EU-Japan Security Relations

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Abstract
As security threats are rapidly increasing both within and outside the EU, the EU is seeking allies to respond to such threats. Japan is an important trading partner of the EU, like the EU it espouses democratic values, and in a similar fashion to the EU is committed to the pursuance of international peace and stability and to effective multilateralism. Japan represents therefore an interesting case for an examination of whether or not the EU is able to cooperate with that country on a number of security areas and to explore why cooperation may exist in some security sectors (e.g., non-nuclear proliferation, cyber security) and not in others (e.g., regional security, climate change). The aim of the paper is to explore the extent to which the two partners not only express similar threat concerns, or make declarations about joint responses, but also adopt concrete measures in the pursuance of security cooperation, both at the bilateral and the multilateral or global level.

Key words: EU External Relations, EU-Japan security relations, security cooperation, Asia, Europe.

Introduction

While intense economic interactions and perceived common values have been the drivers of EU-Japan security relations, different geographic security environments between Europe and Asia and specific Japan-US defence ties have acted as constraints on this relationship. But despite these constraints, EU-Japan security relations have developed gradually and steadily over a forty-five year period. The evolution of the relationship has profited from the similar position both partners take on multilateralism and economic orientation. It has also benefitted from the establishment of the
Formation Declaration and the Action Plan of 1991 and 2001 respectively, and the introduction of the Strategic Partnership in 2003. These have given rise to regular high level contacts and extensive collaboration on such issues as multilateralism, non-proliferation and human security.

In part due to pressures from the international community to match economic strength with international security responsibility, e.g., with regard to international terrorism, and in part because of perceived threats arising within the respective European and Asian neighbourhoods, both actors have, over time, strengthened their internal and external security capacity (e.g., the EU via the Lisbon Treaty, and Japan via Article 9 of the Constitution) and have thought of ways to promote their bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. The heightening of security threats since 2012, such as that of Russia on European security, China (maritime) and North Korea (nuclear) on Asian security have further increased the need for more individual defence commitments and for EU-Japan security cooperation. Judging from the range of joint activities and commitments the EU and Japan have introduced over many years (Keck et al. 2013; Tanaka 2013; Ueta 2013) there appears to be considerable scope in EU-Japan security cooperation to enable both partners to rise to these challenges. It is the aim of this chapter, and the book more generally, to assess the scope of EU-Japan security relations in greater depth by examining more closely how these relations in individual security sectors have developed and are likely to be affected by the heightening of security threats.

By adopting a more micro oriented approach rather than the widely prevailing macro (general) oriented security analysis, the aim will be to produce a more differentiated view of EU-Japan security relations and to offer comparisons of the sectors in which cooperation either at the bilateral or multilateral level has occurred, or is likely to continue/discontinue, and areas in which cooperation has languished, or is likely to stagnate/progress. The simple assumption is that existing substantial economic interactions, shared political values and outlooks on global governance do not necessarily affect cooperation between Japan and the EU across a range of security sectors in a uniform fashion. Rather, the way the two actors perceive levels of threats in a given security sector and seek to respond to them might be a more decisive determinant for cooperation. For example, given the rise of cyber security concerns and problems with terrorism in the international domain, it might be expected that these two security sectors are on an upward trajectory in EU-Japan security relations. By spanning across a wide range of security areas, including military and non-military issues, the proposed exercise will help to provide scope and comparisons in the overall assessment of EU-Japan security relations. As a consequence a more in-depth as well as balanced view of EU-Japan security relations is likely to be achieved. The study will also provide information on the inter-actor EU-Japan relationships, e.g. which actor is more proactive (initiating joint actions) in the security relationship, or which actor is more determined to extend norms, value patterns or standards to the other.

