

**CESDP after 11 September:
From Shortterm Confusion to Longterm Cohesion?
Jolyon Howorth**

PRIOR TO 11 SEPTEMBER, THE EU'S attempts to forge a common European security and defence policy (CESDP¹) faced two major internal challenges. On the institutional front, several turf wars presaged a struggle for ownership of the policy itself: tensions between the brand-new Brussels-based agencies (HR-CFSP², COPS, EUMC) and the more long-standing ones (COREPER, Council Secretariat, Commission); between foreign ministries and defence ministries; and above all between national capitals and "Brusselisation" (Howorth, 2001). On the capacities front, defence planners were faced with the challenge of transforming an assortment of military assets emerging from the November 2000 *Capabilities Commitments Conference* into a coherent and effective Rapid Reaction Force (Andréani et al., 2001: 53-71). These internal challenges were complicated by two external problems: how to involve "third countries"—especially Turkey—in CESDP; and how to ensure that CESDP was conducted in harmony with both NATO and the U.S. (Quinlan, 2001). Those challenges did not disappear on 11 September. At the same time, the terrorist attacks introduced further challenges to the fledgling CESDP, involving leadership, internal security, intelligence, diplomacy and procurement. The initial reactions did not augur well for further integration. But longer-term and deeper-rooted trends suggest that the CESDP could emerge strengthened from the crisis.

The most immediately notable feature of European responses to 11 September was *renationalisation* of security and defence reflexes. National leaders all expressed solidarity with the U.S.—on behalf of their respective countries. Each pledged *national* military assets to the U.S. administration—which Washington, for the most part, studiously ignored. Leaders were keen to be seen to be engaging in bilateralism with George Bush. Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder practically raced one another to the Oval Office. Although most European leaders, with the notable exception of Blair, were careful to insist that the emerging campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was not a "war," their evaluation of the root causes of terrorism varied considerably. Some countries stressed that tough questions needed to be asked about U.S. policy across the globe, while others insisted that nothing could ever justify the events of 11 September (propositions which are logically compatible but which betoken

very different approaches to the issue). Most leaders, with the notable exception of Silvio Berlusconi, were careful to express their respect for and solidarity with Islam and with Muslim nations, but there was cacophony between those insisting that U.S. military retaliation should be tightly "targeted" and those who offered "unlimited" support to the U.S. military effort. Some leaders managed to articulate both propositions. Countries eager to incarcerate Islamic terrorists engaged in bitter recriminations with others prioritising *habeus corpus* and the protection of asylum-seekers.³

This heterogeneity of response was symbolised by two highly mediated events. The first was the 19 October 2001 European Council meeting in Ghent, controversially preceded by a tripartite conclave between Chirac/Jospin, Blair and Schröder to discuss the (as yet hypothetical) military involvement of their respective national forces in Afghanistan. This crude attempt to organise a widely resented *Directoire* overshadowed the substantive decisions of the Council itself. The triumvirate planned to meet again on 5 November in London, but this time a *cosy dinner à trois/quatre* was gate-crashed by Berlusconi, Aznar, Solana, Verhofstadt and Kok, highlighting once again the disordered ranks of first, second, and third division players, allies and neutrals, "militarists" and "pacifists" and one CESDP opt-out (Denmark). This confusion enormously complicated the task of the Belgian presidency, struggling to impose its authority in the context of high profile solo diplomacy on the part of Europe's "big three."

Above all, it was Tony Blair's crusading leadership style which, while commanding respect, also fostered divisiveness. Seemingly abandoning the precariously balanced structures of CESDP which he, more than any other EU leader, had been responsible for engineering, Blair threw himself into personal shuttle diplomacy on behalf of the U.S. administration. He reverted overnight to a brand of unconditional Atlanticism which many in Europe (and even in Britain) had assumed to be anachronistic after Kosovo, the missile defence controversy and the Bush administration's generalised penchant for unilateralism. NATO's 12 September invocation of article 5 emanated from a telephone conversation between Blair and the Alliance's secretary-general Lord Robertson. Did this amount to unconditional EU alignment on U.S. foreign and security policy?

Paradoxically, NATO's invocation of article 5, high in political symbolism, could prove to be the historical death-knell of the Alliance *as a military instrument*. It also helps explain why, despite the short-term disordered cacophony of European

(continued on p.3)

EUSA Review

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From the Chair

Martin A. Schain

AS I WRITE THIS, THE Laeken Summit has ended with an expected agreement for a constitutional convention that will begin in March 2002, to recommend reforms for the reorganization of the European Union in 2003. The convention, of course, is only a hesitant beginning of a long struggle to bridge very different visions of European unity in anticipation of expansion during the next decade. Nevertheless, the process itself appears to be an exercise in consensus building that will include members of EUSA in its consultations. It will be an important multi-level collaboration among academics and political actors, an opportunity that is unprecedented in the development of Europe.

During this season we also continue to cope with the after-effects of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th. From my morning walk to my own office in Washington Square, Manhattan, to recent initiatives undertaken by the U.S. and the European Union, we are all experiencing the “global” in ways that are local, national, and international. The EU’s response to September 11th continues to be multi-dimensional. From the proposed EU-wide arrest warrant to the EU’s early December “Afghan Women’s Summit for Democracy,” the European Union is struggling to find its voice. Jolyon Howorth’s fine lead essay on p. 1 of this issue addresses terrorism-related security developments in detail.

At the European Union Studies Association, we have, like most non-profit organizations in the United States, experienced some after-shocks from September 11th. Our September membership renewal drive yielded lower than the usual return, anthrax postal scares have delayed both outgoing and incoming mail, and our year-end fundraising appeal has been affected, like those of most U.S. charities, by diversion of charitable giving to September 11th relief funds. (Even President Bush has called for the continued support of your usual charities.) All of us at EUSA hope that you will take a moment not only to renew your membership but to make a contribution to one of our Funds. We’ve also just launched a new Lifetime Membership option; this type of membership offers all our regular membership materials for the rest of your life, and, for U.S. taxpayers, credit for a \$500 charitable gift tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law. Please contact the EUSA office in Pittsburgh if you would like more information about renewing, making a gift, or establishing a Lifetime Membership.

As the European Union itself prepares for the next round of expansion, so is the field of EU studies “deepening and widening.” EUSA is a leader in this arena. I am pleased to announce the formal establishment of our fourth and fifth member-based interest sections. One focuses on EU-Latin America-Caribbean relations and current developments in the EU vis-à-vis the countries of the Caribbean, Central and South America, and is led by EUSA member Joaquín Roy (University of Miami). We also have a new section on “EU Economics,” which aims to cover both micro- and macroeconomics, placing emphasis both on theoretical rigor and practical applications of theory and statistical analysis. This section is (*continued on p.22*)

(continued from p.1) responses to 11 September, the longer-term dynamics of CESDP are likely to be reinforced. Although in mid-September NATO adopted a series of measures to enhance intelligence sharing, to increase security of Alliance and U.S. facilities, to guarantee blanket over-flight for U.S. and allied aircraft and to re-deploy certain naval assets to the Eastern Mediterranean, these must be regarded as the bare minimum given the gravity of the crisis. The U.S. preferred to discuss military cooperation via multiple bilateralisms rather than through the framework of the Alliance itself. The response from Washington to article 5, as well as to national offers of military assets, was: "Don't call us, we'll call you." Why?

Throughout the 1990s, several U.S. leaders had been calling for NATO to go "out of area or out of business." No longer perceiving Europe to be central to U.S. security interests, they proposed a global deal whereby Europe might attain a measure of regional security autonomy in exchange for political backing of U.S. policy across the globe. The Europeans, preoccupied with their own backyard, remained uninterested. NATO's first ever war—in Kosovo in 1999—revealed the serious limitations of allied cooperation. On 7 October 2001, in the skies over Afghanistan, the U.S. went "out of area"—unilaterally. Although Washington eventually associated with its military efforts a handful of cherry-picked European forces, and although NATO's contribution in terms of logistics and infrastructure was not insignificant, the Afghan war was anything but a NATO operation. European nations, in proffering their troops, may well have hoped to lock the U.S. into a multilateral operation legitimised by the United Nations. In reality, despite the coalition-building efforts of Colin Powell and the State Department, U.S. instincts and practice remained deeply unilateralist. Did the unilateral U.S. shift to "out of area" therefore imply that NATO was destined to go "out of business"?

No. NATO will survive. But it will be further transformed from an essentially military organisation to an essentially political one (Forster & Wallace 2001-2002). The accession of up to nine new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, almost certain to be announced in 2002, will accelerate the Alliance's transformation from an instrument for delivering collective defence to an agency for managing collective security. The new upgraded relationship between NATO and Russia, inaugurating a "Russia-North Atlantic Council" will intensify and accelerate that development. In the war against terrorism, in the campaign against weapons of mass destruction and in regional peacekeeping tasks, Russia is likely to share the stage with the U.S. and the EU.⁴ Washington is likely further to reduce its military presence in Europe. An Alliance with less U.S. military involvement and with more involvement from former Warsaw Pact members will be a very different actor from the body founded in 1949 and even from the body reinvented in April 1999.

Which brings us back to the EU and CESDP. Analysts and actors agree that, by every available measure, 11 September has made the case for CESDP more compelling. Beyond the probe of the cameras, in the Chancelleries and in the corridors of Brussels, significant elements of cohesion—and even integration—can be detected. While in moments of international

crisis it is natural for both publics and elites to revert initially to nationalist reflexes, both constituencies are well aware that the post-11 September world will not be made safer by wagon-circling. Nor do photo-opportunities in the White House rose garden for European leaders in search of status equate to real influence in Washington. Tony Blair learned from the Downing Street "bring your own bottle" fiasco that even the UK's voice has resonance across the pond only to the extent to which it is seen to be expressing the collective views of the EU-15. Those views were refined and consolidated in the months after 11 September.

