Greetings from the co-chairs of the EUSA Political Economy Section:

Michele Chang, Political and Administrative Studies Department, College of Europe
mchang@coleurop.be
Georg Menz, Department of Politics, Goldsmiths College, University of London
sss02gm@gold.ac.uk
Mitchell Smith, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma
mps@ou.edu

Dear Section Members,

Welcome from the new section co-chairs. At the 2009 EUSA meeting, section members endorsed for the first time a troika arrangement for the section leadership. An advantage of this set-up is that we have a representative from each of the geographical areas most active in the
section: the U.S., the U.K., and the continent. This will facilitate efforts to seek out opportunities and draw broad participation in section initiatives, which is our goal.

There also is new leadership at the section newsletter. Patrick Leblond, who served ably as the Data Resources Review Editor for 4 years, has agreed to take over as Managing Editor. In addition, we are pleased that David Cleeton has taken on the position of Forum Editor.

In August we announced our first research project, an analytical retrospective of the Lisbon agenda at the end of the Lisbon decade. The project will focus on the evolution of the Lisbon objectives, progress toward the objectives, and tensions inherent in Lisbon goals. We plan to submit a proposal to the open competition for a special issue of the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, or to pursue an alternative publication venue. In addition, we intend to compose from the submitted papers panels for the September 2010 UACES conference in Bruges and the spring 2011 EUSA conference. We reproduce below the CFP, which has a deadline of October 16. We look forward to your submissions.

The Political Economy Section is sponsoring an interest section essay in the fall 2009 EUSA Review; the co-chairs heartily thank Dermot Hodson and Lucia Quaglia for their fine piece on the EU response to the global financial crisis. Section members and EUSA members generally will benefit from reading this highly informative analysis.

Ultimately, our collective aspiration as co-chairs is to build on the successes of David Howarth and Tal Sadeh, who during four years at the helm of the section initiated and steered to completion important research projects that stimulated productive work and advanced the research agenda in the political economy of European integration. On behalf of the section, we extend our thanks once again to David and Tal and express our hope that we can make a similar contribution during our period in office.

With thanks,

Michele Chang

Georg Menz

Mitchell P. Smith
Center for International Data, University of California at Davis

Vargo Edmunds
University of Ottawa

The University of California-Davis established the Center for International Data whose purpose is “to collect, enhance, create and disseminate international economic data for online and offline distribution”. Some of the data is available for download in a .zip file or by ordering online. The page is maintained by economist Robert Feenstra and his contact information is included on the website: http://www.internationaldata.org/

The website contains various datasets: U.S. imports and exports, U.S. tariffs, world imports and exports, data on Korean and Taiwanese corporations, international financial data (which requires a password), two links to the Penn World Tables.

There is a modest effort by the website to define the available data. For instance, it is mentioned that the data are available in a harmonized system which has been used since 1989 to classify U.S. imports and exports. There is a link that highlights all the layouts of the columns in Excel and even goes as far as admitting that some units are missing. Further, the most impressive portion of the website is the section of working papers that seek to define the available data. This would be helpful for any scholar undertaking preliminary research on the accessible information and could also serve as a guide for further analysis.

U.S. import and export data can be downloaded in three different versions: data from the U.S. Census in ASCII format as well as processed data that include U.S. ports and modes of transport (which is the data that are elaborated in the working papers and are also in ASCII format), and finally the same data but imported into SAS and STATA format.

The disaggregated data can also be aggregated to the 4-digit SIC codes. The downside is that scholars unfamiliar with this system would have to review the codes before viewing it. As well, the years available for the different versions are not synchronized, meaning that each version will have a different start and end date. For instance, the data available in ASCII format is from 1972-2001 and the SAS & STATA is from 1972-2006. Although not an over-extensive problem, those who are unfamiliar with one or the other formats will have to decide which format to use for their appropriate research.
The U.S. tariffs dataset is broken down into two parts for the years 1972-1988 and 1989-2001. There is a link that transfers to another website entitled “International Economics Resource Page” which provides recent trade data. The available data on this page appears to be more comprehensive as it has U.S. import and export data from 1989-2008, which can prove useful for any scholar needing recent figures. There are also other datasets ranging from U.S. Multilateral Manufacturing Imports and Exports and import penetration by manufacturing industry. A weakness is that the datasets on the aforementioned website are not systematically coordinated and could cause some confusion with regards to browsing for information. Further, the layout and presentation may not be friendly to all scholars. Still, this is a useful data resource for political economy scholars who want specific data dealing with U.S. tariffs.