Central to the investigation will be a systematic assessment of threat perceptions and associated responses by Japan and the EU on each of the proposed security areas, e.g., non-proliferation, cyber security, energy security. Furthermore, the intention is not only to establish whether there is convergence or divergence in the levels of threat perception and response between the EU and Japan across a range of security areas, but also to examine whether the existing levels of
convergence or divergence in threat perception and response correspond to similar levels of EU-Japan cooperation in given sectors. To explore which factors may promote or constrain whether given levels of convergence/divergence in threat perception and response correspond to or deviate from levels of EU-Japan cooperation in given security sectors, the influence of four potential intervening factors will examined. First, by tracing EU-Japan security cooperation over time, it might be the case that landmark EU-Japan decisions, such as the 1991 Foundation (The Hague) Declaration or the 2001 Action Plan, have had some influence on the levels of EU-Japan cooperation in given security sectors. Second, in contrast to institutional influences, as put forward by the ‘path dependency’ approach, it is important to capture EU-Japan cooperation which occurs through exogenous events, such as after natural disasters, like the Japanese Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011. Third, individual EU member states may constrain EU-Japan cooperation in given security areas. This factor will be linked to influences arising from internal changes within the EU (e.g., Brexit) and Japan (constitutional changes). Fourth, likely influences from so-called “third actors” (e.g., the role of the United States or Russia) in promoting or constraining levels of EU-Japan cooperation in given security areas will be taken into consideration. In terms of actual measurements of threat perceptions and cooperation, classifications of ‘high’, ‘low’ and ‘medium’ will be applied, assessing, on the one hand, the severity of the threat, and on the other, the extent of actual joint acts. (Further details on the respective categorisations are provided below.)

In the following, attention will first turn to an historical overview of EU-Japan security relations. This will involve a review of the main landmark decisions/actions and partnership agreements taken by the EU and Japan. It will continue with a treatment of conceptual issues which will guide the analysis in the chapter, and then provide some indication of how the substantive chapters of this book address the question of how and to what effect Japan and the EU are able to cooperate on a range of security matters at the bilateral and multilateral level.

**Historical overview of EU-Japan security relations**

Three main periods have marked EU-Japan security relations: 1959 to 1989, 1990 to 2000, 2001 to 2009 and a fourth is likely to emerge from 2011, and especially 2014, onward. EU-Japan relations began in 1959, one year after the establishment of the then European Economic Community (EC). In a formal sense, the EC established its delegation in Tokyo in 1974 and Japan followed suit with the establishment of a Mission to the EC in Brussels in 1979. In 1987 the Japanese Government conferred the title of “Ambassador” to the EC Commission’s Head of Delegation in Tokyo. However, the period 1959-89 consisted of turbulent trade interdependence, marked by numerous trade frictions, and very weak political links (De Prado 2014:3).

EU-Japan relations took on a more formalised character in the period 1990-2000, particularly through the 1991 Founding Declaration on EU-Japan political relations (European Communities 1991), in

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1 For a thorough review of EU-Japan relations between 1970 and 2012 see Keck et al. 2013.
which the two partners confirmed to have shared values, such as the rule of law and democracy, and to promote ‘negotiated solutions to international or regional tensions’ (European Communities 1991). It provided for annual summits, ministerial and parliamentary contacts and thematic dialogues. However, security only became a distinct feature in that relationship in the period 2001 to 2009 with the introduction of the Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation, entitled Shaping our Common Futures, in 2001 (MOFA 2001). Besides stressing the need to address international terrorism, environmental degradation, cyber attacks and secure energy supply, it also suggested the introduction of a strategic dialogue on East Asian security. The Action Plan was further reinforced with the establishment of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership in 2003, which encompasses political and security aspects.

However, the record of translating these objectives into concrete action was patchy, if not modest. Berkofsky puts this down to the fact that the Action Plan had envisaged too many areas of cooperation (over 100, mostly non-military ones) which in the end could not be implemented (Berkofsky 2012:265 and 278). Whilst acknowledging this point, Gilson also cites impeding causes emanating from “structural shifts in the global context within which Japan and the EU work and similar shifts in the very composition and nature of the two partners themselves” (Gilson 2016:797) which over a period of ten to twenty years have changed the context of earlier joint commitments, as laid out in either the Foundation Declaration of 1991 or the Action Plan of 2001. Moving from the causes to the consequences of this implementation failure, Tsuruoka suggests an “expectations deficit” due to Japan’s low expectations of Europe and concludes that “Tokyo has often disregarded the EU as its partner in international relations” (Tsuruoka 2008:113).