Institutional turf wars were set aside and the complex EU nexus of agencies and actors worked seamlessly together to develop a coherent political approach to the crisis. Within ten days, the main outlines had been agreed and were articulated at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on 21 September. A clear CFSP/CESDP program was elaborated and progressively refined at GAC and European Council meetings over the coming weeks. Beyond the expression of "total support" for the *American people* and recognition that UN Security Council resolution 1368 made a U.S. military riposte "legitimate," a relatively distinct EU political agenda suggested a longer-term approach to the global crisis. First, the creation of the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism *under United Nations aegis*. Second, major political emphasis on reactivating the Middle-East peace process on the basis of the Mitchell and Tenet reports⁵, but with the explicit aim of creating a Palestinian state and guaranteeing Israel's existence inside recognised borders. Third, the "integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development." Humanitarian relief for Afghanistan and its neighbours and a long-term commitment to regional stabilisation became a number one priority. Europe's CFSP/CESDP leaders, in various combinations, embarked on an unprecedented round of shuttle diplomacy, repeatedly visiting most countries of Central and South Asia and the Middle East in a relentless quest for solutions. The EU, despite its obvious shortcomings, was emerging as an international actor.

Similar overtures were made towards the EU's neighbours, with intensive diplomatic activity towards Russia, the Mediterranean and Turkey. These coordinated efforts bore real fruit. Russia is an increasingly qualitative partner, not only on trade (the move towards a "Common European Economic Area") but also in the field of security. Monthly meetings now take place between Russia and the COPS. A Euro-Mediterranean Conference of foreign ministers (5-6 November) highlighted a commonality of purpose in consolidating the Barcelona process in the fields of economic development, anti-terrorism, cultural exchanges and security. Above all, a breakthrough was finally announced (early December) in the long-standing impasse over Turkey's refusal to play ball with CESDP.

The fact that the UN-brokered political discussions on Afghanistan's future took place—successfully—in Bonn is testimony not only to the EU's insistence on a proactive role for the United Nations but also to the emerging role of Germany as a key actor within the Union. It also draws (continued on p.4)

(continued from p.3) attention to the relative discretion of France, torn between frustration and relief at playing only a minor role in the American military campaign. The 11 September crisis completed the transformation of Germany into a security actor determined—under Schröder’s bold leadership—to play a part commensurate with its size and influence within the Union. Although Schröder’s determination to deploy combat troops to Afghanistan was several steps ahead of public opinion (and could still backfire electorally), it cleared away a major hurdle to the harmonious development of a viable CESDP. The unprecedented mix of military and civilian instruments that will be the hallmark of CESDP’s future political leverage now enjoys the support of all major players.

The one crucial outstanding problem is that of military capacity. The war against terrorism may well be more effectively conducted through civilian, police and intelligence instruments rather than through smart bombs. Cheque-book diplomacy and a concentration on development aid and the reconstruction of civil society are appropriate foreign and security priorities for an EU which does not seek to become a military superpower. But the carrot without the stick is a far less effective instrument than the carrot backed by the stick. At the Capabilities Improvement Conference on 19 November 2001, the EU began rectifying the very considerable deficiencies in its military “Force Catalogue.” Despite an optimistically worded report, and despite the controversial declaration of CESDP “operationality” at the Laeken European Council, most analysts concur with the view of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that the EU has still “fail[ed] to grasp the severity of the looming crisis” and that “final operating capability” is unlikely to be met before 2012 (IISS, 2001: 291). One major problem is the continued reluctance of member states to adopt a proactive methodology, orchestrated by a formal Council of Defence ministers. The EU’s current military inadequacy, compounded by the likely unavailability of U.S. assets, is the Achilles heel of the CESDP project. It is made worse by only half-hearted attempts to Europeanise and rationalise procurement and by the failure of political leaders to make the case to their publics for rising defence budgets. Worse still, given the near certainty that the US, in the wake of 11 September, will significantly increase defence spending, the already yawning gap between EU and U.S. capabilities will widen even further, rendering interoperability and cooperation in the field still more problematic.

Without the crucial attribute of military capacity, the considerable progress recorded in CESDP, resulting from powerful historical stimuli, considerable political will, harmonious institutional dynamics and the horror of the twin towers, will remain seriously incomplete.

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Acronyms

COPS: *Comité Politique et de Sécurité* French acronym now widely preferred to the English PSC (Political and Security Committee). Comprises senior officials from the 15 member states based in the Permanent Representations and meeting twice a week.
EUMC: European Union Military Committee. Comprising the 15 Chiefs of the Defence Staffs or their representatives.
GAC: General Affairs Council. Bimonthly meetings of EU foreign ministers.
HR-CFSP: High-Representative for the CFSP (Javier Solana). Operates out of the Council Secretariat.

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Notes

1. Strictly speaking, CESDP—an acronym launched at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999—is a sub-set of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) launched at Maastricht in 1991. Since 1999, the CESDP project has dominated the concerns of policy-makers and analysts. In this article, in order to avoid excess acronymania, I shall use CESDP to cover both processes, unless otherwise indicated.
2. See explanations of acronyms at the end of this article.
3. The French media expressed out loud what the political class whispered in private: that the UK in particular had an asylum policy that amounted to harbouring terrorists.
4. While the U.S. Air Force “softened up” Taliban targets in Afghanistan, it was Russian military hardware, from Kalashnikovs to T-55 tanks, which allowed the Northern Alliance to achieve the all-important victory on the ground.
5. Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell presented a plan to end the *intifada* in May 2001 which was accepted “100%” by Yasser Arafat but met with reservations from Israel. George Tenet, director of the CIA, refined the plan with concrete proposals for a ceasefire and withdrawal to positions held in September 2000.

Call for Proposals

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In anticipation of publishing the next volume in our book series with Oxford University Press, the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) seeks proposals from our membership for volume six. Contingent on available funding, we anticipate that volume six will appear in Fall 2003 and may be produced in hardcover and e-book formats for library acquisitions and in paperback for classroom use. Like previous volumes in the series, volume six should provide an overview of recent developments in the European Union, while addressing a current, important EU topic or theme. Past volumes have been oriented around these themes:

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“THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION” LAEKEN DECLARATION

I. EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS

For centuries, peoples and states have taken up arms and waged war to win control of the European continent. The debilitating effects of two bloody wars and the weakening of Europe's position in the world brought a growing realisation that only peace and concerted action could make the dream of a strong, unified Europe come true. In order to banish once and for all the demons of the past, a start was made with a coal and steel community. Other economic activities, such as agriculture, were subsequently added in. A genuine single market was eventually established for goods, persons, services and capital, and a single currency was added in 1999. On 1 January 2002 the euro is to become a day-to-day reality for 300 million European citizens.

The European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an economic and technical collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community's democratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, construction of a political union has begun and cooperation been established on social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, police, justice, foreign policy and a common security and defence policy.

The European Union is a success story. For over half a century now, Europe has been at peace. Along with North America and Japan, the Union forms one of the three most prosperous parts of the world. As a result of mutual solidarity and fair distribution of the benefits of economic development, moreover, the standard of living in the Union's weaker regions has increased enormously and they have made good much of the disadvantage they were at.

Fifty years on, however, the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence. The unification of Europe is near. The Union is about to expand to bring in more than ten new Member States, predominantly Central and Eastern European, thereby finally closing one of the darkest chapters in European history: the Second World War and the ensuing artificial division of Europe. At long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six countries first took the lead.

The democratic challenge facing Europe

At the same time, the Union faces twin challenges, one within and the other beyond its borders.

Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the Union's broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union's everyday action. They want the European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open. Many also feel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in matters by their nature better left to Member States' and regions' elected representatives. This is

even perceived by some as a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny.

Europe's new role in a globalised world

Beyond its borders, in turn, the European Union is confronted with a fast-changing, globalised world. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights. Just a few years later, however, there is no such certainty. The eleventh of September has brought a rude awakening. The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them.

What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.

Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.

The expectations of Europe's citizens

The image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens' wishes. There have been frequent public calls for a greater EU role in justice and security, action against cross-border crime, control of migration flows and reception of asylum seekers and refugees from far-flung war zones. Citizens also want results in the fields of employment and combating poverty and social exclusion, as well as in the field of economic and social cohesion. They want a common approach on environmental pollution, climate change and food safety, in short, all transnational issues which they instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together. Just as they also want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world.

At the same time, citizens also feel that the Union is behaving too bureaucratically in numerous other areas. In coordinating the economic, financial and fiscal environment, the basic issue

should continue to be proper operation of the internal market and the single currency, without this jeopardising Member States' individuality. National and regional differences frequently stem from history or tradition. They can be enriching. In other words, what citizens understand by "good governance" is opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape. What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life.

In short, citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach, developing a Europe which points the way ahead for the world. An approach that provides concrete results in terms of more jobs, better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care. There can be no doubt that this will require Europe to undergo renewal and reform.

II. CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN A RENEWED UNION

The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world. In order to address them a number of specific questions need to be put.

A better division and definition of competence in the European Union

Citizens often hold expectations of the European Union that are not always fulfilled. And vice versa - they sometimes have the impression that the Union takes on too much in areas where its involvement is not always essential. Thus the important thing is to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States in the light of the new challenges facing the Union. This can lead both to restoring tasks to the Member States and to assigning new missions to the Union, or to the extension of existing powers, while constantly bearing in mind the equality of the Member States and their mutual solidarity.

A first series of questions that needs to be put concerns how the division of competence can be made more transparent. Can we thus make a clearer distinction between three types of competence: the exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of the Member States and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States? At what level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here? And should we not make it clear that any powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the exclusive sphere of competence of the Member States? And what would be the consequences of this?

The next series of questions should aim, within this new framework and while respecting the "acquis communautaire", to determine whether there needs to be any reorganisation of competence. How can citizens' expectations be taken as a guide here? What missions would this produce for the Union? And, vice versa, what tasks could better be left to the Member States?

What amendments should be made to the Treaty on the various policies? How, for example, should a more coherent common foreign policy and defence policy be developed? Should the Petersberg tasks be updated? Do we want to adopt a more integrated approach to police and criminal law cooperation? How can economic-policy coordination be stepped up? How can we intensify cooperation in the field of social inclusion, the environment, health and food safety? But then, should not the day-to-day administration and implementation of the Union's policy be left more emphatically to the Member States and, where their constitutions so provide, to the regions? Should they not be provided with guarantees that their spheres of competence will not be affected?

