**Protestant Apocalyptic Narratives and the European Union**

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*If European federalism triumphs, the EC will indeed be an empire. It will lack an emperor: but it will have the Pope. It is difficult not to think that Wojtyla [Pope John Paul II] realises this.*

*--Adrian Hilton[[1]](#footnote-1)*

*As a Christian versed in prophecy I cannot help but see in the emerging European superstate the foundations of a one-world government with a one-world dictator at its head—the man whose biblical names include the Beast, the Man of Sin, and Antichrist.*

*--Alan Franklin[[2]](#footnote-2)*

Christianity is apocalyptic. Christians since the days following the first-century crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth have anticipated a return of Christ Jesus—as stated in the *Apostles’ Creed*—“to judge the living and the dead.”[[3]](#footnote-3) Various Christian traditions have interpreted the prophetic utterances of the Jewish prophets, the author of Revelation and Jesus himself in their own particular ways—often arriving and very different views of the end of history. But orthodox Christians of all sorts have generally agreed that history will come to a dramatic conclusion with Jesus Christ returning in some manner to set things right.

For some conservative European and North American Protestants the “imminent return of Christ” is central to their faith. They believe that the prophetic works of the Bible contain specific predictions that point to Jesus’ physical return to earth in the very near future. For many of these believers the apocalyptic narrative in Scripture is unfolding before their eyes—and the rise of the European Union (EU) figures prominently in the takeover of the world by the forces of evil. In their view the EU is on the wrong side of the cosmic struggle between good and evil.

Conservative Protestant “prophecy writers” tell slightly different stories of the coming “end times,” but most agree on the following general outline.[[4]](#footnote-4) First, political, economic and social changes will make societies, particularly leading Western nations, more immoral and less hospitable to true Christians. Early signs of an emerging apostate church serving a single world government become apparent to those attuned to the predictions of Scripture. The EU serves as a testing ground for the coming world government and the political vehicle of the Antichrist—the future world dictator—who begins his rise to power. Second, the true Christians, who have been watching in horror as the world spirals toward the abyss, are taken from the earth to meet Christ in the air in what is called the “rapture.” Third, with the only righteous earthly force now removed, evil has its way in the world: Antichrist declares a one-world government (with its capital in Jerusalem), the pope unites the one-world church (centered in Rome), and the government issues a single world currency. Fourth, a seven-year period of “tribulation” ensues plunging the world into a series of wars, plagues, natural disasters and persecutions. Fifth, at the end of the seven years, a great battle takes place at Armageddon during which a triumphant Christ returns to earth and defeats the Antichrist and the armies of darkness. He then establishes his capital at Jerusalem and reigns over the world for a thousand years. Finally, at the end of the millennial reign, the dead are raised and Christ pronounces his judgments on all human beings who have ever lived. The blessed rise to heaven; the damned are cast down into hell. Then God shapes a new heaven and new earth to be populated by his saved people.

For these end-times Christians the EU has come to play a crucial role in preparing the world for the Antichrist. The EU’s supranational institutions constitute a proto world government; European federalism is a precursor to global union; the euro is the seed of a global currency; Europol is a global police force in training; EU battle groups comprise an embryonic global military force—the list goes on. The face of evil in the end times, the Antichrist, will use European integration to create an irresistible world power capable of dominating the planet. Put another way, the EU’s process of enlargement will extend to every state in the international system. But the resulting Global Union will be far from democratic. No wonder these conservative Christians are some of the most vociferous Eurosceptics in Europe.

It is very difficult to determine the number of European citizens who would hold to such an end-times view of the EU. Large numbers can be found in the United States and Canada in the fundamentalist Protestant denominations that include independent Baptist groups, most Pentecostals, and many African-American and Hispanic churches. The numbers are smaller in Europe and largely confined to Britain (especially Northern Ireland), the Nordic countries and the Netherlands where they attend small non-conformist or Evangelical chapels (Britain), revivalist or free-church congregations (Nordic countries), fundamentalist Reformed churches (the Netherlands and Northern Ireland), or Pentecostal congregations (everywhere). Since no EU-wide polling of these groups exists (*Eurobarometer* and *European Values Survey* do not have sufficiently granular religious measures to identify with confidence end-times Christians), we must rely on cruder measures. As we shall see below we know that most of these believers are highly religious and socially conservative. Most identify with Christian political parties, which include the Nordic Christian Democratic parties, the small religious parties in the Netherlands, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland. In the UK most end-times Christians side with the Tories or, more recently, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Not all supporters of these political parties focus on biblical prophecy, so the size of the end-times group is certainly smaller than the group of citizens supporting these parties. Thus we are probably safe to assume that the number of end-times Christians is fewer than five percent in each of the Protestant European countries. The exception, however, might be Northern Ireland where the DUP is strong and anti-EU rhetoric caustic (as we will see below).

End-times EU narratives sounds bizarre to most modern ears. But the perspective is not new. It is deeply rooted in the anti-Catholicism and anti-papism of the Reformation and the dispensational theology of nineteenth century British Evangelicals. Contemporary manifestations of this stream of Protestant thinking, however, is also heavily influenced by popular American prophecy teachers who have applied dispensationalism to an integrating Europe since the early 1970s. Understanding Protestant apocalyptic anti-EU narratives requires an exploration of these currents in conservative Protestant thought.

**PROTESTANT ANTI-CATHOLICISM**

From the time of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, Protestants identified themselves as the “not-Catholic” party—the antithesis of “Catholic.” They were proud to be anti-Catholic and especially anti-papal. Anti-Catholicism permeated the highest and lowest rungs of society; it saturated community policy and foreign policy; it inspired laws and spawned holidays. Anti-Catholicism became very early a mark of Protestantism that worked its way into every corner of Protestant confessional culture. In this section we explore anti-Catholic ideology as it developed in the core areas of Germany, Switzerland and France and then as it settled into what became Protestant northern Europe: England, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands.

**The Early Reformers**

The early reformers—by definition—were anti-Catholic. Horrified by the sale of ecclesiastical offices, the immorality of the priesthood, the greed of the monasteries, the misuse of canon law, and the spiritual poverty of the laity, the reformers laid blame at the feet of the pope and the clerical establishment. For them, the pure Christian faith, derived from Scripture and affirmed in the great creeds of the church, had been obscured by the man-made policies and practices of an evil hierarchy. Thus Rome, and particularly the pope, became the focus of their increasingly harsh rhetoric.

Luther’s 1520 treatise to the *Christian Nobility of the German Nation* accused the pope of serving the forces of evil. In a particularly vivid section on indulgences and absolutions (papal instruments used to absolve recipients of sin and its consequences, often for a price), Luther loosed a searing attack on Rome:

. . . for payment of money they make unrighteousness into righteousness. . . . They assert that the pope has the authority to do this. It is the devil who tells them to say these things. They sell us doctrine so satanic, and take money for it, that they are teaching us sin and leading us to hell.

If there were no other trickery to prove that the pope is the true Antichrist, this one would be enough to prove it. Hear this, O pope, not of all men the holiest but of all men the most sinful! O that God from heaven would soon destroy your throne and sink it in the abyss of hell! Who has given you authority to exalt yourself above your God, to break and loose his commandments, and teach Christians . . . to be inconstant, perjurers, traitors, profligates, and faithless? God has commanded us to keep word and faith even with an enemy, but you have taken it upon yourself to loose his commandment and have ordained in your heretical, anti-Christian decretals that you have his power. Thus through your voice and pen the wicked Satan lies as he has never lied before. . . . What else is papal power but simply the teaching and increasing of sin and wickedness? Papal power serves only to lead souls into damnation in your name and, to all outward appearances, with your approval![[5]](#footnote-5)

By the end of his life Luther was referring to the papacy as “an institution of the devil” and Pope Paul III as the “Most Hellish Father.”[[6]](#footnote-6)

As Luther well illustrates, the reformers were virulently “anti-papal.” Committed to the universal (albeit invisible) church, they questioned the pontiff’s assertion of divine authority and supremacy in Christendom.[[7]](#footnote-7) Too often, in their view, popes and “Romanists” used that claim to defend corrupt and deceitful practices. The reformers had drawn back the veil to reveal Rome as the source of evil. As Calvin lamented, “the world today is flooded with so many perverse and impious doctrines, full of so many kinds of superstitions, blinded by so many errors, drowned in such great idolatry—there is none of these evils anywhere that does not flow from the Roman see, or at least draw strength there.” [[8]](#footnote-8) The pope was the human face of evil, the embodiment of all that was corrupt, false and destructive in the church, an enemy bent on destruction of “the reviving doctrine of the gospel.”[[9]](#footnote-9) Such a tool of Satan must be the feared enemy of the kingdom of God—the “antichrist.”

The Bible speaks of the “antichrist” in two senses. Antichrist in the first sense is any person who stands opposed to Christ and his kingdom. Such “antichrists” may be outsiders attacking the church, or even church leaders whose false teachings eventually prove them to be enemies of Christ. The writer of II John says: “Many deceivers, who do not acknowledge Jesus Christ as coming in the flesh, have gone out into the world. Any such person is the deceiver and the antichrist” (v7). Thus, the antichrist is anyone who overtly or covertly undermines right teaching about the nature of Christ.

Both Luther and Calvin applied “antichrist” to the popes and their defenders in this first sense. Speaking against “papists” who arrogantly “will not distinguish between God’s word and human doctrine,” Luther stated, “Here one sees so well how they have set themselves above God like blaspheming Antichrists. . . .”[[10]](#footnote-10) Calvin, addressing the tyranny of the pontiff, accuses the papacy of masking heresy with a “semblance of Christ.” But this cannot hide the fact that “all the heresies and sects which have been from the beginning belong to the kingdom of Antichrist.”[[11]](#footnote-11)

“Antichrist,” however, also appears in the New Testament in a second, more apocalyptic sense. The apostle Paul spoke of a coming “man of lawlessness” who would appear just before the second coming of Christ. This man, he said, “will oppose and will exalt himself over everything that is called God or worshiped, so that he sets himself up in God’s temple, proclaiming himself to be God” (II Thess. 2:1-4). To many interpreters of Scripture this seemed to be the same man the writer of Revelation calls the “beast” who will receive the worship of the whole world (13:8) and I John calls *the* antichrist who is to appear at the “last hour” (2:18). Identifying the last great antichrist, therefore, was a key to unlocking the mystery of the Apocalypse and the coming Day of Judgment.

