Introduction

This is my last issue as Forum Editor before Amy Verdun, my colleague from the EUSA executive board, takes on this task. I take this opportunity to thank all the contributors to the ten Forums that I coordinated for the time they took out of their busy schedules to write original articles for EUSA. When the Forum was dedicated to comments on a specific event such as the elections to the European parliament, referendum results, or the signing of a new treaty, authors have tight deadlines.

Reflecting on past Forums, one is awed by the variety of issues that EU scholars must address and the increasing complexity of the EU itself. In this context, promising theoretical and empirical work is now dedicated to developing proper concepts and methodological tools to study the very actors that build “Europe”—actors that can be found both at the core and the periphery of the Union, in the capital and at the margins. Rejecting a “bird’s eye” view of the EU, these researchers from a range of disciplines (anthropology, sociology, political science, and sociology of law) study EU markets, institutions, policies, social mobilizations, and focus on European political elites and citizens. By narrowing in on the actors involved, their socio-political characteristics and their views of Europe, they have much to tell us about the political dynamics that feed the process of European integration and the social changes that the latter brings about.

This piece draws upon a panel entitled “New directions in EU studies: Sociological theory and methods” put together for EUSA’s 2005 biennial conference in Austin with Juan Diez Medrano (University of Barcelona), Adrian Favell (UCLA) Niilo Kauppi (Academy of Finland), Frédéric Mérand (University of Montréal), and past EUSA chair George Ross (Brandeis). I am grateful for their inspirational contributions.

-Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor

The EU through European’s Eyes: Political Sociology and EU Studies

Virginie Guiraudon

The European Union expands, acquires new competences, its various institutions routinely issue proposals, vote legislation or decide on court cases and then, once in a while, European citizens vote “no” to a new EU treaty, or demonstrators that gather enough momentum to gain media attention make headlines denouncing the EU. Often, we can make sense of these events given our theoretical toolkit and our hands-on experience—a mixed bag inherited from theories of European integration, more generalist approaches (international law, comparative politics, international relations, policy studies, political economy…) and local knowledge acquired through our own research field work. Yet, at some point, we pause and wonder about those who in Brussels and Bucharest invest in Europe, acquire EU-specific resources and skills, and as Margaret Thatcher is reported to have said “go native.” If Balzac or Thackeray wrote today about “upstarts” wanting to join the EU elites, where would these aspiring characters go, what would they do and whose behavior would they seek to emulate? We also would like to know more than what the rare referenda exit polls tell us about how “ordinary Europeans,” but also citizens of candidate countries or resident “third country nationals” view the European integration process.

Why study Europeans to understand European integration? Several authors including Stefano Bartolini and Sidney Tarrow have compared European integration with previous periods in European history during which power was redistributed among different territorial units and levels of political authority. They referred to Wayne te Brake’s study of early modern European history and his notion of “composite polity”—“overlapping, intersecting, and changing political spaces defined by often competitive claimants to sovereign authority over them.” In te Brake’s view, “it was often in the interstices and on the margins of these early modern state formations that ordinary people enjoyed the greatest political opportunities.” The analogy suggests that EU scholars should ask how the emerging EU institutional complex changes the “sources of social power” and its distribution—a key question for political sociology. The answer may lie in the empirical study of the actors that take part in the “institutionalisation
From the Chair

John T.S. Keeler

Fritz Scharpf 5th Recipient of the Lifetime Contribution Award

IT IS A PLEASURE TO ANNOUNCE that Professor Fritz Scharpf has been selected by the EUSA Executive Committee as the fifth recipient of our Lifetime Contribution Award. Scharpf is the first Europe-based winner of the award; the previous winners were Ernst Haas (UC Berkeley,) Leon Lindberg (Wisconsin), Stanley Hoffmann (Harvard) and Eric Stein (Michigan). Scharpf will receive his award at EUSA’s Tenth Biennial International Conference in Montreal in May 2007.

Scharpf studied law and political science at the universities of Tübingen and Freiburg and received his advanced degrees from Yale (Master of Law) and Freiburg (Doctor of Law). He has been an Assistant Professor of Law at Yale Law School, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Constance, Director of the International Institute of Management at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and Director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. His many previous awards include the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science from the University of Uppsala, an Honorary Doctorate from Humboldt University-Berlin, the Great Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, and (with Renate Mayntz) the Bielefeld Science Award.

Scharpf’s remarkable CV lists 21 books, 11 edited books and 165 articles focusing, as most readers know, not only on the EU but on a wide range of topics. Among his most influential non-EU publications are Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (1997), Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (1991), and the two-volume edited work Welfare and Work in the Open Economy (with V.A. Schmidt, 2000). All of these
I. The Return of Sociology: Insights and Caveats

As Adrian Favell recently pointed out, sociologists have written many of the seminal studies of European integration, in particular Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. Yet, this early period was followed by a long parenthesis during which EU studies and sociology ignored one another and Parsonsian sociology was disqualified in favor of paradigms coming from other disciplines, including economics. The fact that an albeit small number of contemporary political sociologists now study the EU is welcome in two respects. First, with respect to theory, a sociology of the European Union is particularly apt at “bridging the gap” between the stylized Manichean dichotomies in EU studies: intergovernmentalism vs. neofunctionalism, rationalists vs. constructivists, ideas vs. interest-based explanations. Second, empirical sociology (i.e. as opposed to social theory) is especially good at studying actors in situ, routines and practices so as to understand power struggles and institutional dynamics. Let us examine these two points in turn.

First, when trying to understand the behavior of individuals, groups or organizations, contemporary sociologists do not usually mobilize concepts that emphasize either material interests or ideals and norms. There is no “either/or” way of thinking as in the debate between liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalists and IR social constructivists. Instead, as Frédéric Mérand has pointed out, in his study of the emergence of the ESDP (European Security and Defense policy): “A theory of preference formation must begin with this multiplicity of purposive and non-purposive forms of behavior. These forms of behavior make sense only if the social and cognitive world inhabited by the individual is taken into account. Social action may be driven by material interest. But it may as well also be driven by ideal interest, constraint, interpretation of a situation, belief in a legitimate order and, quite simply, habit.” To understand why actors have certain “preferences,” sociologists study the locus of action, the nature of the game and their position within it. The same goes for organizations since they do not develop motives in isolation but in relation to others. Thus sociologists assume that actors pursue their interests, organizational and material interest (maintaining or enhancing their position) or ideational interest (imposing their world views). They want to know how these interests came to be defined. Therefore, sociologists study the “social representations”, “frames,” “cultural repertoires,” and the collective or institutional memories that help actors interpret the world they live in and inform their conceptions of interest.

Second, sociology flushes out some of the issues that EU scholars have discussed mostly in abstract or normative terms such as the “European public sphere” or “European identity” to name but a few. Instead of speculating about the “democratic deficit,” it may be fruitful to study, as Olivier Bainsnée did, the European press corps and the ways in which they try to “sell” EU stories to their national newspaper editors or the communication strategies of EU Commissioners, seasoned national politicians with technocratic portfolios and an audience that is hard to reach with twenty five media spheres, as Jean Joana and Andy Smith did. Rather than peruse about “European identity,” Ulrike Meinhof and other researchers have conducted a comparative study that involved in-depth interviews with people living in sets of communities on the border between the EU and (south-)eastern candidate countries that have known past conflict and continuing socio-economic inequalities. European citizenship has been the subject of many abstract accounts. Sociologists and geographers such as Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi instead have focused on the “moving Europeans” that exercise their right of free movement, wondering about their integration or lack thereof into local communities and national cultures and political sociologist Sylvie Strudel has studied their actual use of EU citizens’ rights.

Of course, research on the EU led by sociologists or using social theory can be badly designed. This is mainly due to the fact that some theories developed within the context of the nation-state do not travel well beyond that setting. This is clear in the case of social movement theorists that study the EU with tools developed by authors such as Charles Tilly that focused on mobilization as part of state- and nation-building. In other cases, the research design is faulty because sociologists come to EU studies perhaps lured by the EU’s funding of research on itself yet without enough prior knowledge of the functioning of EU institutions and policies. These pitfalls can be avoided. One strategy consists in first constructing the relevant conceptual categories and their dimensions through inductive studies rather than imposing state-centered ones. Juan Diez Medrano in his work on the ways
Europeans view Europe forcefully argues in favour of an inductive approach for constructing the categories of “frames” i.e. finding them in his rich empirical material (in-depth interviews and newspaper editorials in three countries). 15

Niilo Kauppi in his book Democracy, Social Resources and Political Power in the European Union 16 takes a slightly different approach. He first seeks to “adapt” or “update” the sociological concepts that he deems heuristic to understand European integration by circumscribing what is nation-state-centered about them. He uses Bourdieu’s theory of the “political field,” a notion that is very useful to study power relations in the emerging EU polity (“who gets what, when, how?”). Bourdieu sought to analyze how political agents mobilize resources and regularize certain types of interactions and values at the expense of values and thus establish structured power relations. Yet Bourdieu’s empirical work focused on the French national context, centered on class-based resources and traditional mechanisms of political representation. EU political agents can use their nationality as a political resource, they are positioned in multiple fields, and mechanisms of representation are more complex and diverse.