Lastly, there is the question of how to ensure that a redefined division of competence does not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision for this, regions. How are we to ensure at the same time that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? In the future as well the Union must continue to be able to react to fresh challenges and developments and must be able to explore new policy areas. Should Articles 95 and 308 of the Treaty be reviewed for this purpose in the light of the "acquis jurisprudentiel"?

Simplification of the Union's instruments

Who does what is not the only important question; the nature of the Union's action and what instruments it should use are equally important. Successive amendments to the Treaty have on each occasion resulted in a proliferation of instruments, and directives have gradually evolved towards more and more detailed legislation. The key question is therefore whether the Union's various instruments should not be better defined and whether their number should not be reduced.

In other words, should a distinction be introduced between legislative and executive measures? Should the number of legislative instruments be reduced: directly applicable rules, framework legislation and non-enforceable instruments (opinions, recommendations, open coordination)? Is it or is it not desirable to have more frequent recourse to framework legislation, which affords the Member States more room for manoeuvre in achieving policy objectives? For which areas of competence are open coordination and mutual recognition the most appropriate instruments? Is the principle of proportionality to remain the point of departure?

More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union

The European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses. However, the European project also derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions. The national parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project. The declaration on the future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, stressed the need to examine their role in European integration. More generally, the question arises as to what initiatives we can take to develop a European public area. *(continued on p.8)*

(continued from p.7) The first question is thus how we can increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the present institutions, a question which is valid for the three institutions.

How can the authority and efficiency of the European Commission be enhanced? How should the President of the Commission be appointed: by the European Council, by the European Parliament or should he be directly elected by the citizens? Should the role of the European Parliament be strengthened? Should we extend the right of co-decision or not? Should the way in which we elect the members of the European Parliament be reviewed? Should a European electoral constituency be created, or should constituencies continue to be determined nationally? Can the two systems be combined? Should the role of the Council be strengthened? Should the Council act in the same manner in its legislative and its executive capacities? With a view to greater transparency, should the meetings of the Council, at least in its legislative capacity, be public? Should citizens have more access to Council documents? How, finally, should the balance and reciprocal control between the institutions be ensured?

A second question, which also relates to democratic legitimacy, involves the role of national parliaments. Should they be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament? Should they have a role in areas of European action in which the European Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of competence between Union and Member States, for example through preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?

The third question concerns how we can improve the efficiency of decision-making and the workings of the institutions in a Union of some thirty Member States. How could the Union set its objectives and priorities more effectively and ensure better implementation? Is there a need for more decisions by a qualified majority? How is the co-decision procedure between the Council and the European Parliament to be simplified and speeded up? What of the six-monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Union? What is the future role of the European Parliament? What of the future role and structure of the various Council formations? How should the coherence of European foreign policy be enhanced? How is synergy between the High Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced? Should the external representation of the Union in international fora be extended further?

Towards a constitution for European citizens

The European Union currently has four Treaties. The objectives, powers and policy instruments of the Union are currently spread across those Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential.

Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The first concerns simplifying the existing Treaties without changing their content. Should the distinction between the Union and the Communities be reviewed? What of the division into three pillars?

Questions then arise as to the possible reorganisation of the Treaties. Should a distinction be made between a basic treaty and the other treaty provisions? Should this distinction involve

separating the texts? Could this lead to a distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for the other treaty provisions?

Thought would also have to be given to whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty and to whether the European Community should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship between Member States in the Union?

III. CONVENING OF A CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

In order to pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible, the European Council has decided to convene a Convention composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union. In the light of the foregoing, it will be the task of that Convention to consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses.

The European Council has appointed Mr V. Giscard d'Estaing as Chairman of the Convention and Mr G. Amato and Mr J. L. Dehaene as Vice-Chairmen.

Composition

In addition to its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, the Convention will be composed of 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State), 30 members of national parliaments (two from each Member State), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives. The accession candidate countries will be fully involved in the Convention's proceedings. They will be represented in the same way as the current Member States (one government representative and two national parliament members) and will be able to take part in the proceedings without, however, being able to prevent any consensus which may emerge among the Member States.

The members of the Convention may only be replaced by alternate members if they are not present. The alternate members will be designated in the same way as full members.

The Praesidium of the Convention will be composed of the Convention Chairman and Vice-Chairmen and nine members drawn from the Convention (the representatives of all the governments holding the Council Presidency during the Convention, two national parliament representatives, two European Parliament representatives and two Commission representatives).

Three representatives of the Economic and Social Committee with three representatives of the European social partners; from the Committee of the Regions: six representatives (to be appointed by the Committee of the Regions from the regions, cities and regions with legislative powers), and the European Ombudsman will be invited to attend as observers. The Presidents of the Court of Justice and of the Court of Auditors may be invited by the Praesidium to address the Convention.

Length of proceedings

The Convention will hold its inaugural meeting on 1 March 2002, when it will appoint its Praesidium and adopt its rules of procedure. Proceedings will be completed after a year, that is to say in time for the Chairman of the Convention to present its outcome to the European Council.

Working methods

The Chairman will pave the way for the opening of the Convention's proceedings by drawing conclusions from the public debate. The Praesidium will serve to lend impetus and will provide the Convention with an initial working basis.

The Praesidium may consult Commission officials and experts of its choice on any technical aspect which it sees fit to look into. It may set up ad hoc working parties.

The Council will be kept informed of the progress of the Convention's proceedings. The Convention Chairman will give an oral progress report at each European Council meeting, thus enabling Heads of State or Government to give their views at the same time.

The Convention will meet in Brussels. The Convention's discussions and all official documents will be in the public domain. The Convention will work in the Union's eleven working languages.

Final document

The Convention will consider the various issues. It will draw up a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved.

Together with the outcome of national debates on the future of the Union, the final document will provide a starting point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate decisions.

Forum

In order for the debate to be broadly based and involve all citizens, a Forum will be opened for organisations representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, academia, etc.). It will take the form of a structured network of organisations receiving regular information on the Convention's proceedings. Their contributions will serve as input into the debate. Such organisations may be heard or consulted on specific topics in accordance with arrangements to be established by the Praesidium.

Secretariat

The Praesidium will be assisted by a Convention Secretariat, to be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council, which may incorporate Commission and European Parliament experts.

15 December 2001

The Future of the European Union
Laeken Declaration

Document available on the Web site of the Belgium EU Presidency at <www.eu2001.be>, on the European Union's Web site, Europa, at <europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm> and on several European Commission Web sites.

Spotlight on Spain in the USA

Many EUSA members focus on EU member states. This feature highlights individual EU member states' official and major presences in the USA.

Important Web sites

- Primary diplomatic Web site (in Spanish and English): www.spainemb.org
 - The U.S. Embassy in Madrid hosts Web pages on the bilateral relationship, e.g., treaties, reports, speeches, and current news: www.embusa.es/bilateral/
 - Sí, Spain, Rich site, in four languages, of Spanish current affairs as well as its historic, linguistic, and cultural development: www.sispain.org
- Related organizations:
- Fundación Consejo España-Estados Unidos www.consespain-usa.org
 - Casa de América www.casaamerica.es
 - Instituto Cervantes www.cervantes.es

Missions Embassy of Spain, 2375 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20037; tel. 202.452.0100. Ten consulates in Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Puerto Rico, San Francisco, Washington, DC.

News EFE, the largest Spanish news agency in the world, owns newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV stations in scores of Spanish speaking countries and areas. Their Web site has 10 years of archived news articles (in Spanish) and photographs: www.efe.es/

Spain-U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Non-profit membership organization that fosters trade and investment between the two countries:
www.spainuscc.org

Selected scholarly resources

- The *Mediterranean Studies Association* promotes the scholarly study of the Mediterranean region in all aspects and disciplines and publishes the annual academic journal, *Mediterranean Studies* www.mediterraneanstudies.org
- *South European Society and Politics*, academic journal from Frank Cass Publishers www.frankcass.com/jnls/
- *Journal of Southern European and the Balkans*, academic journal from Carfax/Taylor & Francis www.tandf.co.uk/journals/
- EUSA has launched a new member-based interest section on the EU-Latin America-Caribbean, including Iberia. www.eustudies.org/eulacaribbeansection.html

Teaching the EU

Editor's note: This column is written by members of EUSA's "Teaching the EU" Interest Section. For more details about the Section and how to join it, please visit the Web page www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html

Taking the Mystery Out of Teaching on the EU

John D. Occhipinti

HOW MUCH CAN UNDERGRADUATES really learn about the European Union (EU) in one semester? What is the best way to facilitate this? These are important questions for faculty, but answers to them will likely differ somewhat from institution to institution. Thus, my intention with this short essay is merely to help other teachers of the EU reflect on what they do in their classrooms by describing my own objectives and strategies.

One way that my experience may be unique compared to colleagues at other universities is that my course is devoted solely to the subject of the EU, rather than embedded in a broader class on Western European politics. This allows me to approach my course similar to the way I might teach a course on American Government to visiting European undergraduates, who might have only one semester to learn as much as they can about politics in the United States. That is, I take a comprehensive approach to teaching my course, covering the EU's historical development and policy-making institutions, actors, and procedures, as well as its major policy areas.¹

This obviously entails a great deal of detailed information for American undergraduates to absorb, especially since most know less about European politics when they begin the course, compared to what many European students seem to know about the United States. However, having taught my course every fall since 1996, I have been impressed by how much students can actually learn about the EU in one semester, as well as what they can retain long afterward. I attribute this at least partly to my teaching approach, which relies heavily on using visual aids and study guides aimed at taking the "mystery" out of the EU for my students.

Coverage of the historical evolution of European integration in the twentieth century accounts for about four weeks of my course. This not only helps students to see the EU of today in its proper historical context, but also to realize its potential for future growth and change. This promotes greater critical thinking about possible alternatives to the EU's present decision-making procedures and competences, such as those proposed in the Treaty of Nice or recently suggested by the Belgian Presidency at the Laeken European Council. Clear understanding of the EU's meager beginnings and gradual, though not always regular, development seems to help students overcome their own initial Euro-skepticism about the chances of further integration and enlargement. Devoting so much time in the semester to the history of the EU means sacrificing coverage of other areas, but this

helps to justify the cross-listing of my course in our History Department, helping to attract more students.

