s it had a respectable achievement (especially in the area of the customs union and agriculture). The change in the world economy in the area of currency fluctuations was bound to wreck havoc with this newly achieved European integration process. But achieving cooperation in the area of monetary policy was going to be far from easy. Yet, Mourlon-Druol argues, the conventional story goes that “the EMS suddenly appeared and was intensely but swiftly negotiated.” (p. 4). He states that there is some truth in that story but that for a fuller picture one needs to focus on “the wider trends in European monetary cooperation” (p. 4). Mourlon-Druol's book seeks to offer insights into how various earlier attempts at European monetary integration played an important role in the EMS's creation. In his words, it needs an “interweaving of transnational, intergovernmental, and supranational dimensions as well as the interaction among economic, political, political-psychological, and technical dimensions.”(p. 4), leading him to the central question of his study: “how was a European consensus built regarding European monetary cooperation in a world of floating currencies?”(p. 6).

The book seeks to understand the different types of paths that could have been taken to achieve monetary cooperation in the European Economic Community (EEC) at the time. Indeed, there could have been a myriad of possible ways to cooperate and numerous visions of how to move forward, given that the Werner Plan to create an Economic and Monetary Union in the EEC had failed, the snake had mixed results, and there were various visions (‘economists’ and ‘monetarists’) of how to move forward in the area of economic and monetary integration. In terms of its theoretical contribution, this book offers an eclectic approach, and in that way is similar in analysis to Verdun (2000) and Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone (1999)

The book offers a detailed account of the developments in the area of monetary integration, chronicling first briefly the period from 1945 to 1974. The bulk of the book covers six years running up to the creation of the EMS in 1979. The historical study excels in being firmly based on archival sources and serves to provide a detailed picture of the many plans, proposals and initiatives that were put forward in the EEC and the member states with a view to achieving closer monetary cooperation. Mourlon-Druol carefully documents these plans, proposals, and manifestos and walks us

through the various European Council meetings during these years that failed to produce the results needed for further monetary integration. Not only are the formal politicians and institutions (Commission and European Council) discussed, but experts are also examined (such as the economists who wrote the All Saints' Day Manifesto). Mourlon-Druol also points to political-psychological factors, such as the finding by the heads of states or government that it is important to meet informally, or at least without the whole entourage present, to facilitate conversation.

The archival material unearths lots of interesting facts (the term ECU was coined in 1974 by European Commission President François-Xavier Ortoli, p. 61) but also amusing facts (for example, a poem found its way into the official archives of the Council that served as a plan to create a new European Society (p. 90), which can probably only be understood by realising what dire straits the EEC was finding itself in). Mourlon-Druol eloquently weaves together the story of the creation of the EMS by linking together the plans, the people, and the facts throughout this six-year period. He cleverly presents the fact but also offers political and historical analysis of what is fact and what is ‘mythology.’ For instance, as is well-known, technically speaking the EMS did not at all present a major overhaul from what had been arranged in the context of the snake. But it was politically important to signal that this new EMS heralded a new era (the French wanted economic and political rapprochement with Germany, p. 225). Mourlon-Druol illustrates carefully how this whole process unfolded and how it ended up being concluded as the EMS in 1979 with all EEC members part of it. He also stresses how the final negotiated EMS was the result of “all kinds of actions taken on the margin, if not outside, the Treaty of Rome.”(p. 257). He also points to the weakness of the Commission that, despite putting forward proposals at least once a year, was continuously bypassed by the European Council.

As can no doubt be gathered from the above, this book has all the qualities of an outstanding historical study. Yet the book is even more ambitious: in his final chapter Mourlon-Druol seeks to contribute to the political science analyses of European monetary integration. In this chapter he dabbles into learning, the role of elites, epistemic communities (through the participation of specialised committees) but also the contribution of academics and practitioners. He also highlights the rise of the European Council as an institution (which only officially became a formal institution with the Lisbon Treaty but in practice its ascendancy can be traced back to the 1970s). Finally, in his con-

cluding chapter he stresses the importance of putting the analytical lens on the interaction of transnational, supranational and intergovernmental phenomena (we are back to the eclectic approach mentioned above).

All in all, by bringing together new archival material the author is able to weave together a story that has been hinted at in many of the earlier works, cited in the opening paragraph of this review, but did not come out fully until now. Thus, this book offers an important ‘missing link’ in a chain of writings on EMS and EMU and as such should be read by all those interested in understanding Europe's past, present and future monetary cooperation.