The reformers were cautious about such prophecy. They usually refrained from calling a particular pope the long-awaited antichrist or the beast of the last days, but drew heavily on the apocalyptic to argue that it was from the papacy that the final antichrist would emerge, perhaps quite soon. The pope’s claim to divine authority and the pomp of his court deeply offended the reformers, who charged that the pope had done just what the Scriptures foretold of the Antichrist: elevating himself to a universal status equal with God.[[12]](#footnote-12) In sum, the reformers spiced their critique of the pope with hints that their struggle with Rome might anticipate the long-awaited Apocalypse—a view that subsequent Protestant generations would periodically elaborate.

The anti-papalism of the early reformers, couched in the venomous language of vernacular books and pamphlets, drew on their personal experience of the Roman Church as well as fourteenth and fifteenth century internal reform efforts. The Council of Trent later addressed many of these charges, especially concerning simony and other overt corruptions. But hatred of the pope as the monster at the center of a web of spiritual deception and material corruption entered the heart of Protestant confessional culture, even as Protestants lost contact with genuine Catholics. Exaggeration and distortion became the currency of Protestant propagandists. Still, Catholic military pressures in Germany, France and the Low Countries and the persecution by Catholic rulers on the Continent and in Britain also hardened anti-papalism. Protestants feared that the pope’s “greatest ambition was to root out Protestantism with the maximum of bloodshed and cruelty.”[[13]](#footnote-13) Anti-papalism and a more general opposition to Catholics as an enemy community became less and less distinguishable as the Reformation spiraled into religious warfare. As Counter-Reformation forces pushed embattled Protestantism to Europe’s northern periphery, deep-seated anti-Catholicism emerged there, vilifying the pope and his “slavish minions.”

**Reformation England**

The Reformation came to England only fifteen years after Luther posted his theses (1532), but under somewhat suspect conditions. Henry VIII’s marital difficulties sparked the English succession from Roman Christendom, but the nation—at least large parts of it—took to its new independent status with considerable vigor.[[14]](#footnote-14) Special antipathy toward Rome developed soon after the break.[[15]](#footnote-15)

England was, in fact, justified in its fear of Catholic power. Rome wanted England back in the fold and Catholics had taken up the challenge. England’s own Catholic Queen Mary I tried to wrench her kingdom out of Protestant hands by executing hundreds of Protestant leaders. Her widower, Phillip II of Spain, launched his unsuccessful armada against Elizabeth I in 1588. Homegrown Catholics later attempted a *coup d’etat* against James I in the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. And, of course, the Stuart kings, especially Charles II who converted to Catholicism on his death bed and the openly Catholic James II, caused so much consternation among Protestants that Parliament overthrew James in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and banned Catholics from the throne. For Protestants, these miraculous deliverances proved God favored the English. To commemorate these confessional and national triumphs, English Protestants instituted a cycle of holidays, each with its own anti-papal traditions,[[16]](#footnote-16) such as burning the pope in effigy on the anniversary of Elizabeth I’s accession.

In response to the external threat, as well as the popular desire for uniformity, Parliament passed a series of harsh penal codes between 1559 and 1610 that made it unlawful and, indeed, treasonable to engage in Catholic rites. Catholics could not hear mass, join a profession, hold office, own a weapon or come within ten miles of London. Priests were banned from the country and anyone harboring them could be condemned to death. The list of prohibited activities was very long and penalties harsh, but rarely enforced; the laws were designed more to deter than to punish.[[17]](#footnote-17)

Through the seventeenth century fear motivated English anti-Catholicism. Protestants believed that a Catholic take-over would result in arbitrary and tyrannical rule. A Catholic monarch, whether imposed from outside or raised up from within, would inevitably hand England over to the pope, whose rule would mean disorder, persecution, torture, heavy taxation and the confiscation of lost monastic property. Popular writers wittingly or unwittingly stoked such fears. John Foxe, for instance, extolled the virtues of Protestants martyred by Catholics in his best-selling *Acts and Monuments*, while pamphleteers such as John Pym and William Prynne whipped up anti-Catholic sentiment by accusing “Papists” of various acts of treason.[[18]](#footnote-18) Some pamphlets were more graphic than others. According to Henry Care (1680), a Catholic take-over would see English Protestants

forced to fly destitute of bread and harbour, your wives prostituted to the lust of every savage bog-trotter, your daughters ravished by goatish monks, your smaller children tossed upon pikes, or torn limb from limb, whilst you have your own bowels ripped up . . . or else murdered with some other exquisite tortures and holy candles made of your grease (which was done within our memory in Ireland), your dearest friends flaming in Smithfield, foreigners rendering your poor babes that can escape everlasting slaves, never more to see a Bible, nor hear again the joyful sounds of Liberty and Property. This, this gentlemen is Popery.[[19]](#footnote-19)

Protestants feared that a Catholic monarch would collude with Rome to strip them of their property, dissolve Parliament, end representative government, and move to wipe out their faith just as Louis XIV was doing in France. The struggle with Catholicism was thus a struggle for English liberties against the threat of continental tyranny.[[20]](#footnote-20)

To English Protestants this struggle constituted a final stage in history. John Foxe depicted the fight “as the final cataclysmic conflict of the forces of Christ and the forces of Antichrist which was to end only on the Day of Judgment.”[[21]](#footnote-21) Puritan writers before the Civil War and during the Commonwealth readily identified the pope as Antichrist and proclaimed the imminence of the coming millennium (the earthly reign of Christ) based on their reading of Daniel and Revelation.[[22]](#footnote-22) Restoration writers also made frequent references to antichrist and “Babylon” (usually referring to the papacy).[[23]](#footnote-23) Millennial agitation subsided, however, as the seventeenth century wore on. As Miller puts it, “The Puritan failure to build a new godly society during the Interregnum and the obstinate failure of the world to come to an end greatly reduced the attractiveness of prophecies about the immediate future based on the books of Daniel and Revelation and, incidentally, also reduced the attractiveness of an apocalyptic interpretation of the conflict of Catholicism and Protestantism.”[[24]](#footnote-24) Thus, the apocalyptic tradition receded, only to re-emerge a century later.

The early eighteenth century saw a new form of Protestantism—“Evangelicalism”—arise out of the open-air revival preaching of George Whitefield and John Wesley. Out of this “Great Awakening” came an Evangelical movement that placed new emphasis on personal conversion to faith in Jesus Christ and the Bible as the sole guide for Christian doctrine and practice, an emphasis Wesley seems to have absorbed during travels among German Pietists in 1738.[[25]](#footnote-25) These were the true heirs of the Puritans whose churches—which included dissenting Presbyterians, Congregationalists and Particular Baptists—had experienced recent declines.[[26]](#footnote-26) They were active and zealous for the “gospel” and their energy revitalized old denominations (including the Church of England) and led to the creation of new ones, most notably Methodism. By the mid-nineteenth century the movement had dramatically revived church attendance across many denominations and achieved a level of religious influence in Victorian Britain not seen since the seventeenth century.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Eighteenth-century Evangelicals were quite free of anti-Catholic rhetoric, but this was due more to Catholics’ status as a small minority on the fringes of British society than to any strong commitment to tolerance. As the nineteenth century dawned, however, Catholics became more visible and Evangelicals, like their Puritan ancestors, reacted against a perceived threat to the nation. They responded sympathetically toward Protestants in Ireland under pressure from Catholics angered by Methodist preaching. They also created anti-Catholic propaganda organizations to oppose Catholic political rights when the cause of emancipation gained steam in the 1820s. And finally they decried the growing influence of “papist” doctrine and practice in the Church of England (to which most still belonged) through the Oxford Movement, a high-church conduit for significant conversions to Catholicism such as those of John Henry Newman and Henry Edward Manning. The main factor, however, was the massive influx of Catholic refugees from the Irish Potato Famine (1845-1849) into England, adding a hearty dose of ethnic prejudice, class stereotyping, and fear of revolution to existing anti-Catholicism, fermenting into a “heady and distasteful brew.”[[28]](#footnote-28) With the survival of Protestant Britain at stake, Evangelicals established organizations such as the influential Protestant Association (1835) to combat Catholic influences.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Such anti-Catholic efforts among Evangelicals persisted well into the twentieth century. The sectarian struggle in Ireland over Home Rule continued to excite anti-papal sentiments among British Protestants, as did sectarian conflict in Scotland. And controversies over the “papistical” Revised Prayer Book (rejected by Parliament in 1928), the centenary celebration of the Oxford Movement in 1932-1933, and the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948 (which many expected—wrongly—would include the Catholic Church) all involved Evangelicals taking anti-Catholic stands.[[30]](#footnote-30) Thus Evangelicals preserved the anti-Catholic traditions of the English Reformation that not only opposed the teachings and practices of the Roman Church, but also vilified Catholics for a host of shortcomings that included disloyalty to the nation. But what set Evangelicalism apart from run-of-the-mill British anti-Catholicism was its rediscovery in the early nineteenth century of the role of the Roman Church in the “last days.” Evangelicalism’s particular fascination—bordering on obsession—with prophecies of the Apocalypse injected its anti-Catholicism with new emotion.

**The Premillennial Shift in British Evangelicalism**

As we saw above, the early reformers sometimes attempted to connect their struggle with Rome to the biblical Apocalypse. Such apocalyptic thinking was not new to Christendom. Anticipation of a return of God to earth in judgment had been an important element of Christian religion from the first century based on the witness of the Jewish prophets, Jesus, Paul, and the writer of the Revelation.[[31]](#footnote-31) Christians through the centuries, however, often paid little attention to difficult scriptures dealing with the last days, content simply to affirm that Christ will return to judge the earth. But in crises Christians often sought to make sense of mystifying events by fitting them to particular interpretations of prophecy.[[32]](#footnote-32)

The Reformation itself brought on much speculation about the timing of events depicted in prophetic passages. Many in Latin Europe believed that the split in the church was clear evidence that the great final struggle between good and evil had begun and that Christ was soon to return. The early reformers, apart from their references to antichrist, tried to downplay apocalyptic speculations for justified fears of radical (mainly Anabaptist) attempts to hurry the millennium, the thousand-year reign of Christ. But as the Reformation passed into its seventeenth-century adolescence, apocalyptic speculation took hold of the Protestant imagination, inspiring some to flee Europe for a millennial kingdom in America, others to execute King Charles I in favor of a holy Commonwealth, and still others to back the young Elector Friedrich in his bid to block Habsburg and papal powers from recapturing central Europe for Rome, thus igniting the Thirty Years War.[[33]](#footnote-33) Each side in these great conflicts believed themselves to be Christ’s agents and their enemies in camp with the antichrist. But the Protestants in particular thought the end was at hand and Christ was preparing to return to claim his chosen faithful.