Although the examination of the EU's history comes early in the course, I have found it best not to teach this as a mystery. This means that I use the very first week of the semester to provide students with a comprehensive overview about the *present* state of the EU, describing the nature of its three pillars, how they work, and the policies handled by each. This helps students better to appreciate the historical information that they must understand later on. Consider how difficult it would be to teach the history of American politics to students who are completely unfamiliar with politics in the United States. That is, students are likely to make more sense out of any history when they already know how the "story" turns out in the end.

Another way to help students appreciate the EU's history is to provide them with a suitable conceptual framework. To this end, I devote time during the first week of classes to developing the concepts of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, as well as the functionalists and realist paradigms associated with these. In addition, I make use of a chart, as a handout and overhead, which compares the history, nature, and significance of the major EC/EU treaties. Along with the framework provided by the concepts, this chart helps students to categorize and prioritize the details in the EU's history and to see the "forest from the trees."

Following a midterm exam on concepts and history, the course turns to a month of reading and instruction on the decision-making bodies of the EU, covering one major institution per class (e.g., the Commission, Council, EP, and ECJ). For the last several years, I have made use of a very detailed institutional diagram that I have created. This depicts all of the decision-making bodies in pillar one, including many of their significant sub-parts, offices, and decision-making mechanisms. For example, the figure on the diagram containing the Council of Ministers includes, among other details, a breakdown of weighted votes and COREPER. Likewise, the European Parliament is depicted with its present party groups, national seat allocations, committees, etc. This diagram is provided to students at the very start of the semester and is displayed as an overhead during each session of the second part of the course. This helps students to learn visually, taking the mystery out of learning about the EU's institutions by supporting the assigned readings and class discussions.

Each day, I cover a different body on the diagram and its subparts, as well as describing the functions of these, using the diagram on an overhead. As we progress through the institutions, students can gradually see how all of the pieces fit together, and I reinforce this by using the diagram to review what we have already covered and where we are going. The success of this approach is evident at the next midterm exam (and again at the final exam), when students are asked to reproduce the diagram in full detail by drawing it on a blank sheet of legal-sized paper. Along with this, students write a companion essay that describes the EU's general legislative process in pillar one, from the impetus of a proposal through the possible adjudication of disputes. There is indeed a lot to memorize and learn for the exam on this material, but there is no mystery in this for students, as they know these

questions are coming. Although I have been using this method for the past five years, I am still quite impressed by how well students can accomplish these tasks, displaying not only a detailed knowledge of the EU's governmental institutions, but also a sound comprehension of how these work and are related.²

The remaining weeks of the semester cover eight to ten major policy areas of the EU, with a particular emphasis on how each of these is related to the question of the impending enlargement of the EU. In fact, enlargement is treated as a separate policy area in its own right at the end of the semester, as well as being examined simultaneously with the CAP at the start of this section of the course. One noteworthy feature of this part of the course is that each session includes time for students to make conference-style presentations of their on-going research projects related to that day's policy area.

After taking student proposals, I assign paper topics to insure that every policy area is covered and that no more than two presentations take place each class session.³ In recent years, students' research has been greatly facilitated by the growing on-line availability of policy-orientated research and press articles on the EU, as well as the wealth of information found on the Europa web site. In addition, I have built a "Blackboard" web site for my course, which contains several useful links and my own research paper guide.⁴ The research paper helps students to become experts on their topic, while gaining a sound overview of the EU's other policies through lectures, class discussion, and other student presentations. Furthermore, making their own presentations helps students to learn actively and hone their public speaking skills.

In addition to working on their papers, students are provided with a blank chart at the start of the third part of the course, which entails columns for each policy area and rows for various categories of information about them (e.g., rationale, history, key documents, policy components, etc.). Students are required to fill in the chart's blank boxes with notes and submit a copy of the chart before the comprehensive final exam, keeping a copy for use as a study guide. As in earlier parts of the course, this approach helps to take the mystery out of studying the EU, by helping students to focus on the most important aspects of each policy, as well as providing them with a way of comparing policy areas according to the different categories.

This chart serves as a take-home portion of the final exam, but also as a study sheet. Near the end of the course, I provide students with a review sheet, letting them know what to expect on the final exam, including the kinds of questions from the third part of the course based on their policy chart. This review sheet also contains an essay question for the final exam on the tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in the history of the EU. This guides students in the review of their class notes and readings from the first part of the course with an eye to the "big picture." Students are also reminded that they will have to re-draw the institutional diagram on the final exam. With this kind of help, most students ultimately do quite well on the final exam, displaying a sound understanding of the EU's history, institutions, and policies.

To summarize, my teaching method aims to promote learning about the EU by making use of various presentation techniques, visual aides, and study guides. Students' understanding of the European Union is also reinforced by various active learning techniques, including class discussion, paper presentations, and (for some) participation in intercollegiate simulations. Although many aspects of my course are quite conventional, I hope that this account of my teaching method is helpful to faculty in their own efforts to take the mystery out of learning about EU for their students.

John D. Occhipinti (Dept. of Political Science, Canisius College) is completing a book on the politics of police cooperation in the European Union, focusing on the development of Europol and related institutions.

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- McCormick, John (1999) *The European Union: Politics and Policies* (2nd Ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Nugent, Neill (1999) *The Government and Politics of the European Union* (4th Ed.). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wallace, Helen and William Wallace (eds.) (2000) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4th Ed.). Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press.

Notes

1. There are many fine textbooks available to help faculty teach the EU. See, for example, Dinan (1999), George and Bache (2000), McCormick (1999), Nugent (1999), and Wallace and Wallace (2000). Faculty might also want to supplement or update these readings by using materials found on the massive Web site of the EU itself (<http://europa.eu.int/>).
2. For some students, this understanding is reinforced each year by their participation in an international, intercollegiate simulation, "Eurosim," organized by the Trans-Atlantic Consortium for European Union Simulations and Studies. Students are assigned "alter-egos" (e.g., MEP, Minister, COREPER, Commissioner, etc.), and then they act out these roles out within a given policy theme and format. For more information see www.fredonia.edu/departments/polisci/eurosim/.
3. The number of students enrolled in my course typically ranges from 10-20, and we cover at least ten different EU policy areas. The topics and enrollment vary according to that year's theme and location for Eurosims, which takes place in Europe every other year. Eurosims 2002 was held January 3-6 in Prague.
4. "Blackboard" is the brand name for a template allowing easy creation and maintenance of Web sites for academic courses; see all the Blackboard products and e-Education services at www.blackboard.com. See my Blackboard-based syllabus at this long, though accurate, URL: http://courseinfo.canisius.edu/bin/common/course.pl?frame=top&course_id=_1377_1

EUSA Interest Sections

History

In response to strong support indicated by EUSA members who responded to our 1998 Tenth Anniversary Member Survey, the EUSA Executive Committee decided to establish member-based interest sections on any topic related to European Union affairs. As in other academic associations, the interest sections reflect the diverse interests and energies of the membership and it is hoped that the sections will be a vibrant part of EUSA.

Five EUSA interest sections have now been launched. They draw members from throughout academia, government agencies, law firms, think tanks, and others, from many countries. Their activities range from a collaborative research project to a small conference to a compilation of syllabi, to give a few examples. One of the many benefits of the sections is that they bring together the EUSA membership in smaller subgroups based on common EU-related interests. They have the potential to become effective working groups in subfields of EU studies, as the field itself grows and becomes more specialized. The section Web pages, member rosters, activities, and other information may be found on the EUSA Web site (go to www.eustudies.org and click on "Interest Sections"). The existing EUSA sections are:

EU Law (D. Bruce Shine, Coordinator)

EU Political Economy (Erik Jones and Amy Verdun, Co-Chairs)

Teaching the EU (Peter Loedel, Chair)

EU-Latin America-Caribbean (Joaquín Roy, Chair)

EU Economics (Patrick Crowley and Brian Ardy, Co-Chairs)

Section Policies

EUSA's overarching policies and practices for member interest sections, adopted by the EUSA Executive Committee in January 2000, are as follows:

- Interest section members must be current EUSA members.
- Interest sections must have a minimum of 15 members.
- Interest section members pay \$5 dues per annum in addition to their EUSA membership dues. This amount is allocated to EUSA to help cover administrative costs relating to the interest sections.
- Interest sections may decide to increase their membership fees, and will receive the difference from EUSA between the two amounts in order to fund their special projects and activities.
- EUSA will host dedicated Web page(s) for the interest sections as part of the EUSA Web site.
- The EUSA office will set up and maintain an e-mail distribution list for each interest section.
- Interest section members will appear in a separate set of listings in the biennial EUSA Membership Directory.
- The EUSA office will generally commit to assisting interest sections in recruiting members and disseminating information about their activities.
- Each interest section must elect a chair, coordinator, or other leader who will serve as the primary liaison with EUSA and is responsible for interest section financial matters. Interest section members may also decide to elect other officers.
- Interest sections are encouraged to submit panel proposals for the EUSA Conference.

In October 2001 the EUSA Executive Committee also adopted the following set of policies to govern and guide the activities of EUSA interest sections, in light of the growing number of such Sections. EUSA interest sections must:

- Meet at each EUSA Conference.
- Carry out at least one added-value project each year (e.g., Web pages, newsletters, publications, colloquia or workshops, syllabi bank, or other form of information exchange).
- Develop, within 12 months of establishment of the section, a democratic process of selecting section leadership and inform the EUSA board of that process.
- Make an annual report of activities to the EUSA board.

In addition to meeting the above-mentioned guidelines, sections will be evaluated every three years by the EUSA board (and discontinued if not active or active but not operating within EUSA interest section guidelines and policies).

As general principles, interest sections should recruit new members to the Association and contribute to the greater welfare of the Association.

Interest sections of the EUSA are subordinate bodies who shall not possess the legal authority to speak on behalf of the EUSA, obligate EUSA funds, or obligate or give the impression that they have the legal authority to commit the EUSA to any policy or position unless and until such action and/or conduct has been approved by the EUSA Executive Committee or by action in compliance with EUSA policy and procedures as contained within the EUSA Constitution and By-laws.