In this respect, studying the EU is bound to enrich sociology. Similarly, legal and political anthropologists that studied EU institutions and European integration came away questioning some of the foundations of their discipline. Marc Abélès, who was among the first anthropologists with Irène Bellier and Maryon McDonald to study the EU, recalls that “nobody twenty years ago thought that European politics could in any way raise interest among anthropologists.” In the early 1990s, the three anthropologists went inside the EU Commission and Parliament, minutely observing the behaviors and practices of its members, studying the rituals and symbols of the institutions. 17 They came away with a enriched vision of culture: a need to compromise among cultures that gave rise to a “culture of compromise.” And they pointed some of the lacunae of anthropology. In particular, anthropologists usually focus on traditions and the relationship of societies with their past. When they were doing field work within EU institutions, it was the uncertain future that predominated in discourses and social representations: the Europe that was continuously “being built.” In brief, the re-crossing of paths between sociology and European integration studies may be reciprocally enriching as it was for anthropology.

**Euroelites: Recent studies**

Anthropologists immersed themselves in the supranational institutions of the EU, the Commission and the Parliament, as did George Ross, who observed daily the activities of the Delors cabinet at a critical juncture in the story of European integration: the “relance de l’Europe” and wrote a trail-brazing study based on six months of observation. 18 It comes as no surprise that the studies that followed also focused on actors within these institutions. Studying the careers, attitudes, strategic choices and routines of Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is important to understand how the European political field differs from national ones. They are all the first ones who should “go native” and depart in part from their national garb. Liesbet Hooghe’s book on the Commission has shown through 137 interviews that, in fact, one cannot generalize about the “supranational” or pro-integration” outlook of its members, or their views of the state or the economy; and that national and professional socialization remains key to understand the attitudes of Commission staff. 19

A recent study headed by Didier Georgakakis and Marine Delasalle 20 has sought to understand the particular resources needed to enter and prosper within the European Commission by studying the entire professional careers and socio-economic profile of all (191) Director Generals (DGs) and deputy DGs of the Commission since 1960. While they find that the basic characteristics of top civil servants resemble that of their national counterparts (schools attended, gender balance, ...), they also observe that an international profile and insider experience are important and that few DGs have none and are just exiled there for electoral purposes (or after electoral defeats). They do draw attention to the remaining dichotomy between “technical”/”sectoral” posts where national experience suffices and “political/transversal” ones where networks and specific knowledge of the EU machinery matters.

Andy Smith and Jean Joana have closely studied the trade-offs that Commissioners make between their functional role (their portfolio), their transversal role as voters in the college of Commissioners and their national past and future. The authors identify the workings of EU politics through the trade-offs made, the difficulties encountered by a sample of Commissioners and their stuff during the Delors II and Santer Commissions. They study the composition of the cabinet (in terms of general or specific expertise and the balance between national backgrounds), its organization and agenda (e.g. how much time is devoted to following dossiers outside the Commissioner’s competence or liaising?) 21 The authors also analyze the communication strategies of the Commissioners (who do they speak to about what?) The difficulty in finding an adequate media outlet is telling of the difficulty of their multiple roles: as technocrats, politicians, diplomats – to paraphrase the title of the book. The case of Edith Cresson who gave an interview in Le Monde while suing Libération during the 1999 Commission crisis over her misuse of funds is telling. Her knowledge of the French press did little to help her against the assaults of the British, German or Scandinavia journalists.

Niilo Kauppi’s comparative study of EP electoral campaigns and the profiles of MEPs in Finland and France suggests that there may be a clearer distinction between national and EU parliamentarians than among the bureaucrats and more room for the media to play a role. In Finland, can-
didates which he calls “popular diplomats” have fared well: former race-car drivers and TV newscasters considered to be presentable figures for the outside world, likable characters with international reputations, good images of Finland in Brussels. The benign neglect of the campaign for the EP elections by the “real” seasoned national politicians only reinforces the dynamic.

Research on the Brussels NGO world also suggests that one may “escape to Europe” from fairly closed national professions and do well. There are many lawyers and academics in the NGO world whose careers were frustrated in their home country. Those who do well in creating recognized NGOs that serve as service providers and expert input for Commission projects often have had an experience in expert-driven activism (e.g. from the consumer or environmental movements) or legal practice. Europe in this sense is only attractive for some and welcoming for even fewer. There are still of course great cross-national differences in the desirability of a “European” job. This is true for many professional groups including journalists: working for Euronews may be a decent “first job” for English journalists and a very well-paid job for Spaniards and Italians.

Beyond looking at Europe through its “professions,” another interesting angle to study EU elites and their specific resources has consisted in studying the “schools of Europe.” Virginie Schnabel’s work on the College of Bruges is interesting in this respect. Through an analysis of the Bruges recruitment procedure, student profiles and curriculum she shows that an ability to interact in multicultural settings, a kind of a cosmopolitan joie de vivre, is valued by the educational institution. The importance of social events and extracurricular activities in relation to academic subjects is clear. It will be an important resource later to network and contribute to the kind of interpersonal contacts that make the EU institutional system function.

A valued “EU-specific” type of capital among European elites is legal expertise. This is quite clear from the curriculum of the College de Bruges, to the recruitment of personnel not only within EU institutions but also in EU lobbies, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. The potentialities of EU law have also attracted many national interest groups and social movements whose causes were on the margins of the core market-making project of European integration. Knowing the intricacies of EU law and EU jargon with its array of acronyms, treaty article numbers, exotic names of famous ECJ cases and strange concepts such as “subsidiarity” is a key resource and means of distinction and recognition among the emerging EU elites. It would thus be fitting that we had many studies on the development of a distinct EU legal community. In fact, we have had few studies since Eric Stein showed the way in his seminal 1981 study of the positions of the various parties in landmark ECJ cases.

Harm Schepel and Rein Wesseling’s analysis of the authors of EU legal doctrine is a noteworthy exception. They tallied the institutional affiliations of the authors of all the articles written in the three major European law journals (in English, French and German) and examine the writings of judges, Commission officials and academics. They note the quantitative importance of writing by members of the Court and the Commission (relative to national judges and bureaucrats in national public law journals) but also the homogeneity and cohesion of the “legal field” in celebrating the court, systemizing case law and finding legal arguments for the expansion of Commission competence and more generally for the EU. The authors argue that this cohesion is helped by a shared basic mindset (or habitus) whereby European law is a rational force against the irrational, illogical and ideological realm of national “politics.” Clearly their research calls for a study of the individual careers of judges, so as to show the permeability between the various institutions that produce doctrine, including academia.

**Conclusion**

Donald Puchala in a famed 1972 review of existing studies on European integration recalled the fable of the blind men and the elephant: each touched a different part of the animal and came to wildly different conclusions. In fact, he was vindicated when scholars studying different parts of the beast (“grand bargains” during treaty revisions or “legal integration” through preliminary rulings and other litigation) disagreed strongly as to its nature: an intergovernmental logic or a supranational dynamic. Yet, one needs to use new lenses and explore new aspects of the evolving process of European integration, which is more like a chameleon than an elephant. The political sociology studies reviewed here are a complementary way of looking at the EU to avoid some of the “blind spots” of EU studies, aspects that have been neglected yet contribute to our understanding of the emerging EU political system.

Although we only focused on European elites, sociological concepts and methods can be used to complement studies on a number of questions: EU institutions and the dynamics of market-building and polity-building, the timing, character and content of new EU policies, and the attitudes of Europeans towards integration. The lessons to be drawn for other social sciences is the need for more systematic data-rich comparative projects that combine qualitative and quantitative methods and do not hesitate to answer macro questions with a microscope.

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**Endnotes**


7 In fact, some EU studies have started to take into account the combination of material and ideal interest and normative considerations, notably Frank Schimmelfennig’s work on enlargement. See his for instance The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, in: International Organization 55/1 (2001): 47-80.