Developments since 2010, and especially 2014, in EU-Japan security relations can be deemed as a new period marked by attempts to address past failings more profoundly and to instil new life into the relationship. It also coincides with ongoing important geopolitical (involving the roles of China, Russia and the United States) as well as domestic changes in Japan and the EU. A start to these new attempts was made with the establishment of the EU-Japan High-Level Group (HLG) in 2010 and co-joined in March 2011 with the start of negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement alongside the parallel development of a binding political agreement, including a Free Trade Area and a Strategic Partnership Agreement. As pointed out by Reiterer, establishing a framework agreement with the EU, similar to the one concluded with the Republic of Korea, could facilitate EU-Japan defence cooperation (Reiterer 2015:12). It will be the task of this and the following chapters to explore whether and how progress is being made towards the implementation of these intended agreements. The chapter of this volume on economic security will be particularly relevant in this respect. Besides paying attention to the historical and empirical context, it is also important to establish what theoretical and conceptual tools might help to guide the assessment of EU-Japan security relations, which will follow next.

**Conceptualising EU-Japan Security Relations**
Given the strong emphasis both Japan and the EU place on liberal-institutional values and rule-based governance, both domestically and internationally, and as both seek to secure the fruits of their economic success in the international fora, a liberal-institutionalist framework provides some valuable orientation into EU-Japan security relations. Such an approach is further fostered by the fact that both actors are also large contributors to international aid and cooperation programmes, pursue extensive multilateral actions, support UN actions – though less by Japan with regard to UN peacekeeping – and champion the concept of human security. However, while the EU has historically emphasised cooperation and de-emphasised the “use of force”, Japan tends to be turning towards a more assertive and militarily oriented national foreign policy and to be deviating from the “shared sovereignty” concept of the EU (Tsuruoka, 2008:118). These deviations derive partially from Japan’s obligation under its alliance status with the United States, but have also grown in intensity since 2015 with the perceived bellicose North Korean nuclear behaviour and the assertive Chinese maritime policy in the East and South China Seas (Hughes 2016). The latter involve disputes over the Senkaku Diaoyu islands and the Chinese declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea. As concerns grow over Russian involvement in the Ukraine and Russia develops a more threatening posture towards the Baltic countries, and as questions are being raised about NATO’s credibility by President Trump it might also be possible that the EU will adopt a more military oriented posture. But for the time being, while the EU espouses to a large extent post-Westphalian characteristics, Japan’s security culture is of a ‘hybrid’ kind, falling between a Westphalian and a post-Westphalian approach (Fukui 2010). However, while noticeable, these differences do not seem to adversely affect EU-Japan security relations, and therefore make a strictly neo-realist orientation of EU-Japan security relations less applicable.

Furthermore, the institutionalist aspect is also strongly anchored in the bilateral ties between Japan and the EU, as signified in the 1991 Foundation Declaration and the 2001 Action Plan and the 2003 Strategic Partnership. While Gilson rejects historical institutionalism and its element of “path dependency” as a useful approach in the assessment of EU-Japan relations (Gilson 2016), nonetheless there might be security areas where such an approach is more relevant or less relevant. As part of the four so-called intervening factors (mentioned above) between levels of threat perception and levels of cooperation in given sectors, attention will be paid primarily, in the following chapters of this volume, to the impact of institutional factors, such as the landmark EU-Japan agreements and the various institutional dialogues which underpin this relationship. While theoretical tools like liberal-institutionalism and historical institutionalism help to inform about the nature of EU-Japan relations, the extent to which Japan and the EU engage with each other cooperatively in the security domain or pursue different – and possibly even conflicting – strategies requires thorough empirical research across a number of dimensions – as provided in the contributions to this volume.

**Key concepts in the analysis of EU-Japan security relations**

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2 The EU and Japan provide sixty per cent of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (Reiterer 2015:6).
This exercise will be guided by the use of a number of key concepts that serve as heuristic tools for subsequent empirical analysis which are linked in their practical application. Convergence (and its negative counterpart divergence) is defined in this context as the degree of policy conformity the EU and Japan are able (or unable) to achieve in a given security dimension with regard to threat perceptions and associated responses. Japan and the EU may agree (or disagree) on which security threats they find more salient and on how to respond to perceived threats. For example, in view of the rise in cyber attacks at regional and global level, both may express similar levels of concern and policy response. Cooperation is defined as the degree of actual security cooperation between the EU and Japan, whether in the shape of formal agreements or of joint actions (involving either material resources or firm commitments to joint standards) in each of the security dimensions under investigation. However, whilst it is plausible to assume that there is a strong link between the degree of policy conformity in threat perception and levels of cooperation, the possibility that cooperative arrangements or joint actions can arise independent of any such link cannot be discounted altogether: cooperation might occur spontaneously as a consequence of exogenous events such as natural disasters, something that must remain a potential scenario to be found in empirical research.