Proposal Guidelines

Here's how to propose an EUSA interest section:

- Any EUSA member may propose an interest section.
- Proposal must be a 1-2 page formal letter (500 words maximum) on institutional letterhead including a rationale for the interest section topic and a brief statement of the proposer's qualifications for leading it (submit two copies of this letter).
- Proposer(s) must make at least a one-year commitment to leading the section.
- Please include the *short form* of proposer(s)' curriculum vitae (one copy).
- Proposal must have at least ten brief letters of support from EUSA members (must be collected and submitted en toto by the proposer, not submitted individually to EUSA by their authors); these letters may be in the form of printed e-mail messages with contact coordinates, such as typically appear in an e-mail signature, given.
- Deadline for proposals: ongoing.
- Decisions on interest section proposals and policies to be made by the EUSA Executive Committee and its appointed Subcommittee, if any. Decisions of the EUSA Executive Committee are final.

Please use regular mail (not e-mail or fax) to submit your interest section proposal to the EUSA Administrative Office, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. With questions about how to put together an interest section proposal, please send an e-mail to eusa@pitt.edu. EUSA members are encouraged to inquire about their interest section ideas before putting together a proposal.

Book Reviews

Carol Cosgrove-Sacks (ed.) Europe, Diplomacy and Development: New Issues in EU Relations with Developing Countries. New York: Palgrave, 2001, 286+ pp.

THIS VOLUME GREW OUT OF a course at the College of Europe, Bruges. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks has collected the student essays from the course, edited them, and supported them with introductory and concluding essays of her own, which not only “bookend” the collection but provide intellectual focus and coherence. In fact, the Cosgrove-Sacks essays give this collection their real worth. The overall thesis and argument of the editor suggests that the EU, in the 1990s, contributed more than half of all overseas development aid. Accordingly, this volume argues that the EU contribution to development is financially important, and perhaps even governing in some ways, and that the EU has an opportunity to make an important contribution in determining the general policies and the direction of development assistant strategies and policies.

The book makes the claim that the EU is both the principal market for exports from developing countries and the main source of financial and technical assistance. This is somewhat overstated if one takes Latin America and Asia into account, but as the volume makes clear, directly and indirectly, the main focus is EU development policy, both current and historical, for the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP), if one sets aside EU-East Europe assistance. In fact, almost all the essays in this collection focus on the historical and contemporary issues facing the ACP states and the treaties which have formalized the EU-ACP policies in the various Lomé Conventions since the mid 1970s. A dominant question for the reader is whether the cumulative evidence and arguments in this volume show that the EU has reflected, and still reflects, global trends in development strategy, or whether the EU, given its actual and potential heft as an economic and political force, is in a position to affect the direction of development thinking that other actors adopt, including IGOs and NGOs.

The editor is clear about her own conclusion when she states “EU development cooperation policies dictate the terms and conditions of access to the most important market in the world for exports of developing countries. Collectively the EU countries are the largest shareholders in the IMF and the World Bank, and their policies play an increasingly important role in the UN and other multilateral funding agencies” (p. 283). One notes, even in this assertion, hope and possibility rather than tangible reality. It may well be that the EU ought and can play a more important role in guiding and funding development policies on a global scale, yet from a non-European perspective, this strikes one somewhat as wishful thinking. More concretely, the editor is quite right, of course, to indicate that Europe already plays a substantial role regarding the Lomé group of countries, and that the EU ought to play a more telling and creative role in future.

Most of the essays, which range over a wide spectrum of EU development issues, are solidly researched. There is tendency for essays to be strong on legal references to the precise clauses and provisions in treaties and other formal documents covering any given issue. The advantage for the reader or the researcher is that the essays provide a good research tool regarding the legal and administrative basis of EU workings and policies. Be it a chapter on biodiversity or humanitarian assistance, each essay puts at the reader’s fingertips the precise EU policies, legislation, and agreements. As might be surmised, such an approach tends to be weaker on original analysis, thinking, and creative strategies about how to move forward. Ironically, the editor’s call to arms for the EU to play a larger and more creative role is somewhat undermined by the essays that are often excessively legalistic rather than free flowing and thought provoking.

Cosgrove-Sacks’ contributions provide the intellectual framework within which the other essays might serve as informational background. But the intellectually interesting points are mostly made by the editor. Cosgrove-Sacks discusses the historical and ongoing tensions within the EU between multilateral EU development policies and the bilateral policies of the individual EU member states. This dichotomy has been particularly relevant with respect to the former African colonies. France or Britain’s role in the various Lomé Conventions surely needs to be seen as parallel to the pursuit of bilateral French and British interests and relationships with specific African states. The editor and a few of the contributors also point out the interface between political and development objectives of the EU regarding the content and directions of the various Lomé Conventions. Indeed, the many aspects of the Lomé Conventions, which are covered in almost every chapter in the book, are as much political instruments as they are economic instruments. Cosgrove-Sacks makes this valid point clearly and well. Unfortunately neither this intellectual strand nor several others are carried through in the work of the many contributors. The net result makes this a useful research tool for anyone who wants to understand the specific provisions in the EU relevant to EU development policies.

One of the strongest points of the collection is to give the reader an understanding of EU policies on many aspects of the various Lomé Conventions. The collection is a good source for examining the historical changes in EU legislation, law, and policies. For the broader and more weighty questions of the EU and development policies of the past, present, and future, the essays of the editor stand out. Not only does Cosgrove-Sacks frame how one might examine and judge EU development policies, but her essay fully addresses the subtitle of the book: “New Issues in EU Relations with Developing Countries.” The new issues are multilayered, of course, and include the end of the Cold War, global trends in democratization, freer markets, changes within Europe itself, and the overall sad mess on the African continent, to name only the most obvious. The editor wishes to alert Europe and the reader to imagine that the EU could lead with some new thinking. The many, often short, essays in this volume anchor U.S. to the past and present formal structure of EU development policy. This approach may not be wholly satisfactory to moving forward creatively, but one benefits from

the solidity of the effort and can take pleasure in Cosgrove-Sacks' encouraging call to thought and action.

Isebill V. Gruhn
University of California Santa Cruz

George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.) Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 627+ pp.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS HAVE GAINED considerable interest as a field of study among political scientists. The EU-U.S. trade relation is the driving force behind many global developments. Thus, agreement between the EU and the U.S. has become a prerequisite for major decisions to be taken within the WTO. Also, the EU and the U.S. present two of the most widely researched political systems in the world, which have been influential as models for other democracies or regional integration schemes. As a consequence, transatlantic relations offer strong opportunities to study developments and phenomena that have a wider relevance.

The book edited by Bermann, Herdegen and Lindseth focuses on one aspect of transatlantic relations: regulatory cooperation. With the gradual erosion of tariffs and quotas, domestic regulations have decisively moved to center-stage in the debate on trade liberalization. Some of the most widely publicized trade disputes between the EU and the U.S. have evolved around differences in domestic regulations that proved barriers to trade for one party or the other. At the same time, attempts to overcome these differences have met with considerable suspicion on the part of politicians and public interest groups that fear an erosion of domestic standards and of autonomy in setting regulatory standards in the first place.

As a result, regulatory cooperation has become an extremely interesting and pertinent issue: it lies at the intersection of international and domestic politics; it combines technical issues and political choices; and, last but not least, it brings together elements from economics, law and political science.

The book Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation is the outcome of an international conference held in April 1999. It brings together contributions from eminent lawyers, political scientists and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic. In so doing, it aims to "deal as systematically as current knowledge and experience permit with the transatlantic regulatory cooperation phenomenon" (p.2). Judging from its subtitle, Legal Problems and Political Prospects, it also aims to combine insights from law and political science, which is reflected in the backgrounds of the contributors.

The book is quite ambitious, covering a broad range of issues. These issues are grouped into eight sections. Part I deals with the political and legal context of transatlantic regulatory cooperation and contains five chapters by EU and U.S. politicians and civil servants, as well as a member of the Transatlantic

Business Dialogue. These chapters offer brief overviews of the main regulatory issues in EU-U.S. relations at the time the conference was held.

Parts II and III focus on the relation between transatlantic regulatory cooperation and globalization, and theoretical perspectives on regulatory cooperation, respectively. The line between these two parts is not too sharp, as at least one of the two contributions in part II proposes a theoretical perspective on transnational regulatory issues.

Part IV contains five contributions on competition law and international trade law, while Part V highlights transatlantic regulatory cooperation in four selected policy areas up until around mid-1999. Part VI explores the interaction between transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the domestic EU and U.S. legal and institutional systems. Part VII discusses issues of democracy and accountability. Finally, Part VIII presents some perspectives on future developments in transatlantic regulatory cooperation.

As a result of this wide range of issues and authors, the book's chapters differ quite significantly in scope and size. Whereas several chapters do not exceed ten pages, probably offering little more than the authors' presentations at the conference, other chapters offer much more detailed analyses, with one chapter taking almost fifty pages.

Most contributions are extensions of earlier work by their authors, which specialists in the field will probably already be familiar with. Much of this work is on regulatory cooperation or certain regulatory issues in general. As a result, many chapters do not relate specifically to transatlantic regulatory cooperation or EU-U.S. relations, and the book as a whole has difficulties relating more general or theoretical perspectives to specific, empirical case descriptions. While this makes for a rich inventory of issues and perspectives, the link to transatlantic regulatory cooperation is often left to the reader to work out.

For instance, two of the three theoretical chapters in part III discuss neo-institutionalist and public choice perspectives on regulation, respectively, but they do not relate these approaches to transatlantic relations. Rather, the former focuses almost completely on examples derived from European integration, while the latter uses the Basle accords and the EMU to substantiate its point. Similarly, the chapter on legal pluralism in part II, while exploring potentially interesting insights, is based on an analysis of EU-Chinese trade in toys.

In these chapters, the relevance and usefulness of the approach for analyzing transatlantic regulatory cooperation is implied and hinted at, but it is not elaborated much further. Most contributions in part VII discuss concepts of democracy and accountability that apply more generally, but are often not applied directly to the way EU-U.S. regulatory cooperation is organized. By contrast, most of the contributions in parts IV and V offer discussions of a range of regulatory issues in transatlantic relations, for the most part without relating these to broader or theoretical perspectives, however.