As the Enlightenment took hold of Protestant Britain in the eighteenth century, apocalyptic speculation declined, along with virulent anti-papalism. The French Revolution, however, encouraged Evangelicals to reconsider biblical prophecy as they sensed that such a cataclysmic event might signify the imminent return of Christ.[[34]](#footnote-34) In the first three decades of the nineteenth century numerous Evangelical writers—usually Anglicans and often prominent scholars—returned to the books of Daniel (Chapters 2, 7-8) and Revelation (Chapter 13) to interpret the times and predict the future.[[35]](#footnote-35) Much speculation centered on exactly when Christ would return. The Roman Church, following Augustine, had been content to view itself as the embodiment of Christ’s present reign and abjure speculation as to when he might return in the flesh (*amillennialism*). The early reformers did not challenge such thinking, although some argued that the struggle with Rome signaled the imminence of Christ’s return. Protestants who did speculate on the Apocalypse usually assumed that at some point the world would be Christianized and an age of peace would settle on humanity for a thousand years, after which Christ would return to reign (*postmillennialism*). The new nineteenth-century prophecy teachers, however, rediscovered a neglected reading of Revelation 20 that called for Christ’s return *before* the millennial peace.[[36]](#footnote-36) This *pre*millennial view envisioned a time of general spiritual, moral and material decline in Christendom, ending in a series of divine judgments and the glorious return of Christ to earth as supreme judge of all, visibly and in the flesh. After the final judgment, his reign of peace would last a thousand years.[[37]](#footnote-37)

The British “premillennial shift” in the early 1800s had profound effects on Evangelical Protestantism. First, it added a sense of urgency to preaching the gospel that fueled Evangelicalism’s sometimes frenetic activism. If judgment was near and Christ’s return imminent—literally “at any moment”[[38]](#footnote-38)—preachers must traverse the globe to warn of impending doom and map the way of escape. Heightening the urgency was the emphasis placed by some premillennialist teachers, most notably the Anglo-Irish clergyman John Nelson Darby, on the “secret rapture” of the saints—a literal flight to heaven of Christians—that would come before the worst of the predicted suffering. Many responded in faith for fear of being “left behind” and forced to endure the horrors of sinful society’s death throws.

Second, premillennialism encouraged Evangelicals to watch closely for signs of social decay and divine judgment. Premillennial Evangelicals became profoundly pessimistic about the course of human history, believing that the times had to get worse before they could—after Christ’s intervention—get better. They also were fascinated by constant attempts to fit current events to biblical prophecy, seeing in political and economic developments the fulfillment of various Scriptures.

Finally, premillennialists remained staunch anti-Catholics, but their anti-Catholicism took a new direction, given the waning political authority of the papacy. The pope was still an antichrist, but after the French Revolution he was more likely to represent the decadence and godlessness of the present age than the Great Evil feared by the reformers. As Sandeen observes, “Millenarians [premillennialists] without exception were stoutly anti-Catholic and viewed every agitation by English and Irish Catholics as confirmation of the increasing corruption of the world and thus of the increasing likelihood of the second advent.”[[39]](#footnote-39)

Premillennialism steadily gained ground among Evangelicals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with John Nelson Darby credited for this success.[[40]](#footnote-40) Not only did he preach the secret rapture, but also developed an entire system of biblical interpretation called “dispensationalism,” dividing God’s intervention in human history into “ages” or “dispensations.” While he failed to draw most Evangelicals out of their apostate churches to join his Plymouth Brethren, Darby did disseminate his doctrine widely through extensive writings and many travels, including seven lengthy tours of North America between 1862 and 1877. His teaching converted a prominent American preacher, James H. Brookes, who taught the system to Cyrus Scofield. The latter’s *Scofield Reference Bible* (first published in 1909) deeply influenced British and American Evangelicals through its notes and commentary supporting a dispensational interpretation of biblical texts.

By World War I “dispensationalism was the dominant form of the advent hope.”[[41]](#footnote-41) Trench warfare silenced the postmillennialist Evangelicals; they could no longer expect a peaceful Kingdom of God on earth before Christ’s return. Premillennial dispensationalists now dominated conservative Christian circles in Britain. Some actively looked for signs of fulfilled prophecy in past and current events, while others thought all prophecy was yet to be fulfilled. Some remained virulently anti-Catholic, others less so.[[42]](#footnote-42) Mid-twentieth century Evangelicalism in Britain, however, remained anti-Catholic and wary of Rome. Many believed that cosmic events were unfolding as tyrants rose to power and nations flew headlong into war. These certainly looked like the “end times.”

Apocalyptic thinking reinforced the old British Protestant sense that God had intervened in history to save His church from the evil grip of the papacy. Protestant peoples were chosen peoples, none more so than the English who had stood up to Catholic power and by the hand of God escaped destruction and preserved English liberties. English Evangelicals, like most British Protestants, saw in these events a cosmic struggle between good and evil, but went one step further by predicting that history was soon to climax. The premillennialist shift encouraged Evangelicals to scan current events for signs of the Antichrist and the coming Tribulation. And where were they to look for these signs? Without question they looked toward Rome.

**The Netherlands**

Evangelical Premillennialism did not stay in Britain, but influenced Protestants elsewhere in Europe. Calvinists on the Continent were also prone to such antipapal and apocalyptic ruminations: “it was a particular mark of Reformed Protestantism to conceive itself as a crusade against the papal Antichrist.”[[43]](#footnote-43) Such sentiment was certainly evident in the Netherlands.

The Reformation started slowly in the Netherlands, but picked up steam in 1566 when open-air “hedge preaching” (much of it “Reformed”) led to the spontaneous cleansing of the churches by mobs intent on smashing images and other accouterments of Catholic worship. This iconoclasm, which began in West Flanders in August 1566 and spread east and north through much of the autumn, did not target rulers or the symbols of the Habsburg regime. Rather it “was purely and simply an attack on the Church and not anything else.”[[44]](#footnote-44) Local leaders who opposed the cleansings were powerless to stop the destruction when the civic militia sided with the mob, as they did in Middelburg where the militiamen declared, “We will not fight for church, pope, or monks.”[[45]](#footnote-45)

The brutal Spanish reprisals, led by the duke of Alva, only hardened Protestant—now mostly Reformed—attitudes toward the Roman Church. When the great Revolt broke out in 1572, the rebel states quickly moved against Catholics, seizing churches, driving out clergy, and prohibiting mass. Despite the efforts of William I of Orange to institute toleration of both Catholic and Reformed worship in the new States of Holland, popular pressure prevailed and Catholic worship was outlawed in early 1573. But the established Reformed church of the new United Provinces was not the Church of England. Unlike the English church, the Dutch church brought in only a minority—in most places less than a third[[46]](#footnote-46)—of the population as full members. The Reformed church controlled the levers of political power, but the nature of the church, with its strong emphasis on purity of worship, righteous living and church discipline made it less suited than the very broad English church for a public role. Thus, many Dutch citizens remained outside, either as non-attenders, or as Lutheran, Mennonite (Anabaptist), Catholic or Jewish dissenters. The religious communities competed for converts in a slow process of confessionalization that lasted until the mid-seventeenth century. When Spanish armies and other Counter-Reformation forces no longer threatened Reformed Protestantism and Dutch independence, confessional tensions eased, leaving well-defined and very stable confessional communities in the United Provinces.[[47]](#footnote-47) Law and custom separated religious communities, with the non-Reformed groups particularly closed due to official threats and occasionally violent suppression that often forced them underground, or at least out of sight. But the reality of religious pluralism forced a degree of toleration—if unofficial—on civic and church leaders. Not everyone in the United Provinces, however, agreed that toleration should be extended to the non-Reformed, making tolerance *the* fundamental issue for the Dutch republic in the post-Reformation period.

Given the intellectual nature of the Reformed faith, theological controversies were at the heart of church conflicts spilling into Dutch society. The theological struggles between Arminians and Gomarists, Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants, Voetians and Cocceians, Calvinists and Socinians, Collegiants, Cartesians, Spinozists, Bekkerites, and more all boil down to a battle between Reformed orthodoxy—and its desire to create and maintain the pure society—and liberalizing elements intent on opening up both the church and society. When the orthodox were ascendant, Catholics, Lutherans, Mennonites, and Jews were harassed and prevented from worshiping. Orthodox control also meant tighter enforcement of Sabbath regulations and public morals. In contrast, when “Libertines” were dominant, non-Reformed groups were allowed greater—although not complete—freedom to practice their religions.

The orthodox Reformed were the most ideologically anti-Catholic group in the United Provinces, but events sometimes evoked a latent fear of Catholicism and papal conspiracies that permeated all non-Catholic communities. Like their English brethren, Dutch Protestants of all stripes feared that Louis XIV would extend his relentless war against Protestants to their own territories and feared religious isolation as the Catholic James II took the throne in England. These events put pressure on William III of Orange (and later of England) to permit the expulsion of the Jesuits and other “regular clergy,” and the suppression of Catholic schools as protective measures. William prevented such actions and, in fact, did much to promote religious tolerance in the Dutch Republic and in England after 1688, despite his own conservative perspective.[[48]](#footnote-48) But insecurity lingered and Dutch Protestants kept a wary eye on Catholics both near and far.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Dutch society realized the benefits of tolerance—even if “tolerance” meant the creation of tight confessional communities that acknowledged the right of other communities to exist but had little contact with them. Nineteenth-century confessional communities developed a full range of social organizations such as labor unions, business associations, political parties, social clubs and newspapers that united co-religionists and separated them from people of other faiths. This “pillarization” was most evident among Catholics, but also took hold among Protestants, most conspicuously among the conservative (in Dutch, *gereformeerd*) groups that left the increasingly “modernist” Dutch Reformed Church, first in 1834, then again in 1886.[[49]](#footnote-49) These conservative movements reinforced separation from Catholics, seeing cooperation with papists as a “sell-out of national history, political freedom, and Protestant principles.”[[50]](#footnote-50)

