**RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND POWER IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CHINA, THE EU AND THE US AS ‘CONDITIONAL MULTILATERALISTS’**

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**Abstract**

This paper explores the engagement of China, the European Union and the United States with the institutions of global economic governance, within the context of the global multilateral system. The first part of the paper identifies and explores key components of global economic governance - rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation – as they are embodied in or reflected by existing multilateral institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The second part of the paper discusses current challenges to multilateral institutions The third part of the paper contrasts images of China as an ‘experimental multilateralist’, the EU as a ‘compulsive multilateralist’ and the USA as a ‘selective multilateralist’, but argues that in fact each of them has become a ‘conditional multilateralist’. The Conclusion identifies some implications of this situation in terms of Chinese, European and American engagements with global economic governance.

**Keywords:** China; European Union; United States; global governance; global political economy; multilateralism

**Introduction**

This paper relies upon three central propositions. The first is that the effectiveness of global governance processes in the global political economy can be explored by focusing on a series of key components of those processes: rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation. Whilst the paper explores these issues within the context of international political economy, it is clear that they also have an inescapable legal component and that they express the intersection and interaction of political, economic, legal and social/cultural forces.[[2]](#footnote-2) The second proposition is that these key components of global governance processes are surrounded by a set of broad assumptions about the nature and expressions of multilateralism, and that these assumptions are currently under severe strain in what might be termed a crisis of contemporary multilateralism brought about by global shifts in power and preferences, as well as legal and social practices. The third is that the positions of China, the EU and the US in relation to this crisis – and to the ways in which processes of global governance might be used to overcome it – are fundamentally ambivalent, reflecting the three actors’ changing preferences about power, institutions and ideas in the global political economy, but that they may have elements in common reflecting their positions in the global arena.

On this basis, the paper explores the engagement of China, the European Union and the United States with the institutions of global economic governance, within the context of the global multilateral system. The first part of the paper identifies and explores key components of global economic governance - rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation – as they are embodied in or reflected by existing global multilateral institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)[[3]](#footnote-3). The second part of the paper discusses current challenges to multilateral institutions arising from shifting and competing attitudes to global rules and norms, and from the still-incomplete power shift in the global political economy (GPE). The third part of the paper evaluates the attitudes of China, the EU and the USA to the existing multilateral order. Specifically, it examines the relevance of ideas I have expressed in previous work[[4]](#footnote-4) that China is an ‘experimental multilateralist’, the EU is a ‘compulsive multilateralist’ and the USA is a ‘selective multilateralist’, and argues that each of the three has moved in recent years towards its own version of ‘conditional multilateralism’. The Conclusion identifies some implications of this situation in terms of Chinese, European and American engagement with global governance in the GPE.

**Exploring Global Economic Governance**

The argument in this section deals with three central components of global economic governance: rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation, and relates these briefly to the governance of the global political economy. These components are important individually, but also through their interaction within specific global governance contexts and in the strategies of key actors. A number of questions emerge about the underpinnings of these components in terms of broad ideas of multilateralism.

***Rules and Norms***

One key area to be explored in relation to global governance processes is that of rules and norms. Although these can be understood as separate elements in governance, in fact they overlap and interact in important ways, as has been pointed out by a number of legal and other scholars[[5]](#footnote-5). This insight is important to an understanding of international regimes, which as Ruggie has pointed out has often drawn upon a ‘soft version of logical positivism’[[6]](#footnote-6). In addition to their foundations in formal institutions, regimes and other forms of global governance centre on the understandings that those involved have of them, on their ‘learning’ of appropriate behaviour within them and on their generation of norms that identify acceptable and unacceptable behaviours within them. The focus is thus not only on the efficiency of global governance rules in providing means for the management of concrete issues, but also on their effects in terms of social learning, expectations and understandings. Interaction over long periods in dealing (for example) with trade disputes, development questions or the regulation of financial services can create a form of normative or cultural context for the actors involved, enabling a move away from pure bargaining towards problem-solving based on mutual responsiveness. As we shall see later, one of the key areas in which an understanding of rules, norms and ‘social principles’ is important is that of multilateralism, which is conceptualized here as a foundational norm of current governance in the GPE.

On this basis, the key elements of global governance cease to be (only) sets of injunctions and regulations judged in terms of their concordance with material preferences or their instrumental utility. Rather than being management devices, they become arenas within which ‘voice’ and advocacy become as important as material resources and status[[7]](#footnote-7). Rather than being passive channels for the knowledge and preferences of their members, they can themselves achieve status that in turn creates ‘social knowledge’ and defines norms[[8]](#footnote-8). In addition, they can be seen as living examples of the ways in which structure and agency can be co-constitutive of actor’s roles in the GPE more generally, as well as in governance processes themselves. Questions about the perceived legitimacy of institutions, about the identities and role conceptions of actors within them, and about the ways in which the demands of governance can complement or conflict with actors’ self-understandings as well as their material interests are central here.