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Mendez, Fernando, Mendez, Mario and **Vasiliki, Triga**. *Referendums and the European Union: A Comparative Inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

The question of the public's role and influence over European integration has taken on increasing importance since the Danish rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht and end of the so-called "permissive consensus" in the early 1990s. Perhaps the most direct and significant form of public influence are referendums, as demonstrated by the French and Dutch rejections of the proposed European Constitution that effectively ended that proposed reform. The authors offer an insightful analysis of EU referendums, seeking to explain the motivations behind and implications of these instruments and to examine potential alternatives to the status quo that might retain the benefits of the referendum as an instrument of democratic accountability while better ensuring the stability of the EU.

The authors employ comparative institutional analysis; more specifically, comparing institutional frameworks for constitutional reform across a number of countries. Their methodology is largely qualitative, focused on establishing a conceptual framework for distinguishing between different types of referendums and conducting a well-researched historical analysis of how and when such referendums have been employed in different settings. The text is rich with both descriptive and prescriptive analysis (the latter drawing on relevant areas of political theory), but does not offer any causal analysis. The authors make clear their intentions to bridge the research conducted on referendums by political scientists with the work of legal scholars on formal institutional procedures; although the result should be interesting to anyone interested in questions about how democracy currently functions and may evolve in a system as complex as the European Union.

The first chapter begins by summarizing the theoretical arguments in favor of and opposed to direct democracy and moves on to review the research on referendums in the European Union. Drawing on the legal literature, the authors establish a guiding typology of three different types of EU referendums: membership referendums, which define the relationship between a political unit and the EU; policy referendums that determine a course of action of a political unit on a specific policy area within the EU; and treaty-ratification referendums held in advance of an EU member state ratifying a proposed amending treaty. The second chapter analyzes the constitutional provisions for actions toward the EU within all of the individual member states. This analysis suggests that,

in most European democracies, referendums are not constitutionally-mandated and are historically rare occurrences, but that the prospect of EU membership and continued European integration (through treaty revisions) has generated increasing political demands for the use of the referendum mechanism.

The third chapter applies insights from the political science research to better understand the circumstances surrounding the use of EU referendums. The authors begin by identifying three possible motives for political elites to commit to holding an EU referendum: first, referendums may be held due to constitutional mandate, in which case the elites have little choice; second, elites may be pressured by internal or external forces (such as membership referendums in neighboring candidate countries) to secure the legitimacy of a particular course of action toward the EU; third, governing elites may use a referendum strategically to shore up their own political support. In addition to elite motivations, the degree of inter-party consensus on the EU and public attitudes about both the EU and the national government may also influence the likely use and outcomes of EU referendums. To parse out the influence of these different considerations, the authors examine 42 referendums on the EU from the last half century. The most notable findings are that nearly three-quarters of EU referendums are motivated by political pressure or strategic calculations and not a constitutional mandate; the degree of inter-party consensus (measured using content analysis of party statements) is much lower with the politically-motivated referendums than those held by constitutional mandate; and elites appear more likely to hold power-reinforcing referendums when public support for the EU is higher.

The second part of the text shifts to a discussion of the implications of these referendums for the political stability of the EU. The fourth and fifth chapters consider the problem inherent to multi-level political systems of balancing constitutional safeguards for the territorial division of powers with the need for institutional flexibility to address new and changing circumstances. Most of the fourth chapter discusses how the EU has struggled with achieving such a balance, while the fifth chapter examines historical instances in which six other multi-level systems (the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and Germany) have had to reconcile these competing demands. Based on the comparative analysis, the authors conclude that failed referendums are not uncommon in multi-level systems and that political elites often seek to circumvent direct democracy (such as through a high court) in order to institute constitutional change. As the possible and actual use of EU referendums has increased, European

leaders have also had to develop creative solutions for bypassing the referendum process to approve needed treaty amendments; the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), for instance, was created as part of an international treaty outside of the EU's legal framework even though the EU institutions are tasked with administering the policy. Two issues stand out within this discussion: extraterritorial referendums (those in which the effects of a vote are not just limited to the country holding the referendum) may impede progress desired by much of the EU and efforts to work around the referendum instrument diminish the democratic quality of EU decision-making.