The contributions in part VI are probably the most promising in this respect. They focus on the difficulties for transatlantic regulatory cooperation that arise out of the internal legal

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Publishers should send two (2) review copies of books directly to Professor Smith.

structures of the U.S. and the EU. They present a systematic account of how specific U.S. and EU institutions constrain (or, sometimes, enable) transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Here, too, the link to transatlantic relations is not always made explicit, but overall this part offers a clear and well-argued account that may offer interesting insights to students of EU-U.S. regulatory cooperation.

As a collection of conference papers, the relative lack of coherence and systematic links between contributions in this volume is quite understandable. It also makes for a rich and diverse overview that is useful to anyone who wants to gain a broad understanding of issues and perspectives in transatlantic regulatory cooperation.

The book also achieves its aim of bringing together insights from law and political science. Although most contributions are written from one perspective or the other, many contributions should be interesting to scholars from both disciplines, in particular those that are interested in institutional issues.

As an attempt to advance transatlantic regulatory cooperation as a field of study, the book is less convincing. The book could have benefited in this regard from introductory and concluding chapters that place the separate chapters into a common framework, relate them to existing work on transatlantic relations and regulatory cooperation, and draw some more general implications from the various contributions. As it is, the introductory chapter is almost completely dedicated to introducing each of the volume's contributions separately, while a concluding chapter is lacking. The book could also have gained from a more limited selection of contributions that systematically link theoretical perspectives with developments in transatlantic regulatory cooperation, although admittedly this would have prejudiced the book's quality as a wide-ranging overview.

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Hugh Compston and Justin Greenwood (eds.) Social Partnership in the European Union. New York: Palgrave, 2001, 214+ pp.

TEN YEARS AGO, THE European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and European employers led by the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the so-called "European Social Partners," surprised themselves and all informed observers by reaching a historic agreement. This was contained in a letter they jointly addressed to Ruud Lubbers, then President of the European Council and of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) meeting in Maastricht, The Netherlands, in December 1991, proposing changes to be introduced in the new Treaty, granting the Social Partners the Treaty right, at their discretion, to take social policy matters out of the hands of the legislators and to settle the issues through negotiation. In the event of a successful negotiation, the Social Partners could forward the resulting agreement to the Council of Ministers, via the Commission, for conversion into a legally binding directive. The Ministers could either accept or reject the agreement, but could not change its content.

The IGC accepted the Social Partners' request virtually unchanged and it is now an integral part of the Treaty. The unelected Social Partners thus gained the right to legislate on European social policy, replacing the Commission, the Council and even the European Parliament. In the period since the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, they have successfully negotiated and brought into law three agreements, thus proving, against all the odds, that the system can be made to work. Yet the process is little known, poorly understood and continues to raise questions, especially within national Trade Union and Employer organisations and in the European Parliament.

This book, therefore, fills a very real need. Edited by Hugh Compston and Justin Greenwood, it has a chapter by Compston on the intergovernmental dimension of EU Social Partnership and another, jointly with Greenwood, on social partnership in the EU from the standpoint of the self-interest theory, of which more later. Jon Erik Dölvik and Jelle Visser write about ETUC and EU social partnership, vividly describing the tensions and problems within the trade union movement. Ann Branch with Justin Greenwood write a lucid and informative chapter entitled "European Employers: Social Partners?" The question mark in the title is deliberate: it underlines the difficulties employers found in finally accepting their role as social partners at the European level. Daniela Obradovic's contribution examines the impact of the social dialogue procedure on the powers of EU Institutions, while Tina Weber covers the European sectoral social dialogue.

The book explains in fascinating detail how and why the Social Partners arrived at their 1991 agreement. It analyses their motivations and internal debates and examines the reactions of and effect on other bodies, especially the EU Institutions. It also looks in depth at the European Social Dialogue and assesses its current and future impact on the direction of European social policy. The Appendices give the legal basis of the procedure and the full texts of the agreements concluded to date.

The chapter on European Employers relates how they started from a position of outright public hostility to EU-level negotiation. In the early nineties the industrial relations watchword was decentralisation. The “Swedish model” was no longer workable in rapidly changing global market conditions. Why now centralise at the EU-level what was being painstakingly decentralised at national-level? Furthermore, trade unions were losing influence and members in many member States. Why boost their influence and importance at the EU level by recognising them as negotiating partners? Finally, the very real question remained: would national employer organisations grant a true mandate to their European organisations to negotiate binding regulations on their behalf? After several months of hot debate, employers wisely took the pragmatic view: experience showed them that the EU had an insatiable appetite for social legislation, much of it very detailed, very restrictive and too costly for companies. Employers were convinced the IGC would expand the range of subjects in this field, on which the Council could decide by qualified majority vote, thus making it likely that many more social policy directives damaging to business interests would be passed through the Council. There was only one solution: to acquire the right to step in and replace the legislators.

Difficulties within the trade unions were of a different nature. They knew full well that social policy directives proposed by the Commission and approved in the usual way by the Council after amendment by the Parliament, were likely to be more “pro-union” than would any agreement negotiated with employers. So why accept to negotiate if the outcome was likely to be less union-friendly than legislation? Furthermore, the powerful national trade union federations, especially in Germany and Scandinavia, saw EU-level negotiations as a threat to their own status and influence. They did not want ETUC in Brussels to become the “tail wagging the dog,” which has indeed now happened to some extent, as explained in this book. However, the trade unions had also long nursed the overriding ambition to gain the right to act across frontiers. One day, they hope, it will be possible for them to take industrial action across Europe in support of a dispute in an individual member State. The European Works Councils directive would be a step in this direction. They considered that the right to negotiate at EU level would be another. Finally, acquiring the right to negotiate would guarantee for ever ETUC’s status as an important part of the EU Establishment, an attractive proposition especially for unions in countries, like France and the United Kingdom, whose influence was fast diminishing. So ETUC also endorsed the letter addressed to Ruud Lubbers, though driven by a logic quite different from that of employers.

The book, based on original research and on interviews with the main actors, gives a remarkably lively and mainly accurate account of the complex paths along which employers and unions travelled in arriving at their joint destination in 1991. It reveals the tensions and internal disputes that had to be resolved by both sides. It also gives an excellent insight into the profound effects of this Treaty change on the European Institutions.

Business people and trade unionists may find the stated aim of the book, namely (pp.1, 98): “...to determine the extent to which explanations of the development and operation of social

partnership at EU level can be explained in terms of the logic of self-interest, as opposed to factors such as the influence of ideas or of cultural or ideological values” to be a trifle contrived and lugubrious, though no doubt it will appeal to academics. The statement (p.158) that: “We interpret the self-interest of employer leaders, like trade union leaders, as being survival and power ...” is wrong. Employer organisations’ self-interest lies in promoting and defending the best interests of their members. Survival and power are simply means to this end. The social dialogue story is fascinating in its own right, and does not need to be presented in this theoretical framework. Happily, however, the book is not simply a historical record or an academic treatise. It is essential reading for business people needing to understand how the European social dialogue can serve to mitigate the negative effects of future EU social legislation. It is equally useful for those who want an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the trade union movement in Europe, or to appreciate the value of a constructive bilateral dialogue between business and organised labour.

It is also the story of a remarkable and unique achievement: the European Social Partners have shown that trade union and employer organisations from seventeen different states—the EU-15, plus Norway and Iceland which, as members of the European Economic Area, are full participants in the Social Dialogue—are able not only to reach agreements among themselves on difficult social policy issues but also to use their dialogue for the joint examination and anticipation of problems arising from the difficult process of European integration. Without the Social Dialogue, launched by Jacques Delors in January 1985, it is probable that the trade unions would never have accepted to endorse the European single market or the single currency. Without union support these two fundamental policies could never have been implemented.

The merit of this book is that it throws light on the European Social Dialogue and underlines its political and economic importance in the continuing process of European integration.

Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz
Secretary General of UNICE (1985-1998)

Kenneth P. Thomas. Competing for Capital: Europe and North America in a Global Era. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000, 323+ pp.

IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED that industry subsidization by the state is a politically and economically harmful activity. Economists routinely point out the distorting effects on the efficient allocation of capital while politicians frequently lament the waste of resources and loss of budget revenue. Yet despite the obvious negative effects, governments eagerly continue to subsidize industry with an eye either to recruit investment or to retain it. Why? Kenny Thomas provides an interesting and compelling answer. Each government views subsidization as a zero-sum situation. If it does not do it, another will. Using the

context of a prisoner's dilemma, the author contends that harmful subsidization will cease only when the field is leveled. However, in the absence of third-party enforcement in the form of a national or international monitoring authority or increased learning through repeated iterations, cooperation is impossible. This argument is then applied to the cases of the European Union, Canada, and the United States to assess their relative success in this area. The most surprising finding is that the United States has been least successful even though incentives for cooperation may be higher than in Europe.

There is much to recommend about this book. It provides an important bridge between international relations and comparative politics. By examining the dynamics of the demand and supply for subsidies within each country/area, the author is able to connect domestic incentives with international behavior. Governments cannot cooperate internationally because they are domestically dependent upon economic performance, which is generated mostly by industry. The higher the economic performance, the greater the likelihood of reelection. Economic performance is in turn affected by the ability to generate jobs and attract investment by effectively recruiting firms or keeping them from relocating. While this has been a serious problem for a long time, Thomas convincingly argues that the situation has been exacerbated by the increasing mobility of capital. As capital controls have waned on a global scale in the last twenty years or so, "bidding" wars have intensified.

Apart from theoretical considerations, the book also contains an impressive array of policy-relevant material. The author analyzes in detail the subsidy regime, or state aid as Europeans call it, in three countries/areas. For example, he explains the rise of the state aid regime in the European Union, the intricacies of the various control instruments, and the politics behind their use. He also looks at the notification procedures at the World Trade Organization level, evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of those procedures relative to North American and European procedures, and calls for more transparency and access. The end result is the humble, obvious, yet politically controversial, recommendation that surveys should be conducted at the U.S. and Canadian federal levels to document the level and intensity of subsidies. Sadly in the land of numbers, transparency, and free markets, we don't really know the extent of subsidization in the U.S. due to the absolute lack of data, let alone internationally comparable data. In the absence of federal documentation and enforcement of a level playing field, state governments will intensify their efforts to compete for investors by offering an even more dizzying array of incentives. No wonder that the burden of non-consumption taxation in this country has shifted dramatically since 1960 from corporations to individuals.