Such considerations enable us to think about the positions occupied in the governance of the global political economy by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both of these organizations are explicitly rules-based, dealing with on the one hand the regulation of international trade and on the other hand with the regulation of global finance. They also express powerful sets of norms, which were established in the aftermath of the Second World War but which have been progressively adapted to the changing nature of the global political economy, both in terms of structures and in terms of processes. But this process of adaptation has been complicated and ‘lumpy’, given the differing attitudes of leading actors or groups of actors – established ‘powers’, ‘rising powers’, regional organizations and others - towards central norms and assumptions as embodied in the organizations. Thus, both the IMF and the WTO have been the focus of conflicts over the formulation and application of rules, and have been the scene of contention over the ways in which different actors or groups of actors can or should enter into their normative ‘spaces’ – as for example, in the periodic debates about the allocation of quotas and voting rights in the IMF (most recently in 2010), or the tensions over market economy or developing country status in the WTO. In the first of these cases, there has been a gradual adjustment of IMF rules to reflect in the first place the rise of ‘oil powers’ in the 1970s and 1980s, and then the emergence of China and other major state actors in the 1990s and beyond, which has in turn meant a reduction in the formal institutional status of countries such as France and the United Kingdom. In the second case, the Chinese in particular have consistently pressed for recognition as a ‘market economy’ and thus of their increased status and privileges within WTO rules, arousing opposition from the USA and the European Union (including the European Parliament) based on their interpretations of the nature of the Chinese economy.[[9]](#footnote-9) I will return to these broad issues later in the context of Chinese, EU and US approaches to the governance of the global political economy.

In this section, the focus has been on the ways in which we might conceptualise the interaction between formal rules and institutions and more normative aspects of participation in global governance processes. To the questions raised so far, we can now add some more specific questions, first about the more specific impact of institutions and regimes, and then about how key actors participate, and with what effects, through the conceptual lens of negotiation. As we shall see, this raises a different set of implications about how and with what effects actors are involved in global governance processes.

***Institutions and Regimes***

There are several distinct strands to an institutionalist understanding of global governance, and in particular international regimes. Each of them has a distinctive take on the problems and raises a specific set of questions; in this section I will explore some of these concerns as reflected in rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. In the following section I will look more specifically at a negotiation perspective on global governance processes[[10]](#footnote-10).

For rational choice institutionalists, institutions can be seen as relating to global governance and international regimes in two ways. First, they embody the interplay of actors’ preferences, and form a kind of instrument for their pursuit, enabling actors to benefit in terms of information, the reduction of uncertainty and management of relations with others. Questions arise about how actors extract and deploy resources in the regime setting, and thus about (broadly defined) the power that they bring to the regime and the power that they derive from it[[11]](#footnote-11). Second, they draw attention to questions of resources and power and in particular to the ways in which tasks are delegated to agents acting on behalf of the ‘principals’ to whom they are responsible.

As before, we can see that these questions assume more specific forms and focus in the cases of the IMF and the WTO. One of the key aspects of development in both of these organizations has been the extent to which they can accommodate or turn to positive use the inevitable clashes of preferences between key members or groups of members. This can be illustrated by reference to the examples previously cited, of changes in IMF quotas and voting rights and of ‘market economy’ status in the WTO. The growth of membership in both organizations, linked to but not always determined by processes of globalization, has generated new potential for cleavages and the formation of sub-groups or coalitions within the organizations, from the 1960s onwards. In the first place, many changes were linked to processes of decolonization and the creation of post-colonial ‘new’ states; in the 1990s, the predominant processes were on the one hand the fall-out from the collapse of the Soviet empire and on the other, the proliferation of ‘rising powers’ starting with the ‘Asian tigers’ in the 1980s and then focusing particularly on the rise of China and the emergence of groupings such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)[[12]](#footnote-12). Not only this, but both organizations have the potential to act as catalysts for the tensions between international commitments and domestic priorities – in different ways, they are or can be intrusive and challenging. This inevitably raises the question of commitment: how ready are leading actors to make the financial and other commitments that come along with IMF or WTO membership? And how willing are they to comply with what might be expensive judgements emanating from the organizations, entailing commitments in domestic and international financial or commercial policies?

The evolutionary perspective adopted by historical institutionalist approaches to the establishment and development of institutions and regimes provides additional insights relating to change over time and the ways in which institutional changes and path dependencies become embedded within governance processes[[13]](#footnote-13). Importantly for the discussion in this paper, the nature and impact of sequential bargains is a key focus, with implications for the ways in which bargains made in separate arenas and at different times can overlap, create tensions and raise questions of commitment and legitimacy for key actors.

These questions have important links to the kinds of commitments that can accumulate through the operations of the IMF and the WTO, and through the embedding of their members in a sequence of bargains over lengthy periods (although the differences in the life-histories of the two organizations are significant here – whilst the IMF was one of the original Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO only came into existence formally in 1995). For example, the principle of convertibility of currencies that lies at the heart of the IMF has been sustained over a period of rapid and radical change in the nature of the GPE, with the growth of transnational business but also the emergence of strong state actors at differing levels of development. At the same time, the principle of reciprocity at the centre of commitments under the GATT and the the WTO has had to survive periods of global crisis in which the tendency to unilateralism and protectionism have been prominent. Not only this, but there are inevitable linkages between the issues dealt with by the two institutions, demanding management and coordination from members in key areas of policy-making. The principle of monetary stability and management, and the potential for domestic interventions by the IMF, is strongly linked with the capacity of states and other actors to carry on international trade and the need for international capital movements to sustain processes of globalization.[[14]](#footnote-14) This means that the two organizations are very likely to raise challenges for members in terms of two- or three-level negotiation processes (see below), but it also means that the shaping or re-shaping of the organizations themselves at critical junctures in their evolution are likely to become issues in their own right.