The last chapter considers a number of proposals to address these issues: eliminating EU referendums altogether; instituting a pan-EU referendum; replacing the current double-unanimity lock (requiring unanimous support at the EU level and ratification by all EU members) with a super-majority requirement; and allowing for enhanced cooperation on constitutional matters. The authors ultimately conclude that enhanced cooperation may be the only politically and legally-viable solution that allows the EU to move ahead without damaging the democratic process. The authors provide a comprehensive understanding of both the theoretical and the actual implications of EU referendums. The text ultimately contributes more to the legal discussion surrounding these referendums, although the third chapter develops a useful framework for political scientists to study the use of these instruments in the future.

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Hartlapp, Miriam, Metz, Julia and Rauh, Christian. *Which Policy for Europe? Power and Conflict inside the European Commission*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Despite its complex institutional structure and heterogeneous composition, the European Commission usually manages to create a public perception of "speaking with one voice". This book adds to the growing literature on the Commission's internal dividing lines and political dynamics by addressing two inter-related questions: How are policy positions developed at the level of individual Commission Directorates-General (DGs)? And how are conflicting DG positions coordinated and negotiated inside the Commission to arrive at a final legislative proposal? In answering these questions, the book complements existing studies in two important respects: First, rather than study-

ing the individual characteristics and perceptions of the Commission's personnel, it traces concrete policy processes in order to explain the policy positions and the power of different DGs. Second, while in-depth process tracing is hardly feasible on a large-n scale, the book moves beyond single or small-n case studies by adopting a medium-n research design: overall, the book draws on a systematic analysis of 48 EU legislative proposals from two Commission terms (Prodi and Barroso I) in three policy areas (common market and social policies, research and innovation policy, and consumer policy).

The first part of the book (chapters 1-3) introduces the research questions, develops the analytical framework and justifies research design and case selection. The analytical framework consists of a broad set of explanatory factors, which are expected to influence the policy position of individual DGs and their assertiveness vis-à-vis other DGs. In total, more than 20 potential explanatory factors are discussed – ranging from pre-existing EU law to features of internal coordination (e.g. the role of lead departments in drafting legislation) and inter-institutional policy-making (e.g. the anticipated position of the Council or the EP) to "additional resources," such as the support of organized interests or experts. The rationale why some factors are expected to matter mainly for the position formation of individual DGs, whereas others appear to play a major role in the interaction between different DGs is not always clear-cut, but generally, the analytical framework of the book convinces by carefully theorizing and operationalizing a sophisticated set of potential explanations. Combined with the well justified medium-n research design and case selection, the analytical framework suits the authors' ambition to provide a comprehensive and balanced account of the Commission's internal dynamics rather than ex ante limiting themselves to a particular theoretical perspective.

The second, empirical part (chapters 4-10) starts with a historical overview of the Commission's leading political and administrative personnel (i.e. Commissioners and Directors-General) as well as the evolution of relevant DGs, before turning to the empirical core: the process-tracing analysis of 48 EU legislative proposals. In three policy chapters, the internal decision-making process is briefly summarized for each of these proposals; key issues and lines of conflict are established; factors determining the position and power of individual DGs are identified and summarized in standardized tables. While these chapters mainly serve to lay the ground for the comparative analysis, they will also be valuable for anyone interested in specific legislative proposals and, more generally, they

provide an impressive panorama of the complexity and diversity of the Commission's internal policy-development. The remainder of the empirical part complements the policy chapters and emphasizes three cross-cutting issues: expert groups, public opinion and internal coordination mechanisms. These chapters partly address separate literatures; in particular the chapter on public opinion provides an original, balanced account of the Commission's selective responsiveness to diffuse public demands and their mixed enabling and constraining effects.

The final part of the book (chapters 11-13) aggregates the empirical findings and generalizes them in two ways. First, the relative weight of factors explaining the position and assertiveness of individual DGs is established. While the authors are cautious not to overstate the generalizability of their findings given their selection of policy areas and a certain bias towards instances of internal conflict, the comparative assessment of 48 cases supports numerous interesting insights, e.g. regarding the pervasive importance of the legal status quo (and, accordingly, the Commission's susceptibility to path dependent policy-making), the great external influences exerted by organized interests and experts on the position of individual DGs, or the structural advantages of the lead department and the Commission's horizontal services in cases of internal conflict. Second, a typology of three models of Commission policy-position formation – characterized by technocratic problem-solving, competence-seeking or policy-seeking – is introduced and the relative prevalence of the different ideal types in practice is assessed. Technocratic problem-solving is found to dominate in a majority of cases; competence-seeking is most likely in cases of internal conflict; and ideologically motivated policy-seeking, albeit being least common, also occurs regularly in cases of internal conflict. The authors could have elaborated a bit further on how the typology was actually developed, but its overall plausibility as well as its usefulness as a heuristic tool and as a warning against one-sided depictions of the Commission are well demonstrated.