Despite its many benefits, there are some things the study could have done better. For one, state subsidies to recruit investors are different from subsidies to declining industries. While the author deals with both, the majority of state subsidies in this country are in the form of the former rather than the latter. In Europe and to a lesser extent in Canada a substantial amount of state aid is given to sunset industries. Which type is viewed as most harmful to consumers and/or more wasteful for

governments? Most analysts would argue it is the latter rather than the former. This fact helps explain why there may be more political willingness to cooperate in the elimination of aid to declining industries.

Thomas attributes the differences among the three areas under study to the number of actors and the existence (or not) of monitoring and enforcement agencies. While the United States may not fare as well in these variables, at least relative to the European Union and Canada, it does underscore the *potential* for cooperation. Why has this not been forthcoming? The author argues that it is not politically feasible. States are loath to give monitoring and enforcement powers to the federal government. They are, therefore, willing to bear the cost of tax incentives and other economic improvement subsidies to recruit investors. But there may be another more convincing explanation. Thomas alludes in chapter two to the "privileged" position of business to explain the demand for investment. As Lindblom and others have successfully argued, the capitalist state may be structurally dependent on capital for its wellbeing. If so, the more dependent the state is, the greater the incentives of any given state to subsidize business, which consequently leads to less cooperation among states to control the disbursement of such subsidies. A brief examination of indicators of such dependence—for example, corporate taxation rates, unionization indicators, and the like—point to the same conclusion. Business is more privileged in the United States than elsewhere in the developed world.

But ultimately the most convincing explanation of why subsidies are offered and why they are difficult to control lies in the market for investment. To understand why governments are willing to expend substantial amounts to attract investment, sometimes on blind faith that the incentives work, one needs to understand why firms decide to locate where they do. Thomas discusses location theory, but he does not give it the attention it deserves.

There are four factors that explain direct investment decisions. Firms locate in particular areas to be closer to either suppliers or clients, to profitably exploit raw materials, to take advantage of a relatively plentiful skilled labor pool, or to enjoy a favorable business climate. Proximity to primary sources of input is limited to a few industries, e.g., mining, timber, or oil. The presence of a skilled labor pool is also, perhaps surprisingly, limited to a few "high-tech" industries. Most manufacturing activity does not require highly skilled workers. For example, when Mercedes was shopping for a site to locate its first and only production facility in North America, it chose Alabama, a state with no previous automobile facilities and low skills in automobile production and engineering.

There are two factors remaining. Proximity to supplier or customer markets is important in all cases, particularly when transport costs are high. When such costs decline and infrastructure is improved, however, as has been the case in the last four decades, this factor loses some of its significance. The factor that generally plays the most important role in location decisions is a favorable business climate, which includes such indicators as corporate and sales/use taxation rates, average wage levels, utility costs, and right-to-work status. Incentives, such as

tax abatements, entice potential investors to take advantage of the climate. They “sweeten” the deal, and other things being equal, they may become *the* factor that tips the balance in favor of a particular site.

Thomas has it right. The simple truth why subsidies are difficult to control is that a firm always stands to gain from these subsidies and, in the absence of third-party enforcement, a government always *perceives* it stands to lose if it does not offer them.

Nikolaos Zahariadis
University of Alabama Birmingham

Miscellany

The **Center for the Study of French Politics** (CEVIPOF) specializes in analysis of the institutions, actors, behaviors, and major trends structuring political life in France. In addition to analyzing political parties, affinities, and voting patterns, CEVIPOF also researches trade unionism, the media, the history of ideas, public policy, and political philosophy. The Center also explores new fields of analysis including non-conventional political participation, “moral militancy,” governance, and changes in collective action and changes in public action, and now researches the European voter and European citizenship, reflecting shifts in the international scene. Directed by Prof. Pascal Perrineau, the Center may be reached at 10, rue de la Chaise, F-75007 Paris, France; e-mail <info@cevipof.sciences-po.fr>; Web address <www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr>.

A CD-Rom edition of **Intra- and Extra-EU Trade Monthly Data** is published by the EU’s Comext and Eurostat, and comes from Luxembourg. Available in Windows and ASCII versions, and by monthly subscription, latest year (last 15 months on a single CD), or prior year (12 months’ summary in detail on a single CD). Trade values given in Euro, US\$, and Yen. All fifteen EU member states and EU total reporting on imports, exports, and balance on merchandise trade. For ordering information visit <www.euros.ch/trade.html> or e-mail <info@euros.ch>.

Officially launched in June 2001, the **EUR-Lex Web Portal** brings together the whole body of EU legal texts for on-line consultation, much of the material free of charge. Developed by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, EUR-Lex offers integrated access to materials on the CELEX, CURIA (Court of Justice), and EUR-Lex Web sites. The new EUR-Lex offers consolidated search functions for all types of documents, e.g., the Official Journal, Treaties, legislation, case law, documents of public interest such as white papers, and some explanatory materials about legal processes and key players. Documents are available in formats such as HTML and PDF. The new portal is aimed at professional and non-professional users and its goal is to streamline access to all EU law related information. Visit the portal at <<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex>>.

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Calls for Papers

Managing the (Re)creation of Divisions in Europe, June 20-22, 2002, Moscow, Russia. Joint CEEISA-NISA-RISA Convention. Integration processes in Europe create, directly, or as a by-product, new division lines among European states. Scholars will offer theoretical insights, comparative perspectives and interdisciplinary research on this topic. For details visit <<http://guests.fdv.uni-lj.si/ceeisa/>>. Deadline: *Please inquire*.

The Environment and Sustainable Development in the New Central Europe: Austria and Its Neighbors, September 19-21, 2002, Minneapolis, MN. Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota. Seeks proposals in the social sciences, humanities, environmental studies, and public policy studies, that address recent discussions and/or modern history of the economic, political, and social issues facing Austria and Central Europe. For details e-mail Gary B. Cohen at <gcohen@umn.edu> or visit <www.cas.umn.edu>. Deadline: *February 1, 2002*.

The Future of Europe, September 2-4, 2002, Belfast, UK. UACES 32nd Annual Conference and 7th Research Conference, hosted by the Institute of European Studies at Queen's University Belfast. Proposals invited for panels or papers on European integration or any aspect of the European Union, from postgraduate research students and scholars in all academic disciplines. For information e-mail <admin@uaces.org> or visit <www.uaces.org>. Deadline: *February 18, 2002*.

Transatlantic Studies Conference, July 8-11, 2002, The University of Dundee, Scotland. Launch conference of the Transatlantic Studies Association (TSA) and *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. Paper proposals are sought in (1) Diplomatic, Political, and Bilateral Relations, (2) Economic Relations, (3) Defence, Security, and Intelligence Relations, (4) Literature and Cultural Relations, (5) Transatlantic Area Studies, (6) Race and Migration, (7) Comparative Constitutionalism, and (8) Planning, Regeneration, and the Environment. For details visit <www.dundee.ac.uk/~awparker/transatlantic.html>. Deadline: *February 22, 2002*.

The Politics of European Integration: Academic Acquis and Future Challenges, September 26-28, 2002, Bordeaux, France. Organized by the Standing Group on the EU of the European Consortium of Political Research. Conference on the wider aspects of the integration process beyond current developments: the focus on the *acquis academique* implies an interest in taking stock of the field over the past fifty years, while the emphasis on future challenges indicates an interest in contributions addressing the agenda of the EU over the next few years. Open to senior and junior scholars with the participation of doctoral students in particular encouraged. For more details and proposal guidelines, visit <www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/standinggroups/bordeaux/bordeauxhome.htm>. Deadline: *March 31, 2002*.

Conferences

February 7-10, 2002, "The European Union's Eastern Enlargement: Surveying the Social and Economic Divides," University of Toronto Junior Scholars Conference, Toronto, Canada. For information visit <www.chass.utoronto.ca/jiges/euconfer.html> or e-mail <eu.enlargement@utoronto.ca>.

March 7-9, 2002, 19th Annual Graduate Student Conference, New York, NY. Institute for the Study of Europe, Columbia University. "Regionalism, Nationalism, Europeanism: European Identities in the Age of Globalization." For information e-mail Matthew Fehrs at <mbf67@columbia.edu>.

March 14-16, 2002, 13th Int'l Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, IL. Council for European Studies biennial conference. Visit <www.europenet.org> or e-mail <ces@columbia.edu>.

March 19-23, 2002, 98th Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, Los Angeles, CA (has a Specialty Group on Europe). Visit <www.aag.org> or e-mail <meeting@aag.org>.

March 24-27, 2002, 43rd Annual International Studies Association Convention, "Dissolving Boundaries: The Nexus Between Comparative Politics and International Studies," New Orleans, LA. Visit <www.isanet.org/> or e-mail <isa@u.arizona.edu>.

March 25-26, 2002, "European Studies in the 21st Century: The State of the Art," Loughborough, UK, co-organized by UACES and the Standing Conference of the Heads of European Studies. For details visit <www.uaces.org>.

April 4-6, 2002, "EU-Latin America-Caribbean Relations: Preview of the European Latin American Caribbean Summit," University of Miami, FL. Conference of the European Union Center in Florida, the North South Center, and the EU-Latin America-Caribbean Interest Sections of the European Union Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association. Please visit <www.miami.edu/international-studies/euc>.

April 11-12, 2002, "The Rise and Impact of the Social Sciences ..." in the European context, Cambridge, MA. Graduate Student Workshop, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. Visit <www.fas.harvard.edu/~ces>.

May 10-11, 2002, "Representation and Identity in an Integrated Europe," Ottawa, Canada. Centre for European Studies and Centre for Representation and Elections, Carleton University. For details visit <www.carleton.ca/eurus/events.html>.

