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**EUSA  
REVIEW**

## ***EUSA Review Forum***

### **Is the EU Democratic, and Does it Matter?**

THIS FORUM ORIGINALLY CAME IN the form of a roundtable I organized at the American Political Science Association meetings in Philadelphia (August 2003) in an attempt to bring together a wide range of views on the democratic challenges facing the EU. Amitai Etzioni questioned the sustainability of the EU if it did not become a truly supranational political entity. Philippe Schmitter insisted that the democratic deficit problems were real, and most pressing at the national level. I followed up on this, arguing that were the EU to be appropriately understood as a regional state, it would be clear that democratic legitimacy is much less of a problem at the EU level than at the national. Fritz Scharpf concluded by showing that one's view of the democratic deficit depends upon whether one looks at the EU's institutional functioning or its problem-solving ability. The panel generated a lively debate, and the audience was not disappointed. I trust that *EUSA Review* readers will not be either.

— Vivien Schmidt, *Forum Guest Editor*

### **The EU as Test Case of Halfway Supranationality Amitai Etzioni**

GIVEN THAT FULL INTEGRATION OF even two nations into one polity is very difficult to achieve, and limited supranationality is woefully insufficient, one is bound to ask: can “halfway” integration suffice? I define *halfway integration* as giving the nations involved nearly full autonomy in some important matters while providing nearly full control to a supranational authority on other important matters.

The findings reported in my book *Political Unification Revisited* show that two of four attempts to form supranational states, the United Arab Republic and the Federation of the West Indies, did not develop the capabilities that my theoretical scheme suggested are needed for such an integration to be stable. As expected, both collapsed in short order. The third attempt, the Nordic Council, developed only low integrative capabilities but survived by doing little transnational work, leaving high autonomy to the member nations in practically all matters.

The fourth case, and by far the most relevant one for the issue at hand, the European Coal and Steel Community and the

European Union (EU) that evolved out of it, provides the most telling experiment. The EU is trying to largely integrate the economies of the different nations involved, but so far has allowed them to maintain political independence.

I suggest that *halfway integration cannot be stabilized*. The basic reason halfway, mainly economic, integration is not sustainable is that the libertarian model is erroneous. Society is not composed of individuals seeking to maximize their pleasure or profit, nor are markets self-controlling (guided by an invisible hand). People are not merely traders and consumers but also citizens whose sense of self is involved in their nation. Hence, when economic integration that benefits their pocketbook threatens their national identity, people will tend to balk. Furthermore, in free societies, major economic policy decisions must be made in line with a nation's values and politically worked-out consensus—or by other institutions that have acquired the legitimacy previously commanded by the national institutions. Otherwise the sense of alienation will increase to a level that will endanger the sustainability of the regime.

Moreover, communities have shared bonds of commitment that make members care about one another and be willing to suffer for them, make sacrifices they would not dream of making for non-members.

The argument advanced here is not that the EU is not politically integrated at all. After all, there is a European Parliament, a Commission, a Council of Ministers, a European flag, and some other shared symbols. However, the power of these institutions and symbols is very limited compared to the national ones, by practically any measure. The European Parliament is weak compared to the far-from-powerful national ones; the Commission is weak compared to the national governments; and the European flag evokes little sentiment among most people. That is, they do not meet the important crowning criterion of supranationality—that the supranational layer be stronger than the national one.

Also important is that these European bodies are largely international ones and not truly supranational ones. The Commission is composed of national representatives. Although, theoretically, the transnational parties of the Parliament represent like-minded Europeans across national lines regarding European issues, in reality these parties are largely controlled by the national parties that compose them. In short, while there is a measure of political integration, it is much lower than the level of economic integration. And, while economic integration (*continued on p.3*)

***Information and Ideas on the European Union***

## EUSA Review

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## From the Chair

### George Ross

MANY OF YOU WILL AGREE THAT the news from Brussels is not happy. The EU has entered a new period of dangers, with outcomes uncertain at best. All the more reason for us to keep clear heads and pay close attention. Enlargement was never going to be easy, and the workings of existing EU institutions were unlikely to facilitate things. The “Constitution” has not made things easier. Our object of study, and for most, our passion, needs to be understood more and better, and this is our job. At EUSA we have been busy, with much to report.

First of all, many of you will have by now received your copy of *Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance*, by Elizabeth Pond (published for EUSA by the Brookings Institution Press). Pond’s work helps to focus on the subtleties of the EU’s ongoing, but troubled, transatlantic relationships. Regarding publications, we are also pleased to add *JCMS, Journal of Common Market Studies*, to the discounted journals subscription package available to EUSA members. Your renewal form and our Web site carry details of this benefit of EUSA membership.

The EUSA board of directors held its fall meeting in Paris in November. Beyond the delights of Paris, we now have two Europe-based board members and we wanted to deepen relationships with colleagues at Sciences Po Paris. EUSA thus co-sponsored a very successful seminar on the EU and transatlantic relations with the FNPS’s *Forum Européen*. Over sixty attended the event—graduate students, professors, former diplomats and old friends—to listen to EUSA board members and Forum scholars Pierre Hassner and Renaud Dehousse. We owe special thanks to Renaud for hosting the event and the elegant reception that followed it, and we look forward to working with our Sciences Po colleagues again. The board also decided that EUSA’s fourth Lifetime Contribution to the Field of EU Studies award will go to the eminent legal scholar, Eric Stein (University of Michigan Law School). Stein’s work has been key in underlining the fundamental fact that Europeans, peoples of the law, have insisted that the rule of law should lie at the foundations of the EU. A pioneer and leader in EU law, Stein has been described as a “master comparativist” who has written extensively on comparative federalism and comparative law. We congratulate Professor Stein and we are honored that he has graciously agreed to accept the award and deliver remarks at the 9th EUSA Conference in 2005 in Austin, Texas.

The Board also decided that the 10th EUSA Conference will take place in Montréal, Québec, Canada in 2007. Montréal is a very international city with many intellectual, political, and organizational links to EU capitals. Not to be overlooked, however, are its culinary delights and its airplane connections. It is thus a perfect venue for EUSA’s first ever major conference outside the USA. It also presents an opportunity to work with our Canadian colleagues. Next, because of the success of our book series with Oxford University Press, *State of the European Union*, we have recently circulated a call for proposals for volume seven in the series. Please see p.16 in (*continued on p.22*)

(continued from p.1) is growing, political integration may regress, as the size and heterogeneity of the EU is about to be enlarged.

Several European leaders hold that the best way to achieve fuller integration is not to construct a supranational political authority, say, through a constitutional assembly of the kind that preceded the formation of the United States, but to increase economic integration. This, it is said, would lead numerous groups within each nation to realize that their interests have become supranational and hence gradually to shift their lobbying, politicking, and loyalties to the supranational union. This in turn would pressure the EU to develop more EU-wide political powers to work out these differences, which in turn would build the legitimacy of an EU government. Call it a syndicalist integration leading to a full-fledged supranational one. The idea is, instead of a frontal attack and a bold attempt to jump from many nations into a United States of Europe, allow processes to unfold gradually, according people time to adjust to the new supranational realities and for their new loyalties to evolve.

The fact is, though, that such a syndicalist integration is occurring only to a limited degree. Most times, farmers, workers, and businesses find it more effective to lobby their national governments for special considerations (farm subsidies, for instance) than to lobby the EU Commission and Parliament.

The continued high level of national rather than syndicalist commitments was dramatized in the year 2000, when the EU leaders met to reconsider the unanimity rule. The difficult negotiations were about how many votes each nation would be allotted—not each European party. Moreover, the political integration scenario based on syndicalist integration ignores the fact that by itself syndicalization cannot provide the needed core of shared values, legitimacy, and consensus building.

Last but not least, for a sociologist, the notion that a union would move at the same time to greatly expand its membership (and in the process the heterogeneity of its members) and introduce a constitution that moves from nation-protecting unanimity to majority rule, is to maximize friction and minimize the chance for success.

All said and done, it is my hypothesis that halfway integration cannot be sustained and that the EU will either have to move to a high level of supranationality or fall back to a lower one.

*Sociologist Amitai Etzioni is University Professor at George Washington University and Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies.*

## **The European Union is Not Democratic—So What?** **Philippe C. Schmitter**

WHY SHOULD EUROPEANS CARE THAT “their” Union is not democratic and that “their” recently drafted constitutional treaty is not going to change that situation very much? Intergovernmental organizations are not supposed to function democratically. Indeed, they are all much less democratic than the EU. Moreover, there is not much evidence that many Europeans care about this state of affairs. The so-called “democratic deficit” is largely a creation

of academics and intellectuals. We have just seen during the “Convention on the Future of Europe” that ordinary citizens did not seem to be willing to devote much attention to the prospect of constitutionalizing, much less of democratizing EU institutions.