Assessing Convergence and Cooperation

This discussion of convergence and cooperation as key heuristic concepts in the analysis of security relations raises questions about how to measure developments in this respect. It is necessary therefore to elaborate briefly here on the specific criteria used in this study. Convergence is assessed by the extent to which uniform positions exist between the EU and Japan on the perception of threats and on the associated response with regard to ten specific security dimensions. This involves examining how each partner ranks the ten security areas on a scale between ‘high’ and ‘low’. Cooperation is assessed by examining the extent to which the EU and Japan have engaged in joint agreements or actions either at the bilateral or the multilateral level. Joint agreements can be in the form of Summit declarations or the adoption (signing and ratifying) by both partners of, for example, UN conventions. But it will be important to distinguish the extent to which cooperation is merely at the level of ‘intentions’ (rhetoric), or involve a number of actual joint actions: put differently, whether the prospects for cooperation between the EU and Japan remain at the level of discourse rather than practice. Joint actions can, at the low end, take the form of information exchanges on counter-terrorism activities, organized crime or cyber security and, at the high end, the joint anti-piracy maritime operations between the EU and Japan off the coast of Somalia. With regard to joint actions it will be important to examine: the type, frequency or length of action; the material or personnel sources involved in these actions; the temporal or lasting effect which can be attributed to them; the springboard or multiplier implication which can be associated with them. It will also be interesting to establish whether cooperation is more pronounced at the bilateral rather than at the multilateral level and whether there is strong relationship in performance between these two levels or none at all.
Overall, levels of EU-Japan cooperation in the ten security areas will be ranked on a scale between ‘high’ and ‘low’.

A further criterion to be assessed is the extent to which cooperation is in line with the levels of perceived threats, or exists separately, for example, as exogenous events—possibly one-off—response to events such as natural disasters or pandemics. Potential differences in the levels of threat perception and levels of cooperation are most likely subject to barriers in EU-Japan security cooperation. The concern here will be with eliciting existing obstacles or what can be deemed intervening variables. These include internal factors such as differences among EU institutions and/or between EU institutions and member states, and manoeuvres by Japan to divide or undermine EU consensus in selectively dealing with EU institutions (Council or Commission) and individual EU member states. They also involve the roles the United States, Russia and China play in either promoting or hindering EU-Japan security cooperation. There might also be situations where issues of sovereignty might act as barriers to cooperation. Rather than merely bringing to light the similarities or dissimilarities in the differences between levels of threat perception and cooperation, which would tend to portray a static view, the aim is to explore the dynamic element and to examine whether, over time, changes have taken place and/or the force of the argument for similar levels of convergence has either weakened or strengthened. An illustration of the intervening variables between the levels of security threat perception individually and jointly by Japan and the EU (seen as the independent variable) and the levels of EU-Japan security cooperation across the ten security sectors (deemed as the dependent variable) is provided in Diagram 1.

In the following, a number of pertinent issues related to the chosen unit of analysis are discussed. This will be followed by a treatment of how the adopted conceptual framework will be applied in the book.

**The Levels of Analysis Problem in Studying EU-Japan Relations**

The choice to focus in this analysis on EU-Japan security relations, rather than on the security relations of the EU’s member states with Japan, or else on what is sometimes loosely referred to as ‘Japan-European’ security relations, may require some explanation. First of all, this volume is intended as a contribution to the literature on the EU’s external relations and in particular on its evolving role as a security actor. From modest beginnings, the EU has developed a wide-ranging security policy (e.g., with the Lisbon Treaty), and how this shapes up in relations with Japan—a traditional ally and one of its strategic partners—is of considerable scholarly interest and political relevance.

The book does recognize that, undoubtedly, individual EU member states such as, for example, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have a longer and more involved security engagement with Japan than the EU does. In the case of France and the United Kingdom, this greater involvement
is the result of a combination of factors such as their status as nuclear powers, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and their defence cooperation agreements with Japan, involving the development of military equipment (Ueta 2013:2). Equally, Germany and Japan have a long tradition of economic and political ties and have shared interests on the basis of their strongly export-oriented economies. Such bilateral security relations may provide interesting – even important – insights, but the analysis of those respective bilateral security relations would not provide a full account of what EU-Japan security relations entail in scope or degree.