Sociological institutionalist approaches (and their close relative, Social Constructivist approaches) raise questions about the problem of social action within specific institutional contexts, and thus about the ways in which preferences become shaped by the process of interaction within an institution or regime itself, foregrounding a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of consequences’ in the shaping of actor behaviour[[15]](#footnote-15). In contrast to the position adopted by rational choice institutionalists, they emphasise the nature of preferences as endogenous and shaped by processes of social exchange and learning. The positions and actions of ‘agents’ within institutions thus are shaped by issues of organizational culture, rather than by considerations of delegation and ‘contracting’. In terms of the argument here, it is important that sociological institutionalist analysis generates questions about identities, roles, legitimacy and the ways in which these are pursued in intersecting contexts – in other words, the sorts of contexts implied by the governance of the GPE[[16]](#footnote-16).

Thus, sociological institutionalist approaches to the governance of the global political economy pose some of the same questions about commitment, adaptation and coordination as are raised by other institutionalisms. They pose these questions in relation not to material interests or to patterns of preferences, but rather in relation to the identities espoused and narratives generated by key members, and to the ‘inefficient histories’ that result, leading to unexpected and unpredictable outcomes[[17]](#footnote-17). There is no question that membership of the IMF, and the allocation of voting rights within the organization, raises issues not only of concrete interest but also of self-perceptions of leading members within an explicitly hierarchical body. In the same way, the organization of the WTO, based on reciprocity of commitments and the diffusion of influence among members or groups of members, generates powerful perceptions of the nature of good or appropriate behaviour in relation to disputes or to major negotiating occasions. As a result, issues of identity and appropriateness become entangled with questions of legitimacy in ways that can bolster or compromise the identities both of the organization itself and of members.

*Negotiation and ‘negotiated orders’*

The engagement of actors with international institutions and regimes raises further questions about negotiation and the development of ‘negotiated orders’ in various issue areas[[18]](#footnote-18). Institutions and regimes are the result of continuous negotiations between actors, and are also major arenas for multilateral negotiation games. As indicated in the preceding discussion on institutions and regimes, negotiations may be analysed from a rational, a historical and a sociological or constructivist perspective. Negotiations as a key form of global governance process can thus be interpreted as exchanges of strategic moves by calculating actors, but also as processes of persuasion and framing where actors try to construct their ideas and solutions as appropriate in the given context. In the context of this paper, negotiation is thus a key element in understanding the roles played by China, the EU and the US in the global political economy.

Negotiation theory has commonly identified two different (archetypical) modes: bargaining and problem-solving[[19]](#footnote-19). Whereas bargaining is characterised by the playing out of a logic of consequences, in line with rational choice approaches, problem-solving refers to what is the appropriate action in the given situation and the persuasive force of normative appeals[[20]](#footnote-20). Problem-solving actors thus engage in something like what Habermas called ‘communicative action’, where the ‘best argument’ carries the way and actors may be persuaded by convincing and logical argumentation by the other party[[21]](#footnote-21). In this type of process, the use of ‘soft power’, centred on the power of attraction and reward, and the occurrence of social learning and mutual responsiveness is integral to any negotiation.

As noted above, the roles conceived and played out by actors are an important element in the process of global governance. Although roles can be conceived in very general and ‘historical’ or ‘cultural’ terms, they also play an important part in the interactions that occur within specific issue areas or international forums. Here, we become interested in questions of leadership (and also of ‘followership’) and of the differences and tensions between ‘rule-makers’, ‘rule-takers’ and ‘facilitators’ within negotiation processes. Given that these roles can be performed across many issue-areas, and in a multitude of intersecting arenas, it is important to be aware of the ways in which actors attempt to (or fail to) maintain consistency across issues and arenas, and of the ways in which conflicts between roles played at different times and in different places can emerge. Given the focus in this paper, it is clear that for China, the EU and the US, the extent to which they can develop (or have developed, or should develop) consistent roles in the governance of the global political economy, is a persistent and often insistent focus of concern.

In order to frame these questions in more concrete terms, we can return to the examples of the IMF and the WTO. Both of these organizations are built explicitly around processes of negotiation – either within the context of the rules and procedures developed by the organizations themselves, or about the status and objectives of the organizations in a more general sense. Whereas the IMF is a more explicitly hierarchical organization, with key negotiations taking place around the allocation of places in the hierarchy via the allocation of quotas and voting rights and the representation of key economic actors on its governing bodies, and has explicit rules relating to the compliance of members with standards set by the organization, the WTO allows for processes of negotiation at several levels – bilateral, regional and multilateral – within a set of principles about how negotiating outcomes are to be expressed, ratified and implemented. Both organizations allow for the generation of leadership both within the organizations themselves (in terms of permanent officers and structures) and among members, either individually or as parts of sub-groupings. Given changes in international financial dealings and in the structure and content of global trade, it is not surprising that one key characteristic of negotiations in both bodies is complexity and the engagement of multiple stakeholders, either explicitly or indirectly. The result is a process of continuous negotiation, both by technocratic and by political actors, with concomitant risks of political tensions even in the most technical of policy areas[[22]](#footnote-22).

The argument in this section has primarily focused on the establishment, evolution and workings of governance processes in the global political economy, and on the key components – rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiations – which operate separately or in combination to shape those processes and the positions of key actors within them. A central assumption has been that global governance processes are evolutionary in nature: they are established, they grow, they adapt and they have a certain internal logic and dynamic. But it is clear that these assumptions do not hold in all circumstances, and that key elements in the changing global context will play a role in shaping and re-shaping the processes of global governance. The next section reflects on the extent to which such forces have created a crisis in contemporary multilateralism, as a prelude to considering the claims of China, the EU and the US as ‘multilateralists’ and thus as contributors to global economic governance.