The website also offers two datasets of world trade flows, covering the period 1962-2000 and derived from the United Nations in SAS and STATA format. There are also older datasets covering the years 1970-1997, coming from Statistics Canada in ASCII format. The main strength is that there is an explanation for the data in a .pdf file with various questions answered and a willingness to answer other queries through e-mail. As well, the detailed report on World Trade flows is highly informative and insightful, and could prove to be a significant asset before investigating the data.

One of the interesting areas of the website is the section devoted to the study of Asian economies. Given the rising influence of this region, it could prove very valuable for scholars. The section is divided into three parts: Taiwan business groups, South Korean business groups and South Korean productivity. The Taiwanese and South Korean business group datasets include statistics from the 1980s and early 1990s, with a detailed report outlining the comparison between the two. Although this seems to be a good idea, the amount of information within the datasets is lacking. The same can be said of the Korean Total Factor Productivity dataset, as it only includes the period 1971-1991. Data from Asian markets have been highly valued recently in the academic community and an expansion of this data would suit scholars well.

In sum, the Center for International Data website provides reliable information that could prove beneficial for scholars if the content fits their research needs. More statistics from Asian markets and updates to the world export and import datasets would make for useful improvements.
Forum Section
David Cleeton, Forum Editor

The Forum is open to all members of the EUSA Political Economy Interest Section who wish to share their views on empirical, theoretical and policy questions relating to EU Political Economy.

Comparative Advantage in EU Economic Policy: Promoting Effective Trade Reforms
David L. Cleeton
Dean, College of Social Sciences
Christopher Newport University

In times of severe economic crisis it is important to take a careful look at where the European Union can add the most value and therefore should be focusing its efforts to restore the EU economy to sound and sustainable real growth. While the ECB has taken a well-measured approach to steadying the financial system and continues to struggle to come to grips with the important steps needed to understand how to effectively regulate financial markets and institutions, it lacks the authority to make significant progress on its own and in any case must operate within an increasingly complex environment. With strong independent neighbors attempting to control their own currencies and a number of weak economies directly linked to the euro, the eurozone has the potential to be pushed and pulled into a wobbly orbit producing neither satisfactory inflationary performance nor an environment conducive to promoting significant growth potential.

The asymmetric shocks of the financial crisis and the resulting impacts on unemployment and real output have produced a variety of alternative fiscal policy responses in EU member states. In turn the heterogeneity of the impacts and policy actions will produce lingering long-term effects on governmental debt positions and fiscal balances. The track record of attempting to successfully constrain the spillover effects of these continuing budgetary imbalances will likely make the past evolution of the eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact seem only an insignificant historical footnote. Likewise a reasoned approach to regulatory reform across the financial landscape of the EU will take careful bargaining and coordinated efforts in a direction which is not clearly mapped at this point and will have to extend far beyond the EU to have significant and useful results across global financial markets.

On the other hand, one policy area where the EU has clear control and possesses the ability to have considerable short-term and long-term impacts is the sphere of international trade. The
EU’s primary strength has long rested on the integrative nature and growth potential resulting from promoting cross border trade in goods and services and freeing up resource markets in capital and labor. It is a proven policy framework which has built the most integrated and largest economy in the world and offers continued hope to further the well being of newer member states as well as promote economic growth and development for trading partners around the globe.

In the 21st century EU27 exports were growing at an annual rate of nearly 4% through 2007 to the point where, excluding intra-European trade, exports and imports represented slightly more than 23% of GDP in 2008. This was accomplished while running only a slight overall trade deficit in the neighborhood of 2% of GDP and this was primarily explained by the EU’s chronic energy deficit. With the EU27 accounting for one-fifth of world trade and one-half of global FDI, global trade and investment flows make the EU a major player indeed.