Reformed Protestantism clung to anti-Catholicism primarily to protect the distinctive Calvinist nature of the Dutch nation, but some of this resistance can also be attributed to apocalyptic thinking. Dutch Protestants were certainly caught up in the apocalyptic rhetoric of the Thirty Years’ War, but it was the French Revolution that excited interest in biblical prophecy, as it had in Britain. Abraham Kuyper saw the Revolution bringing much benefit in the form of political rights, but blamed it for unleashing a “spirit that stole into the historical life of nations and fundamentally set their heart against Christ as the God-anointed king.”[[51]](#footnote-51) He believed with the British premillennialists that the Revolution’s results fit well with prophetic passages that foresaw an “anti-Christian power [that] will manifest itself in all its naked brutality only *toward the end*. . . .”[[52]](#footnote-52) Christians who discerned this “great apostasy” and knew that the end was approaching were to love their enemies, but not “accede to their counsel.”[[53]](#footnote-53) Rather, all those who loved Christ and awaited his return should “heartily unite with all sincere believers in the land to resist their [enemies’] philosophy and to rescue the country from their pernicious influence” so that “the spirit of apostasy [could] be arrested.”[[54]](#footnote-54)

**Scandinavia**

In Scandinavia the kings, not the clergy or the laity, led the revolt against the Roman Church. Reformation was a top-down affair that took several decades to permeate the newly independent kingdoms of Denmark (including Norway) and Sweden (including Finland). Once reform took hold, however, it achieved total victory. So thorough was the transformation in Scandinavia that by the end of the sixteenth century, Catholicism had been completely eliminated for all practical purposes. Thus, unlike their German, English and Dutch counterparts, Scandinavian Protestants had no contact with Catholics, domestic or foreign. Lutheranism—the Protestant form chosen by the monarchs of both Denmark (Fredrick I) and Sweden (Gustav Vasa)—had no competition from, or even much contact with, other forms of Protestantism until the nineteenth century.

Scandinavian Lutherans were anti-Catholic like their Protestant brethren everywhere, but their opposition to the Roman Church was a national assumption that virtually never needed defending. The law in both Denmark and Sweden reflected the anti-Catholic nature of state and society. In Denmark Christian III abolished Catholicism in 1536, expropriating church property in the process; the Royal Law of 1665 pledged the crown to tolerate only the Lutheran faith in the kingdom of Denmark-Norway; in 1705 police were ordered to prohibit the practice of foreign religion, including Protestant alternatives to Lutheranism as well as Catholicism; and in 1736 Lutheran rites were made compulsory for every citizen.[[55]](#footnote-55) When Norway wrote its 1814 constitution it kept the official faith: “The Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the state.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Furthermore, Catholic orders were explicitly prohibited from entering the country. As for Sweden, the Reformation was not complete until the early seventeenth century when the threat of royal re-imposition of Catholicism by force had passed. By 1593, however, Sweden, like Denmark, had prohibited Catholic practice—except by foreigners who promised not to proselytize. The Church law of 1686 went further, demanding that all Swedish subjects assent to the Augsburg Confession of 1530 and the Book of Concord of 1580.[[57]](#footnote-57)

In sum, once the Reformation dust settled in Scandinavia only Lutheranism remained; all non-Lutheran religions, especially Catholicism, were banned. The state compelled the teaching and practice of Lutheranism and occasionally sought to purify the national religion of vestigial “papism.”[[58]](#footnote-58) And the evidence indicates that the population was more than willing to follow the state’s lead.

The strict religious conformity required by the state in Denmark and Sweden resulted in a particularly impersonal religious experience for most people, especially in sparsely populated rural districts. A shortage of priests made church attendance difficult; class differences between clergy and peasant parishioners hindered pastoral care; and state-mandated restrictions on theological content and the educational differences between clergy and illiterate congregants made religious instruction arid and impractical. The resulting spiritual hunger opened many Scandinavians to the German pietism of Philip Spener and August Francke. Pietists taught the need for personal conversion, the study of Scripture in small groups, private devotions, Christian behavior, practical preaching and lay participation in church government, gaining for them a ready hearing in many rural communities. The Lutheran establishment objected to the dispensing of religion by unsanctioned individuals and opened a new religious conflict in Scandinavia that pit the religious establishment against unauthorized, but otherwise orthodox religious communities that had no intention of withdrawing from the state churches, only purifying them. Both Sweden (1726) and Denmark (1741) passed Conventicle Acts prohibiting small, unauthorized gatherings for prayer and Bible study. If caught, participants could be fined, imprisoned or even banished from the kingdom.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Official opposition did not eradicate Pietism from Scandinavia. Pietism, instead, laid the foundation for a larger Evangelical revival in the early nineteenth century—one similar to the British awakening. The new revivals were more enthusiastic than the sincere but rather staid pietistic movements, and more popular among peasants than their more intellectual predecessors.[[60]](#footnote-60) The Scandinavian Evangelical revival began in Norway with Hans Nielsen Hauge, a farmer’s son who became an unordained itinerate preacher after his conversion in 1795. He preached a simple message of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ and called newly awakened believers to study the Bible and live holy, productive lives.[[61]](#footnote-61) Hauge traveled to Denmark in 1804, but had little impact. The Danes, however, began their own revival, first in Jutland where peasants objected to new devotional books, then more forcefully and successfully after 1811 under the leadership of Christen Madsen.[[62]](#footnote-62) The revival in Sweden was ignited after British Methodist George Scott arrived in 1830. Evangelicals were not typically angry rebels; their focus was on changing individual hearts. But they were critical of the worldliness of the state church and sometimes angered fellow citizens by refusing to take communion with the “unregenerate.” They criticized the clergy’s lax morals, inattentiveness to the laity’s spiritual needs, and ostentation, which some could only describe as “popishness.”[[63]](#footnote-63) They were no more anti-Catholic than the religious establishments of Denmark and Sweden, but saw themselves as the carriers of the authentic national religious tradition.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Improved transportation in the nineteenth century and mass migrations from Scandinavia to America—encouraged by pressure put on revivalists by the Swedish and Norwegian states—soon connected the Evangelical revivals in Europe and North America. Revivalists across the two continents shared a belief in personal salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, reliance on the Bible for guidance in doctrine and practice, and in many cases, premillennial interpretations of biblical eschatology.

Dispensationalism reached Scandinavia by mid-century and took hold of revivalist elements. For instance, in 1871 a dispute over school textbooks in Jarlsberg, Norway led an Evangelical congregation to charge that the State Church’s unwillingness to fight the new texts revealed the power of the Antichrist and pointed to the imminent return of Christ.[[65]](#footnote-65) One of the most influential evangelists and missionaries of the late nineteenth century, Fredrik Franson, a Swedish immigrant to America, carried the message of Christ’s imminent return back to Scandinavia during several evangelistic forays, the last from 1898 to 1900.[[66]](#footnote-66) Premillennialism did not affect the majority of Scandinavian Lutherans, but for the revivalists, both in and eventually outside the state churches, end times thinking with its strong dose of anti-Catholicism, remained a central article of faith well into the twentieth century.

**ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN PROTESTANT POLITICS**

European Protestants remained anti-Catholic in the eighteenth through twentieth centuries, even where few Catholics existed. In Britain the Gordon Riots of 1780 and strong popular opposition to the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 showed the depth of anti-Catholic feeling. Britain, however, was comparatively tolerant. Not until the mid-twentieth century had all of the Nordic countries passed laws guaranteeing religious liberty. Norway allowed Catholic services in 1843 and in 1845 permitted dissenter congregations to organize. But prohibitions against the Jesuits remained until 1956.[[67]](#footnote-67) Sweden continued to restrict Catholics and the existence of monasteries until 1951.[[68]](#footnote-68) For Scandinavians to be Catholic was to be truly “foreign”; few Catholics lived in Scandinavia and fewer were native born. Scandinavians saw their Lutheran religion and their nationality as completely intertwined. As for religiously mixed areas, including the Netherlands and Northern Ireland, anti-Catholicism continued to run deep in some particularly conservative circles. Looking at hardline Dutch and Northern Irish Protestants in the late twentieth century was a bit like peering back into the sixteenth century.

**Britain and Northern Ireland**

Anti-Catholicism remained a hallmark of nineteenth-century Protestant politics. Liberal politician and four-time prime minister William Gladstone, himself a committed high-church Anglican, spent time in opposition during the 1870s writing pamphlets critical of the Vatican. As he informed Lord Granville, his purpose was to defeat a worldwide Catholic conspiracy “to direct European war to the re-establishment of the temporal power; or even to bring about such a war for that purpose.”[[69]](#footnote-69) *The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance* (1874) attacked papal infallibility as inconsistent with freedom of thought and questioned whether British Catholics could be loyal to both the crown and the pope. The following year in *Vaticanism: an Answer to Reproofs and Replies*, Gladstone described the Catholic Church as “an Asian monarchy: nothing but one giddy height of despotism, and one dead level of religious subservience.”[[70]](#footnote-70) The papacy would destroy the rule of law, establish tyranny, and hide these “crimes against liberty beneath a suffocating cloud of incense.”[[71]](#footnote-71) Gladstone’s pamphlets sold well.

British Protestants avoided creating explicitly religious political parties everywhere but in Northern Ireland, where conflict with Catholics made religion the most politically salient social cleavage. Protestantism and support for union with Great Britain went hand in hand in Northern Ireland from its founding in 1921 as an administrative unit within the United Kingdom. Fear drove Protestants to cling fiercely to the British state as their protector from the Catholic-dominated Republic of Ireland. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and mainline Protestant churches led Northern Irish Protestants through most of the twentieth century, but theological and political conservatives perceived a drift toward modernism and ecumenism in those churches (a “Romeward trend” in conservative rhetoric[[72]](#footnote-72)) and in the UUP’s reformist wing (toward accommodation with Catholics). In response, conservatives launched a religious and political counter movement in the 1960s.[[73]](#footnote-73) Various small parties, such as the Protestant Unionist party and Protestant Action, pushed against modernist and reformist tendencies, but an explicitly religious Protestant political movement did not reemerge in Northern Ireland until Ian Paisley, a fiery preacher and leader of the small but growing Free Presbyterian church, created the Ulster Democratic Unionist party (DUP) in 1971. The DUP’s close ties to the Free Presbyterians through overlapping leadership and a shared ideology sometimes made party and church indistinguishable. Early on, the DUP relied heavily on the leadership and rhetoric of Paisley and the activism of Free Presbyterian Church members.