July 22-27, 2002, "European Culture in a Changing World," 8th International Conference, International Society for the Study of European Ideas, Aberystwyth, Wales. For further information, visit <www.aber.ac.uk/tfts/issei2002/>.

Fellowships

European University Institute (EUI) offers three-year post-graduate grants to begin September 2002 in law, economics, history, and social and political sciences, for study leading to the doctoral degree from the EUI. Contact e-mail <applyres@iue.it> or telephone 39.055.46.85.373. Deadline: *January 31, 2002*.

The **Bicentennial Swedish-American Exchange Fund** offers travel grants of 25,000 Swedish crowns to support two- to four-week intensive research trips to Sweden for qualified U.S. citizens and permanent residents with well-developed projects in politics, public administration, mass media, business and industry, working life, human environment, education, and culture. Research trips must take place between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003. For details visit <www.swedeninfo.com> or e-mail <requests@swedeninfo.com>. Deadline: *February 1, 2002*.

The **European Union Fulbright Program** offers various fellowships for 2002-2003, including **Grants for Citizens of Member States of the EU**: One-semester awards for research on EU affairs or U.S.-EU relations at an accredited institution in the U.S. (candidates must arrange their own affiliation including a letter of invitation), and one-semester awards also available for lecturing on EU affairs at selected U.S. universities (institution placement will be provided for successful candidates). Candidates must be professionals, policy makers or academics involved in EU affairs and proficient in English. For information, visit <www.kbr.be/fulbright>. Deadline: *March 1, 2002*.

Humboldt Research Fellowships are offered by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and enable young highly qualified foreign scientists and scholars holding doctorates to carry out research projects of their own choice in Germany (age limit: forty). Applications may be submitted for long-term research stays of between six and twelve months; short-term study tours, participation in conferences, and educational visits cannot be funded. Research fellowships are offered on a world-wide competitive basis to scholars of all nations and academic disciplines. There are no quotas of either country or academic discipline. Up to six hundred research fellowships are available per year. The research fellowship program is open primarily to young scientists and scholars. Applications are decided upon by an independent selection committee of sixty German scientists and scholars from all disciplines. Decisions are based exclusively on academic achievements. The main criteria are the quality and feasibility of the research project proposed by the candidate and his/her internationally published work. Research projects and German hosts are selected by applicants themselves; research projects and schedules must be agreed between applicants and proposed hosts prior to the submission of applications. For application details visit <www.humboldt-foundation.de> or e-mail <post@avh.de>.

Publications

EU-Related Journals Received

European Review of History, in English and French, includes original research, review articles, and resource information for scholars of European history of all centuries and subdisciplines. *The European Legacy* is a multidisciplinary journal devoted to the European intellectual and cultural history and the paradigms of thought which have evolved in the making of the New Europe. Both published by Routledge. Visit <www.tandf.co.uk/journals>. *Collegium: News of the College of Europe* (21: IX, 2001) is a special edition (bilingual) on "Current Challenges in International Humanitarian Law." Contact by e-mail <collegium@coleurop.be>. Volume 2: 3 (Fall 2001) of *Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition* is devoted to "Transatlantic Strains" and "Asia's Future." Contact by e-mail <ip@dgap.org>.

New and Recent EU-Related Book Notices

Böröcz, József and Melinda Kovács (eds.) (2001) *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement*. Central European Review e-book, www.mirhouse.com/ce-review/Empire.pdf.
Cederman, Lars-Erik (2001) *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pubs.
Friedrich, Wolfgang-Uwe and Gerald R. Kleinfeld (eds.) (2001) *New Atlanticism: Transatlantic Relations in Perspective*. New York: Berghahn Books.
Greenwood, Justin (2002) *The Effectiveness of EU Business Associations*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.
Greenwood, Justin (ed.) (2002) *Inside the EU Business Associations*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.
Grix, Jonathan (ed.) (2002) *Contemporary Germany: Research Methodologies and Approaches*. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham Press.
Gstöhl, Sieglinde (2002) *Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Knill, Christoph (2001) *The Europeanisation of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Leonhard, Jörn and Lothar Funk (eds.) (2001) *Ten Years of German Unification: Transfer, Transformation, Incorporation?* Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham Press.
Malmborg, Mikael af and Bo Strath (eds.) (2002) *The Meaning of Europe*. New York: Berg Publishers.
Maskus, Keith E. and John S. Wilson (eds.) (2001) *Quantifying the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Notermans, Ton (ed.) (2001) *Social Democracy and Monetary Union*. New York: Berghahn Books.
Pace, Roderick (2001) *Microstate Security in the Global System: EU-Malta Relations*. Santa Venera, Malta: Midsea Books.
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EUSA News and Notes

Save the Dates: Be sure to mark on your calendars the dates of our Eighth Biennial International Conference, to be held in Nashville, Tennessee at the Hilton Suites Nashville Downtown, March 27-29, 2003. Please note that these dates are two months earlier than our conferences have been held in the past. The EUSA Executive Committee made this change in response to consistent feedback from conference delegates, with the added benefit of having our conference alternate more closely with the biennial conference of the Council for European Studies. Please check our Web site from time to time for our conference updates and the call for proposals, which will go out this spring.

Contact Coordinates: Due to security concerns of both the U.S. Postal Service and our own mail delivery service at the University of Pittsburgh, it is more important than ever that mail you send us be correctly and completely addressed. Please use our new name and new room number (we moved in June 2000). Our correct address is: European Union Studies Association, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. In the same vein, please be that sure we have your correct, current mailing address and e-mail address. Our members tend to move and change institutions regularly, and some of our mail to you gets returned to us, with a fee attached, when we have an out-of-date address. To keep our e-mail List Serve useful, we also need your current e-mail address. Thanks very much.

The *EUSA Review* follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): [EU-Related Academic Programs](#) (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): [EU-Related Web Sites](#) (preference given to primary sources such as databases, electronic publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): [EU-Related Organizations](#) (academic and professional associations, research centers, and institutes with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): [EUSA Members' Research Notes](#) (EUSA members' current EU-related research projects, with particular attention to funded projects). We list EU-related conferences and calls, fellowships and scholarships, and publications (books, journals, working papers) in every issue of the *Review*. Please send your brief announcements to arrive before the above-mentioned deadlines, either by e-mail to eusa@pitt.edu or by regular mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings, though we will do our best. We regret that we cannot accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

From the Chair

(continued from p.2) being co-led by EUSA members Patrick Crowley (Texas A&M University Corpus Christi) and Brian Ardy (South Bank University, UK). We thank all interest section leaders for their efforts and we encourage all EUSA members to join one or more sections and to explore establishing others that reflect your particular areas of research and study. Please go to our Web site at www.eustudies.org and click on "Interest Sections" for a list and links to the Web pages of current sections, along with guidelines and policies for the operations of EUSA interest sections as adopted by the EUSA Executive Committee. For those without, or weary of, Web access, we have also printed the guidelines and policies in this issue on p.13.

I also have the pleasure of announcing to our membership that we have just signed an agreement with Oxford University Press for the publication of the next three volumes of our book series, *State of the European Union*TM. Funds permitting, we plan to enhance the series in a number of ways and we are delighted at the possibilities for continued cooperation with Oxford on this project. We've been thrilled to watch Oxford take our series new places ranging from an e-book edition for library acquisitions, paperback edition for classroom use, and even translation to and publication in Romanian in 2002. Librarians and long-time EUSA members will recall that we have so far published five volumes in the series, each co-edited by a pair of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic and focusing on a current EU theme chosen by the Executive Committee. For the next edition, volume six, the EUSA Executive Committee has decided to open up the process by holding a competition among the membership for proposals for the topic, authors, and substantive approach of the next volume in our series. Scholars interested in proposing a topic, approach, and a specific set of authors for the next edition of our *State of the European Union*TM should see p.5 in this issue for our Call for Proposals.

In the coming year EUSA plans to work to increase its membership in sectors where scholarship on the European Union has been expanding in the United States and Europe. In the U.S. we will make a special effort to increase members among scholars in law schools, business schools and programs in government and public policy. In Europe, we will recruit in those countries in which our membership seems to be proportionately small. We see ourselves as a transnational organization of scholars and practitioners, and part of our mission is to generate trans-Atlantic initiatives in scholarship and collaboration.

Your EUSA membership and support helps build our strong Association, the only of its kind devoted to scrutiny of the ongoing European integration process, and helps to train future scholars and practitioners in what will continue to be a vital field. On p.19 in this issue you will find a list of all those individual persons who made gifts to EUSA above and beyond their membership dues in 2001; for such support, we are extremely grateful.

MARTIN A. SCHAIN
New York University

EUSA Lifetime Membership

What is it?

Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment to EUSA of US\$ 1500.

What does it include?

The Lifetime Membership includes all regular membership benefits for life. Among those benefits currently are subscription to the quarterly *EUSA Review*, receipt of occasional EUSA monographs, qualifying for EUSA competitions, discounted registration rates at the EUSA International Conference, subscription to our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA interest sections.

Are there any other benefits?

By making a one-time membership payment, you not only avoid the task of renewing each year, but gain the twin advantages of securing lifetime membership at today's dollar values *and* avoiding future dues increases.

Who should do this?

Any person wishing to support the endeavors of the European Union Studies Association—the fostering of scholarship and inquiry on the ongoing European integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional benefit is a receipt for a one-time \$500 charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law (reducing your tax liability for the year in which you become a Lifetime Member).

How do I become a Lifetime Member?

Simply mail your check, in US\$ and made payable to “EUSA,” to the European Union Studies Association, address given at right. (We can't accept lifetime membership payments by credit card.) We will send you a receipt and letter of acknowledgment.

Will my Lifetime Membership be publicly recognized?

Yes, EUSA Lifetime Members will be listed in the *EUSA Review* and in our printed, biennial Member Directory.

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
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Thank you for your support of EUSA!

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Founded in 1988 (and formerly called the European Community Studies Association), the European Union Studies Association™ is a non-profit academic and professional organization devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union.



European Union Studies Association
Information and ideas on the European Union

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to support EU-related scholarship and education,
travel to the biennial EUSA Conference, and more

EUSA Endowment Fund
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