9 Depending on the tradition, there are different terminologies to designate that locus of action. Structural constructivists such as Pierre Bourdieu call this a “social field” and American institutional sociologists such as Powell and Di Maggio an “organizational field.” See Pierre Bourdieu, *Le sens pratique* (Paris: Minuit, 1980) and Paul Di Maggio P. and William W. Powell, The Neo- Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).


11 For a fuller elaboration of this point, see Adrian Favell, “Europe’s identity problem” *West European Politics* 28/5 (2005): 1109-1116.


22 ECAS (the European Citizens’ Action Service is a good example see Julien Weisbein, « Le militant et l’expert. Les associations civiques face au système politique européen », *Politique européenne* 4 (2001) : 105-118

23 Olivier Baisnée and Dominique Marchetti, « Euronews, un laboratoire de la production de l’information européenne » *Cultures et conflits* 38/39
Stability and Growth Pact Reform, European Economic Governance and French Policy Preferences

David Howarth

On 20 March 2005, the EU ministers of finance reached a formal agreement on a reform to the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability Pact, Pact, SGP), the formal aspects of which were finalised on 27 June 2005. This agreement followed several months of intense and often acrimonious intergovernmental debate. This contribution argues that SGP reform, especially the elimination of automaticity and the introduction of considerable room for interpretation by member state governments, conforms well to long-standing French intergovernmentalist preferences on fiscal policy coordination at the EU-level. However, very little progress has been accomplished with regard to the alternative French visions of EU-level economic governance (EEG), which reflect the supranational implications of dirigeante – active economic interventionist – French preferences. Meanwhile, the domestic dirigeante-style margin of manoeuvre insisted upon by French governments compromises the credibility of the reformed Pact as a form of EU-level economic governance.

How the 2005 SGP reform adds margin of manoeuvre

- While the official deficit threshold will be maintained, there will be a derogation – allowing a member state to exceed temporarily the 3 per cent figure to a limited extent – in the event of an ‘unusual event outside the control of the member states’ and a ‘severe economic downturn’ (defined more leniently than previously) and because of ‘a negative growth rate’ or even ‘a protracted period of very low growth relative to potential growth’ (with no precise figures being provided). Previously, only a significant recession triggered the non-application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).2

- For a temporary but undefined period of time a deficit will not be declared excessive if the member state concerned devotes considerable public expenditure to one of several ‘other relevant factors’: 1) investment; 2) research and development; 3) structural reforms (provided they have a long-term impact on the solidity of public finances); 4) EU policy goals; 5) European unification; 6) international ‘solidarity’ (including spending on both aid and military). Further consideration was to be given to these ill-defined spending categories. Once the 3 per cent deficit limit is reached the Council and Commission are to examine the extent to which spending on these ‘pertinent factors’ contributes to the deficit in question.
A member state which has achieved a public spending surplus during periods of relatively strong economic growth and which has a relatively low debt burden is to be treated more leniently.

A member state exceeding the 3 per cent threshold is to obtain a delay of 3 years to bring its deficit down again. The objective is to bring the deficit below the threshold within two years following the launch of the EDP (up from the previous one year) but a government can obtain a delay of an additional year if there are particular circumstances that should be taken into consideration (notably low economic growth). Before advancing to the sanctions procedure, the Commission is to prepare a report to determine whether a supplementary delay of a year should be allowed.

Following the identification of an EDP by the Commission and the Council, a member state is to have 6 months (previously 4) to propose corrective measures.

As under the original Pact, member states are expected to avoid pro-cyclical budgets in good times (when real growth is superior to potential growth) – although there is no way of forcing governments to do.

More effort is to be demanded from member states with a relatively heavy debt burden which have not undertaken structural reforms – although, again, compliance mechanisms remain weak. The mid-term objective of each member state will be determined with regard to two factors: 1) those member states with low debt levels and strong growth are allowed more margin of manoeuvre and a medium term deficit of up to 1 per cent; 2) those member states with high debt levels and weak growth prospects are expected to move to a deficit close to balance or in surplus (as was the case with the original Pact but this objective is now to be redefined every four years). Member states which have not yet attained their medium term objective are ‘required’ to reduce their structural deficit annually by 0.5 per cent of GDP. Compliance mechanisms are, yet again, weak and an explicit exception allows considerable leeway to member states undertaking ‘structural reforms’.

Under the new Pact, there is thus considerably greater scope for counterclaim in the event of non-compliance with existing rules, given that member states can justify their excessive deficits with reference to numerous factors. Furthermore, the increased uncertainty that surrounds the determination of acceptable medium term balances makes it even more difficult for ECOFIN to trigger sanctions against errant member states. Thus, the reform eliminates the elements of automaticity in the original Pact and introduces considerable room for intergovernmental margin of manoeuvre.

The politics behind the reform

The small number of fiscally virtuous member states defended the existing Pact in ECOFIN’s discussions, while most of those member states exceeding (or at risk of exceeding) the crucial three per cent deficit threshold sought reform. As would be predicted by liberal intergovernmentalists, the reforms reflected the preferences of the two most economically important and politically influential Euro-zone member states: France and Germany. While the switch in German policy – from pro-Pact to pro-reform zealotry – was crucial to bringing about reform, the French position on the Pact reflects longstanding preferences on EU-level economic governance dating back to the earliest negotiations on EMU in the Werner Committee of 1970. Reform is thus the outcome of a shift in German government policy towards French preferences. It is precisely the elimination of the elements of automaticity in the original Pact and the introduction of considerable room for interpretation which conforms well to two French preferences: intergovernmentalism in EU-level policy-making but also long-standing dirigeisme. However, the inherent tension between these two preferences that directed French policy on Pact reform also in effect undermines the pursuit of some versions of EU-level economic governance ostensibly promoted by French governments.

Arguably, there was no need for explicit reform to allow intergovernmental margin of manoeuvre with regard to the application of the original Pact’s rules, as demonstrated by several developments: ECOFIN’s 25 November 2003 decision to suspend the EDP against France and Germany; the EUC’s 13 July 2004 ruling revoking ECOFIN’s conclusions but effectively allowing the suspension; and the Commission’s own decision of 14 December 2004 to suspend the application of the EDP against France and Germany on the – rather problematic – grounds that these member states would succeed in bringing their deficits to at or below the 3 per cent threshold. The original Pact’s own provisions also ensured intergovernmental margin of manoeuvre: for example, the lack of obligation imposed on the Council to impose either reporting requirements or sanctions upon the member state exceeding the 3 per cent threshold; and then the need for a qualified majority vote in ECOFIN (two-thirds excluding the member state(s) subject to the procedure) – to launch and proceed with the EDP procedures. Still, the political reality of the Stability Pact – that it could be used as a device to wield against and potentially embarrass offending governments – made its reform politically desirable for the rule-breakers. It can also be argued that reform was desirable because the original Pact increased the likelihood of political conflict – among member state governments, between the governments and the Commission and between the governments and the European Central Bank (ECB).
The SGP and French views of EU-level Economic Governance (EEG)

Leading French policy makers, advisors and academics have, since the start of discussions on the shape of the EMU design in 1988, been the principal proponents of the establishment of some form of EEG, what the French have labelled ‘gouvernement économique’. The term ‘economic governance’ can signify several different things. In general terms, EEG is an institutional set up at the European level that is designed to establish some form of macro-economic policy – be it only ‘soft’ / non-binding economic and employment policy coordination or ‘harder’ more binding forms of fiscal policy coordination – that has direct impact upon the member states.

The peculiar French preoccupation with EEG reflects concerns linked to the traditionally widespread reluctance – rooted in the dirigiste tradition – to accept central bank independence and the ‘sound money’ (low inflation) bias of the EMU project. At the same time, the convergence criteria and Stability Pact fiscal policy rules have been a useful external constraint for French governments. Thus, French government rhetoric on the purpose of EEG has reflected varying concerns to achieve a variety of objectives: to reinforce the pursuit of domestic structural reform, but also to encourage coordinated EU reflation in order to boost economic growth; to bolster the credibility of the EMU project and ECB monetary policy-making, but also to counter-balance and even limit the monetary policy-making power of the ECB. What various French proponents have meant exactly when they espoused EEG is always unclear, even though there has been a limited attempt by French academics and government economic advisors to explore possible EEG scenarios. Different governments – indeed different policy makers – place different emphasis on different kinds of coordination. Indeed, the most common feature of French discourse on EEG has been the absence of any concrete proposal of transferring real economic policy competences from the national to the European level.