The political Protestantism of the DUP was raw. The party and the religious movement behind it represented well-preserved remnants of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century evangelical Protestant Britain, products of the frozen sectarian politics of Irish independence. The DUP represented a minority of Ulster Protestants who believed that the Protestant way of life in Northern Ireland was under threat from a Catholic conspiracy masterminded by the Antichrist in the Vatican, intent on curtailing their liberties and ultimately returning all of Britain to the Roman fold.[[74]](#footnote-74)

Long before the creation of the DUP, Paisley acquired a reputation for articulating the combination of religion and politics characteristic of conservative Ulster Protestants. In one episode Paisley, who supported the holding of an anti-Catholic meeting in the Ballymoney town hall, found himself at odds with a priest named Father Murphy and some mainline Protestant leaders. The local council eventually cancelled the meeting, causing Paisley to vent his fury:

Priest Murphy, speak for your own bloodthirsty persecuting intolerant blaspheming political religious papacy but do not dare to pretend to be the spokesman of free Ulster men. You are not in the South of Ireland. . . . Go back to your priestly intolerance, back to your blasphemous masses, back to your beads, holy water, holy smoke and stinks and remember we are the sons of the martyrs whom your church butchered and we know your church to be the *mother of harlots* and the abominations of the earth. . . .[[75]](#footnote-75)

We repudiate the lies of Priest Murphy, bachelor agent of a foreign power and brand as traitors all those associated with him and those who hastened to do his will. We affirm Article 31 of the church of our Gracious Lady Queen Elizabeth II that ‘masses are blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits’.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Here we see conservative Irish Protestantism’s no-holds-barred anti-Catholicism, fear of a Roman conspiracy, and reliance on the protection of the Protestant British state against Catholic “traitors.” Protestant Unionists believed that their liberty—indeed, all liberty—depended on the Protestant state’s resistance to Catholic tyranny.

Paisley’s religious movement, beginning on the fringes of Ulster Unionism, entered politics and gained support, even from less religious Protestants because Unionists perceived a weakening of state protection. The DUP was committed to defending Protestant identity and strengthening the state in its fight against the Catholic insurgency. But Paisley and his followers saw the Protestant struggle against Catholicism in more apocalyptic terms. The conflict in Northern Ireland was a small but significant battle in a worldwide conflict against the forces of darkness in these “last days.” Paisley’s conservative Presbyterianism drew its premillennialism from nineteenth-century British Evangelicals, but shared this theological ancestry with American fundamentalists, with whom he had strong ties.[[77]](#footnote-77) Paisley’s premillennialism, however, differed significantly from that of most Anglo-American dispensationalists: it did not include a belief in the rapture, and focused almost exclusively on the papal antichrist and the Roman church.[[78]](#footnote-78) The Catholic Church was viewed by Paisley’s movement as the only institution with “the power, influence, and reach to be the sort of comprehensive anti-Christian force suggested in prophecy,”[[79]](#footnote-79) the evil “Babylon” of Scripture. Boosted by a general fear of Catholics in unionist Ulster[[80]](#footnote-80) and by a conviction that they were fighting a cosmic battle, more Protestants turned to the DUP to represent their interests.

**The Netherlands**

Protestant political movements in the Netherlands, like those in Northern Ireland, struggled against the forces of Catholicism and liberalism. Unlike Northern Ireland, most of the Dutch Protestant parties came to terms with both.

Protestants in the Netherlands organized politically in the nineteenth century in reaction to the liberalism and secularism of the French Revolution. Abraham Kuyper’s Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), which he founded in 1879, drew heavily on orthodox factions within the Dutch Reformed church that eventually broke away to form the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands. These conservatives resisted liberal tendencies in both religion and politics, preferring a Protestant theocracy to the tolerant liberal state that developed after 1815. Kuyper argued for a confessional alliance with Catholics (although not a party merger) to resist secularizing tendencies.[[81]](#footnote-81) The ARP joined with Catholics (who did not form a true democratic party, the Roman Catholic State Party, until 1926) to form a government in 1888.

The first Protestant political schism occurred in 1894 when upper-class leaders broke with Kuyper and his “little people” over the extension of suffrage and its implied notion of *popular* as opposed to *divine* sovereignty. They formed the Christian Historical Union (CHU) in 1904, which continued to oppose extension of the franchise, while also taking a harder line against the Catholic Church. In 1918 another split of the ARP gave rise to the Political Reformed Party (SGP), a permanent opposition party that refused to cooperate with Catholics. A theological spat within the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands in 1944 produced yet another Protestant party in 1948, the Reformed Political Alliance (GPV), which required all party members to be members of the new Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (Liberated). The process of Protestant political division went into reverse in 1980 when the ARP and CHU joined with the Catholic party to form the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). The merger resulted in a disgruntled ARP faction forming its own party, the Reformatory Political Federation (RPF), joining the GPV and SGP as one more small orthodox party. In 2000 the GPV and RPF merged to form ChristianUnion (CU) and the combined party entered a CDA-led government for the first time in 2007.

Theology has always mattered to the Protestant parties, often being the only difference between them. The ARP, while seldom attracting more than one-fifth of the electorate, regularly participated in government with other political forces, including Catholics. It defended Protestant rights, especially in education, but its appeal was broad and tolerant compared to other Protestant parties. For the most part, the small Reformed parties were content to advocate “biblical principles” while winning no more than a few seats in Parliament. The SGP, for instance, refused to accept women in church or party leadership, making the party unattractive to most orthodox Protestants, much less secular voters. All these small parties were strongly anti-Catholic and their rhetoric quite apocalyptic—with frequent mention of the papal antichrist.[[82]](#footnote-82) Protestant parties, large and small, were strong supporters of the monarchy and Dutch nationalism. After World War II the CHU’s manifesto still called the Netherlands a Protestant nation and extolled God’s liberation of the land from Catholic Hapsburg domination.[[83]](#footnote-83) The ARP, for its part, resisted decolonization of the East Indies because it undermined Dutch sovereignty. Dutch Protestants, for all their factional fighting, were strong nationalists.

**Scandinavia**

The Scandinavian states were more successful in driving out Catholics and other non-Lutherans than the British or Dutch achieving greater sectarian purity than other Protestant countries. At the first sign of religious deviation, the state—often with popular support—moved quickly to crush the rebellion, even when the deviants were committed to orthodox Lutheranism and the state churches. Eighteenth-century Pietists, for instance, and nineteenth-century Norwegian Haugeans were victims of such drives for purity. Revivalism in Norway and Sweden did eventually produce Free Church movements that broke from the state churches, but state churches remained fixtures of Scandinavian society. The question of how to treat dissenters continued to be a problem through the twentieth century. The Danish state church faced similar issues with the rise of Nicolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig, whose popular religious teaching ran afoul of the religious authorities in the 1820s. But the Danish state found in Grundtvig and his movement a safe way of transforming the distant and hierarchical state church into a “people’s church,” thus depriving free church advocates of a grievance. So powerful was this sense of unity in Denmark that even in today’s secular society the reactions to the presence of Islam, according to Jespersen, “can hardly be attributed to Danes feeling threatened in their own faith, but relate to the perception that any attack on the Church is an attack on the entire basis on which Danish society is built.”[[84]](#footnote-84)

Scandinavian Protestants, as noted above, did not organize as religious blocs until the twentieth century. The new religious parties that sprang up beginning in the 1930s represented those revivalist and morally conservative elements that had long been repressed. Their electoral support was centered in geographical areas associated with anticlericalism and evangelical enthusiasm.[[85]](#footnote-85) The Norwegian Christian People’s party (KrF) ignited the Christian movement in the Nordic region. Revivalists, beginning with Hauge in the early nineteenth century, considered politics a noble calling and sought to achieve many social goals by political means. Their struggle against the religious and political establishment in their strongholds in the south and west of Norway led them into alliance with the Liberals in the nineteenth century. That alliance pressed for liberal and nationalist causes: parliamentary supremacy over the Swedish king (Norway was in a union with Sweden after 1814), defense of the language and culture of rural areas, and, eventually, Norwegian independence (which came in 1905). Religiously conservative Norwegians, an important faction in the nationalist alliance, were increasingly concerned with the growing modernism in the state church and the secularism of Norwegian society. Revivalist support for the Liberals continued to weaken in the first decades of the twentieth century, but conflict over teetotalism (revivalists were in favor) and the opening of a blasphemous play in the National Theater in Oslo (revivalists were against) inspired religiously conservative leaders in west Norway to start an independent Christian People’s party in 1933, which became a national party in 1945.[[86]](#footnote-86) The party’s first program stated its commitment “to protect Christian and national values in the church, the school, the workplace, and in our cultural life as a whole.”[[87]](#footnote-87)

Other Christian parties have followed the Norwegian model. The Finnish Christian League (SKL) formed in 1958 and adopted a nearly verbatim translation of the KrP party program.[[88]](#footnote-88) The Finnish party was most concerned about the “proliferation of politically motivated secularism and atheism,” as well as the strong influence of communism on national politics.[[89]](#footnote-89) The Swedish Christian Democratic Union appeared in 1964 after a series of moral issues rose to national prominence. Conservative Swedish Christians were concerned about the rising abortion rate, an increase in sexually transmitted diseases, sexual instruction in schools, public warnings against sending young children to religiously “ecstatic meetings,” the public showing of sexually explicit films and a proposed reduction in religious instruction in public education. The story was similar in Denmark when the Christian People’s party formed in 1970 as a reaction to the moral laxity of Danish society and changes to religious instruction in the schools.[[90]](#footnote-90) Unlike the Norwegian KrP, which led governments, the Finnish, Swedish and Danish Christian parties were mostly small, socially distinct protest parties, although all eventually participated as junior coalition partners in national governments. Like the KrP in Norway, these parties did not represent the views of the liberal state Lutheran churches, but spoke for church-attending laity in state churches and free-church members, who believed they represented the genuinely Protestant perspectives on politics and society.

Protestants founded distinctly confessional political parties in response to the opening of a religious social cleavage in Protestant nations. But only in Northern Ireland, and to a lesser degree in the Netherlands, were Protestant parties designed to counter Catholic influence. Confessional parties, for the most part, arose in response to the secularization of society and religious and social liberalism *within* official, state-supported Protestantism. Less fervent Protestants in Germany and the Netherlands supported Catholic-Protestant political alliances, but devout believers, often from revivalist traditions, created parties to represent their counter-cultural movements.

