Unpacking the social (GAL/TAN) dimension of party politics: Euroscepticism and party positioning on Europe’s “other”

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Abstract. How do parties’ positions on the social (GAL/TAN) dimension of political contestation condition their stance on European integration? What constitutes the meaningful boundaries of the social dimension and how do these boundaries vary across countries and contexts? In this paper, we probe deeper into the content of the social dimension, which remains under-theorized and underutilized in explaining party positioning on the European project. Using several rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey we evaluate how party positioning on social issues, like lifestyle choice, the protection of civil liberties, and immigration, differs across Western and Eastern Europe. We find that, while the components that constitute the social dimension are more stable in the West, the relationship between the social dimension and EU support is more clear in the East.

Introduction:

How do parties’ positions on the social dimension of political contestation condition their stance on European integration? What constitutes the meaningful boundaries of the social dimension and how do these boundaries vary across countries and contexts? More specifically, in a time of marked public hostility towards globalization, immigration, and ethnic minorities, how do parties incorporate rhetoric of Europe’s “other” into their political platforms?

Research concerned with mapping the dimensionality of party competition in Europe shows that three dimensions exist: the economic left-right, the social GAL/TAN and the pro-/anti-European integration dimensions. In this paper, we probe deeper into the content of the social dimension, which hitherto remains under-theorized and underutilized in explaining party positioning on the European project.

No precise definition exists as to what constitutes the boundaries of the social dimension of political contestation, and the term encompasses a wide array of non-economic issues such as national sovereignty, immigration, and lifestyle. Although the literature acknowledges that parties have had to incorporate some elements of the social dimension into their party platforms, the full range of these elements has not been explored in detail in empirical analyses. Some authors simply argue that European party politics can be reduced to a single dimension that bundles disparate issues into an overarching left/right dimension, while others focus solely on the nationalism/supranationalism dimension.

We contend that party positions on various social issues are key predictors of party Euroscepticism in their own right. In particular, we are interested in the ways that parties incorporate discourse over immigration, ethnic minorities, civil liberties, and lifestyle choice into
their positions on the EU. We test our theory using three waves (2006-2014) of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data on party positioning towards integration. Our primary focus lies in explaining the similarities and differences between the old-15 member states and the new Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). While there is evidence that the patterns of political contestation in the newer members has aligned with those in the West, the legacy of communism in the former set of countries has produced distinct regional dynamics in how the “other” is perceived and constructed by Eastern European parties. Historically, xenophobic and Islamaphobic rhetoric has been more prevalent among (radical) right-wing parties in the West, while hostility towards ethnic minorities has been the purview of their CEEC counterparts.

What are the dimensions of party competition?

Three dimensions structure party political competition within Europe. The first is an economic, left/right dimension that is primarily concerned with wealth redistribution, the welfare state, and regulation of the economy (Marks et al. 2006). The Left generally supports greater economic regulation, while the Right is generally more supportive of greater individual economic freedom. The second dimension is a cultural dimension—the so-called “new politics” dimension—that has gained prevalence since the postmaterialist revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s. This dimension captures several noneconomic issues—for example, environmental protection, lifestyle choices, immigration and ethnic minority issues, etc.—and is therefore much more varied than the economic dimension. In this article, we refer to this dimension using the GAL/TAN acronym (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). “Green, Alternative, Liberal” parties typically support more expansive personal freedoms—greater civil liberties, same-sex marriage, a
greater role for citizens in governing, etc. Conversely, parties on the “Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalism” end of the spectrum typically reject these ideas, favoring instead law and order; tradition; the belief that the government should be a strong moral authority; etc. Finally, the third is a European dimension that is primarily structured around support for EU integration. Centrist parties tend to be more supportive of the EU while parties of both extremes tend to be more euroskeptic, though for differing reasons (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks et al. 2006; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012).

Matthew Gabel (1998) argues that the liberalization of EU markets through European integration affects citizens of different educational and socioeconomic backgrounds in differing ways. Low income, low skill workers are often negatively affected by integration; conversely, high income, high skill workers are often able to capitalize on market liberalization to significant personal benefit. In addition, liberalization of capital markets will adversely affect low-income workers by making it easier for capital to move to productive areas. Thus, it becomes harder to force capital-owners to accede to demands to maintain the high wages upon which these low-income workers depend. Finally, Gabel argues that proximity to a border with another EU member will prove beneficial due to increased economic interaction between neighboring countries.