French government pronouncements on EEG have only occasionally made reference to the form of economic governance that was explicitly established by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact. This is EEG as the coordination of macroeconomic, and specifically fiscal, policies to achieve low budget deficits and reduced debt loads, which in turn are supposed to contribute to greater price stability. French policy statements over the past fifteen years reveal five other understandings of EEG – some overlapping; some contradicting – beyond the core goals of price stability and, subject to this stability, economic growth:

- as economic policy coordination with other member state governments and with the ECB to achieve an ‘appropriate’ policy mix;
- as a more energetic EU-level interventionism designed to stimulate economic growth and create jobs;
- as a political interlocutor of the ECB to contribute to the legitimisation of ECB monetary policy making;
- as an exercise in political communication to reinforce the credibility of Euro-zone monetary policy; and
- as an explicit limitation of the ECB’s independence.

The inconsistent and often incoherent presentation of the concept of EEG by leading members of French governments both left and right reflects the inherent contradiction between two well-established French policy making preferences. On the one hand, the consequences of a dirigiste approach in the context of EMU encourages French governments to match the single monetary policy with some form of supranational economic governance that can bring about a tight coordination of national macroeconomic policies but also serve as a potentially useful device to empower French governments in the domestic political and economic context.

On the other hand, the Gaullist reflex to retain national policy making margin of manoeuvre (‘sovereignty’) as far as possible is manifested in the preference that EU-level policy making is conducted in an intergovernmental manner. The difficulty elaborating a clear French policy on EEG has thus paralleled the incoherence in French policy on European integration more broadly and the failure of French governments to move beyond the divisive questions of principle (‘should we transfer sovereignty?’) to the more consensual challenge of managing such change: not ‘why’ but ‘how’ to transfer sovereignty.4

While governments at certain times have made use of the official ‘price stability’ form of economic governance to justify spending cuts and structural reforms in France, most of the time the fiscal policy rules have been either qualified or directly challenged in French government discourse and policy on EEG precisely because the ostensibly binding nature of these rules could be politically inconvenient. The more regular emphasis placed on the other forms of EEG – notably as ‘policy mix’ and ‘intervention’ but also as the political representation of the Euro-zone and even as political control over monetary policy – reflect more the dirigiste tradition, crucial to government-legitimisation in France.

Given these preferences, it is not surprising that the Stability Pact was accepted by the Juppé Government only after lengthy and bitter debate to meet intransigent German demands and ensure the start of Stage Three of EMU.5 The restrictive rules of the Pact have been most explicitly challenged in the context of electoral contests: thus the positioning of the Plural Left coalition in the 1997 legislative elections and the Chiracian Right in the 2002 presidential and legislative elections. For French governments, tightened macroeconomic policy coordination is a desirable goal as long as most of this coordination remains ‘soft’ – with French support for ‘hard’ policy coordination restricted to social and employment policies – and retains a broadly interventionist character emphasising growth and job-creation in line with the goals established in the Lisbon strategy.
At the same time, French governments have sought institutional reform in order to counter-balance the official price stability goals of EMU. Leading French government figures – including President Chirac – have occasionally called explicitly for the elimination of the European Central Bank’s goal-setting independence. A more regular feature of French government policy announcements has been the extension of some kind of political control qualifying the bank’s ‘sound money’ emphasis. However, French governments have never spelled out the institutional arrangements and decision making procedures whereby this political control would be achieved. The reinforcement of the role of the informal and intergovernmental Eurogroup in Euro-zone coordination has been a French objective for the past decade and has been explicitly presented as the reinforcement of EEG. Notably, French governments have advocated giving the Eurogroup a treaty-recognised status and power to make legally binding decisions. Only very limited reinforcement was incorporated in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 2003, involving principally the creation of a Mr. Euro who is to chair Eurogroup meetings for two years and be expected to provide a more noticeable political face to the Euro-zone. It might be argued that French efforts to reinforce the status and role of the Eurogroup could stem from the restrained and secretive nature of this body, which ensures a flexible application of the rules and a politically sensitive margin of manoeuvre, thus well reflecting the paradox of French policy on economic governance that is both intergovernmental and dirigiste in nature.

Given the prioritisation of domestic political and economic concerns and much emphasised dislike for binding supranational macroeconomic policy rules, there was strong reason to suspect that following the start of 1999, when the going got tough, the French would start breaking rules – which indeed they did. Both the Jospin Plural-Left and Raffarin UMP governments failed to follow the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) established for France. With the failure of the Jospin Government to make sufficiently large cuts to the budget, the economic slow-down from 2001 resulted in the rapid rise of the deficit towards the 3 per cent figure, breaking this figure for 2002, 2003 (4.2) and 2004 (3.7) and potentially 2005. In the meantime, French debt rose from 56.8 per cent in 2001, exceeding the 60 per cent figure in 2003 (63.9). With the launch of the Early Warning and then Excessive Deficit procedures against France and the stubborn refusal to move rapidly to cut the deficit, President Chirac and the Raffarin Government joined the growing ranks of those calling for a temporary ‘softening’ of the SGP and even a rethink on the Pact.6

The failure of the Schröder Government to meet the 3 per cent deficit figure gave the Raffarin Government greater political margin of manoeuvre on the rules — and the two countries formed a tax cutting and public spending alliance, thus emphasising the more interventionist form of EU-level economic governance. The Franco-German growth initiative of 18 September 2003 attacked the Commission for being excessive in its drive for budget cutting and ‘anti-industry’, pledging further tax cuts in both countries and 10 major jointly funded infrastructural projects.7 This was followed by the announcement later in September of France’s budget for 2004 incorporating further tax cuts despite promises at the Stresa ECOFIN meeting by Finance Minister Francis Mer that the French government would prioritise deficit cutting in order to get to the 3 per cent figure for 2005. Predictably, the French government accepted the Schröder Government’s demands that the application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) be suspended and then joined with the Germans to push through Stability Pact reform.

Following the March 2005 agreement on the Pact, the French Finance Minister, Thierry Breton, presented the ‘spirit’ of the revision ‘to help rather than to punish’.8 Indeed, the increase in government margin of manoeuvre potentially eliminates existing forms of sanctions and helps member states avoid overt conflict, while the recommendations made in the BEPG remain potentially useful advice that the governments can choose to ignore. The lack of progress with regard to the alternative French visions of EEG – for example, the more interventionist form of macroeconomic policy coordination promised in the Franco-German growth initiative of September 2003 has come to naught – suggests that EU-level economic governance remains above all a vaguely defined political device to be wielded by member state governments to serve their own purposes.

Endnotes

1 Volontarisme can be equated with dirigisme which Schmidt has defined as ‘a set of interventionist policies and directive policymaking processes’ with the state actively steering the economic (industrial and so on) development of the economy (V. Schmidt ‘Running on empty: the end of dirigisme in French economic leadership’ Modern and Contemporary France, 5 / 2, 1997, 229. See also P. Hall Governing the Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 1986); A. Shonfield Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: OUP, 1969).


7 Le Monde 19.9.2003

8 Le Monde 22.3.2005
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ANYBODY PAYING ANY ATTENTION to the current round of multilateral trade negotiations will be aware of the EU’s importance as an international trade power, for good or ill. Sophie Meunier’s Trading Voices is a sophisticated attempt to explain when and why the EU exercises influence in international trade negotiations.

To those familiar with Meunier’s work, the central argument of the book will come as no surprise. The EU’s potential bargaining leverage is affected by the interaction between the degree of ‘supranational competence,’ which combines both voting rules and the degree of delegation to the European Commission, and the international ‘negotiating context,’ whether the EU favours more radical change than its negotiating partner (‘reformist case’) or prefers the status quo (‘conservative case’). More specifically, a lower degree of ‘supranational competence’ increases the EU’s potential bargaining leverage in negotiations where it favours the status quo, but weakens it where the EU seeks change. Moreover, the EU’s institutions also shape the EU’s negotiating position. Where supranational competence is restricted, the most conservative (protectionist) member state dictates the common position. Where supranational competence is extensive (qualified majority voting and some Commission autonomy), the EU’s position reflects the preferences of the EU’s pivotal state. Thus the EU’s institutions affect how protectionist the EU’s negotiating position is, which has distributional consequences for the EU’s member states. This insight leads into Meunier’s subsidiary discussion about efficiency and legitimacy in EU trade policy. Although the discussion is interesting and informed, Meunier problematises the relationship, rather than resolving the tension. Meunier forcefully, if not uniquely, makes the point (often self-servingly glossed over by the European Commission) that increasing the efficiency of EU trade policy is not an unqualified boon; the crucial question is what objective (whose preferences) is being pursued more efficiently.