**PROTESTANT ANTI-CATHOLICISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

Protestant anti-Catholicism remained a potent if less visible force in the postwar period. Its continued presence inspired euroskeptical views of the EU, especially among conservative believers. Many of these views were homegrown. But many were also influenced by a popular resurgence of dispensational teaching in America. Leading this wave was Hal Lindsey whose 1970 book, *The Late Great Planet Earth*, sold over 35 million copies in over 50 languages.[[91]](#footnote-91) This immensely influential publication made European integration central to the apocalyptic narrative. In his 1977 edition of the book Lindsey stated: “We believe that the Common Market and the trend toward unification of Europe may well be the beginning of the ten-nation confederacy predicted by Daniel and the Book of Revelation.”[[92]](#footnote-92) This confederacy, he argued, was a revived Roman Empire perfectly suited for the coming antichrist. Here was his prediction:

The United States will not hold its present position of leadership in the western world; financially, the future leader will be Western Europe. . . .

As the United States loses power, Western Europe will be forced to unite and become the standard-bearer of the western world. Look for the emergence of a “United States of Europe” composed of ten inner member nations. The Common Market is laying the groundwork for this political confederacy which will become the mightiest coalition on earth. It will stop the Communist take-over of the world and will for a short while control both Russia and Red China through the personal genius of the Antichrist who will become the ruler of the European confederacy.

Look for the papacy to become even more involved in world politics, especially in proposals for bringing world peace and world-wide economic prosperity.[[93]](#footnote-93)

Lindsey underlined essentially the same point in several additional books: *There’s a New World Coming* (1973); *Planet Earth—2000 A.D.: Will Mankind Survive*? (1994); *The Final Battle* (1995); *Apocalypse Code* (1997); and *Planet Earth: The Final Chapter* (1998). In each he identifies the European Union as the vehicle for the antichrist to achieve global control. More recently American prophecy teachers have taken to the Internet with views similar to Lindsey’s. According to *Rapture Ready*, for instance, “The Bible predicts that someday a world leader will emerge from a revived Roman Empire. The European Union is clearly the fulfillment of this prophetic event.”[[94]](#footnote-94)

Popular American teachings on the EU have combined with traditional anti-Catholicism to undergird the anti-EU stance of conservative European Christians in Protestant areas of Europe. We explore these views in each geographical area in the sections below.

**Britain**

British distrust of the “Continent” (a sometime pejorative term for the land across the Channel[[95]](#footnote-95)) spanned the political spectrum while taking several different forms. Religious prejudice was one. Both the socialist left and the traditional right could at times emit a strong scent of historic British anti-Catholicism.[[96]](#footnote-96) Talk in Europe of recreating Charlemagne’s empire, the public Catholic piety of the major European leaders, and the perceived centrality of the Roman Church to the European project set many British citizens on edge. For the postwar British, “the Catholic nature of ‘Europe’ was a generous source of prejudice against it. . . . Britain in 1950 was still an emphatically Protestant country, in which Catholicism was something foreign and therefore suspect. . . . Anti-Catholic prejudice was instinctive. . . .”[[97]](#footnote-97) Examples abound. Foreign Office officials, for instance, were well aware of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s superstitious discomfort around Catholic priests, whom he believed brought bad luck.[[98]](#footnote-98) More seriously, Bevin’s deputy Kenneth Younger became quite disturbed by the aspects of the Schuman Declaration. Schuman, he noted in his diary, was “a bachelor and a very devout Catholic who is said to be very much under the influence of the priests.” As for the Schuman Plan, Younger confided that it “may be just a step in the consolidation of the Catholic ‘black international’, which I have always thought to be a big driving force behind the Council of Europe.”[[99]](#footnote-99) After the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Conservative party published a “helpful” explanation that reassured skeptical readers that the document had “nothing to do with the Vatican, the Pope or religion.”[[100]](#footnote-100)

The Labour party’s left wing, which opposed any move toward the Six, was deeply suspicious of an integrating Europe dominated by Christian Democrats resistant to international planning for full employment.[[101]](#footnote-101) The Christian Democrats were thought to be the political arm of the Roman Church. And of course there was some evidence to support that view. Labour’s Denis Healey, for instance, was deeply troubled by the *Mandement* (letter of admonition) issued by Dutch bishops in 1954 that listed penalties, including excommunication, for those participating in socialist organizations or political activities.[[102]](#footnote-102) Christian socialists were also suspicious of the “‘Roman’ flavor of European integration” and often expressed their distrust in anti-Catholic terms.[[103]](#footnote-103) More moderate Labour forces were less likely to write off Europe as hopelessly clerical, but they were aware of the pressure from the left. Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell favored a move toward Europe (that is until October 1962), but even he had to acknowledge the conspiracy theorists in his party, if only to take them to task:

You hear people speaking as though if we go into the Common Market . . . this is the end as far as an independent Britain is concerned. That we’re finished, we are going to be sucked up in a tunnel of giant capitalist, Catholic conspiracy, our lives dominated by Adenauer and de Gaulle, unable to conduct any independent foreign policy at all. Now frankly, this is rubbish . . .[[104]](#footnote-104)

Anti-Catholic views were not confined to the socialist left. Similar, if more theologically extreme perspectives could be found on the evangelical and nationalist right. The National Union of Protestants, for instance, warned, “Romanism is trying to knock out, not only Protestantism, but any suspected revival [*sic*] to world domination.”[[105]](#footnote-105) Not all anti-Catholic rhetoric was quite so direct, but as Philip Coupland reminds us, “suspicion of Catholicism remained, and it continued to be seen as a definite threat—‘the Roman menace.’”[[106]](#footnote-106) Many British Protestants had come to see some good in the Catholic Church, but they continued to find much of its ecclesiology, doctrine, theology and worship repellant. They also objected to its reactionary politics, corruption, and worldly intrigue, which made it a “terrible menace to freedom and even in many places to true religion itself.”[[107]](#footnote-107)

For some Protestants the distrust extended to battles against a common foe. Protestants and Catholics, for instance, could agree that communism must be resisted, but some evangelicals rejected co-belligerency with Catholics as a cure worse than the disease. As one writer in *The English Churchman and St. James Chronicle* put it, “The choice is not between Communism and Vaticanism, both are from a common source and are characterized by the same spirit and practices.” This anti-Catholic view was applied effortlessly to the Common Market when the *English Churchman* warned that, “Rome is endeavouring to create a Rome-sponsored bloc of nations,” and later opined, “By all means co-operate, but not amalgamate. For England to surrender her sovereign power to a super-state would be yet another step towards our downfall.”[[108]](#footnote-108)

Mainstream British Protestantism remained suspicious of Catholicism and by extension a European Community that popular perception closely associated with the Vatican. But anti-Catholicism had begun to mellow in the British mainstream, making it less central to the debate over British accession to the EC. That mellowing, however, did not extend to Northern Ireland. The hardline Ulster Protestants led by Reverend Ian Paisley still brought seventeenth-century Protestant passion to bear on the question of British membership. Paisley, for whom the world had entered “the final unfolding of the great drama of world empires of history,” saw the Common Market as the “final manifestation” of the evil Roman Empire, the kingdom of the anti-Christ. As Paisley read and interpreted the books of Daniel and Revelation, he saw that as history drew to a close there would be “ten kingdoms in Europe and at the head of those kingdoms there will be the beast and in association with the beast there will be a church, and that church will be the Church of Rome in her final manifestation.” The Common Market, established by the Treaty of *Rome* (not an insignificant detail), was in Paisley’s view dominated and controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, which Revelation 17 depicts as a woman representing the city of Rome (“Mystery, Babylon the Great, the Mother of Harlots”). Paisley was convinced that the European Community was the seat of evil and the last thing he wanted was to see Britain voluntarily join the forces of darkness.[[109]](#footnote-109)

Paisley also feared that joining Europe would weaken Protestantism and undermine the liberty of Protestant peoples. Speaking during the 1975 national referendum debate on UK membership, Paisley lamented the fact that “when we [Britain] joined the Common Market we became a Protestant minority in an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic federation of nations”—a federation he dubbed “the greatest Catholic super State the world has ever known.” Moreover, he was convinced that the “Roman Catholic States of Europe” would ignore Protestant Ulster (“Do you think they will have any time for this part of the United Kingdom which is the last bastion of Protestantism?”) and would institutionalize a soft prejudice that would reduce Protestant freedoms:

I have found in this Common Market struggle the intense hatred of pro-Marketeers for the true Protestantism of God’s Word. . . . [I]f you stand up and say, for religious reasons, you are against the Common Market, then you are branded as a bigot. You are branded as a traitor. You are branded as an extremist. . . . And I want to tell you that we are moving into a time of religious persecution, when these nations of Europe are going to insist on one church; one church for Europe and that church will be the Roman Catholic Church.

Not surprisingly, Paisley urged his followers to vote “no” in the 1975 referendum: “I trust that every man and woman . . . across our Province will take their stand against what is nothing less than the kingdom of the Anti-christ.” [[110]](#footnote-110)

Paisley’s anti-EU vitriol continued into the twenty-first century. In June 2000, for instance, Paisley posted on the European Institute of Protestant Studies website a summary of his perspective. Speaking of the EU, he declared:

Knowing the Bible should make us realise that it is pure folly to want to join (via ecumenism) this final apostasy of Babylon which is Biblically and historically wrong. Rome is unchanging, unrepentant and arrogant without change. People are striving for unity with this beast as though it was something required as a necessity in this life and for the next. Such folly when our gracious Lord brought us out of such bondage in the

Sixteenth century. . . . What folly to return.[[111]](#footnote-111)

Paisley and those associated with his brand of hardline British Protestantism spoke of a Vatican conspiracy to create a “Roman Catholic European Superstate” as a first step to world domination. The fingerprints of the Vatican, in their view, are all over the EU. They point to the deep blue and the twelve stars in the EU flag and see symbols of the Madonna; they note the repeated references to Charlemagne and see a plan to recreate the Carolingian Empire; they observe a depiction of Europa riding on a bull (Zeus) on a postage stamp and see the whore of the Book of Revelation; they see a EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and expect a military take-over by the Vatican.[[112]](#footnote-112) For these Irish Protestants, however, the central issue was identity. They saw themselves as a chosen people called by God to resist the forces of coming Anti-Christ. For them to join with Catholics in building Europe meant the end of their sacred mission and the loss of their identity as a separate people. And they refused to give in.