Thus, Gabel presents a set of clear “winners”—high-income, high-skill workers; the wealthy; those living near borders—and “losers”—low-income, low-skill workers; the poor; those living away from borders—from integration. Given this dichotomy of economic winners and losers, it is possible to infer party support for integration based off a party’s expected median voter. For parties whose median voter falls into the “economic winner” category, we can expect a stronger support for integration; conversely, parties whose median voter falls into the “economic losers” category should display less support for integration.
Similarly, Clifford Carrubba (1997) identifies national “winners” and “losers” from integration. Specifically, he examines net national contributions to the EU budget to show that transfer payments from the EU are often used to further the integration process. He shows that budget contributions reflect the domestic concerns within each nation, and refutes the notion that transfer payments are made out of “fairness” whereby the richer states give a “helping hand” to the poorer states (Carrubba 1997, 469). Unsurprisingly, he finds that states that give more to the EU budget than they receive—i.e. are net-contributors—tend to be less supportive of integration, while states that receive more from the Union than they give—i.e. are net-recipients—tend to be more supportive of integration.

Figure 1: Western European Party Families, 2014

![Western European Party Families, 2014](image)
Figure 1 shows the alignment of party families in Western Europe in 2014. In Western Europe, party competition is strongly clustered in the Left-Gal and Right-Tan quadrants. Those parties that are economically left—the social democrats, greens, and the radical left—also tend to be more-or-less socially "liberal." Over time, there has been a proliferation of the extremes and a general polarization of party families. There are fewer parties occupying a centrist position—the Left-Gal and Right-Tan blocks seem to have consolidated toward the extremes. This polarization is not unexpected, however. As the radical left and radical right have grown in influence, mainstream parties have adopted radical rhetoric in an attempt to capture new voters and have therefore shifted their ideological positions toward the respective extreme. This has been especially true of the Christian democrats, conservatives, and other mainstream right parties (Mudde 2007; March 2011).

Similarly, Figure 2 maps the parties of Eastern Europe onto the two dimensional competition space. As Marks et al. (2006, 159) explain, this pattern is best explained by the legacy of communism in Eastern Europe and the post-communist transition to market liberalism. Communism in Eastern Europe was a Left-Tan phenomenon—it provided greater levels of economic equality than in market liberal societies, but did so by suppressing dissent and alternative lifestyles. Post-communist reform in Eastern Europe has therefore been focused on implementing free markets and on opening the political sphere. These trends have run hand-in-hand with the general effects of increased globalization. Those parties that represent the “losers” of the transition process—the rural, the elderly, non-English speakers, the poorly educated, the unemployed, and low-skill workers—attempt to ameliorate its effects by supporting tradition and economic egalitarianism, i.e. Left-Tan policies (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). In contrast, parties supported by the transition “winners” favor market liberal policies and greater
social freedoms, i.e. Right-Gal policies.

**Figure 2: Eastern European Party Families, 2014**

Comparing Central and Eastern Europe with the West:

Our broad argument is that parties compete on both the economic and social dimensions, and that party positions on social issues largely inform their stance towards European integration. At the same time, we maintain that there are significant differences in the party space and competition structure between the West and the East. First, we argue that the Eastern European party space is much “noisier” and exhibits greater instability, owing to the relative newness of the
social dimension in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and their post-communist legacy. This leads to greater to factor indeterminacy in the CEEC, as we demonstrate in the empirical analysis below. Second, we expect that the way parties position themselves on the social dimension produces divergent outcomes on integration support in the two regions. In the West, positioning on either extreme of the GAL/TAN dimension produces Euroscepticism, while in the East, Eurosceptic party attitudes are found primarily on the TAN end of the spectrum. Finally, we assert that the components of the social dimension that inform support for integration in the West (i.e., immigration, multiculturalism) are different from those in the East (i.e., ethnic minority rights, religion). Simultaneously, we acknowledge that the time element, particularly the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, conditions the salience of these components in both regions.

Traditional comparisons of party competition in the East and West are rooted in Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage theory and assess the ways in which party ideology constrains political space and party positioning on integration (Mair 1997; Marks et al. 2006). Western parties are the byproducts of centuries-old political cleavages, generating a strong link between ideologically stable parties and cognitively mobilized voters capable of discerning amongst various economic and social policies. The onset of rapid and, to some degree unexpected, democratization in the East, following the collapse of communism, does not conform to the protracted evolution of the Western European party space. Instead, the CEEC have skipped the historical trajectory of cleavage-based mass parties, and arrived directly at the strategic, issue-oriented party organizations found in the West (Lewis 2000; Rovny 2015).