**Power, change and the crisis of contemporary multilateralism**

Although it is easy on one level to identify elements of crisis in contemporary multilateralism, ranging from the impact of the global financial crisis after 2007 to the resurgence of geopolitics in the Middle East and eastern Europe, it is important to take a step back from the question itself, and to clarify some of the key ideas relating to multilateralism in the global political economy[[23]](#footnote-23). As argued more than twenty years ago by John Ruggie and others, multilateralism can be seen as a form of international praxis, embodying a set of principles of action including (for example) reciprocity[[24]](#footnote-24). In this way, it constitutes a challenge to the practices and institutions of bilateralism, discrimination and inter-state bargaining, at least in principle, although as Ruggie points out, multilateral principles and practices can infuse and shape bilateral or small-group relationships[[25]](#footnote-25). Multilateralism as a form of praxis is clearly more salient or more viable in certain conditions than in others, and it is therefore closely linked to such factors as the distribution of power in the world arena, the nature of issues and the institutional forms in which multilateralism may be practised. As such, it relates closely not only to processes of change in the global political economy, but also to the three key dimensions outlined above – rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation.

One logical focus of analysis in the contemporary era is the links between multilateralism and multipolarity, since it is assumed that the world is moving towards a more dispersed distribution of power and away from the unipolarity seen as characteristic of the early post-Cold War years[[26]](#footnote-26). But it must be remembered that the distribution of power is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, and that it will vary according to issue area and to the nature of participants in the world arena. Not only this, but it will reflect the roles assumed and played by those with actual or potential leverage over the global political economy, as argued above. This underlines the point that the test of multilateralism as an international practice is the extent to which it shapes institutions and rules, frames international norms and values, and affects behaviour especially of key actors[[27]](#footnote-27). These actors include states, but also include major international economic and security actors, such as transnational corporations and terrorist networks.

I argue that currently all three of the key elements outlined above are subject to major challenge amounting to a crisis of contemporary multilateralism[[28]](#footnote-28). Multilateral rules and norms are challenged, and different conceptions of multilateralism itself (for example, between established and ‘rising’ powers, and as will be seen below, between China, the EU and the US) play a key role in shaping perceptions of its continued utility. Institutions and regimes are subject to wide variations in levels of commitment from key international actors, most dramatically exemplified by the actions of the Trump Administration, but also by the growth of regional and bilateral arrangements in the global political economy; multilateral negotiations have in many cases been abandoned for more limited forms of agreement, most obviously in the international trading system. Where major multilateral agreements can be reached, they are often subject to problems of ratification and implementation arising either from domestic change or from shifting international power alignments. One widely used definition of ‘crisis’ provided by John Ikenberry – ‘an extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of the political order are called into question’ – may not fully cover this slow degeneration and loss of commitment, which aligns more to definitions of chronic long term or structural crisis, during which there can be a gradual erosion of normative consensus, of institutional forms, and of commitment to established procedures such as negotiation. But it is nonetheless a crisis, which has had its ‘extraordinary moments’ and undoubtedly raises key questions about the sustainability of the existing order. It also raises questions about the capacity or willingness of actors to play the role of ‘multilateralist’ in challenging conditions.

As a result of the preceding analysis, it is possible to advance three general propositions. The first centres on *rules and norms*. Actors’ presence in multilateral contexts will be shaped by a mixture of internal and external normative forces, generated by changing political alignments and by the need to adjust to the changing nature of the global political economy. On the one hand, institutions and regimes will be seen as an arena for projection of the actors’ ‘voice’ and consolidation of actor identity, and as a vehicle for projection of norms. On the other hand, involvement in multilateral processes may serve to accentuate normative tensions within actors themselves, and create frictions between discourses developed at the regime level and those within the actor. In conditions of turbulence or crisis, these tensions are likely to be exacerbated and to pose significant problems of coordination and management.

The second proposition concerns *institutions and regimes*. Actors’ commitments to and activities in a multilateral context will be shaped by the complex relationships between the actors’ own ‘regime-ness’ (for example, in the case of the European Union, but also in the case of states characterised by political and/or economic instability), the process of domestic preference formation and the extent to which they can extract resources both from their own members and from the system itself. There will be also be a fluctuating balance between internal bargains and the need for external commitment, and between the ‘logics of appropriateness’ at actor and regime levels. It is to be expected that in conditions of turbulence or crisis, this multiple balance of commitments and logics will become more challenging and more salient.

The final proposition focuses on *negotiation*. Involvement in multilateralism will uncover tensions between actors’ commitment to processes on the one hand of bargaining and on the other of problem-solving. This in turn links to ideas about what is ‘normal’ for actors and for multilateral processes, to the projection of norms and to actors’ capacity to build relevant coalitions based on material or normative considerations. At the same time, and relatedly, involvement in multilateral processes and regimes will raise questions about actors’ conceptions of their international role and especially about their capacity to supply leadership within multilateral processes on a consistent and continuing basis. In conditions of turbulence or crisis, the concept of ‘normality’ itself can come under challenge, and the capacity of key actors to maintain and perform consistent rules will be thrown into question.