Northern Irish Protestants were not the only British Christians to resist the EU on biblical grounds. British author Alan Franklin, for instance, called the EU the “final world empire” and, like Lindsey, saw the European Union birthing the antichrist:

I can imagine Lucien, or whatever Antichrist is called, striding into the assembly of the European Union. A tall, dominating figure with great intellect, arresting looks, commanding manner, and air of authority . . . [Members of the assembly] can seldom agree on anything, have no clear ideas of their own and have already cried out for a strong leader. This they will get.[[113]](#footnote-113)

Likewise, Adrian Hilton, in his very popular 1997 book, *The Principality and the Power: Britain and the Emerging Holy European Empire,* critiqued the EU as a papal dominated re-created Holy Roman Empire. Thus Britain, the home of dispensational theology and vitriolic anti-papism, contains some citizens who combine these two intellectual and cultural currents into a sincere hatred of the European Union, and particularly Britain’s membership in it.

**The Nordics**

The Catholicism of the Christian Democrats stirred the embers of Nordic anti-papism and Catholic stereotypes and grated on the mostly secular or at best nominally religious Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats’ tendency to ground political thinking in Christian concepts and religious rhetoric struck Social Democrats as archaic and coercive. The Nordic Social Democrats, like the left wing of the British Labour party, saw continental Europe as a bastion of capitalism and Catholic traditionalism. In Sweden, Social Democrats, indeed most Swedes, could summarize the threat of Europe using four C’s (or K’s in Swedish): “capitalism, Catholicism, conservatism and colonialism.”[[114]](#footnote-114) The socialists of the north found the European continental bloc insufficiently progressive. According to Tony Judt, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander (in office 1948-1968), “ascribed his own ambivalence about joining [the EEC] to the overwhelming Catholic majority in the new Community.”[[115]](#footnote-115) Niels Matthiasen, the internal secretary of the Danish Social Democrats in the late 1950s, articulated the party line: “As a member of the Common Market we would become the seventh country in a union dominated by the Catholic church and Right-Wing movements.”[[116]](#footnote-116) Even Gunnar Myrdal described the EC as states “with a more primitive form of social organization than ours,” arguing that, “it is above all the securely Protestant countries that have progressed economically and in all other ways.”[[117]](#footnote-117) Another leading Social Democrat, Enn Kokk, put it even more starkly. His description of a Europe ruled by capitalism and papism ended with a dismal assessment: “Today’s Franco-German combination, an alliance between General de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer at the forefront of a Catholic, conservative and capitalist western Europe is a disquieting creation. . . . a politically dead landscape.”[[118]](#footnote-118)

The animosity that Social Democrats felt for Continental Christian Democrats sat atop an iceberg of popular cultural distrust. Rural populations in all the Nordic countries feared the cultural changes that integration with the continent might bring. Religiously conservative Scandinavians, heirs of the nineteenth-century revivals, were quite willing to express religious concerns. Free Church partisans in the Swedish Riksdag in 1951“saw the threat of Catholic monasteries as being almost as dangerous as secularization and de-Christianization.” For them, “Europe” was “synonymous with Catholicism.”[[119]](#footnote-119) During the 1962 Norwegian Storting debate on whether Norway should apply for Common Market membership, religious conservatives from the Liberal and Christian People’s parties, with some help from Labor, argued against membership “on the basis that the Protestant religion in Norway would be weakened,” that EEC countries would exert a “conservative influence, as a result of the strong position of the Catholic church in these countries,” and that in general, “full membership would constitute a threat to Norwegian culture.”[[120]](#footnote-120) Such arguments disappeared from Storting debates in the 1970s, but not from political campaigns. During the 1972 referendum campaign “a number of people were worried about the EC closing down the Protestant Norwegian state church, and also feared . . . a ‘Catholic invasion.’”[[121]](#footnote-121) More generally, the opponents of Community membership claimed, “The country would be invaded by foreign workers, catholic ideas, continental drinking habits, and foreigners buying up their mountain huts, lakes and forests.”[[122]](#footnote-122) The state alcohol monopoly was possibly in danger, which greatly bothered teetotalers, among others.[[123]](#footnote-123)

Well into the 2000s conservative Christians in Norway were denouncing the EC as Vatican dominated and the kingdom of the antichrist.[[124]](#footnote-124) Norwegian prophecy teachers Bente and Abel Struksnæs, for example, predicted on their website a Vatican take-over of the European Union in a “quest for European unity and world dominion.”[[125]](#footnote-125) One Norwegian bishop grew so concerned by such rhetoric in the early 1990s that he warned “believers against indulging too much in demonising the EEC.”[[126]](#footnote-126) Other Nordic states contained similar sentiments. During the Maastricht treaty debate in Denmark, for instance, conservative Christians debated in the pages of *Idé Politik* whether or not the European Community was the resurrected Roman Empire of biblical prophecy.[[127]](#footnote-127)

**CONCLUSION**

End-times narratives do not fit well with modernity. They are conspiratorial, non-empirical, intolerant, and authoritarian. In other words, they are the antithesis of rational, scientific, tolerant and democratic contemporary Europe. But they are not alien to Europe; they are the leftover bits of the last four centuries that happen to have survived into the current liberal age. They serve as windows to the Protestant past.