The primary reason for a concern with Euro-democratization is simple: far more than any other arrangement for policy-making between sovereign national states, the EU has had a major—if not always recognized—impact on the practice of domestic democracy within its member-states. The expanding scope of its policy tasks and the more modest, but still significant, increment in its supra-national authority may have passed for some time largely unperceived by mass publics, but that “permissive consensus” has ended. Since the signing of the Single European Act and, especially since the contentious ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, wider publics have become *politicized* with regard to the EU. For the first time, “European issues” have forced their way onto the agenda of national politics, and domestic politicians can lose and gain votes as a result of the positions they have taken in Bruxelles. The new cleavages generated by “more vs. less” Europe seem to be cutting across traditional cleavages established by class, religion and geographic location and, thereby, undermining the coherence of domestic political parties and party systems. Even more surprisingly, an overwhelming proportion of prominent national politicians irrespective of parties have tended to support EU initiatives (except in Great Britain), but they have found themselves increasing disavowed by their previously obedient followers. Politicization, in other words, has tended to disfavor rather than favor further extensions of the integration process.

The fact, as we have noted above, that the EU is not itself a practicing democracy raises the *a priori* likelihood that its impact upon “domestic democracy” will be negative—not so much in undermining democracy as such, but in gradually diminishing “the accountability of rulers to citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their representatives.”

The impact of the non-democratization of Europe upon democracy in Europe is still a process—not (yet) an outcome. It has changed, albeit sporadically, with shifts in the functional content of the integration process and expansions in the *compétences* of European institutions. Moreover, those institutions themselves are not yet close to having consolidated a stable and legitimate set of rules, *pace* the efforts of the Convention. Even in retrospect, it is difficult to point to a distinctive—much less a definitive—contribution, since the net effect of supra-national governance seems to complement (and, probably, to enhance) trends that were already affecting domestic democracies. Indeed, the emerging Euro-Polity might best be interpreted as an exaggerated version of both the positive and negative features of “post-modern,” “post-national,” “post-statist,” and “post-liberal” democracy in Europe.

But can this “transitional” situation endure indefinitely? In a book entitled *How to Democratize the European Union ... and Why Bother?* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). I have argued that there are at least two good reasons why it may be timely to begin experimenting with continental democracy sooner rather than later:

(continued on p.4)

(continued from p.3) (1) There is considerable evidence that rules and practices of democracy at the national level have become increasingly contested by citizens. This has not (yet) taken the form of rebellious or even “unconventional” behavior, but what Gramsci once called “symptoms of morbidity” such as greater electoral abstention, decline in party identification, more frequent turnover in office and rejection of the party in power, lower prestige of politicians and higher unpopularity of chief executives, increased tax evasion and higher rates of litigation against authorities, and skyrocketing accusations of official corruption. It would be overly dramatic to label this “a general crisis of legitimacy,” or to attribute responsibility for it to the European Union, but something isn’t going well—and most national politicians know it.

(2) There is even more compelling evidence that individuals and groups within the European Union have become aware of how much its regulations and directives are affecting their daily lives, and that they consider these decisions to have been taken in a remote, secretive, unintelligible and unaccountable fashion. Europeans feel themselves, rightly or wrongly, at the mercy of a process of integration that they do not understand and certainly do not control—however much they may enjoy its material benefits. Again, it would be over-dramatizing the issue to call this “a crisis of legitimacy” but the “permissive consensus” that accompanied European integration in its early stages is much less reliable—and supranational officials know it.

These two trends are probably related causally. Together they create a potentially serious *double bind* for the future of democracy in Europe. If, on balance, the shift of functions to and the increase in supranational authority of the EU have been contributing to a decline in the legitimacy of “domestic democracy” by calling into question whether national officials are still capable of responding to the demands of their citizenry, and if the institutions of the EU have yet to acquire a reputation for accountability to these very same citizens when aggregated at the supranational level, then, democracy as such in this part of the world could be in double jeopardy. Admittedly, the grip of this bind is still loose, but it is tightening. The national “morbidity symptoms” show no sign of abating; the supranational “permissive consensus” shows abundant signs of waning. Between the two, there is still space for the introduction of democratic reforms, but who will be willing (and able) to take advantage of the rather unusual political space formed by monetary unification and eastern enlargement (not to mention, the increasingly skewed outcome of Euro-elections) is by no means clear. The potentiality exists for acting preemptively before the situation reaches a crisis stage and before the compulsion to do something becomes so strong that politicians may overreact, but will it be exploited? One might have hoped that the “Convention on the Future of Europe” would have done so, but its resulting draft is far too limited and weak to make much difference. It looks to this observer that an important opportunity has been missed and I would not be surprised if European citizens, if and when they are called upon to ratify the eventual “constitutional treaty,” will end up rejecting it or, more likely, finding it so insignificant an improvement on the *status quo* that they will simply not bother to vote.

*Philippe C. Schmitter is Professor in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute.*

## **Democratic Challenges for the EU as “Regional State” Vivien Schmidt**

TO THINK COGENTLY ABOUT THE democratic challenges to the European Union, we need first to decide what the EU is. Otherwise, we are likely to fall back on comparing the EU to the nation-state, which causes problems for everyone. For the pro-Europeans, the EU will always be found wanting in power and democracy when compared to the nation-state. For the Euro-sceptics, such a comparison raises the red flags of “federalism” and “superstate.” For most everyone else, it confuses the issues, since we are left discussing what the EU is not.

I propose a better way of thinking about the EU, as a *regional state*. By this I mean that the EU is best understood as a regional union of nation-states in which the creative tension between the Union and its member-states ensures both ever-increasing regional integration and ever-continuing national differentiation. As a result, the EU is and will continue to be characterized by shared sovereignty, variable boundaries, a composite identity, compound governance institutions, and fragmented democracy—in which legitimacy is as much if not more of a problem at the national level than at the EU level.

Unlike any nation-state, the EU’s sovereignty is shared with its constituent members. As such, it is dependent upon internal acceptance by EU member-states as well as on external recognition by other nation-states, policy area by policy area. On these bases, the EU has already been accepted and recognized as a sovereign region in international trade and competition policy but certainly not yet in defense and security policy.

The EU’s boundaries are more variable than those of any nation-state. Its borders are not as yet fixed with regard to geography—will Turkey be included? but then what about Russia? And its policy reach is asymmetrical—Schengen border controls, European Monetary Union, European Defense and Security Policy all differ in EU member-state participation.

The EU’s identity is more composite than that of any nation-state. This is not only because Europeans identify much less with Europe than with their nation or even sub-national region. It is also because they imagine Europe through a plurality of national lenses.

The EU’s governance system is more compound than that of any nation-state. Although the EU looks something like a federal nation-state, its member-states have much greater independent powers than the sub-federal units of any national government while its decision-making processes are much more complicated as a result of the EU’s greater multiplicity of actors and points of interest access. Moreover, the EU’s politics looks nothing like that of any nation-state, not only because there are no EU-wide elections for an EU leader, but also because there is very little real partisan politics at the EU level, with the little there is submerged by the emphasis on consensus and compromise.

In this system, democracy is more fragmented than that of any nation-state. Instead of having a central government *by, of, and for* the people—through political participation, electoral representation, and governing effectiveness—as well as what I call government *with* the people—through interest consultation—the EU level emphasizes governance *for* and *with* the people while leaving to the national level government *by* and *of* the people.

All of this together makes for big questions with regard to the EU's democratic legitimacy, especially if the point of comparison is the nation-state. However, when the EU is considered as a *regional state*, in which democracy is understood as an amalgam of the national and supranational, the EU's legitimacy problems diminish.

Most importantly, the EU's "federal" checks and balances, its voting rules requiring supermajorities or unanimity, its elaborate interest intermediation process *with* the people, and its consensus politics go very far toward safeguarding minority rights against the dangers of majority rule *by* the people (Scharpf, this issue). By the same token, however, those very checks and balances can sometimes undermine governing effectiveness *for* the people, given that the very rules that are ordinarily instituted with difficulty are even more difficult to change. The lack of an EU level government *of* the people elected *by* the people makes impossible the kind of activating political consensus which can reverse even the most hidebound of rules in any nation-state (Scharpf, this issue).

This absence of EU "politics" causes even more serious problems for member-states' democracies. Because member-state citizens lack a system in which they can "throw the scoundrels out" at the EU level, national politics take the heat for EU problems. National politicians often find themselves held accountable for policies for which they may not be responsible, over which they may have little control, and to which they may not even be politically committed.

Elsewhere, I have argued that the *real* democratic deficit is at the national level. This is so not only because national practices have changed—as the focus of governing activity has moved up while political activity has been submerged—but also because national ideas about democracy have not (*Financial Times*, August 11, 2003). The problem is that national leaders continue to project traditional nation-state visions of democracy—as if nothing has changed, although everything has—while generally leaving the EU vague and undefined.

Politicians have understandably been loathe to expend their limited political resources on the EU, since it has been so much easier to blame the EU for unpopular policies and to take credit for popular policies without mentioning the EU. And what politician, after all, would want to admit to having lost power, control, or political direction? But this leaves national citizens more susceptible to those on the political extremes who do speak to these issues as they inveigh against the losses of sovereignty and identity or the threats to the welfare state.

The best way for national leaders to deal with the national democratic deficit is to engage in discourse and public deliberation that recognize the EU for what it *is*, a regional state,

as they address the changes in national democracy directly. In light of the need to ratify any Constitutional Treaty that comes out of the current IGC, such discourse and deliberation is of the essence. Without this, the outcomes of national referenda on the Constitutional Treaty could likely replicate those of the recent Swedish referendum on the euro.