The three arguments clearly also carry important implications for the pursuit and the achievement of ’effective multilateralism’ (that is to say, on the one hand the effective performance of policies in multilateral contexts, and on the other hand, the use of multilateral agencies, separately or in combination, to address key issues in the global political economy) by a variety of actors. For example, consideration of the significance of rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation in China’s involvement in multilateral contexts will provide a guide to (a) how far it pursues and has achieved ‘effective multilateralism’ through such involvement and (b) how far China can be conceptualised as an ‘effective multilateralist’ on the basis of its activities in specific institutional contexts, and especially in the context of increasing institutional density and interconnectedness[[29]](#footnote-29). This in turn is bound to raise issues about the concept of ‘effectiveness’ as viewed from a range of standpoints, and thus about China’s role(s) in the broader multilateral context, for example its creation of new multilateral bodies such as the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) or its pursuit of ‘strategic partnerships’ at the bilateral level[[30]](#footnote-30). As regards the EU, there is another dimension, given the Union’s identity as a particularly dense form of international regional organisation, and its self-understanding as a multilateralist. The Union has presented itself as pursuing ‘effective multilateralism’ as a core principle of its external action, and as an expression of its international identity in a wide variety of arenas, whilst at the same time attempting to form networks of ‘strategic partners’ and more limited inter-regional partnerships[[31]](#footnote-31). Similarly, US engagement with multilateral contexts and processes can be evaluated in terms of the ways in which it buys into institutions, espouses key norms and commits itself to meaningful negotiations. Studies of US foreign economic policy in particular identify a long-term shift away from multilateralism and towards bilateralism in US engagement with the world, reflecting the impact of both domestic factors and the development of the global economy – for example through the emergence of new challengers within the global arena[[32]](#footnote-32). For all actors, there are important connections between their levels of engagement with multilateral institutions, norms and negotiations and their capacity to achieve legitimacy, coherence and credibility in processes of global cooperation or governance.

In light of the argument so far, it is logical to see the shifting focus and nature of power in the global political economy, the changing roles of (and challenges to) multilateral institutions and the consequent pressures on processes of international negotiation as central elements in the conception, performance and impact of the three actors’ roles in the global arena, and more particularly in the global political economy. To put it simply: the three actors, with contrasting experiences of and engagements with multilateralism and multilateral institutions, might be expected to demonstrate contrasting approaches to the crisis of contemporary multilateralism. In order to test this proposition, we need to focus in more detail on the ways in which China, the EU and the US can be seen as ‘multilateralists’.

**Approaches to Global Governance: China, the EU and the US compared[[33]](#footnote-33)**

For a long time, the Chinese approach as late-comers to multilateralism and to global governance was characterised widely as cautious and conditional, and indeed as ‘experimental’ – the emphasis in these characterisations being on the extent to which the approach reflected the Chinese position as an emerging power with an overwhelming preoccupation with domestic modernization[[34]](#footnote-34). This is not the whole of the story, however, since it has also often been argued that the Chinese position reflects the need to instrumentalise multilateralism as a defence against US predominance and as a means of preserving Chinese autonomy within the world arena[[35]](#footnote-35). In this context, the Chinese approach to global multilateralism is seen as essentially conditional upon the benefits to be gained from engagement, and capable of re-direction if multilateralism seemed to be working against Chinese interests – for example, into forms of regional multilateralism in which China would hold a dominant position. Evidence of this shift can be gleaned from the Chinese pursuit of multiple regional strategic partnership agreements, of regional cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or perhaps most dramatically in the Belt and Road Initiative. Most recently, the speeches of Xi Xinping, for example in 2017 at the World Economic Forum at Davos in and at the plenum of the CCP in particular have expressed a much more assertive approach to questions of multilateralism and global governance, suggesting that China is prepared both to assume a more prominent role in global multilateral bodies but also that the key test for Chinese engagement is likely to be perceived Chinese interests[[36]](#footnote-36).

In terms of the three propositions outlined above, it thus appears that the Chinese have taken an essentially instrumentalist view of international rules and norms, seeing these as reflecting not only the embedded preferences of established actors, but also as a means of expressing their own changing status. In turn, they have approached institutions and regimes as potential means not only of consolidating international status and legitimacy but also of defending their interests against those of more established ‘powers’, as for example in their approach to membership of the WTO or their broader approach to international disputes and potential conflicts[[37]](#footnote-37). Tellingly, as US policies have become more unilateralist (see below), Chinese leaders have become more inclined to underline their commitment to multilateral institutions and processes. This set of positions translates into a commitment to multilateral negotiations, but one that is hedged around with an underlying defensiveness and an increasing assertiveness – a challenging combination.

The EU, on the other hand has often been portrayed as almost a compulsive multilateralist; multilateralism is said to be in its DNA, and to be the means by which the EU can not only exert its influence in the world but also establish its legitimacy as an international actor[[38]](#footnote-38). This can be connected to the idea that the EU is a ‘post-modern’ international actor[[39]](#footnote-39), based on post-sovereign values and in a sense pathologically committed to the pursuit of multilateral solutions to shared problems. But this is not the only possible perspective on the EU’s approach to multilateralism. Others have proposed a more instrumentalist view, which treats the EU as an ‘emerging international actor’ committed to multilateralism because that is the route to the kinds of rules and institutional frameworks within which it can prosper[[40]](#footnote-40). And it is also possible to mount a critical attack on the extent to which the EU actually lives up to its own propaganda as a multilateralist, by showing the extent to which EU behaviour deviates from the kind of liberal internationalism to which it expresses its commitment[[41]](#footnote-41); recent EU policies on migration from the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa, or on the exercise of political conditionality in development policy, might provide evidence here. Finally, it can be argued that whatever its approach to multilateralism, the EU lacks credibility because of its failure to speak with one voice in multilateral arenas or groupings, and the persistent (and subversive) influence of the member states[[42]](#footnote-42). The result is a form of what can be termed ‘contingent Liberalism’ in the EU’s approach to a broad range of global issues, and specifically to the governance of the GPE[[43]](#footnote-43).