1. Adrian Hilton, *The Principality and Power of Europe: Britain and the Emerging Holy European Empire* (Herts, England: Dorchester House Publications, 1997), 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Alan Franklin, *EU: The Final World Empire* (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Hearthstone Publishing, 2002), 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The paper relies heavily on Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth, *Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Adapted from Pat Franklin, “The Great Commission,” in *EU: The Final World Empire*, 205-210. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Martin Luther, “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate,” trans. Charles M. Jacobs, revised James Atkinson, in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 44, ed. James Atkinson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 193-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Martin Luther, “Against the Roman Papacy an Institution of the Devil,” trans. Eric W. Gritsch, in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 41, ed. Eric W. Gritsch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See Martin Luther, “On the Papacy in Rome, Against the Most Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig,” trans. Eric W. and Ruth C. Gritsch, in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 39, ed. Eric W. Gritsch(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 57-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Calvin, *Institutes,* 1143-1144. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid., 1144. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Martin Luther, “Against Hanswurst,” trans. Eric W. Grisch, in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 41, 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Calvin, *Institutes,* 1144. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Luther, “Nobility,” 194-195; Calvin, *Institutes,* 1145. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. John Miller, *Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Roman Catholicism did not collapse, but remained remarkably strong in parts of Britain. See Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Reformation thinking was not new to Britain. John Wycliff developed many in the fourteenth century that were later taken up by the Reformers, including the notion that the pope was the Antichrist himself [Robert C. Fuller, *Naming the Antichrist: The History of an American Obsession* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 37]. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith,* 88-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See Miller, *Popery and Politics,* 51-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., 72-73, 83-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Care quoted in Miller, *Popery and Politics,* 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Miller, *Popery and Politics,* 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See the discussion of the “Fifth Monarchy Men” in David S. Katz and Richard H. Popkin, *Messianic Revolution: Radical Religious Politics to the End of the Second Millennium* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 65-80. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Miller, *Popery and Politics,* 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid., 87-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See W. R. Ward, “Power and Piety: The Origins of Religious Revival in the Early Eighteenth Century,” *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 63, no. 1 (1980): 231-252. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. David Bebbington, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989), 20-21, 34-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid., 107-109. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid., 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The information and all quotes from Bebbington, *Evangelicalism,* 101-102. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 221-222, 255. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See, for instance, Malichi’s (4:1) day that “will burn like a furnace,” Jesus’ teaching on the unexpected coming of the “Son of Man” (Matt. 24), Paul’s discussion of the “day of the Lord” (II Thess. 2:2), and the “great white throne” of Rev. 20:11. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. A good discussion of apocalyptic agitation at the turn of the first millennium, see Richard Erdoes, *A.D. 1000: A World on the Brink of Apocalypse* (Berkeley, CA: Seastone, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. For an excellent summary of Protestant apocalyptic motivations, see MacCulloch, *Reformation,* 532-537; see also Anthony F. Upton, *Europe, 1600-1789* (London: Arnold, 2001), 37-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ernest R. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 6-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. The title of Reverend George Stanley Faber’s early (1804) contribution illustrates the flavor of this literature: *Dissertation on the Prophecies, That Have Been Fulfilled, Are Now Fulfilling, or Will Hereafter Be Fulfilled, Relative to the Great Period of 1260 Years* (Sandeen, *Roots*, 8). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. One important source of this premillennial revival was, ironically, the Chilean Jesuit Manuel Lacunza’s *The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty*. Lacunza finished the book around 1791 but he died before it was published in 1801. It appeared in Spanish about 1812 and English in 1826. Its English translator was the popular London pastor Edward Irving who deeply influenced the development of British Evangelicalism. See Sandeen, *Roots*, 17-18; [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Sandeen, *Roots*, 21-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Dewey M. Beegle, *Prophecy and Prediction* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pryor Pettegill, 1978), 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Sandeen, *Roots*, 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. On Darby, see Sandeen, *Roots*, 60-80; Ernest R. Sandeen, *The Origins of Fundamentalism: Toward a Historical Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), 3-9; Beegle, *Prophecy and Prediction,* 157-159; Bebbington, *Evangelicalism,* 192-193. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Ibid., 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid., 192-193. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. MacCulloch, *Reformation,* 536. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1995), 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Benedict, *Christ’s Churches,* 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid., 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Israel, *Dutch Republic,* 389. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid., 646-647. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See Thomas R. Rochon, *The Netherlands: Negotiating Sovereignty in an Interdependent World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999)*,* 26-29; Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands* (Hampshire, England: Palgrave, 2002), 21-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. James D. Bratt, “Introduction to ‘Maranatha,’” in *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader*, ed.James D. Bratt (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 1998), 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Abraham Kuyper, “Maranatha,” in *Abraham Kuyper,* 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid. (emphasis in original). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Ibid., 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid., 213-214. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Peder A. Eidberg, “Norwegian Free Churches and Religious Liberty: A History,” *Journal of Church and State* 37, no. 4 (1995): 869-885. Academic Search Premier (9602260495); Martin Schwarz Lausten, “The Early Reformation in Denmark and Norway 1520-1559,” in *The Scandinavian Reformation: From Evangelical Movement to Institutionalization of Reform*, ed. Ole Peter Grell(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Eidberg, “Norwegian Free Churches”; see also Frederick Hale, “Anticlericalism and Norwegian Society before the Breakthrough of Modernity,” *Scandinavian Studies* 52, no. 3 (1980): 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Olaf Severn Olsen, “Civil Religion and Christianity in Sweden,” *Fides et historia: Official Publication of the Conference on Faith and History* 7, no. 2 (1975): 42-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The pietist Erik Pontoppidan, whose text explaining Luther’s Shorter Catechism (1737) was a standard in Denmark for nearly 40 years and Norway for 150 years, wrote a short tract on the occasion of the bicentenary of the Reformation (1736) that called for a “sweeping out” of the active remnants of paganism and Catholicism. See Henrik Horstbøll, “Pietism and the Politics of Catechisms: The Case of Denmark and Norway in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 29, no. 2 (2004): 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. For the pietist movement in Scandinavia, see B. J. Hovde, *The Scandinavian Countries, 1720-1865: The Rise of the Middle Classes,* vol. 1 (Boston: Chapman and Grimes, 1943), 303-347; Horstbøll, “Pietism”; and Olsen, “Civil Religion,” 44-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Hanne Sanders, “Peasant Revivalism and Secularization: Protestant Popular Culture in Denmark and Sweden, 1820-1850,” in *Individualisierung, Rationalisierung, Säkularisierung: Neue Wege der Religionsgeschichte*, ed. Michael Weinzierl(Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag München, 1997), 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Hovde, *Scandinavian Countries,* 315-318. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ibid., 312-313. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid., 331. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Madeley, “Religion and the Political Order: The Case of Norway,” in Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson Shupe (eds.), *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered: Religion and the Political Order,* vol. 3(New York: Paragon House, 1989), 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Hale, “Anticlericalism,” 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. David B. Woodward, *Aflame for God: Biography of Fredrik Franson* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1966), 147-149. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Peder A. Eidberg, “Norwegian Free Churches and Religious Liberty: A History,” *Journal of Church and State* 37, no. 4 (1995): 869-885. Academic Search Premier (9602260495). Denmark guaranteed religious freedom in 1849 and permitted the Roman church to organize soon after. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Franklin D. Scott*, Sweden: The Nation’s History* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 359. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Quoted in Philip Magnus, *Gladstone: A Biography* (London: John Murray, 1963), 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Quoted in Magnus, *Gladstone,* 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Ibid., 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Steve Bruce, *God Save Ulster!: The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. See Peter Brooke, *Ulster Presbyterianism: The Historical Perspective, 1610-1970* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Bruce, *God Save Ulster!,* 91-92, 222-223. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. *Revivalist* 3, no. 11, 1-2, as quoted in Bruce, *God Save Ulster!,* 67, emphasis in original. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. As quoted by Bruce, *God Save Ulster!,* 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Paisley is particularly close to fundamentalists associated with Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina where Paisley was given a honorary doctorate in 1966 (Bruce, *God Save Ulster!,* 168-169, 183). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Ibid., 206-207, 221-231. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Ibid., 228. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Three-quarters of Unionists expressed a general “fear of the power of the Roman Catholic Church” in the early 1980s [Edward Moxon-Browne, *Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland* (Aldershot: Gower, 1983), 38 as cited in Bruce, *God Save Ulster!,* 123.] [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Kuyper argued that unlike secular liberals, Catholics confess the Christian faith: “[W]hereas all the parties of the Revolution ignore, if not ridicule, the Second Coming of our Lord, our Roman Catholic countrymen confess with us: ‘Whence he will come again to judge the living and the dead’….They, like we, acknowledge that all authority and power on earth flows from God and is rooted in the reality of creation….They say as do you that this God has sent his only Son into the world and as a reward for his cross has placed on his head the Mediator’s crown.  And they testify with you that this divinely anointed King now sits at the right hand of God, [and] controls the destiny of peoples and States . . .” [Abraham Kuyper, “Maranatha,” in *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader*, ed. James D. Bratt(Grand Rapids, MI, 1998), 218]. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Hans Vollard, “Protestantism and Euro-scepticism in the Netherlands,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 7, no. 3 (2006): 287. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Ibid., 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Jespersen, *History of Denmark,* 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. See Stein Rokkan, “Geography, Religion, and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics,” in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan(New York: The Free Press, 1967), 415-425; Lauri Karvonen, “In From the Cold? Christian Politics in Scandinavia,” *Scandinavian Political* Studies 16, no. 1 (1993): 35-37; John T. S. Madeley, “The Antinomies of Lutheran Politics: The Case of Norway’s Christian People’s Party,” in *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective,* ed. David Hanley(London: Pinter, 1994), 142-154. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Madeley, “Antinomies,” 142-150. The Norwegian word *kristenfolket*, literally translated “Christian people,” came to mean “revivalists” or “fundamentalists.” [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. John T. S. Madeley, “Religion and the Political Order: The Case of Norway,” in *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered, Religion and the Political Order,* Vol. 3, ed. Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson Shupe(New York: Paragon House, 1989), 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Karvonen, “In From the Cold?,” 30 [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Ibid., 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Ibid., 31-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. ABC News, 6 June 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Hal Lindsey, *The Greatest Works of Hal Lindsey: The Late Great Planet Earth; Satan is Alive and Well on Planet Earth* (New York: Inspirational Press, 1994), 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Lindsey, *Greatest Works*, 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Rapture Ready, “Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://www.raptureready.com/faq/faq179.html>. See also, Rema Marketing, “The EU Antichrist,” http://www.theeuantichrist.com. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. For an excellent discussion of the use of the terms “Europe” and “Continent” in postwar British discourse, see Piers Ludlow, “Us or Them? The Meaning of Europe in British Political Discourse,” in *The Meaning of Europe*, 101-104. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. George Wilkes, “The First Failure to Steer Britain into the European Communities: An Introduction,” in *Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community, 1961-63: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, ed. George Wilkes(London: Frank Cass, 1997), 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Hugo Young, *Blessed Plot,* 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Charlton, *Price of Victory,* 46; Hugo Young, *Blessed Plot,* 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Both quotes in Hugo Young, *Blessed Plot,* 50-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, *Britain and European Integration since 1945: On the Sidelines* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Bullock, *Ernest Bevin,* 781, 786. See also the May 1950 pamphlet titled “European Unity: A Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party.” For a thorough analysis of the Labour’s position on integration, see Andrew Mullen, *The British Left’s ‘Great Debate’ on Europe* (New York: Continuum, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Hugo Young, *Blessed Plot,* 51; on the *Mandement*, see Herman Bakvis, *Catholic Power in the Netherlands* (Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1981), 33-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Philip M. Coupland, “Western Union, ‘Spiritual Union,’ and European Integration, 1948-1951,” *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 43(July 2004): 389. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Hugo Young, *Blessed Plot,* 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Coupland, “Western Union,” 390. The word “revival” is obviously a misprint and should read “rival.” [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Nathaniel Micklem quoted in Coupland, “Western Union,” 390. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Ibid., 391. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Ibid., 390 (all quotes). [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. All quotations from Ian Paisley, “The Common Market, the Kingdom of the Anti-christ, Why It Must Be Resisted,” *The Revivalist,* June 1975, accessed 27 June 2014, http://www.ianpaisley.org/revivalist/1975/Rev75jun.htm. See also Steve Bruce, *God Save Ulster! The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 221-231. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. All quotations are from Paisley, “The Common Market.” [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Ian R.K. Paisley, “May God Save Us From Coming Under This Dictatorship Once Again,” European Institute of Protestant Studies, last modified 6 December 2000, http://www.ianpaisley.org/article.asp?ArtKey=soul. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Arthur Noble, “The Conspiracy Behind The European Union: What Every Christian Should Know, A Lecture delivered at the Annual Autumn Conference of the United Protestant Council in London on Saturday, November 7, 1998,” European Institute of Protestant Studies, last modified 30 April 1999, http://www.ianpaisley.org/article.asp?ArtKey=conspiracy; Clive Gillis, “The Popes at War and the Fall of the Papal States,” European Institute of Protestant Studies, last modified 21 October 2000, <http://www.ianpaisley.org/article.asp?ArtKey=papalstates>. For a dispensational view of the flag (and many other related topics) see Bente and Abel Struksnæs, “Watch Out for a Catholic European Union!” <http://www.endtime.net/engelsk/KEU.htm>, retrieved 28 June 2013. For a more complete discussion of the religious controversy over EU symbols, see Foret, *The Secular Canopy*. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Alan Franklin, *EU*, 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Charles Silva, “An Introduction to Sweden and European Integration 1947-1957,” in *Die Neutralen und die Europäische Integration,* 286. See also, Lars Trägårdh, “Welfare State Nationalism: Sweden and the Specter of the European Union,” *Scandinavian Review* 87, no. 1 (1999): 18-23. In Denmark it was similar: “Catholicism, Christian Democracy and Capitalism (or Cartels)” [Johnny N. Laursen and Thorsten Borring Olesen, “A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark’s Nordic and European Policies,” in *Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options*, ed. Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup(Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 2000), 229]. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Laursen and Olesen, “Nordic Alternative,” 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Quoted in Lars Trägårdh, “Sweden and the EU: Welfare State Nationalism and the Spectre of ‘Europe,’” in *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver(London: Routledge, 2002), 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Trägårdh, “Sweden and the EU,” 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Both quotes from Bo Stråth, “The Swedish Demarcation from Europe,” in *The Meaning of Europe*, 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Daniel Heradstveit, “The Norwegian EEC Debate,” in *Fears and Expectations,* 189. Haradstveit’s assessment is based on a content analysis of Storting debates. Cultural issues did not rank high in the number of times they were discussed in parliament, but Haradstveit makes the point that the issues were considered very important by members of the Christian People’s Party in southwest Norway. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Iver B. Neumann, “This Little Piggy Stayed at Home: Why Norway is Not a Member of the EU,” in *European Integration and National Identity,* 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Allen, *Norway and Europe,* 107. See also David L. Larson, “Selected Foreign Policy Elites,” in *Norway’s No to Europe, International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 5,* ed. Nils Örvik(Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1975), 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. For an excellent study of alcohol norms and public policy in the Nordic region, see Paulette Kurzer, *Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Brent F. Nelsen, “The European Community Debate in Norway: The Periphery Revolts, Again,” in *Norway and the European Community: The Political Economy of Integration*, ed. Brent F. Nelsen(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Bente Struksnæs and Abel Struksnæs, “Watch Out for a Catholic European Union!” Christian Information Service, accessed 28 June 2014, http://www.endtime.net/engelsk/KEU.htm. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Willaime, “Protestant Approaches,” 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. See Chris Mathieu, *The Moral Life of the Party: Moral Argumentation and the Creation of Meaning in the Europe Policy Debates of the Christian and Left-Socialist Parties in Denmark and Sweden 1990-1996* (Lund, Sweden: Dept. of Sociology, Lund University, 1999), 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)