Most importantly, focusing on the member states rather than on the European Union and its common institutions and policies would downplay – and risks neglecting – the host of instances where the EU has demonstrated that it does indeed constitute a security actor in its own right when dealing with Japan. Examples are the anti-piracy operation on the coast of Somalia, the climate change negotiations and counter-terrorism measures. Consequently, the choice in this book has been to focus predominantly on the European level as the main level of analysis while incorporating, where appropriate, the role of member states when examining the specific security dimensions which have been chosen for the analysis of EU-Japan security relations. In line with this choice, the following section turns to the theoretical and conceptual orientation of EU-Japan political and security relations.

**Heuristic Devices Informing the Analysis: Structure and Interests**

Although the main task in the following chapters of the book is to undertake a mapping exercise or inventory of different security areas, showing in which aspects of EU security cooperation there is greater convergence or cooperation and in which there is less, it will include consideration of the underlying causes which influence EU-Japan security relations. Consideration will therefore be given to factors such as major policy changes of the United States, Russia or China, or structural changes in the geo-political landscape, e.g., the end of the Cold War. Other factors, though perhaps not at the same level of significance, are internal developments such as Brexit or lack of cohesion in the EU, or natural disasters in Japan (e.g., the earthquake and tsunami of 2011). Both external and internal influences affect the national interest of either partner and with it their relationship with each other. As Simmons et al. suggest, the effects of the internal and external changes can either promote or impede “interdependent decision making” where policy choices of one country are shaped by the choices of others (Simmons et al. 2006), in this case the decisionmaking and joint actions in the field of EU-Japan security relations. The following will explore in more detail the three aspects which are seen to affect EU-Japan security cooperation in this manner.

“Third actors”

EU-Japan security relations do not take place in a vacuum but are embedded in or affected by so-called “third-actor” relations. The United States, China and Russia play a particularly prominent role in this relationship due to their economic and military capacities and geopolitical interests. The following
is a brief account of how these actors interact with EU-Japan security relations. It is to provide the basis for further analysis in the subsequent chapters of the book.

Due to its defence arrangements with both European and Asian countries, the US’ role impinges simultaneously on EU-Japan security relations. However, given the specifics of the 1952 US-Japan defence treaty, implications for Japan are more direct than for their European partners (Gilson 2016:794). There are also differences between the way the US and Japan relate to China and the way the EU does. Whereas Japan and the United States see China’s rise as an economic and political power and its aggressive maritime stance in the East and South China Sea as a threat or as a rival power whose influence in the Pacific Ocean needs to be contained (in the US case by military means), the EU emphasises partnership and the use of economic and political tools in its dealing with China (Christiansen et al. 2016). Not having a military presence in Asia, but being interested in Asian stability, the EU supports United States’ efforts to maintain peace and order in Asia. But at the same time the EU seeks to preserve a certain amount of distance or independence from United States policy, e.g., avoiding being dragged against its will into potential military conflicts between China and the United States over Taiwan or in the South China Sea. It often tends therefore to pursue a neutral role with respect to China, which causes irritation on the part of the US and Japan. Examples are when the EU tried in the early 2000s to lift the arms embargo (introduced by the West after the Tiananmen Square incident), or when the EU become a stakeholder in the Chinese inspired Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). Japan also perceives the EU Asian policy as too China-focussed.

The establishment of the AIIB and –even more–Chinese plans to establish the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project also bring Russia into the equation. As OBOR would traverse Central Asia, it encroaches on Russian interests in the region. To secure its interest in the wider Eurasia region, as well as to counteract Western pressures and economic sanctions (introduced after the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian role in the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine), Russia has introduced the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Moreover, it has also tried to woo China as an ally through the agreement to supply large quantities of natural gas to China. As the EU sees synergies between OBOR and its own infrastructure projects for Europe (the Juncker Plan) there are likely some interesting dynamics to emerge in China-EU-Russia triangular relations, which in turn have the potential to affect EU-Japan security relations. In the wider context, Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict and its inflexibility with regard to the sovereignty of the Kurill islands are also likely to influence EU-Japan security relations.

With the announcement of the Trump Presidency in 2017 to conduct an “America First Policy”, to reconsider its foreign and security policy commitments with partners and allies, and to redefine relations with actors such as Russia and China, there will likely be considerable spill-overs from the repercussions of these changes into EU-Japan security relations. In their selective examination of
individual security sectors, contributors will be advised to explore the extent to which “third actors” have influenced, or are likely to do so, given levels of EU-Japan cooperation.