*Vivien Schmidt is Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration at Boston University.*

## **The European Democratic Deficit: Contested Definitions or Diverse Domains? Fritz W. Scharpf**

THE ALLEGED EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT remains a controversial subject in academic discussion and public debates. One reason could be normative disagreement. "Democracy" is a contested concept, associated with diverse ideal requirements and real-world institutions and practices. But that is not the only explanation. Given the complexity of the object of evaluation, it seems likely that different evaluators—like the proverbial blind men describing an elephant—may be looking at different domains of European democracy, and their seemingly contradictory evaluations might each be valid for the field on which they have chosen to focus. This is the hunch I will follow here.

In order to partition the overall terrain, I will rely on two distinctions. First, discussions of a European democratic deficit may focus either on the EU level or on the impact of Europeanization on democracy at the national level. Second, the assessment of democratic performance (whether input- or output-oriented) may focus either on safeguards against the abuse of governing powers or on the responsiveness of government problem-solving. If these distinctions are combined, they identify four problem areas on which authors might concentrate. While all of them are clearly relevant for discussions of the European democratic deficit, their specific *problématiques* differ significantly, and there is no reason to expect identical conclusions in all of them.

The most sanguine view is held by authors considering the impact of the EU on safeguards against the abuse of national governing powers. There is no question that the Copenhagen conditions for Eastern enlargement had beneficial effects on the treatment of minorities, the rule of law and the effectiveness of public administration in the candidate states. Moreover, as Joseph Weiler has emphasized, under the supremacy of European law, legislators, judges and administrators in present member states have learned to respect European legal constraints reflecting the interests of their neighbors and the concerns of strangers in their midst. Given the evident "rightness" of such changes, it is not surprising that authors focusing on the potential abuse of national powers will emphasize the democratic surplus generated by European rules, rather than any deficits in their genesis.

Conclusions are similarly positive among authors like Andrew Moravcsik who are focusing on the EU's capacity to restrain the arbitrary and potentially corrupt exercise of its own powers. Since checks and balances in the (*continued on p.6*)

(continued from p.5) EU exceed the most extreme constraints imposed in national systems by consociational or consensus democracy, federalism, and reduced fiscal competencies, there is indeed no reason to fear a totalitarian European superstate.

Democracy, however, is not merely about preventing the abuse of state power, but also about ensuring its responsiveness to the needs and demands of constituencies. Thus institutions that prevent tyranny by also preventing effective problem-solving will produce deficits of output-oriented democratic legitimacy. That is not a problem where the European Central Bank, the Commission and the Court of Justice are able to act unilaterally. But otherwise effective European action depends on broad agreement among the Commission, the Parliament and national governments. When the stakes are high, it is easily blocked by politically salient conflicts of interest or normative preferences among member-state governments or constituencies.

The obvious remedy, switching to majority voting in the Council, is not available for the most glaring problem-solving deficits—the lack of an effective common foreign and security policy, the inability to harmonize the taxation of mobile capital or to relocate subsidies from present beneficiary countries to the poorer new member states and, more fundamentally, the absence of common fiscal, economic, employment and social policies that would match the perfectionism of European market integration. Yet if majority votes were able to override national opposition on these politically most salient issues, the lack of input-oriented democratic legitimacy could easily undermine past achievements of political integration in the European Union.

If that is so, national governments are left to cope with the problems the Union cannot deal with. But they must do so under the increasingly tight constraints imposed by European economic and legal integration. These may arise even from legislation that was originally adopted with the agreement of all national governments in the Council of Ministers. But once they are in place, European rules are protected against amendment or abolition by the same checks and balances which had ensured their consensual adoption. Hence when circumstances or preferences should change, neither the Union nor individual governments could respond to political dissatisfaction or violent protest. This lack of responsiveness may significantly contribute to democratic deficits at national levels.

Moreover, the most constraining rules of European law are not even originally supported by intergovernmental agreement. They are the product of unilateral action by the Commission and the European Court of Justice, based on their interpretation of tersely worded clauses in the original Treaties. These interpretations—which could only be reversed by Treaty amendments that need to be adopted unanimously and ratified in all member states—have extended the requirements of economic integration and liberalization far beyond the limits of political consensus in many member states, and they have severely limited the capacity of national governments to respond to the urgent demands of their constituencies.

The controversial literature on the European democratic deficit makes more sense if one distinguishes among its different domains. Issues of democratic legitimacy are nearly irrelevant

for authors focusing on the normative constraints which European law imposes on oppressive or discriminatory national policies. Similarly, fears that the EU itself might develop into an oppressive superstate are dispelled by the high consensus requirements of EU legislation. By the same token, however, the EU's output legitimacy is limited by its incapacity to act in the face of politically salient conflicts among member states. At the same time, the ability of national governments to respond to politically salient problems is narrowly constrained by European law. As a consequence, the European democratic deficit is most manifest at the national level.

*Fritz W. Scharpf is Professor Emeritus at the Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies in Köln, Germany.*

## **EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship**

THE 2003-2005 EUSA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE is pleased to announce the establishment of a new, annual fellowship for a graduate student's EU-related dissertation research. Thanks entirely to contributions to our new Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies—launched in June 2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003), whose work was pivotal in the establishment of the field of EU studies—we will offer one unrestricted fellowship of \$2,000 to support the dissertation research of any graduate student pursuing an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic year 2004-05. Please note the following stipulations for applicants, who must:

- be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an accredited institution in any country;
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- have her or his EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic approved by the professor who will supervise it; and,
- be able to demonstrate clearly the relevance to EU studies of the dissertation topic.

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- (2) A two-page (500 words) *précis* of the dissertation research project that also explains its relevance to EU studies; and,
- (3) Two letters of support from professors serving on the student's dissertation committee, one of them its chair.

The firm deadline for applications to be *received* in the EUSA office is **May 17, 2004**. The successful applicant will be notified by July 15, 2004, and will receive the grant as soon as the fellowship award letter has been signed and returned to EUSA. The fellowship will be paid in one lump sum by check and in US\$ only.

Anyone wishing to contribute to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies should visit [www.eustudies.org/haasfund.html](http://www.eustudies.org/haasfund.html) or contact the EUSA office.

## Teaching the EU

*Editor's note: This column is written by members of EUSA's "Teaching the EU" Interest Section. For details about the Section, please visit [www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html](http://www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html).*

### **Where to Strike the Balance: Blending Economics and Politics Michael P. Gerace**

THIS ESSAY DISCUSSES THE PROBLEM of teaching an interdisciplinary course in European integration, with the challenge being how to balance the economic content with the political and historical content. The crux of the problem seems to be in finding a balance between teaching the economic material as economics proper as opposed to political economy. Too much economics can sacrifice the rest of the course and not enough will only frustrate students. In my course, students are a mix of majors and they can get economics or political science credit for the course. The need to bring both disciplines into the course, however, produces three problems; one is how much economics should be brought into the course; the second is at what level should the economics be; and the third is how can this material be presented along with the political and historical content without loss of cohesion.

#### How much economics?

This question is probably the easiest to answer because the economic subjects follow the major topical areas of the course. I generally cover five areas of economics (not including material that is more properly political economy). These include the customs union, where I present the comparative statics and then the dynamic effects; factor mobility in the EU; the Common Agricultural Policy and its problems; trade policy with areas outside the EU; and monetary integration including detailed discussion of fiscal and monetary policies. Monetary integration is the high point of the economic material in the class.

In each area, I try to present just enough of the economics so as to cover all of the points to be made, while leaving enough room in the class for the political and historical content. Currently the economic subject matter is just fifty percent of the course material and is interspersed with the rest of the material. I ask students to read both economic and political science literature as well. My recent preference for economic literature has been to use Neal and Barbezat (1998). This is a fine book, except that the graphs are hard to read and are sometimes confusing and the book could do more with monetary integration. The most important economic supplemental reading is De Grauwe (2000) for monetary integration and policy and Eijffinger and De Haan (2000) for fiscal policy. These are both high quality texts that present intermediate level economics (advanced in some places).

#### What level of economics?

This question is always posed anew with every class and I have made mistakes along the way. While I have to ensure that the material is sufficient for credit in an intermediate economics course, much depends on the students. At times, I have gone

very far into the economics because the class had a high degree of interest. At other times, teaching the economics has seemed like pulling teeth. Generally, the majority of economics is graphical in nature and most of this is microeconomic. There are some equations in the course as well, most being macroeconomic and dealing with monetary integration and fiscal policy. None of the equations brought into class is complicated. It remains for me only to explain how they work, why they are relevant and what key points they help us better understand.

When I first started teaching this course, my enthusiasm often got the best of me. I used to make the mistake of deriving key results in class so the students could see the whole picture, but almost no one appreciated this. I have also made the mistake of exposing students to scholarly articles in European economic integration. I gathered together a handful of economic articles that were not too difficult or technical and would assign them throughout the term. I thought that exposure to some cutting edge economic debates would be good for the students, but I was wrong. This literature served only to confuse and it certainly failed to spark interest. Now I assign articles that are still economic, but they are not hard research and are much easier to read—and probably more enjoyable.