The result is a fragmented and volatile party space that is conditioned by top-down party formation processes. According to Ost’s pessimistic assessment of 1990s Eastern Europe (1993), social groups in post-communist societies do not have a clear sense of what is in their best interest,
and are thus susceptible to the rhetoric of charismatic leaders, while disregarding ideology-based competition. Because the party space is relatively new, the opportunity structures for entering the electoral arena are significantly different than in the West. New parties without clearly-defined platforms or single-issue parties can crop up easily, thereby “muddying” the waters of the party space (Jasiewicz 2003; Sitter 2003). This is reflected in the fact that Eastern European party systems have a significantly higher number of parties competing in any given election (Bielasiak 2005), while party mergers and splits are common.

We reject this overtly pessimistic view of the Eastern European party space to some extent, but do allow for more volatility in the East, particularly as it relates to the social dimension. Time, globalization and the EU’s geopolitical pull have caused convergence between the East and the West, particularly in the party arena (Lewis 2000; Mudde 2007). Surveys also show that a majority of Eastern European voters can place themselves on the economic left-right scale, although there are twice as many “don’t knows” than in the West, and many people places themselves at political extremes (McAllister and White 2007). Hence, we expect to see a meaningful degree of party system crystallization in the CEEC, but less so in the social dimension, which is considerably newer than the economic left-right dimension.

**Hypothesis 1:** Eastern European party systems exhibit more noise in the social dimension than Western European party systems.

Kitschelt (1992), for example, argues that Eastern European politics are structured in predictable patterns that marry the economic right with social liberalism, on the one hand, and the economic left with social conservativism, on the other (Evans and Whitfield 1993; Sitter 2002; Marks et al. 2006; March 2011). This reflects the communist legacy and the opportunities afforded
to new/opposition and ex-communist parties following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Eastern European communism blended left-wing economic policy, rooted in economic equality, with socially conservative policies that enforced traditional family values and suppressed public dissent. Opposition parties, where they existed, mobilized voters on the reform of the existing system by demanding free market capitalism and political liberalization. Following communism’s demise, these parties demanded a clean break with the past, which they coupled with EU membership and adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria. Communist parties were faced with the stark choice of rebranding as social democrats, the only electorally viable option, or conceding permanent defeat (March 2011). Those that reformed typically adopted a “nationally authentic socialism” that restored domestic legitimacy, stressed a domestic social heritage, and removed the stigma of identifying with a failed project (Mahr and Nagel 1995), while maintaining the importance of traditional state authority.

While Kitschelt makes a theoretically compelling case, more recent studies present a more nuanced picture that shows party system multidimensionality across both regions and within specific countries (Evans and Whitfield 1993; Bakker et al. 2012, Rovny and Edwards 2012; Rovny 2015). Evans and Whitfield (1993) argue that the structure of party competition in the CEEC varies as a function of economic development, levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and the historic status of the state. Subsequent works have identified divergent forms of party competition that is related to communist regime types (Casal Bertoa 2014; Evans and Whitfield 1998; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kostelecky 2002). As summarized by Rovny (2015: 5), the first are bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (Czech Republic) where competition revolves around economic issues; the second are national-communist regimes (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), where liberalizing communist parties lead other parties to highlight non-economic
issues; the third are patrimonial communist regimes (Bulgaria and Romania), where law and order issues are significant noneconomic sources of competition. Furthermore, Ronny (2014) shows that debates over ethnofederalism and the status of ethnic minorities similarly explain patterns of competition in the CEEC.

Hence, one of the central aims of this paper is to unpack the social dimension and identify possible differences between the East and the West. Following the works of Bakker et al. (2012) and Rovny and Edwards (2012), our starting point is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2006, 2010, 2014) on party positioning. The survey asks experts to identify the party positions of electorally meaningful parties in European countries on a wide range of issues. Of these, we identify eight possible issues that tap into the social dimension across the three waves of the survey: 1) protecting civil liberties versus ensuring law and order; 2) support for liberal social lifestyles versus support for traditional family values; 3) opposing versus supporting religious principles in politics; 4) opposing versus favoring a tough immigration policy; 5) favoring multiculturalism versus favoring assimilation; 6) supporting urban interests versus supporting rural interests; 7) favoring versus opposing political decentralization to regions; and 8) supporting versus opposing more rights for ethnic minorities. Ideally, our analysis would include two further issues: 9) support for environmental protection even at the expense of economic growth versus support for economic growth at the expense of environmental protection and 10) the promotion of cosmopolitan versus nationalist conceptions of society. Unfortunately, the latter two issues are not consistently asked across the three time points of the data, and are excluded from the analysis.