**Structural Factors**

The EU and Japan not only have important economic links but also represent global trade strength, representing respectively the world’s first and third largest economies and accounting for a third of the world’s GDP. Whereas Japan is the sixth largest source of EU imports, the EU is Japan’s third largest trading partner. Because of dependency on external trade and to have access to energy sources and raw materials, both the EU and Japan have considerable interest in ensuring that international trade routes are secured (Korteweg 2014), and have put this to a practical test in the joint anti-piracy naval operations in the Gulf of Aden. The link between economic interaction and security, at the bilateral (EU-Japan) and multilateral levels, is hence a significant factor in EU-Japan relations, and a main reason why the economic dimension of security is the subject of a distinct chapter in this study. Japan and the EU are also “interested in enhancing their international standing in order to overcome their respective images as ‘economic giants and political dwarfs’ and to reposition themselves as significant actors in a changing global order” (Mayer 2015:4). This orientation or commitment was reiterated in a speech by the Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Kishida in Brussels in 2015 in which he outlined three pillars for Japan’s policy towards Europe – cooperation for global peace and stability; addressing global challenges together; promoting economic partnership (Kishida 2015:17).

A second structural change with implications for EU-Japan security relations relates to change in the nature of security threats. While the Cold War was dominated by an overlay of a global conflict structure, the post-Cold War security landscape has increasingly been dominated by regional security interactions (Buzan and Wæver 2003) and regional integration dynamics (Hettne 2003). A core concern in this respect is the perceived rise of sub-system violent conflicts, often discussed under the header of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2005). Generally, non-traditional security threats have risen in importance not only in Europe but also in Asia, including climate change, the threat of viral pandemics, the pursuit of food and energy security, as well as the effects of regional conflicts (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013). As a consequence, non-traditional aspects of security have become more prominent in EU-Japan security relations, although the return of geopolitics could shift relations back towards traditional security (Reiterer 2015). While stress is given to non-traditional security threats, issues of regional conflicts, military security and nuclear non-proliferation are also reflected in the selection of the security dimensions of this study.

**The Role of National Interest**

Structural and “third actor” influences can be deemed as having two types of effect in EU-Japan security relations. One is when the interests of both partners are more or less equally affected by external influences, which is likely to lead to joint actions. The other type occurs when external factors
affect one of the partners, which then in turn affect EU-Japan security relations. Examples of the first kind relate to the end of the Cold War, which gave rise to the EU-Japan Foundation Declaration, or to the occurrence of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the mid-to-late 2000s, which led to joint EU-Japan anti-piracy naval operations in that region. A clear fall-out from President Trump’s “America First Policy” on EU-Japan security relations had by mid-2017 not yet emerged.

Examples of the second kind can be seen in Japanese reactions to the bellicose North Korean nuclear stance and the assertive Chinese maritime policy in the East and South China Sea (leading to constitutional changes, on the one hand, and more demands for US protection on the other). Although the EU is seeking to secure safe sea routes for its trade, including through the East and South China Sea (Ueta 2013:2), it cannot provide actual military support and/or to move beyond its self-imposed neutral role of seeking diplomatic or UN solutions to the maritime tensions; hence it acts as an impediment on Japanese-EU security relations. With regard to European concerns over the Russian annexation of the Crimea and its role in the Eastern Ukraine conflict, the refugee crisis and the spate of terrorist attacks on European soil, Japan has supported sanctions against Russia and expressed support to Europe on these matters, and has even provided technical/financial support for EU civilian/military missions in Africa (e.g., Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Although Japan was outspoken in criticising the Brexit vote at the G20 summit in 2016, it is too early to foresee what its likely consequences on EU-Japan security relations will be.

The derived heuristic devices of “third actor”, structure and interests will inform the empirical analysis of this study, by providing guidance as to why certain levels of convergence or divergence appear between the EU and Japan in the assessment of threat perception and associated responses. These levels will then act as a benchmark for the assessment of actual EU-Japan security cooperation.