Another mistake I made was in my use of statistical data. I wanted the students to “see” the economics at work. I used to make a booklet with about fifty charts of data and hand it out at the beginning of the term and refer to it as the course progressed. The data ranged from measures of economic growth, productivity and wage levels to exchange rate data, balance of payments measures and net migration. I used data across member countries and across time and included the U.S. and Japan for comparison. The trouble with all of this was that it was too much to look at, and I do not think that the students liked the charts as much as I did. While I still use data, I do so in smaller doses and I make sure that, when I actually hand out charts, they are simpler and relate directly to that day's lecture. Widely available statistical data are a great resource for such a course and should be used, but the data must be tailored to the audience if they are to be of use to them.

When choosing the level of economics, I have to remember that the students are a mix of majors. Because most of the economics is at least intermediate, however, those with no prior economics often have a difficult time with the material. Rather than turn these students away, though, I attempt to address this problem in two ways. One is that I provide as much background on the economic topics as is reasonable within class. I also offer students optional review sessions outside of class time, usually two before the mid-term and two before the final. This is frequently enough to get most over the hurdles. Most students attend these review sessions as well, including the economics majors.

#### Integrating economics and political science

Weaving together the economics and the political science is sometimes clumsy and difficult. There are some aspects of the course where the two seem to align naturally, but this is not usually the case. The reason for this is that economic and political science material requires different ways of presenting and explaining. Understanding the material requires different skills

on the part of the students as well, and they have to be prepared to shift gears as the material changes. My general method is to present historical background first, then the economics of the subject, then current politics and issues.

In the beginning of the course, for example, I start with a story on the development of European integration up to the Treaties of Rome. The story contains numerous lines of narrative, from Cold War issues and how they interacted with cooperative endeavors in Europe to Germany's economic and military rehabilitation to the advent of the Treaties themselves. Then we shift gears and present the economics of customs unions. The history is put aside as we focus on constructing a graphical presentation of a country's decision to form a customs union with another. I enumerate assumptions, explain the charts, and try to communicate their key points. The big question is whether a customs union creates or diverts trade. The answer, of course, depends on a handful of issues. I then present the dynamic effects of the customs union and what may happen to countries included and excluded from the union. Finally, we look at the actual evidence of whether the EEC was trade creating or diverting, and whether it was responsible for economic growth of members.

Students have to use all of their skills here because each segment of the topic is different in style and content. This tends to work best when there is some controversy. An interesting example is the case of labor mobility in the EU. The EU's expectations were that labor would cross borders among the major economies to find higher wages and would improve the comparative advantage of members, implying the economic argument that factor flows are complements to trade in goods. But the evidence seems to suggest that labor flows are substitutes to trade in goods because labor mobility among the major EU trade partners is quite small. Instead, the majority of labor mobility has come from outside these economies into them. The EU's position on the matter seems to be that a host of practical impediments to labor mobility exist (e.g., language barriers, differences in welfare schemes and retirement benefits, etc.), which it has admonished member governments to correct. When students see inconsistencies like this they start to liven up and try to reason through the economics more and contrast it to the political arguments.

#### Interdisciplinary teaching

Teaching an interdisciplinary course is a balancing act. Each discipline in the course must be covered authoritatively, lest one appear to be a jack of all trades and master of none. There is also the danger of overwhelming students with material, however, and losing cohesion. Finally, there is the possibility that students will be unhappy with the course. Those interested in the political science and history might not appreciate the economics, and those interested in the economics might not appreciate the political science and history. Striking the right balance in my class is an ongoing challenge and seems different with every group of students.

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## EUSA List Serve

*EUSA members sent the following replies to member Robert Ginsburg's 25 September list serve query seeking sources on Turkey's quest for EU membership:*

(1) Barry Rubin and Ali Carkoglu, Turkey and the European Union (Frank Cass, 2003) would be good starting point for further literature. Also try ([www.abgs.gov.tr](http://www.abgs.gov.tr)) the Secretariat for European Affairs of the Turkish government, where the reform packages adopted by the government to meet the Copenhagen Criteria can be found in English too including the National program for the Adoption of the Acquis. ([www.deltur.cec.eu.int](http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int)) is the web page for the Commission representation in Turkey. — Kemal Kirisci, Bogazici University

(2) Meltem Muftuler-Bac's book, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester University Press, 1997), provides a good overview of the history of Turkish-EU relations. There is also a paper in Journal of European Integration (2003) by Muftuler-Bac and myself (McLaren) that discusses events between Luxembourg and Helsinki. In addition, Turkish Daily News (daily newspaper) usually provides good summaries of ongoing constitutional changes in English ([www.turkishdailynews.com](http://www.turkishdailynews.com)). — Lauren McLaren, University of Nottingham

(3) Here are some links to the information, news and comments on the EU-Turkey relations:

[www.euturkey.org.tr](http://www.euturkey.org.tr)  
[www.abhaber.net](http://www.abhaber.net)  
[www.ibsresearch.com](http://www.ibsresearch.com)  
[www.tusiad.org](http://www.tusiad.org)  
[www.ikv.org.tr](http://www.ikv.org.tr)

— Bahadir Kaleagasi, Turkish Industry / Business Association

(4) I would suggest that s/he start with inquiring the official position of Turkey from ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)). There are various sources and research that deal with the issue, so if you could narrow the focus, I will be able to help more. I am more interested in security aspect, and have just finished my master's thesis which has a substantial amount of information on the background of Turkish-EU relations, so if you like, I can send you a copy. — Sebnem Udum, Bilkent University

(5) A great deal of historical data would undoubtedly become available by going through the annual index of the Bulletin of the EU for the last few years. — Peter Herzog, Syracuse University Law, Emeritus

(6) I suggest the web site of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ([www.washingtoninstitute.org](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org)). WINEP has a Turkish studies program directed by Yale PhD Soner Cagaptay and many issue briefs on the subject of Turkish EU membership. — Carl Lankowski, U.S. Department of State

## Spotlight on Italy

*Many EUSA members focus on EU member states. This feature highlights an individual EU member state's major presences in the USA and beyond.*

### Important Web sites

- [www.italyemb.org](http://www.italyemb.org) Embassy of Italy in the U.S.
- [www.quirinale.it](http://www.quirinale.it) The Italian President's Office
- [www.ueitalia2003.it/ITA](http://www.ueitalia2003.it/ITA) Italy's EU Presidency
- [www.esteri.it/eng/foreignpol](http://www.esteri.it/eng/foreignpol) Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- [www.istat.it/fmi/ITALY-NSDP.html](http://www.istat.it/fmi/ITALY-NSDP.html) Italy Economic and Financial Data (government statistics)
- [www.library.yale.edu/wess/italian.html](http://www.library.yale.edu/wess/italian.html) Association of College and Research Libraries resources on Italy

Missions Embassy of Italy in the United States, 3000 Whitehaven Street NW, Washington, DC 20008, tel. 202.612.4400, fax 202.518.2154, e-mail <[stampa@itwash.org](mailto:stampa@itwash.org)>. Consulates in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

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### Selected scholarly resources

- The *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* examines Italian history, politics, economics, culture and society, 18th century-present. See <[www.brown.edu/Research/Journal\\_Modern\\_Italian\\_Studies](http://www.brown.edu/Research/Journal_Modern_Italian_Studies)>. It is the journal (from Routledge) of the Italian Politics Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association (UK) <[www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/italian/italian.htm](http://www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/italian/italian.htm)>.
- The Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society was formed in 1975 by members of the American Political Science Association. Check <[www.arts.mcgill.ca/congrrips/congrrips.htm](http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/congrrips/congrrips.htm)> or try <[www.apsanet.org/PS/organizations/area/italian.cfm](http://www.apsanet.org/PS/organizations/area/italian.cfm)>. CONGRIPS produces a newsletter, awards prizes, and sponsor(s) panels at APSA.
- The Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America is based at Columbia University and aims to, *inter alia*, promote advanced research on Italian history, society, and culture and foster academic and cultural exchange between Italy and the U.S. See <[www.italianacademy.columbia.edu](http://www.italianacademy.columbia.edu)>. Est. 1991 as agreement between Republic of Italy and Columbia.

## Book Reviews

**John Gillingham. European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 608 pp.**

HERE WE PRESENT AN INTERDISCIPLINARY roundtable on John Gillingham's sweeping history of European integration since 1950. The book will interest EUSA members, even those who disagree with his provocative argument. Our roundtable brings together three leading scholars of the EU from history, sociology, and political science to reflect on Gillingham's new work.

— R. Daniel Kelemen, *Book Reviews Editor*

### Neil Fligstein

ANYONE BRAVE ENOUGH TO TRY to capture the whole history of the European Union (hereafter, EU) deserves our praise. John Gillingham's effort to encompass the whole sweep of the European integration project is an impressive effort to synthesize an enormous amount of material. While I recognize this as an impressive achievement, I am skeptical about his message.