In sum, this book breaks new ground regarding the Commission's internal policy-development and while it does not convey any simple or simplistic message, it sets a high standard in terms of comprehensiveness and balance.

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Hay, Colin and Wincott, Daniel. *The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism, Series on 21st Century Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Hay and Wincott address the development, evolution and potential future viability of European welfare systems. The authors provide a long-run historical context of social welfare systems of European nations, distinguish between broad approaches to welfare systems used in Europe and beyond, consider forces affecting the welfare state including globalization, European integration, and the global financial crisis, and assess whether and the degree to which European welfare systems may converge in the face of these endogenous and exogenous pressures. Based on solid foundations of political economy and in-depth knowledge of European welfare systems, the authors use careful reasoning and logic to analyze a comprehensive array of issues associated with the European social welfare systems.

The book consists of seven chapters, illustrated with informative tables and figures that help substantiate the authors' arguments. The absence of mathematical formulations and detailed discussions about statistical techniques used enables access for a wide audience, although the authors' intricate arguments may at times be difficult to follow for readers unfamiliar with the complexities of European welfare capitalism. Nevertheless, the authors convincingly challenge several conventionally-held views and traditionally unquestioned beliefs about European welfare capitalism, including its development, distinguishing attributes of alternative social welfare schemes, and where welfare states may be headed in the future.

By emphasizing the common historical context of Western European welfare states since the latter part of nineteenth century, the authors show in Chapter 1 that social policies are deeply entrenched, have withstood profound crises, and are unlikely to be eliminated in the face of current economic difficulties. The historical perspective also serves to make a fundamental distinction between different welfare systems – those rooted in conservative efforts intended to pre-empt working-class upheaval in Central Europe, and others stemming from progressive efforts developed in Northern Europe.

The authors discuss alternative approaches used by welfare states in Chapter 2, and show that European nations are clustered around alternative forms of welfare capitalism – albeit not tightly defined but with variations along similar dimensions. In contrast to conventional wisdom suggesting welfare systems will converge into a more or less similar system, the authors

show that alternative systems seem to have increasingly mutually distinguishing characteristics.

In the next chapter, the authors examine the effects of globalization and European integration on welfare in additional detail. They persuasively argue that the effects of regional economic integration are more profound than those of broad-based globalization in European nations, and that neither force has thus far led to significant welfare retrenchment. The authors cogently make the case that relatively generous welfare systems do not necessarily affect economic performance and competitiveness in negative way, as long as economies base their competitiveness on quality rather than cost.

In Chapters 4, the authors further analyze the compatibility of welfare generosity and international competitiveness. They argue that the welfare state can in fact enhance economic competitiveness in the presence of proper institutional arrangements, such as internal market flexibility, a focus on product innovation, a strong reliance on physical and human capital, and inclusive labor markets that encourage cooperation and trust.

In Chapter 5, the authors further relate the European integration process to welfare capitalism, and argue that the absence of a comprehensive European-level social policy does not necessarily mean that role of the welfare state will diminish. European integration has meant balancing shared social policy concerns across the continent with sovereign social policy issues and also with competitive market forces, but thus far there has not been a wholesale move away from social solidarity and toward "neoliberal" policies that mainly rely on market rules, social expenditure reductions, deregulation, and privatization.

In Chapter 6, the authors further explore the degree to which social welfare systems have converged in the face of external and internal forces. Contrary to conventional thinking, they show that there were strong convergence patterns among European welfare systems during a period of welfare expansion until 1985, and divergence trends during the time when social programs contracted since then.

The final chapter provides a discussion on the influence of austerity measures in the face of the global financial crisis on European welfare states. The authors take a distinct Keynesian approach, by arguing that maintaining the integrity of social welfare serves in part to stimulate aggregate demand, and that the ongoing economic crisis in Europe is largely due to a lack of economic growth as opposed to a debt crisis *per sé*.