We hypothesize that in the West competition on the social dimension is captured dominantly by party positions on lifestyle choice, religion, immigration, multiculturalism and, to a lesser extent, decentralization to the regions and support for ethnic minorities. Lifestyle choice
is traditionally considered one of the key components of the social dimension in developed democracies, and reflected in post-materialist values like support for gay marriage, abortion, and euthanasia. Western European populations have grown increasingly more secular, as reflected in events such as the passage of gay marriage in a predominantly Catholic Ireland, while educational expansion in the past several decades has made people generally more liberal. This has coincided with shifting attitudes amongst college-educated women to delay or forgo childbirth, resulting in declining population trends, particularly in Germany, Portugal, Italy and Spain. As these trends worsen, debates about lifestyle choice and religion are more likely to dominate public discourse and should be a highly salient component of parties’ positions on the social dimension.

Immigration and multiculturalism have featured prominently in the Western European political arena in the past several decades, a trend that has only increased in light of the economic recession and the migrant crisis. France, the Netherlands, and the UK have significant immigrant communities, owing to their colonial pasts, while Germany houses a large Turkish population of what were originally migrant workers brought in to help the stagnating German workforce in the 1960s. The economic crisis in 2008 exacerbated already somewhat hostile attitudes towards non-EU immigrants, as radical-right wing parties, like Britain’s UKIP and the French Front National, called for limiting the number of foreigners who would take jobs away from natives. At the same time, the 2004 accession of the CEEC sparked public fears about Eastern European immigration, resulting in what is commonly referred to as the Polish plumber syndrome.

Part and parcel of the debate over immigration is the question of how immigrants should conduct themselves once they are let into Western Europe. Should immigrants be forced to assimilate into the mainstream culture of the host country and adopt that country’s customs, or should they be allowed to retain their cultural practices? In 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh, a
Dutch television personality and critic of Dutch policies that allow Muslims to retain their traditional practices, by a young Muslim male, called into question the limits of European multiculturalism. This debate has grown particularly heated in France, where the Sarkozy government passed a 2010 ban on public face covering, citing the incompatibility of Muslim practices with French secularism in public life. The subsequent ban on the building of minarets in Switzerland and the rise in popularity of anti-immigrant parties like the Danish People’s Party, highlight the salience of the debate over European multiculturalism. Given that the issue has typically been presented as a battle between Western European liberal and Christian values on the one hand, and anti-Western Islamic values, on the other, we expect that the role of religion in public life will be doubly important in how parties position themselves on the social dimension.

Finally, we anticipate that part of the competition on the social dimension in the West will be driven by ethnic minority rights issues and regional decentralization. The rise of “new regionalism” is one of the most salient features of the post-Cold War international order, and one that is particularly evident in Western Europe (Paasi 2009: 126; Keating 1998; Ohmae 1995). In the 1970s, strong regionalism was typically associated with minority nations that rejected the idea of the central state and Europe (Keating 1998; Paasi 2009). However, some assert that we are witnessing a shift from a more exclusionary “old” regionalism, to an inclusive “new” regionalism that embraces the idea of a multicultural Europe and supports integration (Keating 1998; Christiansen 1997; Schmitt-Egner 2002). Since the 1980s, regional elites have attempted to capitalize on European integration as means to developing the regional economy and wrestling power away from central governments. The new state order in Europe allows for the construction of alternative identities and provides opportunities for elites to project their region into the international arena (Keating 1998: 87-8). This phenomenon is evident in the numerous pro-
independence referenda in Scotland and Catalonia, along with the proposed partition of Belgium during the 2007-2011 political crisis, and the sustained electoral performance of regionalist/minority nationalist parties in the EU Parliament.

**Hypothesis 2**: Party competition on the social dimension in the West is driven by attitudes towards social lifestyles/religion, immigration/multiculturalism, and ethnic minorities/decentralization.