Gillingham is not just trying to tell the story. He wants to judge the historical figures involved in integration, their goals, their successes and failures, and in the end, he wants to suggest where Europe ought to go. His perspective is that the idea of forming a European state was a bad idea, is a bad idea, and will continue to be a bad idea. So, for example, he chastises both Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein for their involvement in trying to create a European superstate. Instead, he favors a minimalist political structure, one that helps create a new liberal market economy where economic growth will be promoted by unleashing market forces. His Hayekian vision (he invokes Hayek explicitly) will have governments at all levels step aside except to collectively regulate the worst excesses of capitalism in order to produce more economic growth.

I have two big reactions to this effort. First, the European integration project (economic, financial, and political) has managed to help produce over fifty years of peace in Europe. In a place where the two biggest wars in human history were fought out in the space of thirty years, this is a special accomplishment. Gillingham seems to think that this could have come about without trial and error and without the commitment, first of all of the leaders of European governments, and second of all, the European citizenry. To see the history of European integration as being only about European governments foiling the dreamers who wanted to create a European superstate by forcing them to stick to just creating a market, is a bizarre perspective on the process. Gillingham never really answers the question of what provides the forward momentum to this project. If the EU is such a bad thing, then why have governments (and by implication the people who elect them) decided to extend and expand their cooperation?

Second, Gillingham is naïve about the linkages between

states, markets, firms, and workers. Modern capitalist societies need institutional order to flourish. There, of course, is a huge amount of disagreement (both amongst scholars, but also clearly amongst policymakers, political parties, and educated publics) about how much and what type of government capacity is necessary to attain these ends. We know that there is a great deal of variation in these institutions across societies. But, to suggest that a European market economy was built or could be built without collective organizational capacity to regulate, litigate, and produce new rules for markets is an astonishing position. Market integration projects require states where rent seeking is controlled, there exists a stable money supply, there is peace, rule of law, and most of all commercial law to govern market transactions that involve property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange. There also needs to be at least minimal rights to protect workers and consumers. Gillingham misses the critical point that the demand for more Europe was not just a product of political elites, but also firms, their lobbying groups in Brussels (and their home capitals), and the perception by the citizenry that more open markets would produce cheaper goods, economic growth and jobs.

Not surprisingly, Gillingham dislikes Haas's "neofunctionalism." But, while Haasian spillover has never really happened, there is a more obvious mechanism to link the growth of the European Union to the growth of a market economy. In a recent paper, we (Fligstein and Stone Sweet, *American Journal of Sociology* 102, 2002) demonstrate that as trade has increased within Europe, the supply of European rules increased. Moreover, these rules fed back into trade. They helped to reorganize market opportunities for actors and they subsequently led to increased growth in trade. It is this virtuous circle that the EU set in motion in the early 1960s. It is this process that has pushed European economic integration forward.

This kind of feedback is not without historical precedent. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the U.S., there was a long fight over the rights of "foreign" corporations to operate in states where they were not headquartered. The Supreme Court continuously upheld the rights of those firms to do business without restriction, thereby paving the way for a national economy. After the Civil War, industrialization took off. This produced a series of booms and busts that ended up in the depression of the 1890s. There was a huge political demand (from both the left and the right) to regulate the American economy in order to control cutthroat competition and to ensure the rights of all consumers and producers. Between 1890 and 1914, the U.S. federal government produced most of the regulatory capacity it would ever develop for market intervention.

Europe is in the midst of just such a political and economic integration project. Politics is about trial and error, figuring out what works, figuring out what people really want to do. The European project is one of the largest peaceful efforts in human history to bring together people with different languages, cultures and national political traditions. One of the side effects of this process is that it has brought European citizens closer together by giving them the opportunity to meet, trade, travel, and learn about each other first hand. The collective forms of governance

that will be created are only now being imagined. Gillingham seems to want to deny the legitimacy of policymakers within governments and in the Brussels complex to propose to their citizens the different ways this might work. But, this is the politician's job. These projects will come to fruition only if people from across Europe come to see those projects as producing a better future.

*Neil Fligstein is professor of sociology at the University of California Berkeley.*

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## **Pierre-Henri Laurent**

THE HISTORIAN AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: it is interesting that it has taken a half-century to produce the first complete and comprehensive historical work on Europe's post-World War transnational integration written by a historian. There have been numerous valuable monographs (G. Ross, W. Kaiser, J. Young, A. Milward, P. Winand, and W. Liggins are first-rate examples of micro integration studies) and the D. Dinan, D. Urwin, and P. Stirk general treatments are noteworthy, but the 2003 Gillingham work is the most important piece of historical research since the earlier A. Milward book(s) and the recent A. Moravcsik volume. In general, the historiography of integration has been overwhelmingly by social scientists, with political scientists the most prominent and productive ones and historians contributing far less than even economists.

Gillingham, whose previous works included a high-quality exposition on the ECSC, has undertaken an ambitious task and produced an important revisionist portrait and interpretation of regional integration. His overall view highlights the more than half-century contest between economic statism and economic liberalism, emphasizing the evolving redistribution of power and tug of war between Brussels and the nation states. While many may be sympathetic with his criticisms about Eurocrats and their over-regulation and their maintaining the democratic deficit, and agree with his many citations of the wrongs of the centralizers, Gillingham presents an overall thesis that is not persuasive.

The author accomplishes his task by examining and analyzing the four stages in integration in great detail, even though his last two stages (the '80s and '90s) take up two-thirds of the 500 pages of text. In this entire commentary, the author concentrates on economic ideas and policies as the driving motors in integration history and focuses consistently on his liberal versus interventionist ideological thesis. There is a need to define liberal as utilized in Gillingham, for it is employed to denote the European, not American, concept indicating an open market, free trade plus a small, non-intervening government.

A critical dissecting of *European Integration* must commence with an acknowledgement that the historian must cope with a difficult sources and documentation problem in moving from the immediate postwar '40s to the century's end. Contemporary historians face a point in time when the archival materials and primary sources are available and deemed sufficient and

meaningful enough to document in an empirical manner, or when these conditions do not exist. Gillingham's first two periods of study—that is, from the late '40s to the start of the '70s—now do qualify in the former category, primarily because of the extensive release of state papers up to the '80s that deal with the 1945 to 1970 period. Thus, his initial 150 pages on the genesis and first decade-plus of integration institutions (not merely the EEC, but ECSC, EPU and EDC, too) have a strong documentary foundation compared to the last three decades' formulations. In his most significant research in this recent era, he faces the dilemma of all who research—what to utilize as sources when there is a paucity of unsealed archives. At this point, the shift in reliance to secondary sources, news materials and especially electronic databases, although unavoidable, becomes not only evident, but lessens the historical validity sharply of his conclusions from those of the earlier chapters. This is critical since Gillingham contends that the '80s is the most dynamic period in the entire integration history and also is at the core of his “liberalization” viewpoint.

The structure of the book is not simply divided into the aforementioned four stages of integration's historical development, but is also tied to the relationship between ever-present individuals and their ideas on one side, and institutions and states and their policies on the other side. Gillingham does a masterful job of fusing some major thinkers like Friedrich Hayek, Jacques Pelkmans, Rolf Dahrendorf, and Jan Tumlir to the advance of “neo-liberalism” and linking them to the political actors such as Margaret Thatcher (Gillingham's heroine of the entire integration saga and the one paramount advocate of the reapplication of classical liberal ideas to contemporary integration policy) and even the “statists” and “centralizers” like Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein, and especially Jacques Delors. This connective fiber amongst the intellectual and political/economic contributors to integration is enlightening and pertinent, but this selection and isolation of conservative individuals only reinforces the author's perspectives and, therefore, his monocausal approach to explaining the New Europe. If Gillingham sees the necessary theme as the struggle over decision-making “between two principles of social, political and economic organization, the state and the market” (p.xii), then some of the intellectual and political elite positions that were in opposition to, or promulgated other viewpoints beyond, the new-market system of economic liberalism need to be explored.

*European Integration* has some of its best sections when the “Monnet myth” and EC/EU rhetoric are broken down based on credible evidence. These and other specific examples are, however, woven deeply into Gillingham's belief that organizing anything from the center “does not work.” For example, in the pages on the “interregnum” '70s, while offering some helpful insights, he nevertheless underplays the economic downturn of the era after the economic boom of the lift-off phase. In discussing the economic resurgence of the early '80s, he evades the fact that the public/private-sector elites' meeting and collaboration that resulted in igniting the high-tech, competitive global trade *relance* was in major part initiated by Commission

actors and programs (Davignon and the likes of ESPRIT). Again, Gillingham breaks away from most of the EU historiography with his illustrations of wrongful overstretching by the Commission forces and the advocates of supranationalism.

The primary reason that Gillingham has presented a less than compelling or convincing argument is his “either/or” approach. The European building of common policies and institutions is essentially viewed as the work of either federalists and mega-state creators who profess in an unyielding fashion “positive integration” or the efforts of the new marketers’ stressing deregulation, globalization and “negative integration.” There appears to be little or, more likely, no reward in seeking any compromise, middle ground or “mix” approach to the cross-national problem-solving of integration. Gillingham and his “asymmetrical three-level interdependence game” espouses an economic interpretation that condemns any direction from the outer (or top) level or any elaborate regulatory powers.