The EU thus represents a much more ‘mixed’ version of commitment to multilateralism than is presented in much of its formal statements and declarations. There is no doubt that it is committed to the rules and norms of the multilateral system; one of the bases for its existence is the provisions of multilateral agreements and conventions, and the Union has an embedded and pervasive tendency to express itself in terms of multilateral action (whilst not forgetting that individual Member States may not and often do not share this position). The EU derives a significant part of its legitimacy from engagement with institutions and regimes, but this is qualified in a number of cases by the fact that Member States are themselves members if not dominant forces in such arrangements (the IMF being a case in point). In line with this set of commitments, the EU has earned for itself a reputation as a persistent if not obsessive negotiator, and thus as part of the underpinnings for such bodies as the WTO, for example in its continuing commitment to the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations even when they have run into the sand; but increasingly it has become apparent that the Union is willing to pursue regional and bilateral means of managing world trade, even whilst signalling its continuing support for multilateral principles.

Just as on the surface the EU is easy to pigeonhole as a multilateralist, so it appears that the US is also a clear-cut case. The US, it can be argued, is the ultimate ‘selective multilateralist’, despite its central role in creating and sustaining the institutions of the post-World War II liberal international order, enabled by its power and its position to practice ‘multilateralism *à la carte*’ and even to subvert the established order and institutions[[44]](#footnote-44). It can be argued further that this expresses the nature of the US as essentially a ‘modernist’ actor, focused on sovereignist assumptions about the way the world works and the way in which its interests can be defended[[45]](#footnote-45). But this image of the US as multilateralist can be overstated, and there is a series of correctives that can be applied. One of these relates to the changing power position of the US and the need to prepare for a world in which American power is markedly less predominant (thus linking with the debate about multipolarity in a very direct way)[[46]](#footnote-46). Such a prescription seems also to have been borne out at least in part by the Obama administration’s adoption of a kind of pragmatic realist approach to its international commitments and its pursuit of multilateral solutions to some of its key international dilemmas[[47]](#footnote-47). Nonetheless, it was still fair during the Obama years to identify the US posture on multilateralism as essentially selective and ‘domesticist’, focusing on the needs of the USA first. With the advent of the Trump administration in 2017, this position was given a dramatic twist, with the overt pursuit of ‘America First’ as a national strategy and the introduction of domestic and foreign policies designed to serve the needs of the USA above all. In the global political economy, this tendency was best illustrated by the pursuit of an aggressive trade strategy and a marked preference for bilateral arrangements over those of conventional multilateralism[[48]](#footnote-48).

This means that the US occupies a different place on the spectrum of multilateral engagement from those occupied by either China or the EU. From a historical perspective, it is clear that whereas Washington was a key progenitor of the post-Second World War Liberal order, there has been substantial erosion of its commitment to the rules and norms underpinning that order, not just under the Trump Presidency but also over a long period of relative decline reflecting the rise of competitors particularly in the global political economy. The result has been a transition from assumptions of hegemony, through a fragmentation of the US dominance in the global political economy, to a situation in which American leaders have to address the erosion of the country’s international status and legitimacy more directly than ever before. Alongside this problem of rules and norms goes a fading of the US commitment to significant multilateral institutions and regimes, and a fluctuating and unpredictable posture in relation to the relevance and effectiveness of international negotiation.

What are the broader implications of these contrasting approaches to ‘being a multilateralist’? It seems to me that there are several. First, there is apparently no settled pattern of multilateralism in the contemporary world arena, and this reflects the divergence of approaches to and experiences of multilateralism among key actors - here China, the EU and the US. Rather, alongside the norms, institutions and practices of global multilateralism, there is a set of partial multilateralisms that fluctuate and can be put into reverse, along with a set of partial global multilateral groupings (G2, G3, G7/8, G20) that lay claim to parts of the multilateral agenda and may or may not be able to manage what they lay claim to. So there is a proliferation of multilateral or quasi-multilateral groupings that sometimes reinforce and sometimes undermine each other.

At the same time, and particularly in relations among established and emergent major actors, there is a form of multiple bilateralism that centres on (for example) ‘strategic partnerships’ and which may or may not support the more general versions of multilateralism that exist; sometimes this multiple bilateralism extends to the creation or perception of ‘diplomatic triangles’ such as that which has been identified in China/EU/US relations[[49]](#footnote-49). In terms of relations between the China, the EU and the US, there is thus a mosaic of multilateral, quasi-multilateral and bilateral relationships that reflect the different approaches and experiences of the parties and which give rise to often uneasy relationships among the fragments of order to which they give substance.

Conclusion

The discussion above seems to imply that whilst China, the EU and the US can be labelled as different types of ‘multilateralist’, they actually share a number of qualities when it comes to their approaches to the governance of the global political economy. For all three, there is a problem of ‘emerging-ness’ – a clumsy word that implies the search for legitimacy and for a calibration of governance commitments that reflects the fluid status of the three actors (and remember that the EU has only an indirect but central importance in the IMF via the Eurozone and the ECB). For each of China, the EU and the US, there is also an issue of ‘domesticism’, in which the demands of domestic political economy are central to the ways in which they approach global governance processes – although it might be argued that the origins of the three ‘domesticisms’ are very different. For all three of these actors, there is a problem of legitimacy and trust in a fluid and competitive global political economy – one that to borrow the terms used by the EU’s Global Strategy Paper is ‘complex, connected and contested’[[50]](#footnote-50). This means that their approaches to the IMF, the WTO and other multilateral bodies will be crucially dependent upon their broader capacity to manage change in the global political economy, their willingness to see these institutions as relevant to their domestic needs, and their relationship to the shifting distribution of power in the global arena. The record of the past few years seems to reflect a state of flux in each of these actors’ responses to the changes and challenges identified in this paper.