Turning now to Eastern Europe, we hypothesize competition on the social dimension is captured predominantly by party positions on civil liberties, lifestyle choice, religion, and ethnic minorities. In contrast to Western Europe, we predict that immigration, multiculturalism, and regionalization will be less salient in the East. One of the most prevalent features of Eastern European party systems is the presence of “law and order” parties, (e.g., Bulgaria’s Order, Lawfulness, and Justice, Hungary’s Justice and Life Party, Lithuania’s Order and Justice Party, and Poland’s Law and Justice Party). Generally nationalistic, xenophobic, and anti-EU, these parties represent the peculiarities of a post-communist legacy, where cosmopolitan, neoliberal, and socially liberal forces are pitted against economically and socially conservative parties that lobby for a return to national greatness. While EU membership has encouraged significant economic growth in the East, it has also brought with it crony capitalism and corruption, which law and order parties maintain can only be eradicated through the withdrawal of their countries from international organizations and the closing of borders to immigrants. This drive to “restore” law and order on social right is juxtaposed with the desire to protect civil liberties on the social left, who invoke the memories of an oppressive communist regime and argue for limited state intervention in the political and economic spheres.
As in the West, we expect that lifestyle issues form an important component of the social dimension. While post-materialism was late in coming to the CEECs, decades of post-communist rule and almost 15 years of EU membership is ample time for the post-materialist cleavage to manifest in Eastern Europe, and shift some of the political discourse away from the economic dimension. The lifestyles component of the social dimension is further brought to the forefront as it interacts with the religious cleavage, which reappeared following communism’s collapse. Religion has always been a significant political and social force in Eastern Europe (Grzymala-Busse 2012) and the church played a critical role in pushing for democratic reform in communist states (Gautier 1998). The most obvious example is the Polish Catholic Church, who, emboldened by the meeting of Pope John Paul II (a former Archbishop of Krakow) with anti-communist leader Lech Walesa, expressed support for Walesa’s Solidarity Movement.

As communism collapsed, religious organizations were restored as important societal actors, and reclaimed their traditional role of promoting religious teachings and arbitrating moral and reproductive issues (Norris and Inglehart 2001). As the church has entered the political sphere, we expect that lifestyle issues will dominate the social dimension. At the same time, we proceed with caution. Whitfield (2002) argues that the dominant denomination of a country moderates the effects of religiosity in politics, with the Catholic Church being more likely than the Protestant or Orthodox Churches to attempt to affect the political sphere.

As noted by several authors (Ronny 2014; Offe 2002; Crawford 1996; Enyedi 2006), ethnicity has been the most influential sociocultural divide in East European politics. Communism simultaneously reinforced existing ethnic divides in the CEEC, by locking down state boundaries, while also exacerbating them, by allowing an influx of Russian nationals into the satellite states and the Baltics. Following communism’s collapse, ethnic minority issues have come to dominate
the political discourse, albeit not in the same way as in the West. We can group East European countries into roughly three camps: first, where ethnic minorities are dispersed throughout the country (e.g., ethnic Russians in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Muslims in Bulgaria); second, where ethnic minorities are located in one or two predominant regions (e.g., the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia); and third where there are no notable ethnic minorities (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). Rovny (2014) explains that how ethnic minorities were dispersed in the old communist state impacts how dominant parties frame the minorities issue. In places where a politically salient ethnic minority originates outside of the old ethnofederal center, the economic left is more likely to scapegoat ethnic minorities while the right adopts a more tolerant position. On the whole, we expect that parties on the socially liberal end of the spectrum will be more likely to embrace ethnic minority issues, given that they place a premium on civil liberties, while TAN parties are more likely to discriminate against ethnic minorities, whom they view as a threat to the national culture.

**Hypothesis 3**: Party competition on the social dimension in the East is driven by attitudes towards civil liberties, social lifestyles/religion, and ethnic minorities.

We hypothesize three major differences between the West and the East. First, we believe that the civil liberties component is more salient in the East, given the lack of proliferation of explicitly “law and order” parties in the West. Second, we expect that regionalization, a salient issues in the West, will be absent in the East. In Western Europe, ethnic minority issues overlap with the debate over decentralization and greater regional autonomy, given that most ethnic minorities reside in specific regions. The same is rarely the case in Eastern Europe, where minority populations lack a well-defined home territory (Kelley 2004). Furthermore, the CEEC still exhibit highly centralized forms of governance that were left over from the communist period (Keating 2003; Hughes et al. 2003; see also Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010). Regionalization has largely
been motivated by the EU and the disbursement of structural funds, and not at the behest of regional elites. As a result, regions are less institutionalized in the CEEC than in the older member states. Finally, we predict that immigration and multiculturalism are much less salient in the East than in the West, given that immigration from outside of Europe to the CEEC has been less prevalent than to the West. At the same time, we acknowledge that this latter supposition might no longer hold due the migrant crisis and the influx of refugees into Hungary and Slovenia’s borders. However, given that the latest time point in our dataset is 2014, a year before the migrant crisis began, we maintain that immigration will be less salient of an issue.