This point of view casts the Commission as the source of misguided ideas and policies and the basic evil in the integration drama. Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors are without any positive contributions of note, but represent a Eurocracy with statist intentions and goals in constructing a European federal union that has a corporatist *mentalité* at its heart. For Gillingham, the continuing prevalence of this viewpoint in the Commission explains why it now favors a commitment to the “deepening” thrust to fortify the Union’s institutions (read Commission power), and even at the cost of undermining the “widening” of Europe so forcefully that the extension of the new market economy to the east is a giant failure.

Gillingham, who argues persuasively on the *limits* of the supranationality principle in the early formative decades, sees the top-down or elitist approach and/or European power creation as ending in failure in the more recent decades and furthermore alienating the European public in general. In this constant pursuit of federal union, which Gillingham contends rules the Commission bureaucracy, there is little leeway for a Commission that harmonizes and coordinates policies successfully in an intergovernmental structure. This branch of European governance, he claims, is the promulgator of *immobilisme*, the instigator of integration gridlock and stalemate. This outlook is furthermore visible in the presentation of the SEA, exaggerated as a Thatcher product bereft of any Kohl-Mitterand inputs, and in the layout of the TEU as a Delors and French construction, strikingly absent of any collapse-of-Communism, U.S.-influence, and reunification-of-Germany elements.

A meritorious contribution of this book are its telling insights and illustrations about the serious limitations, and even inadequacies, of the proposed theories of European integration. Even though Gillingham expresses a sympathy for the Paul Pierson-inspired “historical institutionalism,” it, in part, once again tends to reflect the classical liberalism bent to this theoretical model. More relevant to most readers will be the implications of Gillingham’s assessment of the major established theories of institutional causation and growth. Liberal intergovernmentalism is the “weightiest” to Gillingham, but still only partial in explaining significant *why’s* (p.488). To this

reviewer, Gillingham is perhaps too quick to dismiss earlier functionalist theory, but he does ably demonstrate that no general economic theory has yet emerged.

Gillingham’s last fourteen pages open the door to the possible interplay of history with the social sciences in the search for answers. That “Envoi” also contains a strong cautionary note about the future of the European unity movement that is more palatable in its brief version than the insistent and relentless multi-page gloom and doom of the Maastricht and ’90s portion of the text (pp.263-479). To point out the Commission’s supranationalists’ and statist’s (they are *not* the same) failures and blunders is a necessary and worthy venture. Gillingham gains our praise for clarifying the means and ends of Euro-fanatics everywhere, and particularly the complicating, damaging, delaying and derailing effects these people caused in the integration developments. His oft-referred to Frankenstein monster, the CAP, is a fine example but is, of course, a formulation and policy of nationalists and powerful economic lobbies much more than the Commission. The threats to integration have not come exclusively from the Left, federalists, technocrats, and the drivers of centralized external institutions. Overall, Gillingham seems to be convinced by the Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) book about the government and marketplace rivalry and the inevitability thesis about the latter’s triumph in taking over the political “commanding heights” in the contemporary world.

What is the essence of Gillingham’s work for the historian? The demerits include its style: it is often not written in a succinct, or even accessible, fashion. There is a dogmatism that sometimes overrides its empirical qualities. It will make little sense to the non-specialist, riddled as it is with technical detail; in its driving thesis, the absence of nuance may cause concern with integration specialists. In its unremitting anti-Commission thesis, the book cannot depict or explain the Commission’s success and contribution in the form of the accomplishments of cross-border centralizing regulatory functions and powers. Nor does Gillingham adequately delineate the part played by the Court of Justice and European Parliament.

Gillingham is either unaware or unwilling to grant the impact of integration growth that was based on what Loukas Tsoukalis called “the elitist conspiracy of good intentions and remarkable results.” One is driven to conclude that the author has either intentionally or unwittingly devised an almost bewildering ideological and Euroskeptical orientation that fails because it denies much historical reality.

Nevertheless, there is worth to Gillingham’s book. It is a significant piece of work extolling a novel reinterpretation. It will be, and should be, widely read and cited. It will inspire other historical studies about this most important European historical development since the Second World War. It covers enormous ground ranging from a great in-depth analysis of several smaller states and their contemporary dilemmas brought about by recent EU developments to the skillful and illuminating explanations of the globalization and technology forces as they impinge on integration. It will not end the debate surrounding the birth and evolution of the EC/EU, but it does present a breakthrough picture of European integration at the intersection of the

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new global market economy and the new economic conservatism at century's end. Notwithstanding his ideology, Gillingham has given us, in his historical detail, an extremely rich resource about recent Europe's search for "ever closer union."

*Pierre-Henri Laurent, a founding board member and past Chair of the European Union Studies Association, is an independent scholar and professor emeritus of history, Tufts University.*

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## George Ross

CAN 400 MILLION EUROPEANS BE WRONG? *European Integration* is a *livre à these*. John Gillingham flies his colors openly as a follower of Friedrich von Hayek. In his view, state and public decisions have little business intervening in market flows beyond providing an absolute minimum of regulation—roads, traffic lights, police, courts, and little more. Gillingham further posits an historical "meta-narrative" in which advanced capitalist societies are destined toward a world in which markets will be the central decision-making mechanisms in most areas of life. This is controversial indeed.

Gillingham is wide-ranging, erudite, and takes economists and social scientists seriously. He recognizes that understanding EU Europe involves seeing the EU between "globalization" and local societies while giving attention to all three levels and their interactions. Gillingham writes well, with delightful razor-sharp irony. Moreover, his combination of Hayekian meta-narrative and lively, sometimes irreverent, style helps him avoid the Euro-adoration that one often finds in EU histories. Read Gillingham, therefore, to observe a sharp mind able and willing to deconstruct the pious stories that view European integration as a struggle against the forces of darkness.

Gillingham judges actors and processes as heroic or villainous, depending on whether they promote "negative integration" (market-building) or "positive integration" (market-regulation and more). This is not troubling for the first period of

European integration, roughly up to the mid-1970s, because he recognizes that the original EEC six lived in a post-WW II world where all states regulated economic life and tried to manage, demand, and seek full employment using Keynesian recipes. Gillingham's earlier work predicted that there would be little worship of Jean Monnet: the ECSC did not work very well, even if its institutional design was later influential, while Monnet's subsequent proposals were unrealistic. De Gaulle becomes a semi-hero by insisting upon strict inter-governmentalism and beating down a power-hungry Walter Hallstein.

The bulk of Gillingham's story concerns the challenges to European integration brought by the "regime change" that began in the later 1970s. As a Hayekian, he welcomes the demise of Keynesianism and the shift to a price stability macroeconomic regime, extensive market opening, internationalization, privatization and deregulation. Problems begin, however, with his propensity to judge everything for European integration in light of these liberal preferences, which leads him to a Manichaean plot in which liberal heroes oppose interventionist, state-building villains. The main hero is Margaret Thatcher, uncannily aware that "there is no alternative" to ultra-liberalism. The leading villain is a devilish French corporatist, Brussels bureaucratic operator, and aspirant superstate architect, Jacques Delors. To Gillingham what happens is that Delors, together with other continental conspirators like Mitterrand, Kohl and assorted Belgians, seduces Europe from the wisdom of Thatcherism toward a "deepening," a scenario that, according to Gillingham, was designed to aggrandize the undemocratic EU center, particularly through federalist political unification. The sequels were a disaster, claims Gillingham. This story has the advantage of being extremely simple and, for those for whom ultra-liberalism has become faith, it provides a sophisticated gospel that is superior to ordinary Euro-skeptic tracts. Alas, none of these makes Gillingham's story either correct or accurate.

A few editorial comments about the Delors years illustrate the problems of Gillingham's agenda. The Single Market Program and the SEA were not Thatcherite creations, as he claims. Lord Cockfield was as much or more part of the Delors' Commission than a Thatcherite mole. The Single Market agenda was driven by Jacques Delors. The SEA was largely written by the Commission, under Delors' leadership. The Delors I Package budgetary arrangements were a vast improvement over what had earlier existed. The structural funds were not a boondoggle. Delors I laid the groundwork for the McSharry CAP reform, itself helped forward by Delors and cleverly linked to the Uruguay Round end-game which itself produced the WTO, a much better solution to trade issues than GATT. Economic and Monetary Union was not the only conceivable solution to the EU's monetary problems, but the EMU proposal had the virtue of potentially de-coupling the fate of EU economies from the iron fist of the Bundesbank. And Delors can hardly be held responsible for the rough and tumble of the Maastricht EMU negotiations, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and German unification, where German toughness led to restrictive convergence criteria and, eventually, the Stability and Growth pact. Indeed, Jacques Delors warned the European Parliament in the wake of Maastricht that



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a “bankers’ Europe” was in the offing. Moreover, in the wake of the end of Cold War all EU members faced agonizing reconfigurations of their defense policies, making CFSP a logical, albeit longer-term, new approach. And what is wrong with a Europe that insists upon high environmental, health and safety, and social policy standards? Finally, can Delors be held responsible for the difficulties of the present enlargement because he promoted deepening Community commitments rather than a “come as you are” invitation to formerly communist Central European societies?