As Meunier has introduced these arguments elsewhere, the main value added of the book comes in their elaboration and integration and in their illustration through four detailed case studies. The case studies all focus on EU-US negotiations, but cover an intentionally wide range of issues and capture most of the variation in the two key independent variables: EU-US agriculture negotiations during the Kennedy Round (restricted supranational competence and conservative negotiating context); EU-US negotiations during the Uruguay Round (extensive then restricted competence and conservative context); EU-US negotiations of public procurement during the Uruguay Round (extensive competence and reformist context); and the EU-US aviation negotiations (no EU competence then restricted competence and conservative context). In the Kennedy Round the EU successfully fended off negotiations on agriculture, while in the public procurement negotiations it was successful in gaining improved access to the US market. During the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations the EU’s institutional context is depicted as changing from expansive competence (during which the US secured the relatively favourable Blair House agreement) to restrictive competence after which Blair House was renegotiated to be less favourable to the US (and a majority of the member states). In the air transport case the EU does not have a common position until after the European Court of Justice ruling in 2002, during which time the US secured much of what it wanted through agreements with individual member states. Each of these cases is complex as it brings together both internal EU policy making and international negotiations.

These cases and their selection, however, are not entirely unproblematic. Starting with the bigger picture. First, one of Meunier’s ‘boxes’ is empty – there is no case study of the EU having restricted competence and a reformist agenda. Meunier contends that negotiations under such circumstances are unlikely, but I and others have identified non-trivial examples, including the post-Uruguay Round General Agreement on Trade in Services negotiations on telecommunications and financial services and international environmental negotiations. Further, although Meunier makes a reasonable case for it being useful to look at EU negotiations with the US, because its market is of comparable size, trade is in relative balance and it also has internal weakness, there is no discussion of how representative the EU’s relationship with the US is (not very) and the implications for the generalisability of the findings to the EU’s relations with other trade partners.

Further, some of the individual cases are not entirely persuasive. For example, it is far from clear that during the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations the EU’s supranational competence changed in a way that supports the argument. From the outset the EU’s member states had accepted a common negotiating position, but stressed that doing so did not prejudice the allocation of competence, which meant that they asserted the right to ratify individually aspects of the round, particularly concerning services and intellectual property rights. One might make the case that until the concept of the single undertaking was clarified in the Dunkel draft text, the agriculture negotiations were understood to fall within the exclusive competence of the EU and thus be subject to ratification by qualified majority vote. The Blair House agreement, however, was concluded after it was clear that the Uruguay Round would have to be rati-
fied by each member state. Thus the intensity of supranational competence did not obviously formally change between Blair House and its renegotiation. Rather, it would appear that the Commission exceeded its mandate and was pulled back. The EU-US aviation case is also problematic in that the account ends in early 2003 with the EU’s decision to enter negotiations. As a consequence, the discussion focuses on agreeing a common position, rather than the EU’s leverage in a negotiation, although Meunier (accurately) speculates about how the negotiations were likely to play out. Arguably, however, here the crucial issue is that the US had already got most of what it wanted by the time the negotiations really began. This situation may have been facilitated by the EU’s institutional structure, but is hardly a unique situation. It is common for one side to want or need an agreement more than the other.

This leads to another criticism. Although Meunier engages with a number of possible alternative explanations, she does not address how the cost of no agreement played out in the negotiations. For example, Andreas Dür has argued that the EU got a favourable deal in the Kennedy Round because US exporters were mobilised to push for US liberalisation by concerns about being excluded from the EU market as the customs union (and common agricultural policy) came into place. The impetus for the public procurement agreement was the EU’s adoption of an internal policy that would have excluded US firms from the EU market unless the US offered reciprocal market access. Thus a viable alternative explanation was not explicitly tested and rejected.

Not addressing where the cost of no agreement lay in the negotiations is an example of a broader problem with the strongest version of Meunier’s argument. Negotiating outcomes reflect the interaction of the relative bargaining power of the participants. Meunier’s account focuses only on the EU’s bargaining power. She is aware of this problem and so in the more theoretical discussion of the argument she carefully talks only of the EU’s ‘potential bargaining leverage,’ but in the case studies the account slips towards explaining the outcome based on the interaction between the EU’s supranational competence and the negotiating context.

Despite these shortcomings, Trading Voices is essential reading for anybody studying EU trade policy. This is both a commendation of the book and a criticism of the existing literature. The argument is elegant and logical. Unfortunately, the case studies do not overwhelmingly demonstrate it. That at least means there is plenty more work to be done testing the argument.

Alasdair R. Young
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RICHARD CAPLAN’S BOOK IS THE FIRST IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF ONE of the most controversial episodes in the history of the EU’s fledgling common foreign policy: the recognition of new states in Yugoslavia during the war that tore apart that country. Four central questions guide his analysis: Was there a strategic logic behind the European Community’s decisions on conditional recognition? What were the strategic consequences of those decisions? What do the EC’s actions tell us about international law? What lessons can be drawn from this experience of conditional recognition for the management of conflict and inter-ethnic relations?

Caplan lucidly chronicles the contentious history of the recognition decisions. In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, and Yugoslavia descended into a barbaric war that saw concentration camps appear again on European soil and ‘ethnic cleansing’ become a household term. The issue of the breakup of Yugoslavia into smaller sovereign units was at the heart of the conflict, thus posing a fundamental challenge to outsiders seeking to halt the bloodshed: should the country be forced to stay together, or would its fragmentation actually help to end the fighting? The European Community, having immediately acknowledged that it should assume responsibility for mediating a solution to the conflict (‘twas the ‘hour of Europe’), led the international community’s approach to recognition – and ultimately took a considerable amount of flak for doing so. During the last six months of 1991, as war spread in Croatia and threatened to spill over to other areas, the EC member states grappled with the recognition issue, and were split between those member states that argued recognition would ‘internationalize’ the conflict and thus help end it, and those that argued recognition could only be extended at the end of a process of conflict resolution and in the context of an overall settlement.

On 16 December 1991, however, the Twelve agreed on guidelines for recognition of new states in Yugoslavia, which would permit recognition of new states – in the absence of
an overall settlement – provided they met certain conditions. An arbitration commission (the Badinter commission) was to evaluate applications for recognition and make recommendations for Community decisions. In one of the most infamous episodes of the EC’s involvement in the Yugoslav war, Germany broke ranks and recognised Croatia and Slovenia ahead of the commission’s findings and a collective EC decision; in January 1992 the rest of the EC was effectively forced to follow suit or abandon all pretence of a common policy. In April 1992 after a controversial referendum favouring statehood in Bosnia-Herzegovina (pushed for by the EC), the EC recognised that country. Greece, however, blocked collective recognition of (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia for over two years, despite a favourable opinion from the Badinter commission.

As Caplan notes, the controversy surrounding Germany’s actions in particular has ‘led many analysts to treat the [EC’s use of recognition] as a mere face-saving gesture, the real purpose of which was mask a fundamental policy reversal so as to forestall a heightening of divisions among the Twelve’ (p. 3). But, he argues that such ‘extra-strategic’ factors do not adequately explain the EC’s recognition policy: it had a strategic logic, and was specifically designed as an instrument of conflict management which could deter Belgrade from pursuing a campaign of violence against the break-away republics, transform the conflict into an interstate war and thus both allow third-party intervention and create new legal rights and obligations for the parties, and induce the adoption of policies such as the protection of minorities by republics seeking recognition (p. 25). The Twelve were clearly trying to use conditional recognition to influence their immediate security environment. That the recognition policy was so imperfectly implemented should not blind us to the strategic logic behind it. All of this is very persuasively argued, but the reasons for the imperfect implementation are not given as much attention. While Caplan illuminates the domestic pressures and strategic considerations that led Germany to support recognition, he does not provide us with a clear reason why Germany acted unilaterally to recognise Croatia and Slovenia (p. 47), nor does he dwell much on the Greek position regarding Macedonia.

The most impressive part of the book, Chapter 4, contains a robust refutation of the claim that the EC’s recognition policy aggravated and extended the war in Yugoslavia (most tragically to Bosnia-Herzegovina): ‘Delayed or non-recognition would not likely have meant a greater change for peace – and in the cases of Macedonia and Kosovo may have had the opposite effect – if only because the forces of violence in the region were to a large degree operating independently of the fact of recognition’ (p. 97). He even goes further and argues that recognition actually created opportunities for international action; the tragedy lies in the failure to seize those opportunities (p. 98).