The paper has tried to identify some key components in the governance of the global political economy, to assess the extent to which the broader assumptions behind such governance are challenged or in crisis, and to evaluate the ways in which China, the EU and the US relate to these challenges. Despite the ways in which China, the EU and the US might be seen as essentially different types of ‘multilateralist’, a key conclusion of the paper is that actually they have more in common than might meet the eye. The challenges of ‘emerging-ness’, of ‘domesticism’ and of legitimacy and trust identified in the paper are thus its most important initial findings. Rather than manifesting fundamentally contrasting types of commitment to and engagement with multilateralism and with global economic governance, it is thus more plausible in many ways to see each of China, the EU and the US as ‘conditional multilateralists’, cultivating alternatives such as multiple bilateralisms and regional multilateralisms (or in some cases what might be termed ‘hegemonic multilateralisms’ based on dominance in the regions concerned). This in turn implies that the essential elements of global economic governance – power, rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation – are under challenge not only from the changing nature of the global political economy in general, but also from the positions adopted and roles played by China, the EU and the US, three of its central actors. Whilst these roles might be conceived as being played out in relative isolation, another key finding of the paper is that given the nature of global interconnectedness, they inevitably intersect and interact. Confrontations, collisions and tensions are thus inevitable; the extent to which they might transform or undermine the multilateral order of rules and norms, institutions and regimes, and negotiation is an open yet fundamental question for the governance of the global political economy.