The EU continues to use the full range of trade policy instruments, from tariff quotas to customs controls as well as an increasing variety of instruments of trade defense such as anti-dumping procedures. The EU has typically been on the forefront of the development of trade liberalizing frameworks including multilaterally under the GATT and WTO regimes; reciprocally via bilateral and regionally based preferential trade agreements; and in non-reciprocal fashion through special access to European markets granted to specific developing countries. The EU understands the rational for promoting further trade and investment liberalization, both in domestic and foreign markets. Clearly on the export side, opening up new markets helps to sustain and promote the growth of domestic firms, as highlighted by Germany’s sectoral dependence on exports to bridge the gap created by weak domestic demand. On the import side, new goods and investments offer a multitude of opportunities to create improved access to new technologies and productivity enhancing ideas while enhancing competitive pressures to hold down consumer prices and producer input costs.

In addition to these clear cut benefits from trade promotion, it is important in the current economic climate not to exacerbate the cyclical trade volume decline. While most forecasters are expecting 2010 to bring a quick rebound from the near 20% collapse likely to be recorded during 2009, there is a duty to restore trade growth by resisting calls for increased protectionism. And in the case of the EU this also means increased vigilance in opposing the use of illegal state aid favoring domestic firms.

A concerted push by the EU to promote further trade liberalization should take a multipronged approach. Beyond pushing forward on a successful conclusion of the Doha round of WTO talks the EU should apply rigorous analysis to proposed preferential trade agreements to insure they are properly designed to produce clear net benefits with trade creation outweighing trade diversion effects. Promise is also offered under broader application of innovative schemes to substitute common rules of origin across the wide set of EU’s free-trade area partnerships. In all of these areas the EU can push forward to reestablish its global leadership in promoting long-term economic growth by building institutional arrangements and decision-making frameworks driving economic development forward throughout the initial decades of the 21st century.
The European Central Bank (ECB), like many of the world’s central banks has faced a very difficult year. The global financial crisis that began last fall has had a tremendous impact on the Eurozone and challenged the policy-makers in the ECB in ways that were hardly envisioned when the central bank was designed and given its mandate. Despite the challenges of managing monetary policy in a multi-national economic zone, the ECB has come through the storm no worse for wear. In fact, the ECB has shown that it can weather the political perils of finding a one-size-fits-all monetary policy in a Eurozone, which has seen some very different challenges in the different national economies. Perhaps even more importantly, the ECB has demonstrated that it can be pragmatic in its approach to policy without abandoning the monetary policy principles that have given the central bank so much of its credibility. I believe the ECB has come out of the worst part of the global financial crisis a stronger institution than when it went into it.

An important place to start with any discussion of the monetary policy of the ECB is its origins and mandate. The ECB was modeled on the German Bundesbank in terms of structure and policy principles. When European policy-makers were debating what form the central bank should take, the German Bundesbank was used as a model with relatively little acrimony. One reason for this was that the German government made this a condition to agreeing with the plan for monetary union. Another important reason for using the German central bank as a model was that there was a consensus among nearly all European central bankers that the German central bank was the most successful in the world in terms of promoting low inflation and solid growth and that it had immense credibility in global currency markets. Thus adopting the Bundesbank model meant that the new central bank would be able to borrow some of the German central bank’s credibility to help get the new European common currency off the ground running. The German monetary policy paradigm was also considered the evident best practices with no really viable better alternative available.

The ECB’s primary mandate has been price stability. It does not have a commensurate growth mandate. The thinking behind this mandate, as it was at the Bundesbank, was that price stability is the foundation for economic growth. This mandate is firmly based on a monetarist view of policy. As with the Bundesbank, the ECB has made the targeting of money supply growth a key part of its policy mix. Money supply growth is targeted in order to create the best conditions for liquidity in the economy that will not spur inflation, which was defined as consumer price increases greater than two percent per year.

The track record of the ECB had been admirable prior to the start of the global financial crisis. The eurozone enjoyed relatively low inflation, solid, if somewhat uneven, growth, and a strong currency. Despite a few attacks on its actions from various politicians in Europe, no European...
political leader seriously offered a challenge to the central bank’s policies or mandate. For a new institution managing a new currency, the ECB had a very effective start.

Then the global economic crisis hit. There was plenty of reason to think that the ECB would have a very difficult time navigating the choppy waters of the eurozone economy because of the crisis. Several policy challenges became quickly evident. First, the crisis did not hit the eurozone uniformly. The economic impact of the crisis was hardest in the eurozone member states Ireland, Greece, and Spain. These countries saw financial implosions that seemed to represent systemic risk in their markets. Other eurozone members saw slower growth but not the same degree of threat to their financial markets. And lurking on the sideline was the crisis ridden banking system of the United Kingdom.