The closer Gillingham’s story gets to the present the more it lacks nuance. When integration is “negative” (leading to market liberalization), Gillingham applauds. When it is “positive,” (involving market regulation), he condemns. More broadly, he blames the EU, usually the “Brussels bureaucracy,” for Europe’s failure to sprint toward the Thatcherite “market society” that Hayekian convictions foresaw as Europe’s future. In *European Integration* we start with a history and end in polemic. There are readers who will enjoy the feistiness of Gillingham’s argumentation and its particular bias. There is no reason beyond political conviction to think that Hayekian liberalism must be EU Europe’s final destination, however. *A fortiori* there can be little justification for measuring the evolution of the European Union against a prescriptive trajectory of hyper-liberalization. In fact, the EU area has liberalized considerably since the 1970s, while promised payoffs from this have been very slow in coming. The basic reason why the EU and its member states have not chosen a Hayekian road has little to do with Brussels plots for a federal superstate. To paraphrase an oft-quoted remark of Lionel Jospin, if Europeans now accept markets, they still reject market societies. Time and again Europeans have democratically

indicated that they do not want a world where supply and demand curves determine all aspects of life and where public goods and governmental action to correct market perversities are taboo. Could they be right?

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## EUSA Review Feature

### Books on European Integration, 1945-2002: From the EEC to the EU © 2003, Phil Wilkin

FOR MY RECENT ARTICLE IN the American Library Association journal, *Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries* (40: 11, July/August 2003, 1651-1666), I searched databases, searched through journals, and read as many reviews as I could, in order to develop the following bibliography—aimed at librarians deciding which EU-related books to include in their collections. I included only books which might reasonably be used in an undergraduate class, either as “core text,” “supplementary text,” or “reference works.” I considered some 275 books, resulting in the 163 titles here. Please note that I chose among titles published in 2002 or earlier, and the original article included 13 pages of annotations, grouped by time period and/or topic. To suggest titles for the upcoming, expanded version of this bibliography, please e-mail me at <pwilkin@pitt.edu>.

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- Young, John W. *Britain and European unity, 1945-1999*. 2<sup>nd</sup>. St. Martin's, 2000.
- Phil Wilkin, PhD, is West European Studies bibliographer for the University Library System, University of Pittsburgh, where he created the WES Virtual Library and co-created the on-line Archive of European Integration.*

## Conferences

- January 22-23, 2004: "The relationship between Africa and the European Union," University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa. European Community Study Association of Southern Africa. Contact <lthomas@uwc.ac.za>.
- February 14, 2004: "EU Studies Fair 2004: Beyond Accession," Brussels, Belgium. European Voice's 5th Annual Education Studies Fair. Contact <timrobinson@economist.com> or <mayssabadr@economist.com>.
- February 26-27, 2004: "Europe and America 1989-2004: Political Economy, Economic Policies," 21st Annual Graduate Student Conference, Institute for the Study of Europe, Columbia University, New York, NY. Contact <abj2102@columbia.edu>.
- March 14-15, 2004: "Transatlantic Relations: What Next?" Washington, DC. EUSA's EU as Global Actor Interest Section and EU Centers in Syracuse and Georgia. Contact <klevenso@syr.edu>.
- April 16-17, 2004: "Incorporating Minorities in Europe: Nineteenth Century to the Present," Cambridge, MA. Center for European Studies, Harvard University. Contact <lmeschen@fas.harvard.edu>.
- April 22-23, 2004: "Cosmopolitanism and Europe," London, UK. Royal Holloway, University of London. Contact <chris.rumford@rhul.ac.uk>.
- April 28-29, 2004: "Cooperation between the Widened European Union and Its New Vicinity: Stakes and Prospects," Rabat, Morocco. IV International Jean Monnet Days of Study. Contact <chaire@montesquieu.u-bordeaux.fr>.
- May 7-9, 2004: "Justifying Enlargement," Madrid, Spain. Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, Madrid, and ARENA, University of Oslo. Contact <helene.sjursen@arena.uio.no>.
- May 28-29, 2004: "A Constitution for Europe? Governance and Policy Making in the European Union," Montréal, Canada. 6th Biennial Conference, ECSA Canada. Contact <jeffrey.kopstein@utoronto.ca> or <isabelle.petit@umontreal.ca>.
- June 11-12, 2004: "A Transatlantic Divide on Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Policies of Canada and the European Union in Light of the New Bush Doctrine of Pre-emptive Attacks," University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada. Contact <eus@uvic.ca> or <averdun@uvic.ca>.
- June 24-26, 2004: "Implications of A Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity," 2nd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bologna, Italy. ECPR Standing Group on European Union. Contact <ejones@jhubc.it>.
- July 12-15, 2004: Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference, Dundee University, Scotland, UK. Contact <a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk>.
- September 18-19, 2004: "The Atlantic Community Unraveling? States, Protest Movements, and the Transformation of U.S.-European Relations, 1969-1983," Nashville, TN. Contact <matthias.schulz@vanderbilt.edu>.

## Publications

- Barany, Zoltan (2003) *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bergedorf Round Table (2003) *Contours of a "New World Order"? American and European Perspectives*. Berlin, Germany: Körber-Stiftung.
- Brustein, William I. (2003) *Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Cutrini, Eleonora (2003) "Evolution of Local Systems in the Context of Enlargement." SEI Working Paper 67. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.
- Dinan, Desmond (2003) *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Einhorn, Eric S. and John Logue (eds.) (2003) *Modern Welfare States: Scandinavian Politics and Policy in the Global Age (2nd Ed.)*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 2004* (2003) Europa Publications. London, UK: Taylor & Francis.
- Herrmann, Peter and Arno Tausch (eds.) (2003) *Dar al Islam: The Mediterranean, the World System, and the 'Wider Europe.'* Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
- Howorth, Jolyon and John T. S. Keeler (eds.) (2003) *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kalicki, Jan H. and Eugene K. Lawson (eds.) (2003) *Russian-Eurasian Renaissance? U.S. Trade and Investment in Russia and Eurasia*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Karatnycky, Adrian *et al.* (eds.) (2003) *Nations in Transit 2003: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Luther, Kurt Richard and F. Muller-Rommel (eds.) (2003) *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Miles, Lee (ed.) (2003) *The European Union Annual Review 2002/2003*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander Stubb (eds.) (2003) *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (3rd Ed.)*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Newton, Julie M. (2003) *Russia, France and the Idea of Europe*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pugh, Michael and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.) (2003) *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Rollo, Jim (2003) "Agriculture, the Structural Funds, and the Budget after Enlargement." SEI Working Paper 68. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.
- Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart (2003) "Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality." SEI Working Paper 69. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.

## Calls for Proposals

**Transatlantic Essay Competition 2003**, sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) and the Richard C. Welden Foundation. The debate within the United Nations Security Council over a resolution authorizing force against Iraq has highlighted rifts in transatlantic relations. What impact have these rifts had upon the UN Security Council? Can the U.S. and the EU agree on the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining world order in the future? The competition examines the relationship between the U.S. and Europe by soliciting papers on different areas of transatlantic relations. The contest is open to all individuals and co-writing partners. The contest is not limited to U.S. citizens; it is open to worldwide submissions. A distinguished jury of international affairs experts will judge the essays. Submissions must not exceed 5,000 words on double-spaced, typed pages. Footnotes, biblio-graphic material and the cover page are not included in the word count. Only submissions written in English will be eligible.

The winner of the competition will be notified on March 31, 2004. The Transatlantic Essay Competition and the \$10,000 prize will be awarded at the FPA Annual Dinner in May 2004. Essays will become property of the FPA and will not be returned to the author(s). FPA may reprint a portion or the entirety of the essays in FPA publications or on our Web site. The winning contestant(s) will be credited as the author when their work is published. For full details on the essay competition, visit <[http://www.fpa.org/topics\\_info2414/topics\\_info\\_show.htm?doc\\_id=193917](http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=193917)>. A letter or e-mail will be sent to confirm the receipt of an entry. Deadline: *January 31, 2004* (entries postmarked with the date of January 31, 2004 will be accepted).

**“Constructing World Orders,”** 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference, September 9-11, 2004, The Hague, The Netherlands. Organized by the Standing Group on International Relations. This *pan*-European conference will analyse the societal, economic, political, legal and military consequences of Europe’s “new deal.” Panel themes: What did we learn over the past century? Are we still in a fruitless debate between Idealism and Realism? Can new approaches, notably Social Constructivism, shed new light on the analysis? How will International Relations Theory meet International Law in the historical setting of The Hague?

The conference also presents an early opportunity to evaluate the enlargement process that started in Berlin in 1989. Scholars from both sides of the table can discuss the negotiations on the basis of their outcomes. The final theme combines the others at a higher level of abstraction. How do traditional and new schools of thought in International Relations cope with the variety of politically relevant structures in the present world society, such as the international system, the world economy, international society, and the fruits and perils of globalisation? For more information on the proposal process, see <[www.sgir.org/conference2004](http://www.sgir.org/conference2004)>. Deadline: *February 1, 2004*.