Hay and Wincott provide a refreshing and major contribution to the literature on social welfare systems

in Europe. In the book, the authors analyze European welfare capitalism with open minds by questioning long-held assumptions. In a balanced analysis that includes external forces including globalization and European economic integration, as well as internal forces such as national political processes and demographic trends, the authors carefully make the case that welfare states are likely to survive, but in changed and perhaps less generous form.

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Young, Alasdair R. and Peterson, John. *Parochial Global Europe: 21st Century Trade Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

This book helps fill a significant gap in the literature on the European Union's external relations: despite the importance of EU trade policy to the Union itself and to the world it is still under-researched and only partially understood. Young and Peterson provide a comprehensive overview of current EU trade policy based on a theoretical framework which is in line with mainstream International Political Economy and builds on two-level game and principal-agent approaches. They argue that EU trade policy is in fact composed of multiple policies. Each of these policies presents a distinctive constellation of (1) mobilized societal preferences reflecting the distribution of anticipated costs and benefits, (2) patterns of political institutions with specific degrees of delegation and decision rules, (3) government preferences (economic welfare, market failure, foreign policy), and (4) balances of power in the international bargaining context. According to the authors, the interaction between these four factors generates different trade policy sub-systems and helps explain the objectives and achievements of EU trade policy. The framework of analysis set out in Chapter 2 thus draws on the existing literature but also elaborates further on certain aspects, for instance by distinguishing whether trade policy is reciprocal and trade relations are symmetric or not. It integrates societal, state and systemic factors of explanation and puts forward a few hypotheses about how different types of policy sub-systems explain the extent to which EU trade policy responds to societal pressures. Hence, the authors discuss the factors shaping the EU's win-set in various settings but not the negotiation strategies that agents such as the European Commission can use in two-level trade games.

Chapter 3 outlines the development of EU trade policy and the emergence of a more proactive trade strategy since the mid-1990s. Chapter 4 introduces

the multilateral trading system and the EU's conduct in the WTO Uruguay and Doha Round negotiations. Chapter 5 deals with defensive and offensive trade policy instruments, in particular EU anti-dumping and market access measures. Chapter 6 discusses the role that the internal market plays for EU trade policy, generally liberalizing market access for foreign firms yet occasionally creating obstacles. Chapter 7 assesses the EU's record regarding regulatory cooperation with third countries. Surprisingly, it misses out on the far-reaching regulatory and legislative approximation processes going on between the EU and its immediate neighbours. Chapter 8, finally, addresses the issue of trade policy as a means of foreign policy. It is, oddly, rooted in foreign policy analysis rather than the book's approach of policy sub-systems. The chapter focuses on the trade-development nexus, political conditionality and the EU's trade relations with other big powers. The authors argue that the EU only uses trade policy as a foreign policy instrument when the costs are low and with developing countries rather than peers. It is not entirely plausible though why a trade agreement with South Africa should be regarded as a foreign policy instrument contrary to a trade agreement with Russia or India. Moreover, the EU concludes different types of trade agreements with different kinds of countries.

As significant economic interests often prevail over any normative agenda, Young and Peterson conclude that – although the Union's capacity for external action is greatest in the field of trade – the EU is less of a 'Normative Power Europe' than a 'Parochial Europe' (or 'Parochial Global Europe' with reference to the Commission's 2006 'Global Europe' trade strategy). The EU's preoccupation with its own internal politics would hamper its efforts to play a global role. In this sense not only trade policy might appear parochial. While the EU has over time increasingly inserted normative provisions in its unilateral and bilateral trade policy instruments, it has indeed never suspended any trade agreement in response to violations of human rights or democracy – not even when the costs were low.

Although the authors need to be applauded for their broad approach which enhances our understanding of the intricacies of EU trade policy, this breadth comes at the expense of depth. In this regard two major shortcomings have to be mentioned. First, while the chapters mentioned above illustrate certain aspects of the book's approach, none of them systematically applies the rich analytical framework set out at the beginning. Second, in a book on how EU trade policy is actually made the reader would expect a chapter detailing the relevant actors and decision-making processes. Yet,

knowledge about the legal and institutional complexities of EU trade policy making in the various subfields (negotiation of trade agreements, implementation of the common commercial policy, application of trade policy instruments) is largely assumed and the different chapters refer to these issues merely in a rudimentary manner. The book thus risks missing out on further variation across policy sub-systems. It targets a rather advanced audience of EU studies and is best located somewhere between a research monograph and a textbook. Nevertheless, the book must be highly recommended to scholars of EU external relations as well as trade policy practitioners. It is a great contribution to a still neglected field of EU studies.