Caplan also investigates the novelty of the use of conditional recognition in terms of past practice on diplomatic recognition. He argues that while the EC did depart from practice, it did so by reinforcing norms such as the protecting of human rights and peaceful resolution of disputes; thus, the EC did not contravene international law by using conditionality.

The last substantive chapter then draws general lessons regarding conditional recognition and puts forward the argument that conditional recognition can be used as an instrument of conflict management. This is the least convincing section of the book: the EC’s recognition policy arguably remains a very unique episode in both the EU’s history and international relations more generally. The recognition of other new states in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa (Eritrea, Asia (East Timor) has been guided much more by traditional diplomatic practice than by a repetition of the use of conditionality. While Kosovo and Montenegro (one republic not discussed by Caplan) may find that any moves to recognise them as independent states are accompanied by a list of conditions, it is not so clear that beyond the former Yugoslavia such innovative practices will endure. It is also not clear that the EU would ever again use conditional recognition in such an autonomous fashion: the inconsistent way in which it applied its own recognition policy and the debate over the consequences that then ensued have tarnished the EU’s reputation to such an extent that it has become inconceivable that the EU acting alone will determine the future of Kosovar or Montengrin statehood in the way it did the other Yugoslav republics.

But these are minor quibbles about a very impressive book which presents a carefully-constructed and well-documented argument about the EC’s recognition policy. It will undoubtedly remain one of the best ever scholarly treatments of the making and implementation of that policy.

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FOR A COMPARATIVIST specializing in Central European defense politics, the EU and EU enlargement can often look like the proverbial “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” It has not always been completely clear why the EU would expand to include countries like Poland and Hungary (much less Bulgaria or Romania) nor why these countries appeared
to be knocking so insistently on the EU’s door, especially after an initial rebuff. These two volumes by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier go a long way to answering these questions from both sides, while also raising other issues for further investigation. One book is an attempt to systematically explain the enlargement of the European Union from the point of view of the EU itself, and the other is an attempt to understand the effects of EU enlargement on the countries to which it expanded.

The Politics of European Union Enlargement is a collection of theoretically informed approaches to the decision to enlarge, many of them previously published in a special issue of The Journal of European Public Policy. The goal of the volume is “to bring together in a systematic form the insights from recent theoretically informed studies of EU enlargement…. [and to] contribute to the debate between rationalist and constructivist analyses in international relations (IR) theory (p. 4).” The volume is divided into five sections: an introduction, a section on the politics of accession in applicant countries, a section on the macro-politics of enlargement, a section on the substantive politics of enlargement, and a concluding section. By the editors’ own description of the state of the field, there should also have been a section on member state politics, but such work is rare, especially work done in a comparative or theoretical framework.

The book proposes to “embed the analysis of enlargement in the current IR debate between rationalist and sociological or constructivist institutionalism” (p. 9), but this reviewer finds that it fails to do this consistently or clearly. This aspect of the agenda, while present in both volumes, is largely left in the background. This is perhaps partially due to the lack of clearly competing paradigms presented by the two schools. Instead of taking one side or the other, most of the chapters in this volume used both kinds of explanation to make their point. Indeed, what makes these chapters useful is the lack of unanimity. A number of the chapters draw conclusions that are incompatible with those drawn by others in the volume, but the impeccable editing turns this into a plus by generating a well cross-referenced conversation among opposing viewpoints. The final two chapters underline the different macro-perspectives and create a coherent ending for the collection, as well as pointing out directions for further investigation.

The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe explores the assumption that the EU has influence on the domestic politics of the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) by testing three models of the domestic impact of the EU across different issues arising in the new Central and East European member states. This book places itself on the dividing line of the rationalist/constructivist split in IR, while also seeking to straddle the divide between the focus on internal politics typical of comparativists and the concern with the effects of the EU as an international institution common in the IR literature. It does this by looking at the effects of conditionality on rule adoption at various stages in the accession process. The authors gauged rules by their likelihood of adoption as well as the type of adoption (formal, behavioral, or discursive). The influence of the EU was categorized as external incentives, lesson-drawing, or social learning. The chapters apply these models to explain the rule adoption or lack thereof in a particular sector (minority rights, civil service reform, health care, regional policy, migration, social policy, environmental policy, and banking), usually in two or more countries.

In the end, most of these authors argue that external incentives played a stronger role in rule adoption than social learning or lesson drawing, but none of them argue conclusively that the picture consists of all one dynamic and none of the others. Indeed, all of these studies portray a complex process involving EU politics, domestic politics, veto players and the governmental and social costs of rule adoption resulting in mixed success. In the concluding chapter, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier note that external incentives interacted with the initial conditions of each country in the context of democratic conditionality, while social learning and lesson drawing appear to have played a more important role in the context of euquisit conditionality once the external incentives were in place. The importance of external incentives raises key questions for the continued adoption of rules on the part of new members.

In arguing that rule adoption is more likely to happen by external incentives than by social learning or lesson drawing, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe also argues that those countries that are most susceptible to external incentives are the unstable democracies. This argument seems to run counter to the argument made by The Politics of European Union Enlargement that countries with more democratic regimes are more likely to undertake the costly second round reforms required by EU membership (p. 53). Mattli and Plümper argue that this is because more democratic countries have more political will to carry out such reforms, but Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that more advanced countries are less likely to be influenced by conditionality because the threat of exclusion is not credible to these countries. They are therefore more likely to engage in formal (rather than more thoroughgoing behavioral) rule adoption in cases where governmental costs are high. The fact that more democratic countries may be more likely to engage in formal rule adoption raises the issue of what happens once the conditionality of membership disappears upon accession. It also points to an uncomfortable paradox clear from some of the chapters in The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe and pointed out in Schimmelfennig’s and Sedelmeiers’s conclusion that the process of EU accession “subverted the democratic processes in the accession countries…and transferred its market-distorting rules to the CEECs” (p. 222).
In summary, these two volumes are of great importance, well-researched, systematic in their application of a particular set of frameworks, and masterfully edited. They both clearly result from long term collaboration and conversation among the participants. Reading them together raised some interesting issues, however. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe defines Europeanization as a process in which states adopt EU rules. These can be formal or informal and cover a broad range of issues and structures. Rule adoption refers to the institutionalization of EU rules at the domestic level (p. 7). The Politics of European Union Enlargement defines enlargement as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms. Horizontal institutionalization takes place when institutions spread beyond the incumbent actors, that is, when the group of actors whose actions and relations are governed by the organization’s norms grows (p. 5). These two definitions leave this reader unsure where Europeanization ends and enlargement begins. The Politics of European Union Enlargement further distinguishes among four kinds of enlargement: 1) applicants’ enlargement politics, 2) member states’ enlargement politics, 3) EU enlargement politics, and 4) the impact of enlargement (p 6). It seems from this that Europeanization and EU enlargement are the same thing, which is a little too convenient. The ability to draw a distinction between the two is important because for many readers, Europeanization refers to a much more diffuse process of the transfer of cultural values, which cannot be measured as neatly as rule adoption. Europeanization is often seen to precede enlargement rather than to be a part of the process. If they are the same thing, then Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeyer should say so. If they are different, then the definitions need to be refined to reflect those differences.

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International dispute resolution has enjoyed considerable attention among students of international politics in recent years. The increased legalization of international politics, most conspicuously in the world trading system, has given rise to a range of studies and publications on the development, functioning and consequences of international dispute resolution mechanisms. This literature has benefited from the cross-fertilization between law and political science, and scholars from both disciplines have contributed to it.

Gregory Shaffer’s Defending Interests provides a distinct contribution to this literature. Shaffer’s book studies the role of public-private networks in bringing complaints before the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Although, formally speaking, WTO complaints can only be brought by governments, private industries play important roles both in identifying practices that violate WTO law and in preparing the reports and claims that governments subsequently present before the WTO. As a result, WTO litigation can be thought of as a hybrid between public and private litigation. The way these public-private networks operate in practice, the reasons why they work that way, as well as the implications this has for governance in the world trading system, are the topics Shaffer addresses.