**“The Transatlantic Relationship: Conflict and Cooperation,”** April 29-30, 2004, Claremont, CA. Organized by the European Union Center of California, a sustaining member of the European Union Studies Association. Undergraduate students of the University of California system (Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Santa Barbara) and the Claremont Colleges are encouraged to submit applications/paper proposals that enhance their training in and knowledge of the EU and U.S./European relations. The participating campuses simultaneously offer courses on the issues relevant in Europe today and adjust the curriculum to encourage student initiated research and presentations. Having completed individual projects, students from each participating institution and their faculty mentors will gather to focus on European issues and student research.

Students may pursue a wide range of topics that may deal with, but are not limited to: Common Foreign and Security Policy, the role of NATO, diplomacy and the use of force, public opinion and foreign policy, monetary and trade institutions, the Doha Round of trade negotiations, Common Agricultural Policy, the single currency, immigration, culture and identity, the EU Constitution, or transatlantic relations after the Iraq war. Early applications are encouraged as space may fill up fast. Applications will be considered on a first-come, first-served basis and will be accepted from schools (group applications) and from individual students. Registration materials and more information are available at <[www.eucenter.scrippscol.edu](http://www.eucenter.scrippscol.edu)> or by e-mail to <[eucenter@scrippscol.edu](mailto:eucenter@scrippscol.edu)>. Deadline: *March 12, 2004*.

**“Global and European Governance,”** Fifth Annual European Summer School in EU Studies, August 2-13, 2004, Bielefeld, Germany. An advanced study programme combining lectures, seminars and workshops on a broad range of theoretical and empirical aspects. Presentation of a paper (20-25 pages) related to or describing one’s PhD thesis is compulsory for all participants. Working language will be English. The program is organized by Mathias Albert (University of Bielefeld) in collaboration with the ECPR Standing Group on European Union and Antje Wiener (Queen’s University Belfast), Knud Erik Jørgensen (Aarhus University), and Rey Koslowski (Rutgers University), all EUSA members. Lectures/seminars will be at the University of Bielefeld; accommodations will be in town.

Participants from ECPR member institutions are eligible to make applications to the ECPR mobility fund ([www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr](http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr)). For other participants, the organizers will make a determined effort to make a limited number of grants available, particularly for participants from East and Central Europe. Please send by regular mail a letter including paper title and 400-500 word abstract, along with your name, postal address with postal code and country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, and institutional affiliation, plus a letter of recommendation from your supervisor, to: Fifth Annual European Summer School in EU Studies, Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Post-fach 100 131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany. Details and information on fees available by e-mail: <[governance.summerschool@uni-bielefeld.de](mailto:governance.summerschool@uni-bielefeld.de)>. Deadline: *March 31, 2004*.

## EUSA News and Notes

The **2003 EUSA Conference Paper Abstracts** were posted on the EUSA Web site this fall; interested parties may order copies of papers at \$US 4.00 each, postage included, up to but no more than 25 papers. (This fee helps underwrite our costs in copying and mailing the papers to you.) Please note: the abstracts represent those papers that were deposited with EUSA at the conference in Nashville. Get the abstracts (in a PDF file) on-line at <<http://www.eustudies.org/2003EUSAConferenceAbstracts.pdf>>.

**Are you moving?** Please drop an e-mail to the EUSA office at [eus@pitt.edu](mailto:eus@pitt.edu) in advance to let us know your new address, even if it is a temporary one. (The U.S. Postal Service will not forward the *EUSA Review* to you.) We regret that we cannot replace membership materials that you have missed when we have an out-of-date or inaccurate address for you. Members may purchase back issues of the *Review* for US\$ 5 each, postage included.

The 2003-05 Executive Committee of the European Union Studies Association is pleased to announce the launch of the **EUSA Book Prize**, to be awarded at each biennial EUSA conference, for a book in English on any aspect of EU studies and published in the two years prior to the EUSA Conference. This prize carries a cash award of \$US 300 to the author(s). For the 2005 EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded in Austin, Texas, books published in 2003 and 2004 will be eligible. Authors or publishers should submit one (hard) copy of the nominated book with a letter of transmittal to EUSA Book Prize, European Union Studies Association, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. (Nominated books may not be submitted by e-mail, as galleys or proofs, or in any form other than hard-copy published book.). Deadline for receipt of nominated books in the EUSA office: *January 15, 2005*.

The *EUSA Review* follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): [EU-Related Academic Programs](#) (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): [EU-Related Web Sites](#) (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): [EU-Related Organizations](#) (academic and professional associations or independent research centers (such as think tanks) with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): [EUSA Members' Research Notes](#) (current, EU-related, funded research projects). Send brief announcements by e-mail to <[eus@pitt.edu](mailto:eus@pitt.edu)> or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

## From the Chair

(*continued from p.2*) this issue for the call, which is open to current EUSA members. We also decided to establish two new awards. The first is the EUSA Book Prize (with a cash prize of \$300) which will be awarded at each biennial EUSA conference for a book in English on any aspect of EU studies published in the two years prior to the EUSA conference. Please see left on this page or our Web site for details. Next, because of the generous response to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies, we will launch an annual EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship of \$2,000 to a graduate student doing EU-specific dissertation research. Please see p.6 in this issue and watch our Web site for details of the first competition. We thank all who contributed to the Haas Fund and we urge EUSA members and friends to consider contributing to it to support graduate student research in the field.

Alas, in November the board had to accept the resignation of Valerie Staats, our omni-competent Executive Director for the past seven years. Being Executive Director of EUSA is not an ordinary job. Our ED is responsible, with chairs and boards spread all over two continents and several countries, for keeping EUSA going on a day-to-day basis and developing its future. Valerie has been self-starting, insightful, shrewd, and entrepreneurial. She began in January 1997 and has dealt with an assortment of chairs, boards, and members. In this short time she has been instrumental in changing the name of the Association, establishing and nourishing our interest sections (now seven), launching three internal funds and an annual year-end appeal, working toward organizational self-sustainability, developing all-new membership materials, trade-marking our "intellectual properties" (e.g., name, book series title, Web domain), growing our cash reserves, increasing membership, launching our sustaining memberships, and conducting two member surveys (for EUSA's 10th and 15th anniversaries), among many, many other things.

We all can visualize Valerie at our biennial conferences, physically small but energetically huge, moving from place to place to make sure that every detail is up to her high standards, elegant, irrepressible, welcoming, smiling and on top of things. Valerie is irreplaceable, even though we have begun to recruit a replacement (stay tuned!). How could Valerie abandon EUSA? First, no one could do such a difficult job indefinitely. But the real reason is that Valerie has found a position closer to her heart, as executive director of Pittsburgh Cares, a community service organization that helps Pittsburgh, particularly its less fortunate citizens, to survive and thrive. Pittsburgh gains much while EUSA loses a lot. Valerie moves into a position engaging her heart and commitment, which we have also benefited from here at EUSA. We know how well she will do. Personally, I will really miss working with such a lovely person, but I admire her ambition to make Pittsburgh a kinder, better, and more equal place. Thanks for seven great years and Godspeed, Valerie.

GEORGE ROSS  
Brandeis University

## A Special Message

### From the outgoing executive director ...

HERE, FOR THE FIRST AND last time, I directly address the EUSA membership in our newsletter to say farewell and thank the many who have helped me over the past seven years. It has been a great ride, and I have learned much and loved getting to know many fine members of EUSA around the world. Your goal of learning more about, and advancing the body of knowledge on, the European integration project is so very important to global relations, today and beyond.

It has been wonderful to be part of EUSA's growth in membership, expansion of activities, the name change, and more. My tenure here also coincided with the explosion, and now quotidian use, of e-mail as part of our work lives, a change that has made more things possible, while altering forever the nature of our workplaces. I leave to become executive director of Pittsburgh Cares, a wonderful service organization where I've been a volunteer for the past six years. I'll be doing many of the same kinds of tasks, but for a different cause. (See [www.pittsburghcares.org](http://www.pittsburghcares.org) and know that I would love to hear from you.) Please be assured that I will work closely with EUSA's new executive director and help to ensure a smooth transition. I am very pleased with the state of the organization as I leave, and am confident that EUSA will thrive.

Before moving on, I must thank those with whom I've worked closely and who have helped make my job easier. First among them are my predecessors in the job, who paved the way: Bill Burros (now at the EU Delegation in Washington) and Desmond Dinan (now at George Mason University). I have also been very fortunate to have had as leaders/colleagues five distinguished, visionary, and hard-working Chairs of EUSA (in chronological order): James Caporaso, Gary Marks, Vivien Schmidt, Martin Schain, and George Ross. To each of you, thank you for everything and please know that you have, as a group, been *nonpareil*.

To all the board members with whom I've worked since 1997, thank you for your volunteer time, efforts, and faith. Very special thanks to Alberta Sbragia, past EUSA Chair, *ex officio* board member, and generous, supportive liaison between EUSA and the University of Pittsburgh. To her and our valued hosts in Pitt's University Center for International Studies, including UCIS Director William Brustein, we would not be where we are today without you. To those game, gallant EUSA members who served the Association as interest section leaders, book reviews editors, conference hosts and program chairs, and *ad hoc* committee members, it has been a true pleasure to know and work with you; your volunteer efforts made a concrete difference. To the kind EUSA members who loyally renew their memberships and contribute to our funds, thank you for giving EUSA its continued *raison d'être*. I wish all of you the very best. — VALERIE STAATS, PhD

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