The Social Dimension and Party Support for Integration

How do parties formulate their stances on European integration? Is integration support/opposition built into their existing positions on the economic left-right scale, or does European integration constitute a separate axis of competition? If the latter is the case, to what extent do party positions on the social GAL/TAN dimension inform party support for the European project? Following Bakker et al. (2012), we argue that party competition in Europe takes place in a three-dimensional space, where economic, social, and integration-related party positions exist separately of one another. At the same time, we acknowledge that these three dimensions are much more interrelated in some countries than others. In this section, we briefly review the existing literature on how the economic and social dimensions impact party support for integration, paying special attention to the differences between the West and the East. We then generate hypotheses about how specific social dimension issues translate into more/less Euroscepticism. We argue that
the most meaningful social issues in the West are immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic minority rights, while in the East they are civil liberties, social lifestyles, and ethnic minorities.

Party competition on the left/right dimension primarily revolves around questions of economic inequality stemming from industrialization (Knutsen, 1995). Social democratic parties traditionally favor state intervention in the economy in an attempt to ameliorate inequality, while conservative parties favor free-market capitalism and neoliberal policies. The advent of globalization and European integration has forced parties to take positions on these processes, and they have done so by linking the policies to the economic left/right dimension (Marks and Wilson, 2000). Because the single market opens borders, facilitates movement of capital, and encourages privatization, mainstream right parties have been the leading supporters of integration.

While economic concerns factor significantly into a party’s stance on integration, Euroscepticism is also tied to cultural opposition to the European project. Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that integration and globalization have altered the cleavage structure in Europe by shifting societal concerns from the economic left/right dimension to a new cultural/social dimension. Societal conflict is no longer driven purely by economic competition between the winners and losers of globalization but also by cultural competition between natives and immigrants, and political competition between defenders of national institutions and proponents of supranationalism (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 181). As these new societal divisions are not easily absorbed into the existing economic left/right dimension, parties are forced to compete for votes on the social dimension. Broadly speaking, losers of globalization and integration will seek out TAN parties that advocate protectionist measures, both economic and social, to delineate natives from foreigners, while winners will seek out GAL parties that promote international integration. However, the relationship between party positioning on the social dimension and support for
integration is more nuanced in the West, given the proliferation of radically left-wing and socially GAL parties that oppose integration on economic grounds but support multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism.

As Marks et al. (2006) point out, the predictive power of the left/right and GAL/TAN dimensions to explain integration support varies across the West and the East. In the West, one observes a bipolar Euroscepticism that is located at both Left and TAN extremes. Mainstream parties find it difficult to oppose integration, as these parties have been part of the governing coalitions responsible for integration. Given their marginal positions within the party system, radical parties have greater incentive to oppose integration in the effort to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties, leading them to take a more Eurosceptic stance on integration. Hence, if one spatially maps party positions on integration, one observes an ‘inverted U-curve,’ with mainstream parties located in the middle of the curve and radical parties on the tail ends (Hooghe et al., 2002: 968).

In the West, the radical right mobilizes voters primarily on the GAL/TAN dimension by taking strong positions on immigration and the preservation of national sovereignty. The radical right plays to voters’ fears about the implications of open borders and the subsequent influx of foreigners, particularly from non-EU member states. For these voters, the fear is primarily cultural and is manifested in xenophobic and racist attitudes towards immigrants. As Kriesi et al. (2006) note, radical right movements are culturally protectionists. They oppose integration because it dilutes national culture, brings unwanted immigration, and undermines the national community (Hainsworth, 2008; Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 188).
**Hypothesis 4:** In the West, parties proposing more tough immigration policies are less likely to support integration.

The radical left mobilizes voters on the traditional economic left/right dimension by taking a strong anti-capitalist and anti-globalization position. This leads radical left parties to reject European integration, which is perceived as ‘a Trojan horse for international capitalism’ (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 188). According to Kriesi et al. (2006: 928), the left opposes the opening up of borders primarily on economic grounds for fear that integration poses a threat to the left’s achievement at the national level. Integration interferes with the state’s ability to protect the economic well-being of its citizens by requiring privatization, deregulation, and the influx of foreign goods and investors (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009). At the same time, radical left parties are decidedly GAL, frequently more so than mainstream parties. While Eurosceptic, these parties are presumed to be supportive of more open immigration policies. After all, worker solidarity is the cornerstone of the radical left platform. Given their emphasis on internationalism and cosmopolitanism, radical left parties are more supportive of multiculturalism. What is not clear is the extent to which the multicultural aspect of these parties’ platforms translates into Euroscepticism or off-sets economic hostility towards the EU, which is an internationalist project. At a minimum, we expect that radical left parties place multiculturalism on the political agenda and force mainstream parties to incorporate it into their existing platforms.