Overview of the contributions to this volume

The substantive chapters covering the chosen security dimensions are structured along the lines of five core themes arising from the previous discussion: (a) threat perceptions; (b) response to threats; (c) the degree of convergence/divergence on threat perception and response; (d) the incidence of cooperation at the bilateral level; and (e) cooperation at the multilateral level. After having briefly explored the development of the particular security dimension, authors will examine the threat perceptions and policy response preferences of each of the EU and Japan in the respective security dimension. This will also involve an examination of the existing barriers to convergence by considering the implications of changes in terms of external (geopolitical and “third party actors”) and internal developments within the EU and Japan. In a second step, the analysis will identify the degree to which policy convergence in threat perceptions and response exists between the EU and Japan. The presence or absence of policy convergence will then be related to an assessment of the degree of cooperation which the EU and Japan have undertaken in a given security dimension either at the bilateral or the multilateral level. Attention will also be paid to whether joint cooperative actions in the
security field occur in the absence of convergence, for example, through spontaneous joint actions in response to natural disasters. While this step will examine the evidence for actual or potential cooperation, it will also examine the extent to which barriers exist both within the EU (problems of cohesion), between the EU and Japan (for example, attempts by Japan to undermine EU cohesion), and from “third party” influences on EU-Japan security cooperation.

The book covers a range of traditional and non-traditional security dimensions which are examined by teams of authors along these lines. Specifically, the ten security dimensions that have been selected for this analysis are:

1. military security
2. regional security
3. non-proliferation
4. terrorism and organized crime
5. climate and energy security
6. human security
7. civil protection
8. cyber security
9. economic security
10. migration and immigration.

The choice to focus on these security dimensions is justified in terms of the explicit reference that both Japanese official policy papers as well as key EU documents such as the 2001 ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ (European Commission 2001), the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council 2003), the 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (European Union 2008), the 2007 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (European Council 2008) (modified in June 2012), and the EU’s Global Strategy (European Union 2016) make to these particular security areas.

The ten security dimensions have also been selected in part because of the expectation that they induce different cooperation characteristics. One assumption here is that there may be a variation between higher and lower levels of cooperation across these areas. Medium to high levels of cooperation might be expected for the chapters on: climate change and energy security (Biedenkopf and Ohta); economic security (Christiansen, Defraigne and Kubo); human security (Harnisch and Masujima); cyber security (Christou and Nitta); non-proliferation (Casarini and Tsuruoka); and civil protection (Dorussen, Tago and Madokoro). These are areas where either the common perception of threats has risen over a considerable period of time or where international norms, collaboration or regulatory arrangements have promoted the adoption of similar policy approaches between the EU and Japan (for example, ensuring that international trade routes are secured, or that measures are adopted in response to climate change).
In contrast, low levels of cooperation might be expected for chapters dealing with military security (Duke and Akutsu); regional security cooperation (Diez and Tsubouchi) and immigration/migration (Koff, Okabe and Akashi). Although, there are internal EU differences with regard to immigration or migration, the EU’s policy line is more flexible on this policy field than Japan. In part this is due to the EU’s free movement (Schengen) policy. The security dimensions of military and regional are more closely associated with the different security concerns (proximity or intensity) of the two respective partners, or the support they can expect from each other in coping with the threats. As suggested by Berkofsky, the EU’s ability to either help to protect Japan against aggressive acts, or to secure peace in a wider sense in the Asia region, is seen in Japan as very limited (Berkofsky 2012:270). However, partly due to the Crimea annexation by Russia and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, partly because of US pressures on the European NATO allies to increase their defence expenditures and partly because of Brexit, the EU has taken steps since mid-2016 to mount a defence component. For example, the EU agreed in March 2017 to create a new military planning and conduct capability within the existing EU Military Staff of the European External Action Service and to enable joint rapid-reaction forces to be sent into action in Africa or Middle East (European Council 2017). Also the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) paper of 2016 invokes the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’, the ability to decide and implement EU security policy without relying on the United States. While the EU is still far away from this goal, potential negative fall-outs from the Trump presidency on the position of NATO may make it more urgent for Europe to invest in the development of military capabilities and build effective command and control structures (Bond and Besch 2016). Interestingly, the EUGS also recommends a strengthening of the Common Security and Defence Policy Partnership policy with partner organisations and partner countries (Council of the EU 2016:30). As there is already some collaboration between the EU and Japan in the EU’s anti-piracy mission in Gulf of Aden, this policy might lead to further cooperation with Japan.