In doing so, he compares practices in the US and the EU. Both have established legal procedures under which private firms can inform their governments of foreign trade barriers and urge them to take action. Shaffer shows that these legal procedures are nested in broader public-private networks that are formed to deal with foreign trade barriers. At the same time, there are also marked differences in the way these networks operate on either side of the Atlantic. Shaffer details these differences and offers an account both of why they exist and of why the EU system has tended to develop more toward US-style lobbying and litigation. In the concluding chapter, Shaffer discusses the implications of these public-private networks for domestic politics, transatlantic relations, and the operation and equity of the world trading system.

Shaffer’s book is a well-written, well-informed and thoughtful account of this important yet understudied phenomenon. It has two particular strengths. To begin with, the book is a very good example of how insights from law and political science can be combined to produce better analysis. From law, Shaffer borrows a thorough understanding of law and legal reasoning, as well as a precise and well-documented style. From political science and socio-legal studies, he borrows a keen interest in how law works in practice and what are the political and policy implications of legal procedures. By bringing these two perspectives together, Shaffer is able to understand both the different legal instruments used in the US and the EU and the actual practices that take place ‘within’ or ‘under the umbrella of’ those legal constructs.

Second, Shaffer gives a detailed and well-informed analysis of the way public-private networks operate in WTO litigation. Based on documentary sources, existing literature, and a wide range of interviews, the book presents an empirically rich analysis that reveals an intimate knowledge of the field and the players. Despite this empirical richness, the book is clearly structured, well written and to the point, with a pleasant touch of anecdote and subtle irony.

All in all, the book’s strongest points, and probably its main ambitions, lie in the thorough presentation of empirical material and the nuanced analysis of policy practices. It is less ambitious in terms of theoretical analysis and it avoids sweeping generalizations. Theoretically, Shaffer places his book within the literature on public-private policy networks, and his analysis of the differences and similarities between
the US and the EU is an important contribution to that literature. The analysis relies mainly on inductive reasoning, combining empirical insights and existing literature, and the book’s conclusions are carefully crafted not to extend beyond the reach of the empirical basis. As a result, Shaffer devotes less attention to systematic theory and broader theoretical generalizations, although the book does hint at the wider relevance of the type of networks studied.

Shaffer’s book is recommended reading for at least three groups of scholars. Most obviously, the book will be of interest to students of international trade policies or, more specifically, transatlantic trade relations. Shaffer gives a detailed and in-depth account of the way WTO litigation works in practice, as well as an analysis of the implications this has for transatlantic ties and the world trading system. Moreover, Shaffer’s extensive tables and appendices provide useful reference materials. In addition, the book should be read by scholars working on international adjudication and dispute resolution. Although Shaffer focuses on WTO litigation, his analysis has implications for a wider range of international dispute resolution mechanisms, and provides excellent input for a comparative study of those mechanisms. Finally, the book is relevant to those interested in lobbying and interest representation in the US and the EU. With the rise of interest group activity in the US, this topic has gained greater interest among students of EU politics. In recent years, some of this work includes comparisons between the EU and US systems of interest representation. Shaffer’s book provides an excellent comparison in one specific area and may serve as both an empirical and a theoretical source of inspiration.

Given the specificity of the book’s topic, it is less well-suited as reading material in undergraduate courses. It may, however, form useful complementary reading in graduate or advanced undergraduate courses on trade politics, trade law or international dispute settlement.

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The EUSA Review follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): EU-Related Academic Programs (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): EU-Related Web Sites (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): EU-Related Organizations (academic and professional associations or independent research centers (such as think tanks) with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): EUSA Members’ Research Notes (current, EU-related, funded research projects). Send brief announcements by e-mail to eusa@pitt.edu.

Spotlight on Denmark

This feature highlights an individual EU member state’s major presences in the USA and beyond.

Important Web sites
- www.denmark.dk - Official Denmark site developed by the Danish State. Provides news, articles, map, history, facts on economy and links.
- www.visitdenmark.com - the official tourism and travel information guide to Denmark.
- news.denmark.dk - the news on Denmark.dk is provided by the national news agency Ritzau, the principal supplier of national and international news to all Danish news media.
- www.yellowpages.dk/ - Danish Yellow Pages
- www.ambwashington.um.dk - Embassy of Denmark in the United States of America
- www.um.dk/en/menu/TradeAndInvestment/ - the Trade Council of Denmark provides both individual consultancy to enterprises and general business service directed both at enterprises and the public at large.

Mission
Embassy of Denmark
3200 Whitehaven St., N.W.
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Royal Danish Consulate General
Suite 310, 151 Bloor Street West
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EU Related Academic Programs

The following is a list of EU-focussed degree or certificate granting programs which were submitted to the EUSA Review after solicitation through the EUSA listserv, and is not intended to be complete.

Undergraduate Degrees and Certificates

The Good Governance Consortium.
An undergraduate certificate program in which students compare the “best practices” of governance in the US and the EU. The program consists of one semester of preparatory work and one semester of study abroad at one of eight participating universities (University of Cagliari, Italy; Catholic University of Leuven; University of Turku, Finland; Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration; Brigham Young University, University of Minnesota, University of Kentucky, and University of Illinois). Contact: pahre@uiuc.edu, http://ggc.wu-wien.ac.at/.

Minor in European Studies with an emphasis on the EU.
This program is designed for individual students of The Claremont Colleges wishing to meet minimum requirements for proficiency in European Union Studies. Contact information: Lukas Loncko, European Union Center of California, Scripps College, E-mail: lloncko@scrippscollege.edu. Telephone: (909) 607-8103.

BA (Honours) International Relations, Loughborough University.
Students of international relations study politics in regional and global arenas, examine international organizations, and consider problems of security. Contact Dr Ruth Kinna, r.e.kinna@lboro.ac.uk, tel. + 44 1509 223651.

BA (Honours) European Studies, Loughborough University.
The European Studies (ES) degree is designed to give you an insight into the dynamics of the international political system, with a particular focus on Europe. Contact Dr Ruth Kinna, r.e.kinna@lboro.ac.uk, tel. + 44 1509 223651.

BA (Honours) Politics with a Minor, Loughborough University.
The Politics programme is a multidisciplinary degree that gives you the opportunity of combining your major studies with one or two Minor Subjects drawn from a related discipline in the arts or social sciences. Contact Dr Ruth Kinna, r.e.kinna@lboro.ac.uk, tel. + 44 1509 223651.

Graduate Degrees and Certificates

Master of Arts Program in European Studies (MAPES), Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, in English.
Designed to provide its graduates with the academic and analytical skills they will need to seek European-related careers in the institutions of the European Union and other international European organizations, business, government, the NGO sector, and the academia. More information can be found at www.mapes.boun.edu.tr, or contact Ms. Bahar Baser at mapes@boun.edu.tr or (+90) (212) 359 73 44.

Graduate Certificate in Interdisciplinary European Studies, Duke University Center for European Studies.
Open to doctoral students in the arts and sciences and professional schools. Contact Sharon McHugh Peters, phone 919.684.6449; email: sharon.peters@duke.edu, or check the Center website at www.jhfc.duke.edu/ces/.
MSc International and European Politics, Graduate School of Social and Political Studies, Edinburgh University.

The MSc in International and European Politics offers an advanced knowledge and understanding of key issues and controversies in contemporary international and European Union politics, including international institutions and structures, and political and policy processes. The MSc is available as a one-year taught degree. Contact: Tel: +44 (0)131 651 1560, E-mail: Soc.Sci.GradSchool@ed.ac.uk.

MSc European Union Politics and Law, Graduate School of Social and Political Studies, Edinburgh University.

The MSc in European Union Politics and Law is designed to equip students with an advanced knowledge of the legal, political and policy processes of the European Union, including constitutional issues, foreign and security policy, regulation, multi-level governance, and the relation of citizens to the EU. The MSc is available as a one-year taught or research degree. The taught degree prepares students for professional and specialist practical work on the EU. The research degree is designed to prepare students for further academic training at PhD level. Contact: Tel: +44 (0)131 651 1560, E-mail: Soc.Sci.GradSchool@ed.ac.uk.

Master of Arts in German and European Studies; MAGES/Ph.D. in Economics, German, Government, or History, BMW Center for German and European Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

The interdisciplinary MAGES program is a 2-year, full-time program in the U.S. capital dedicated to cultivating a new generation of transatlantic leaders; MAGES prepares students for professional careers in international business, government or nongovernmental organizations, as well as for academic careers. Contact: Web: http://cges.georgetown.edu Email: cges@georgetown.edu, Phone: +001-202-687-5602 (general); 888-565-8076 (toll-free admissions, US/Canada).

Master of European Politics and Policies (MEPP) programme, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium).