**Hypothesis 5:** In the West, parties that espouse multiculturalism are more likely to support integration.

In the East, Euroscepticism exhibits a unipolar pattern, with Eurosceptic parties located in the economically left and socially TAN quadrant (Marks et al. 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe
This quadrant is chiefly populated by ex-communist and “law and order” parties. “As the unravelling of the communist system put the transition process in motion, proponents of marketization and liberal democracy converged” to the right/GAL pole (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 188). Furthermore, EU conditionality ensured that EU-friendly parties delivered market-oriented economic reforms and supported liberal democratic standards. To carve out a niche in the new party space, ex-communists differentiate themselves on the basis of pro-welfare and anti-integration policies, and by invoking communist nostalgia for social stability. As such they espouse traditional gender roles and communal values, while rejecting socially liberal lifestyles, which they argue are propagated by European integration. Furthermore, as we mentioned earlier, law and order parties reject the EU on the basis that it fosters corruption and leads to the demise of national sovereignty and culture.

**Hypothesis 6:** In the East, parties that espouse traditional values are less likely to support integration.

**Hypothesis 7:** In the East, parties that advocate stronger law and order policies are less likely to support integration.

Finally, in both regions, we expect that party positioning on ethnic minority rights impacts integration support. The single European market reduces the economic penalty for regional political autonomy by affording regions opportunities to move beyond the national economic sphere in search of new trade partners (Keating 1998; Ohmae 1995; Marks and Wilson 2000). The EU’s policies of championing minority rights and language protection help strengthen minority nationalist identity (Laitin 2001). Additionally, the EU’s open borders have removed barriers for regional communication and coordination, allowing minority nations to form alliances across state
lines. Keating (1998) argues that these developments have led to a shift in minority nationalist attitudes towards the EU. While in the past minority nations opposed integration because it led to further loss of democratic control and a more remote government, present day minority nationalists see Europe as a source of support for minority cultures and languages that are threatened by the central state. In the East, where regions are less institutionalized and ethnic groups are more dispersed, ethnic minorities are still more likely to support integration, given that the EU stressed ethnic minority rights during the accession process in many East European countries.

**Hypothesis 8:** In both regions, parties that support greater rights for ethnic minorities are more likely to support integration.

**Unpacking the Relationships**

In order to test the various hypotheses stated above, we employ the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File (1999-2014) and use the last three waves of survey data (2006, 2010, and 2014). These data cover all EU member countries and include any political parties that won seats in either the national or EP elections. This yields 188 parties in 2006, 203 in 2010 and 245 in 2014. For any given party-year, the data include between 3 and 23 expert opinions, with an average of 11 expert responses per party/year.

Before testing our hypotheses, it is helpful to first revisit our understanding of the relationship between left/right party position and position toward European integration. The familiar inverse-U shape exists in the West for all three survey waves. That is, parties on either the left or right ends of the left-right scale tend to be more Euroskeptic than parties in the more moderate region of the left-right dimension. This pattern is less true in the East, where the relationship between left-right and the EU dimension is less-well
defined. These relationships are plotted by year for both the West and the East in Figure 3. While there is some evidence that this relationship in the East is starting to converge to the West, things are clearly less-well defined, in terms of the inverse-U in the CEES countries.

![Figure 3: Left/Right and EU Position](image)

In Figure 4, we present the relationships between the GAL/TAN dimension and position toward the EU across both the East and the West for the three waves of data included in our study. Here we see a rather different picture than we do in Figure 3. That is, the relationship between GAL/TAN and EU integration is both more clearly defined and more stable in the East than it is in the West, with TAN parties being the main driver of Euroskeptic attitudes in the East and a rather random set of relationships in the West.
There are several possible explanations for what we see in Figure 4. First, it could be the case that the GAL/TAN dimension is more stable over time in the East, thus leading to a more stable relationship between GAL/TAN and EU position, although this would run counter to our expectations posited in Hypothesis 1 above, namely, that GAL/TAN will be noisier in the East than in the West. To test this, we estimated country and country/year specific exploratory factor analyses of the eight items that are asked consistently across the last three waves of the CHES data. In Figure 5, we plot the factor loadings for each of the 8 items in each country over time. What we see is a great deal more variation in terms of the magnitudes of the factor loadings over time and space in the East than we do in the West. While this is a rather ‘soft’ test, it certainly does lead some support to Hypothesis 1, in that the items that compose the GAL/TAN dimension are more varied in the East over time than they are in the West.
Having demonstrated that the items that compose the GAL/TAN dimension are more varied in the East than the West, we now turn to a more detailed examination of how these items relate to the underlying dimension across time and space. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey asks respondents to place parties on each of the 8 policy positions included in the above factor models, but additionally the survey asks experts to place parties directly on the GAL/TAN dimension.
With the direct GAL/TAN placement question as a yard stick, \(^1\) we can compare how well the different items predict the GAL/TAN score for a given context and then compare these relationships across time/space. To do this, we estimate regressions with the direct GAL/TAN measure, which ranges between 0 and 10 (lower numbers are more GAL), as the dependent variable and the eight items used in the factor models as the independent variables. Our interest is in identifying which items are better predictors of the GAL/TAN position and whether or not there is a systematic difference across East and West in terms of these regression coefficients.