Conclusion

EU-Japan security relations are complex, rich on declarations and prone to bouts of inactivity, if not occasional disregard in each other’s concerns. In one sense these drawbacks are surprising given that every year at EU–Japan Summits the two partners reconfirm that they are ‘close partners’, ‘natural partners’ or ‘strategic partners’, and that they have already established a “strong, longstanding and dynamic relationship” (Higashino 2016). Moreover, the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership can be considered as being one of the EU’s most valued Strategic Partnerships (Mayer 2015:1). The relationship is also served by a rich tapestry of institutional links, such as the annual summit meeting, the foreign ministerial meetings, Political Director’s meetings, the HLG, the Strategic Dialogue on East Asia Security Environment, Strategic Dialogue on Central Asia Security Environment, and a number of working groups dealing with different regions and themes (e.g., non-proliferation) and the UN. In addition, the EU has stressed through various statements, such as the 2007 Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (modified in June 2012), its
potential role in promoting confidence-building measures and regional integration in Asia. It has also signed the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia in 2012.

In another sense, however, these meetings and declarations conceal existing underlying differences between the two partners over their respective security interests and attendant security ties with the United States. In many ways, the EU has been successful in promoting peace and stability in its neighbourhood, mostly through its enlargement strategy and in a more limited way through its European Neighbourhood Policy. Although these EU efforts have been supported by similar enlargement NATO strategies, they can be considered as being largely independent of US security ties. In contrast, Japanese regional security concerns, such as over the North Korea’s nuclear threat and assertive Chinese maritime actions in the East and South China Sea, require US protection. In addition, the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 continues to bind Tokyo to the foreign policy decisions of Washington today (Gilson 2016:794). By contrast, the EU’s ability to either help to protect Japan against aggressive acts, or to secure peace in a wider sense in the Asia region, is seen in Japan as very limited. As a consequence observers come to the view that the record of EU–Japan cooperation on political and security issues in East Asia has been largely disappointing (Cameron 2013; Tsuruoka 2011, Gilson 2016), and that EU–Japan relations can be described as reluctant or awkward (e.g., Nuttal 1996) or entail a history of unfulfilled promises, or “untapped potential” (Vanoverbeke 2013). It is perhaps unsurprising that many of the disappointing statements about EU-Japan security relations have come from the Japanese side; unsurprising because most of the EU-Japan initiatives for greater cooperation (e.g., the Foundation Declaration and the Action Plan) have come from the Japanese side rather than the EU.

However, despite much of the negative recording, it is important not to overlook that the common stance both partners take on liberal values and trade, multilateral action and rule-based governance are important drivers of EU-Japan security relations. As in any type of relationship there are uneven developments across a range of actions and it is important to explore the relationship more fully and to establish in which security areas there is more or less cooperation. Moreover, it is important to determine how newly emerging changes in the domestic or external environment affect EU-Japan security cooperation across a range of areas. For example, while the UK decision to leave the EU is likely to have significant repercussions on the role of the EU as effective actor, it is important to establish how this will affect different security areas. Similarly, while the so-called ‘Abe Doctrine’ has “the potential to set Japan on a new international trajectory” (Hughes 2016:2), the repercussions might vary across a range of security areas. In terms of external changes, EU-Japan relations might likely be affected the US Trump Presidency, which could affect US security commitments to Japan and NATO. The growing occurrence of cyber attacks are another likely external factor affecting EU-Japan security relations.

It may therefore be that individual issues gain in prominence in EU-Japan security relations while others linger. Already, the EUGS focuses less on the role of Strategic Partnerships and puts more
emphasis on practical or feasible areas of cooperation, such as on Japanese participation in EU crisis management missions in places like Africa. This dovetails with Gilson’s suggestion that "Japan and the EU need to wipe the slate clean, to implement functional and workable agendas, based on contemporary mutual interests and not constrained by outdated and unworkable structural or normative frames of references" (Gilson 2016:803). These workable agendas will be part of the proposed investigation into what makes EU-Japan cooperation succeed in some and not in other security areas.

The following ten chapters will provide a mapping exercise or inventory of different security dimensions, showing in which aspects of EU security cooperation there is greater convergence or cooperation and in which there is less. Expectations are that such an exercise will provide a more differentiated picture of the various facets of security policy than those often associated with a one-dimensional (for example, military, environmental or cyber security) treatment of EU-Japan security relations.

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Diagram 1: Causal Interactions in EU-Japan Security Cooperation