The Master of European Politics and Policies (MEPP) programme is a one-year full-time postgraduate political science programme (advanced academic master’s programme) with a strong orientation to public administration, and accredited by the European Association for Public Administration Accreditation (EAPAA). For further information contact the Faculty of Social Sciences, MEPP Co-ordination Office, Tel: +32 16 32 31 01, E-mail: mepp@soc.kuleuven.be, Website: www.kuleuven.be/mepp.

LLM, London School of Economics


MSc International Relations, Loughborough University.

This programme focuses on the study of international relations in the contemporary global arena, developing students’ conceptual and theoretical foundations in this field, and offering the opportunity for in-depth study of specific cases and issues of contemporary relevance. Contact Dr Helen Drake, h.p.drake@lboro.ac.uk, tel. + 44 1509 222989.

MSc European and International Studies, Loughborough University.

This programme offers students a wide choice of optional modules, and so the opportunity to develop a personalised profile of EU-related study. Contact Dr Helen Drake, h.p.drake@lboro.ac.uk, tel. + 44 1509 222989.

Master’s Degree in European Studies, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey.

The M.A. in European Studies Program at Sabanci University aims to provide a comprehensive study of historical and contemporary developments in Europe, specifically of the European integration process, from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Contact: Bahri Yilmaz, Jean Monnet Chair, bahri@sabanciuniv.edu, Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Jean Monnet Chair ad personam, muftuler@sabanciuniv.edu.

MA in Politics, University of Bath.

This one-year Masters programme provides students with a broad knowledge of contemporary politics and offers second-semester specialisations in either European politics or international relations. Two semesters of taught courses, reflecting staff expertise and including thorough training in research methods, are followed by a 20,000 word dissertation. Contact Ann Burge, Department of European Studies, Tel: +44 1225 386178, Email: a.v.burge@bath.ac.uk.

MA in Contemporary European Studies (EUROMASTERS), University of Bath.

The EUROMASTERS programme offers UK and international students an opportunity to develop an in-depth understanding of the central issues of European politics in its international context. The programme is delivered by a consortium of European and American elite universities. Contact Ann Burge, Department of European Studies, Tel: +44 1225 386178, Email: a.v.burge@bath.ac.uk.
MA European Studies. The European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham houses one of the largest concentrations of expertise worldwide dedicated to advanced teaching and research in European Studies. Contact Dr. Carolyn Moore, Programme Director, European Research Institute, Web: www.eri.bham.ac.uk., Email: c.s.moore@bham.ac.uk , Tel: +44 121 414 8573

MA European Studies (research). The European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham. houses one of the largest concentrations of expertise worldwide dedicated to advanced teaching and research in European Studies. Contact Dr. Carolyn Moore, Programme Director, European Research Institute, Web: www.eri.bham.ac.uk, Email: c.s.moore@bham.ac.uk , Tel: +44 121 414 8573

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MPhil in Contemporary European Studies, the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge.

The course, which begins in October consists of two parts: four taught options which are examined in mid February and a 25,000 word dissertation on an agreed topic which is submitted in mid July. Contact: Wendy Slalinka or Wendy Cooke, Centre of International Studies, Tel: 44 (0) 1223 767235/6, Email: intstudies@lists.cam.ac.uk.

Graduate Programmes, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, New Zealand.

The NCRE offers MA and PhD theses on European Union related subjects. Contact: Professor Martin Holland, Director, National Centre for Research on Europe, Jean Monnet Chair of European Integration and International Relations, phone +64 3 3642348, email, ncre@canterbury.ac.nz, www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz.

LLM in European Law, School of Law, Roebuck Castle, University College Dublin.

A one year program (90 ECTS credits) providing a range of specialist European Law subjects at post-graduate level with emphasis on the legal impact and consequences of European integration over the last 40 years. Contact: Bianca Cranny, Tel: +353 1 716 8769, email: lawpostgraduate@ucd.ie.

Master’s Degree in European Economic and Public Affairs (MEconSc), the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, Belfield. For information contact dei@ucd.ie, www.ucd.ie/politics, or www.europeanstudies

This intensive 12-month interdisciplinary programme focuses on the business, economic, legal and political aspects of European integration and the European Union and includes two 14-day substantive research visits to Brussels and the EUI Florence.

Master’s Degree in European Studies (MA), the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, Belfield. For information contact dei@ucd.ie, www.ucd.ie/politics, or www.europeanstudies

This broad-based 12-month interdisciplinary programme focuses upon the cultural, historic, linguistic and socio-economic development of Europe. Students must also take up a modern European language.

Graduate Programme in International Relations (MSc, MLitt, PhD), the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, Belfield. For information contact dei@ucd.ie, www.ucd.ie/politics, or www.europeanstudies

This new integrated graduate programme provides students with the theoretical and methodological tools effectively to analyse the workings of the contemporary international system, whether initially registering for a 12-month MSc, a two-year MLitt or a 4-year PhD.

Master’s Degree in Development Studies (MSc), the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, Belfield. For information contact cds@ucd.ie, www.ucd.ie/politics, or www.europeanstudies

This unique 15-month interdisciplinary programme provides participants with a deep understanding of the process of development and a range of transferable skills to enable them to work effectively in the field. Part-time and research-only programmes are also available.

Masters’ Degrees in Politics (MA), the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, Belfield. For information contact politics@ucd.ie, www.ucd.ie/politics, or www.europeanstudies

These 12-month disciplinary programmes offer a rigorous yet flexible and innovative approach to major issues in contemporary politics with advanced specialisations available in subject areas such as Political Theory, Comparative Politics, Human Rights British-Irish Studies and Ethno-Communal Conflict.
Master Programme in European Integration and Regionalism (MEIR), University of Graz (Austria) and implemented in cooperation with the European Academy of Bolzano (Italy) and the European Institute of Public Administration (Antenna Luxembourg and Barcelona).

The Master Programme is highly interdisciplinary and designed to provide in particular a firm understanding of institutions and fundamental concepts of EU and European Community law, regional and social policies, regionalism and federalism, cultural diversity and minority protection under the auspices of the process of European integration. Further information about the Programme as well as the application forms can be found at http://www.eurac.edu/meir.

Master’s Program: Public Policy and Management, University of Konstanz
Department of Politics and Management.

The 2 years Master’s program in Public Policy and Management puts special emphasis on policy analysis, public administration, international organization, European integration, management of change, organizational development and management of conflict and peace. The program is divided into four sub-programs: Public Policy and Governance, Administrative Reform and Organizational Change, European Integration and International Organization, Management of Conflict and Peace. Contact: Dr. Johannes Dingler, University of Konstanz, Tel.: **49 (0)7531 88-2600, E-mail: Johannes.Dingler@uni-konstanz.de.

MA in European Integration, Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland.

The MA aims to provide its graduates with an appreciation of the historical, legal, political and economic aspects of the European integration process while, at the same time, providing them with detailed, practical knowledge of how the European Union functions, how it makes policies and how it interacts with national, regional and local government, the public and private sector, and other actors within and beyond the borders of the EU. Contact Professor Edward Moxon-Browne, email: Edward.moxon-browne@ul.ie, Web page www.ul.ie/~ceuros.

Transatlantic Masters Program, offered by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and European partners.

Students enroll for either the American degree (MA in Political Science, concentration Transatlantic Studies) from UNC-CH or for a European degree, (Master in Transatlantic Studies) awarded by most European partner sites. Contact Sarah Hutchison, Graduate Program Coordinator, Center for European Studies www.unc.edu/depts/tam

Recent Publications


books currently register more than 100 citations on Google-Scholar (GS)—and Games alone records 519. Scharpf’s most celebrated article in the EU studies field is “The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” (Public Administration, 1988; German version published in Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1985). This seminal piece, with more than 440 GS citations in its English and German versions as of 2006, explained why the multi-level decision-making institutions of the EC tended to produce substantive deficiencies in outcomes not explicable in terms of the goals of the actors, their resources or the behavior of interest groups. His most cited book, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic (1999), discusses how multi-level governance in Europe could achieve greater legitimacy through the development of European policies reinforcing national efforts to maintain the welfare state in an environment of increased global competition. From his early work through his most recent articles (e.g., “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity” (JCMS, 2002), Scharpf has arguably done more than any other scholar of his generation to illuminate the implications of European integration for both democracy and social welfare. And given that he has produced one book and eleven articles since his “retirement” in 2003, scholars in our field no doubt have much more to learn from Professor Scharpf.

John T.S. Keeler
University of Washington (Seattle)
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