The second major challenge posed by the global financial crisis was that it began a process of disinflation. That meant prices began to sink throughout the eurozone as financial asset linkages with real assets and household wealth effects threatened the onset of a general deflation. The ECB, which has been geared toward fighting inflation, now had to figure out how to evade a disinflationary spiral. As it lowered its main interest rates, it became evident that it was failing to stop the price slide, which threatened to cause a deflationary depression in the eurozone.

Another major problem the ECB faced in the midst of the financial crisis was that there is no single bank regulator in the eurozone. Member state governments have jealously guarded their power to regulate their own banks. This meant that the ECB lacked good, complete information on the health and activities of the banks operating in the eurozone. This implied that it was fairly difficult for the ECB to develop a clear picture of the financial landscape of the eurozone, something necessary in order to make truly well-informed monetary policy decisions.

What did the ECB do to fix the mess? Its first strategy focused on interest rate reductions. It reduced its main rate gradually to a record low of one percent to add liquidity to the eurozone. While this had some therapeutic effect, it was not enough to pull the eurozone out of recession.

It also asked for a larger role in bank supervision. While the ECB was not given the role of bank supervisor for the eurozone as it had requested, it did get a closer degree of coordination among European Union bodies and national governments to oversee banks more closely and to formulate new regulations so as to avoid a repeat of the crisis in the future.

The most controversial strategy that the ECB had to consider, at least internally, was the issue of quantitative easing. This basically meant creating money to buy securities and thereby inject more liquidity into the eurozone. This policy option initially was very controversial and produced public divisions within the ECB. The central bank was divided into what I have called the “Bundesbankers” versus the dissenters. The “Bundesbankers” were lead by Vice President, Jürgen Stark, who had come from the Bundesbank. This camp was opposed to quantitative easing because it was viewed as a potential open door to inflationary expectations and moving outside the normal operating constraints of the mandate. Axel Weber, the President of the Bundesbank, also opposed the idea publicly. What was so shocking about this policy debate is
that it was, to a degree, aired publically. It was unheard of in the years prior to the crisis that ECB policy-makers would display disunity on policy matters in public.

Despite the acrimony over how to move forward, the ECB decided to engage in unconventional monetary policy measures to improve the liquidity situation in the eurozone. It has engaged in a form of quantitative easing, buying up covered bonds. It has also eased banks’ access to unlimited liquidity through fixed rate tenders.

While these actions may seem a significant deviation from the Bundesbank’s playbook, the ECB was forced by circumstances to develop new ways to deal with the financial crisis. Rather than view the ECB’s new policy measures as a move away from the Bundesbank model, they should rather be viewed as emergency measures that will be unwound once the liquidity situation is righted. The primary foundation for this view is that the ECB has stated consistently that its mandate has not changed and it will not add liquidity to the market that will drive inflation down the line. The ECB has no incentive to continue with unconventional monetary policy once this crisis is past. There is no reason to think that policy-makers in the ECB have discarded the Bundesbank policy paradigm because of the crisis. Inflation would only erode the credibility and reputation of the central bank. The Bundesbank model had served the ECB very well. Besides, that policy model did not get Europe into this financial mess, the lack of proper bank regulation in the United States and elsewhere was the primary cause.

Members’ Recent Publications


Calls for Papers

After the Lisbon Decade: Progress and Prospects
(EUSA Political Economy Section)

In a now well-worn phrase, the European Council in March 2000 announced the objective of making the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world." The Lisbon process encompassed a range of strategic objectives, including intensified and more coordinated investment in innovation; structural economic reform to stimulate entrepreneurship; and revision of education and social welfare systems to augment human capital and restructure incentives for labor force participation.

Both a mid-decade evaluation of advancement toward the Lisbon goals by the European Commission and an assessment delivered to the Council in the November 2004 Kok Report concluded that there had been little progress. A "relaunched" Lisbon agenda ensued, with a renewed, narrowed focus on growth and job creation and greater emphasis on national action plans by member state governments.