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Costa, Olivier and Brack, Nathalie. *How the EU really works.* Ashgate, May 2014.

Both the European Union (EU) integration process and the dedicated literature seem to have hit a plateau, caught between a 'rock' of dramatic institutional and constitutional changes, and a 'hard place' of deep socio-economic and financial crisis. Generally, it has become increasingly difficult to tackle the intricacy of these overlapping circumstances without the threat of triviality and incompleteness – or paradoxically adding even more complexity.

From similar considerations the present volume starts, including an account of the major analytical and methodological pitfalls (pp. 9-12) to avoid when studying the EU. Amongst others, the risk to overrate its sui generis nature, which implies the incomparability of the EU to any other political system or organization – the opposite hazard being conceptual stretching, that is, using interpretative tools that do not really fit the case.

Drawing on their varied experience – which evidently overshoots a mere academic knowledge – the authors accepted the theoretical challenge, putting together a thorough review of the extant literature on EU politics and policy processes and an up-to-date analysis of the main steps of a polity which still qualifies as a work-in-progress. In fact, 'the democratic character of the system is not assessed only on the basis of objective criteria determined by the institutional actors and experts. It also depends on the perception of citizens' (p. 9).

The book is organized in nine chapters, fluidly flowing in succession and giving the impression of a 'funnel of causality', integrating different levels of analysis. Yet, without oversimplifying, since the chapters

are interrelated but, at the same time, autonomously telling their own story.

Chapter 1 tackles the historic dimension of European integration, emphasizing its incremental nature and accounting for its phases – up to the current times of crisis. No teleological approach is adopted, since the unpredictability of the events seems nowadays truer than ever: 'only time will tell how the EU will evolve' (p.34).

Chapter 2 is dedicated to the 'grand theories', as well as the so-called middle range theories of EU integration, which the authors openly endorse – calling this evolution a 'normalization' of the EU in political science. The chapter briefly accounts also for more recent contributions coming from fields other than that of European studies, e.g. Comparative Politics or International Relations. A final section effectively summarizes the emergence of the 'Europeanization' topic, conceived as a kind of sub-discipline of EU studies: going beyond renowned definitions, more recent theoretical debates on the role played by Europeanization in the study of the EU are presented, underlining the implication of this phenomenon for the interaction between different levels of government.

By using categories and concepts of comparative politics and public policy analysis, chapters 3-6 go straight to the actual functioning of the EU, systematically reviewing all the institutional and non-institutional actors contributing to EU operations.

Chapter 3 focuses on the so-called 'executive power' (the European Council and the Commission); chapter 4 deals with the main features of the 'legislative power' (the Council and the European Parliament), as lately shaped by the Lisbon treaty (1 Dec 2009); chapter 5 is devoted to the organs (e.g. the Court of Justice, or the Court of Auditors) ensuring effectiveness and legitimacy of decision-making; chapter 6 concludes the series by covering the actors external to the five main EU institutions, and offering an idea of the EU political system as embedded in a broader context, where other, non-institutional, players (lobbyists, experts, etc.) enter the game. A rich section (6.4) dedicated to national parliaments, whose enhanced role after the Reform treaty has been fraught with both practical and political problems (p.165), has been opportunely comprised.

Overall, this should have been an 'inevitably' scholastic part, pedantically listing nature, powers and functions of the aforementioned institutions and actors: instead, it becomes original and easy to read, thanks to the abundance of practical and informal aspects, which constitute the added value of the volume.

Chapters 7 turns to operational features, describing the evolution of the EU competences before and

after Lisbon and the main procedures of decision-making, with abreast considerations on the limits of the logics of decision within the EU, especially at a critical juncture.

While giving emphasis to the plurality of decision-making styles, Chapter 8 proposes a typology of four models, which allows highlighting the specificities of the EU political system. Completing the picture, the final chapter analyses the decision-making process from a public policy network perspective, successfully considered as more sensitive to grasp the EU's real functioning and uncertain contours – avoiding abstract speculations.

Undeniably, such a real-world approach sets out an innovative way of both understanding and teaching the workings of the EU, to the extent that this volume is recommendable to not only students and fellow scholars, but also to a wider public, and to EU practitioners, wanting to work for responding to the old and new challenges the EU is engaged with.

Alba Ferreri
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

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