In Figures 6 and 7, we graphically present the results of three regression models in both the East and the West (one model for each region/year). What immediately jumps off the page is that both positions on civil liberties/law and order and social lifestyle are the strongest predictors of GAL/TAN positions across time and space. In the West, we see the importance of religious principles and ethnic minorities decreasing over time, in terms of their predictive ability for GAL/TAN positions. Interestingly, when controlling for all components of the social dimension, position toward immigration does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance in the East or the West for any of the three waves of data. So, while there are some differences in terms of which policy positions are better at predicting GAL/TAN positions, these generally do not conform to our expectations in hypotheses 2 and 3 in any systematic fashion.

\(^1\) In the East, the correlations between the factor estimated using EFA and the direct GAL/TAN question range from a low of 0.63 in Latvia to 0.99 in Poland, with the average correlation well above 0.90. In the West, the lowest correlation is 0.94 in Belgium.
Figure 6: GAL/TAN regression coefficients, West
Figure 7: GAL/TAN regression coefficients, East
We next turn to an analysis of the relationship between the components of GAL/TAN and position toward European integration. We estimated regressions with EU position as the dependent variable, where higher values represent the more pro-EU position, and the eight component of the GAL/TAN position as the independent variables in both the East and the West.
Rather than presenting tables of regression coefficients, we present a series of marginal effects plots to test our remaining hypotheses.\(^2\)

*Figure 8: Immigration Policy and EU Position*

Figure 8 displays the relationship between immigration policy and EU position. Higher values on the immigration policy variable represent support for more restrictive immigration policies. The results here are rather striking. That is, parties in the East that favor less restrictive immigration policies tend to be more pro-EU, while the opposite appears true in the West.\(^3\) In Figure 9, we display the relationship between attitudes toward multiculturalism (lower values

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\(^2\) These results are from regressions controlling for all 8 indicators of GAL/TAN.

\(^3\) Subsequent analyses suggest that the relationship between immigration and EU is non-linear in the West.
correlate with more favorable attitudes toward multicultural polices, with higher values representing more assimilationist positions) and EU position. In neither the East nor the West does this variable reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

We also hypothesized that parties that support a more traditional values (opposed to same-sex marriage, reproductive rights, legalization of marijuana, etc) are less likely to support the EU and that this would be stronger in the East than the West. Here the results both support and do not support our expectations as the relationship is clearly negative, but is stronger in the West than in the East. Figure 10 graphically illustrates this relationship. In Figure 11, we show the effect of position toward civil liberties vs. law and order and EU position. Higher values of the law and order variable represent more favorable views of stronger enforcement of laws. We
hypothesized that pro law and order parties would be less likely to support the EU in the East and this expectation is supported by the data. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, is the result in the West, where pro civil liberties parties tend to be less supportive of further European integration.

Finally, we test the hypothesis that parties that support greater rights for ethnic minorities would be more pro-EU in both the East and the West. In Figure 12, we see, again, that this hypothesis is only partially supported by the data. Parties supporting rights for ethnic minorities are much more supportive of the EU in the West, while there is no discernable relationship between these two variables in the East.
Pithy Conclusion

The electoral space in much of Europe has grown more complicated over time, as the role of the European Union has increased in scope. Because of the growing importance of both EU and policies like immigration and traditional lifestyle values, it is increasingly important for scholars to gain a deeper understanding of how these different dimensions of electoral contestation relate to one another. Given the changing nature of the salience of different policies across time and space, it is equally, if not more so, important to understand how the components of these different dimensions relate to one another.

In this first cut, we have attempted to shed light on how the components of party’s social policy dimension (GAL/TAN) vary across country, region, and year as well as how these
components related to positions toward the EU. We find that there is a considerable amount of variation in terms of what issues are more closely related to the underlying GAL/TAN dimension over time and space and that there is considerable variation in how these components relate to position toward the EU across eastern and western Europe. Clearly, there is more work to do to better understand how and why this variation exists, but this initial analysis highlights that there is, in fact, interesting variation to explain in terms of the make-up of the GAL/TAN relationship and in how GAL/TAN relates to the EU.