The Lisbon Council Presidency Conclusions asserted that meeting the challenge of globalization demanded "a radical transformation of the European economy." To what extent has such a transformation taken place? What have been the primary areas of success and failure as the Lisbon decade comes to a close? How might we explain these outcomes? Has the EU made progress toward resolving apparent contradictions inherent in the Lisbon agenda, including that between heightened economic competitiveness and greater social cohesion, or between a reduced regulatory burden and economic "sustainability"? How has the agenda itself evolved, particularly as governments have confronted new challenges in the areas of energy security and environmental stewardship, as well as intensified demands on fiscal policy in the face of structural and cyclical economic demands? Where does the EU turn next in its quest to galvanize a coordinated effort to augment economic dynamism? How might the EU institutions and member state governments identify productive goals and what mechanisms might the EU deploy to overcome collective action problems?

Driven by these questions, the co-chairs of EUSA’s Political Economy Section call for contributions to a project focused on evaluating the implications of the Lisbon decade, including, but not limited to, the following:
• Focused analyses of areas of progress or stagnation, including labor force participation, research & development, and social welfare policies;
• Cross-country comparative studies of the impact of the Lisbon process;
• Examinations of Lisbon goals, their evolution, and internal tensions, including historical-sociological analysis of the genesis of the Lisbon goals;
• Theoretical studies of mechanisms for pursuing Lisbon objectives.

Approximately 8-10 papers will be selected for inclusion in the project; these papers will serve as the basis for a proposal to be submitted to an open competition for a special issue of the January 2011 edition of the Journal of Common Market Studies (or, in the event that the proposal is unsuccessful, another leading EU studies journal). In addition, authors of the selected papers will be invited to participate in panels at the UACES conference on “Exchanging Ideas on Europe” scheduled to take place in Bruges, Belgium from 6-8 September 2010, as well as the spring 2011 EUSA conference.

Those interested in contributing should submit a paper proposal of up to 750 words by 16 October 2009 simultaneously to all three Political Economy Section co-chairs:

Michele Chang  
College of Europe  
michele.chang@coleurope.be

Georg Menz  
Goldsmiths College  
sss02gm@gold.ac.uk  

Mitchell P. Smith  
University of Oklahoma  
mps@ou.edu

The section co-chairs will select the papers for the project and inform all submitters of the status of their proposals no later than 25 November 2009. Those selected for inclusion in the project will be expected to submit complete paper drafts by 1 March 2010 (at which time the participants may be invited to participate in a project workshop) and revised, final papers by 1 June 2010.

Council for European Studies  
Seventeenth International Conference  
Montreal, Canada  
April 15-17, 2010
A recent crisis of confidence has unsettled paradigms for economic, social and political governance: political identities, social allegiances, parameters of markets, cultural truisms, and religious truths are all in flux. Europe has long served as a model for the rest of the world - whether as object of admiration, forced exemplar, foil, or cautionary tale - and the present vacuum of certainty presents yet another moment of opportunity for scholars of "the old world." Are European experiments in economic coordination the solution to the excesses of unregulated capitalism - is this the moment for the revenge of the European model?

For the 2010 conference, the Council for European Studies (CES) welcomes proposals for panels, roundtables, book discussions and individual papers on the study of Europe broadly defined. We encourage proposals in the widest range of disciplines; in particular, we welcome panels that combine disciplines, nationalities, and generations. The Committee will accept only two submissions per person. Members may also participate in a maximum of two sessions.

The Council for European Studies fosters and recognizes outstanding, multidisciplinary research in European studies through a range of programs, including conferences, publications, special events, and awards. The Council's international conferences bring together scholars from a multitude of countries and a variety of fields for discussion and interdisciplinary exchange.

Proposals may be submitted until **October 15, 2009** via the URL:

http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/ces/ces10/

More information on the conference will be available in upcoming issues of the CES newsletter. You may subscribe to the newsletter here:

http://www.ces.columbia.edu/members/indiv_members.html

Participants will be notified of the Committee's decisions by December 1, 2009.

Cathie Jo Martin, CES Chair
Boston University

Sophie Meunier, Conference Co-Chair
Princeton University

Philip Nord, Conference Co-Chair
Princeton University

Globalization and Governance: Innovative Research on Globalization and Fiscal Policy
Washington University in St. Louis
February 26-27, 2010
Washington University in St. Louis is hosting an interdisciplinary conference on February 26-27, 2010 on the topic of Globalization and Governance. The goal of this conference is to bring together scholars exploring innovative theoretical and empirical contributions on the relationship between economic globalization and fiscal policy. We encourage contributions with new theoretical insights or innovative empirical analyses (e.g. subnational data analysis, experiments). Six to eight papers will be selected based on the significance and originality of the research, and the fit with other papers selected.