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 2018 and since prepared for inclusion in a Special Issue of *The Chinese Journal of Global Governance*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a discussion of these complex interactions, of the ways in which ‘instrumentalist’ and ‘normative’ approaches to them can be explored, and of the ways in which processes of ‘legalization’ can be used as a basis for analysis of the global political economy, see R. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, London: Routledge, 2002, Part II. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The paper focuses particularly on global multilateral institutions, although one implication of its argument is that there has arisen a set of partial multilateral institutions, such as the G2, G3, G7/8 and G20, that have assumed responsibility for some areas of governance in the global political economy and which attract varying levels of commitment from China, the EU and the US. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See M. Smith ‘The EU, the US and China: strategic engagement, political commitment and diplomatic interaction in multilateral arenas’, in Jing Men and Wei Shen (eds) *The EU, the US and China – Towards a New International Order?* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014, pp. 8-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See for example J. Goldstein, M. Kahler, R. Keohane and A.-M. Slaughter (eds) *Legalization and World Politics*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001; K. Raustiala and A.M. Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ in W.Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, Thousand Oaks, CA and London: SAGE, 2002; Slaughter, A.-M., *A New World Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004; A. Hurrell, ‘Norms and Ethics in International Relations’ in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*; A. Linklater, ‘A European Civilising Process?’ in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. J.G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation*, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See M. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders:transnational advocacy networks in international politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’, *International Organization* 53(4), 1999, pp. 695-732. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See for example European Parliament Resolution of 12th May 2016 on China’s market economy status (2016/2667 (RSP)). Related to this is the EU’s stance on anti-dumping, as reflected in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30th November 2009, *OJ* *L* 343, 22 December 2009, p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The argument in this section reflects previous work by the author and Ole Elgström on the European Union and international institutions/regimes: O. Elgström and M. Smith ‘The European Union and international regimes’ in K.E. Jørgensen and K. Laatikainen (eds) *Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: performance, policy, power*, London: Routledge 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See M. Barnett and R. Duval (eds), *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; R. Barnett and M. Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’; R. Keohane and J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: world politics in transition*, 3rd edition, London: Longman, 2001. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See for example M. Kahler and D. Lake (eds) *Governance in a Global Economy: political authority in transition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003; J. Grieco and G.J. Ikenberry, *State Power and World Markets: the international political economy*, New York: Norton, 2003; R. Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: the world economy in the 21st century*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See for example O Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism in International Relations’, *International Organization* 65(2) 2011, pp. 367-399. Much historical institutionalist analysis has been generated in studies of the European Union: see for example P Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: a historical-institutionalist analysis’ in W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds), *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. For discussion of the issues relating to IMF/WTO linkages, see for example: ‘The WTO in Relation to the Fund and the Bank; Competencies, Agendas, and Linkages’, in A. Krueger (ed) *The WTO as an International Organization*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998; D. Siegel, ‘Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: the Fund’s Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements’, *American Journal of International Law* 96(3), 2002, pp. 561-599. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. J. March and J. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: the organizational basis of politics*, New York: Free Press, 1989. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See for example M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, *International Organization* 52(4) 1998, pp. 887-917; R. Barnett and M. Finnemore, *Rules for the World: international organizations in global politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. J. March and J. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, *International Organization* 52(4) 1998, pp. 943-969. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See M. Smith, ‘Negotiating New Europes: the roles of the European Union’, *Journal of European Public Policy,* 7(5), 2000, pp. 806-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See Hopmann, T., *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press; R. Walton and R. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations*, 2nd edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991; O. Elgström and C. Jönsson, ‘Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-solving?’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(5), 2000, pp. 684-704. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See P. Kotzian, ‘Arguing and Bragaining in International Negotiations: on the application of the frame-selection model and its implications’, *International Political Science Review* 28(1), 2007, pp. 79-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See T. Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue”: communicative action in world politics’, *International Organization*, 54(1), 2000, pp. 1-39; H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and All That; communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations’, *European Journal of International Relations* 10(3), 2004, pp. 395-435. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See for example: E.M. Truman (ed) *Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005; Krueger, *The WTO as an International Organization*. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See Smith ‘The EU, the US and China: strategic engagement, political commitment and diplomatic interaction in multilateral arenas’. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. J. Ruggie (ed) *Multilateralism Matters: the theory and praxis of an organizational form*, New York: Columbia University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, Chapter 1; see also the chapter by Miles Kahler in the same volume: M. Kahler, ‘Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers’. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See for example G. Grevi, *The Interpolar World: a new scenario*, Occasional Paper 79, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2009; G. Grevi and A. De Vasconcelos (eds), *Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia*, Chaillot Paper 109, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2008; R. Alcaro, J. Peterson and E. Greco (eds), *The West and the Global Power Shift: transatlantic relations and global governance*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See R. Foot and A. Walter, *China, the United States and World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. This argument is developed at greater length in Smith, M. (2018) ‘The EU, the US and the Crisis of Contemporary Multilateralism’, *Journal of European Integration,* 40(5), 2018, pp. 539-553*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See A. Orsini, *The European Union with(in) International Organizations: commitment, consistency and effects across time*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See Minjiang Li, ‘Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and its Implications for Sino-US Relations’, *Global Governance* 17(3) 2011, pp. 331-351; M. Callaghan and P. Hubbard, ‘The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road’ *China Economic Journal* 9(2), pp. 116-139, DOI: 10.1080/17538963.1162970. *For* related discussion, see for example Jørgensen and Laatikainen (eds) *Routledge Handbook on the EU and International Institutions: performance, policy, power*. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See C. Bouchard, J. Peterson and N. Tocci (eds), *Multilateralism in the 21st Century: Europe’s quest for effectiveness*, London: Routledge, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Gowan, P. and Stokes, D., ‘Global Economy’ in M. Cox and D. Stokes (eds) *US Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; M. Cox, ‘The Economic Rise of a Superpower: from Washington to Trump’ in M. Cox and D. Stokes (eds) *US Foreign Policy*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. The arguments in this section draw upon Smith ‘The EU, the US and China’. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See L. Odgaard and S. Biscop, ‘The EU and China: partners in effective multilateralism?’ in D. Kerr and Liu Fei (eds), *The International Politics of EU-China Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; R. Zongze, ‘China-EU-US Relations: shaping a constructive future’ in D. Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider and Z. Hong (eds), *China-Europe Relations: perceptions, policies and prospects*, London: Routledge; C. Grant and K. Barysch, *Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order?* London: Centre for European Reform, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. J. Clegg, *China’s Global Strategy: towards a multipolar world*, London: Pluto; Grant and Barysch, *Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order?* [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. See Xi Jinping, ‘Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of our Times, Promote Global Growth’. Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Xinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum 2017. Davos, 17th January 2017. State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Found at [www.china.org.cn/node\_7247529/content\_40569136.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm) (1st August 2018); Xi Xinping, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characeristics for a New Era’. Report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Beijing, 18th October 2017. Found at [www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c\_136725942.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm) (1st August 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. See for example S. Breslin, ‘China and the global order: signalling threat or friendship?’ *International Affairs* 89(3) 2013, pp. 615-634 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. See M. Smith, ‘The EU, the US and Global Public Goods: competing models or two sides of the same coin?’ In R. Whitman (ed) *Normative Power Europe: theoretical and empirical perspectives*, London: Routledge; Bouchard, Peterson and Tocci, *Multilateralism in the 21st Century*. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. See R. Cooper, *The Post-Modern State and World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2000); Zongze, ‘China-EU-US Relations’. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. K. Möller, ‘Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the EU’, *China Quarterly*, March 2002, pp. 10-32; Odgaard and Biscop, ‘The EU and China’. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See R. Youngs and P. Solbes, ‘Europe is failing to shape the global governance debate’ <http://www.europesworld/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/Article> ; R. Youngs, *The EU’s Role in World Politics: a retreat from* liberal *internationalism*, London: Routledge, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. C. Grant, *Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power?* London: Centre for European Reform, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. R. Youngs and M. Smith, ‘‘The EU and the Liberal Order: Contingent Liberalism’, *International Spectator* 53(1), 2018, pp. 45-56. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See the work of G.John Ikenberry: *Liberal Leviathan: the origins, crisis and transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011; ‘The American liberal order; from creation to crisis’ in M. Cox and D. Stokes (eds) *US Foreign Policy*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. M. Smith, ‘The EU, the US and Global Public Goods’; Zongze, ‘China-EU-US Relations’. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. J. Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West’, *Foreign Affairs*, 87(1) January/February 2008, pp. 23-37; J. Ikenberry, ‘The American liberal order: from creation to crisis’. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. M. Smith, ‘European Responses to US Diplomacy: “special relationships”, transatlantic governance and world order’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 6, 2011, pp. 299-317. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. J. Peterson, ‘‘Present at the Destruction: The Liberal Order in the Trump Era’, *International Spectator* 53(1), pp. 28-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. R. Ross, Ø. Tunsjø and Z. Tuosheng (eds), *US-China-EU Relations: managing the new world order*, London: Routledge, 2010; Jing Men and Wei Shen (eds) *The EU, the US and China – towards a new international order?* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*. (Global Strategy Paper). Brussels: June 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)