We ask all interested authors to submit a one-page abstract to Nathan Jensen at njensen@wustl.edu by October 15, 2009. The Weidenbaum Center at Washington University will cover all travel and lodging expenses for the presenters.

Nathan Jensen
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
St. Louis, MO 63130
Email: njensen@wustl.edu
WWW: http://nathanjensen.wustl.edu/

---

ecpr Standing Group on the European Union
Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics
Porto, Portugal (24 to 26 June 2010)

hosted by the Faculty of Economics at the University of Oporto and the University Fernando Pessoa

http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/

The ECPR Standing Group on the European Union is organizing its Fifth Pan-European Conference. It will be hosted by the Faculty of Economics of the University of Oporto and the University Fernando Pessoa, in Porto, Portugal, from 24 to 26 June 2010. The Standing Group’s Pan-European Conference is the largest academic conference on the European Union in Europe and brings together scholars working on the European Union from all over the world.

The conference program is divided into twelve sections under the co-chairmanship of Anand Menon from University of Birmingham and Hussein Kassim from University of East Anglia. The sections and section chairs are as follows:
• Theories of European Integration chaired by Mark Pollack of Temple University. This section covers the study of European integration with particular emphasis on theory development.

• EU Institutions chaired by Andreas Maurer, German Institute for International and Security Affairs. This section covers the study of European institutions and decision making.

• The EU and the Member States, chaired by Paolo Graziano, Bocconi University. This section looks at EU-member state interaction, including not only debates about Europeanization, but how member states attempt to influence developments at EU level.

• Public Opinion, Party Politics and Interest Intermediation chaired by Sarah Binzer Hobolt at Oxford University. This section covers all aspects related to European public opinion, elections and participation in EU level policies.

• Economic and Social Policies chaired by Nicolas Jabko, CERI, Sciences Po., Paris. This section covers the study of European Union socio-economic policies.

• Environmental Governance and Climate Change chaired by Annette Bongardt, Instituto Nacional de Administração. This section covers environmental policy, including its interaction with other policy areas.

• EU Law and Politics chaired by Susanne Schmidt, University of Bremen. This section covers the study of the European Union with particular emphasis on the interactions between politics, policy, and law.

• Gender and Diversity chaired by Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey. This section covers the study of European integration with a particular emphasis on issues of gender, identity and diversity.

• The European Union as a Global Actor chaired by Frédéric Merand, University of Montréal. This section covers all aspects related to external economic and political relations.

• Enlargement and the European Neighborhood chaired by Yannis Stivachtis, Virginia Tech. This section covers all aspects related to the politics and economics of EU enlargement.

• Immigration, Migration and Asylum chaired by Christian Joppke at the American University of Paris. This section covers all aspects related to the politics of immigration and migration in Europe, including asylum policy.

• The EU: Challenge, Crisis and Reform chaired by Dan Kelemen, Rutgers University. This section looks at the external and internal challenges confronted by the EU, and how it has responded. It assesses EU efforts at reform and considers what further changes are necessary.

The program chair will accept proposals for BOTH individual papers and whole panels (including a maximum of four papers). Proposals should be made on-line using the conference website: http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/
Proposals for individual papers should include the name, affiliation, and contact details (including email address) for all paper authors, as well as a brief (max. 150 word) abstract and paper title.

Proposals for whole panels should include the full details for each paper (as above), plus the name, affiliation, and contact details for the panel convenor, chair, and discussant, as well as a short (max. 100 word) panel synopsis. In all cases, persons making proposals should indicate which of the conference themes they feel their proposal best addresses.

The deadline for proposals is **30 November 2009**.

---

**Deadline**

for submissions to the Spring 2010 issue
Friday, 19 February 2010

Please direct all correspondence to the appropriate editor.

Patrick Leblond, Chief Editor:  pleblond@uottawa.ca

David Cleeton, Forum Editor:  Cleeton@cnu.edu

In particular we are looking for:

- Members’ recent publications (since this issue)
- Members’ news (since this issue)
- Calls for papers (due dates prior to 15 September 2010)
- Notice of forthcoming events (taking place prior to 15 September 2010)