



EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION

Vol. 17, No.3 ISSN 1535-7031
Summer 2004 www.eustudies.org

EUSA REVIEW

EUSA Review Forum

The European Parliament: Taking Stock after the June 2004 Elections

ON JUNE 10-13, 2004, voters in the 25 member states elected a new European Parliament (EP). Five days later, governments agreed on a Constitution for the EU that reinforces the legislative role of the EP in numerous areas. This is a unique occasion to reflect on the evolution of dynamics within the European Parliament and on its relations with other EU institutions. This Forum gathers four recognized experts on the EP and European elections to take stock of changes and continuities in the practices of members of the EP. First, Niilo Kauppi analyzes the key features on the 2004 election campaigns, underscoring previous patterns: low turnout in elections instrumentalized as mid-term elections for the parties in government and the use of celebrities to gather the vote. Next, Michael Shackleton revisits the last five years to underline the evolution of the role of the EP in the institutional triangle with the Commission and Council. Its increased working relationship with the Council spurred by the co-decision procedure has the potential to leave the Commission less influential on shaping policy output. Olivier Costa focuses on the party dynamics within the EP during the last mandate. While confirming that voting patterns have not changed drastically, he observes some changes in coalitions. Finally, Simon Hix looks towards the future. In his view, although the June results have not significantly altered the partisan composition of the EP and the strength of the main parties, he points to the broader picture; a Center-Right Parliament working with a Council dominated by Center-Right governments and potentially a Commission with many Center-Left representatives. The overall Right-wing partisan balance of three major EU institutions may generate decisions reflecting an ideological standpoint much clearer to read and comprehend for the European voters in the 2009 elections.

-Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor

'Europe': A Side Issue in European Parliamentary Election Campaigns

Niilo Kauppi

IT IS A PARADOX, but while the powers of the European Parliament have increased substantially since the first direct elections in 1979, electoral participation has plummeted - from 63 per cent in 1979, to 48.4 per cent in 1999, and 45.3 per cent today. The reasons for this high level of abstention are well known: the political stakes are low,

there is a public lack of knowledge about the issues, and a distrust of 'faceless' Brussels bureaucrats. It is no surprise that in 2004, party campaigns chose to 'remedy' the situation by concentrating on domestic issues and promoting celebrity candidates in almost all member states.

Although all member states use proportional voting in European elections, national variations in the size of the electoral district and the types of proportional systems used shape candidates' political campaigns. In the 2004 twenty-five separate elections for the European Parliament, voters chose between over 14,600 candidates vying for 732 seats. The British and Dutch voted first (June 10), followed by the Irish (June 11), the Czechs (June 11 and 12), the Latvians and Maltese (June 12), and the Italians (June 12 and 13). The remaining eighteen member states cast their votes on June 13. In Germany, Italy and the UK, European elections coincided with local elections, in Lithuania with presidential elections, in Luxemburg with parliamentary elections, and in Ireland with a referendum. Competing media events like the Euro 2004 soccer tournament also influenced the European vote. In the host country Portugal, the Euro 2004 tournament totally eclipsed the European Parliament campaign. As it happens, this contest ended prematurely on June 9 when the top candidate for the opposition Socialist Party died of a heart attack while on the campaign trail.

Domestic issues and quarrels dominated electoral campaigns in all twenty-five member-states. Traditionally, European elections have served as a vote of confidence or no-confidence in the ruling government and in the European Union as a whole. In Italy and the UK, campaigns centered on domestic issues and involvement in the Iraq war. In Italy, the debate turned into a duel between Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi. In Spain, the Socialists, having pulled Spanish troops out of Iraq, continued criticizing the Conservatives for their war-mongering. In the UK, Prime Minister Tony Blair's pro-European line was under fire. Former Labor MP and number-one candidate in the anti-European UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) Robert Kilroy-Silk called for a withdrawal of the UK from the EU. In France, the elections turned into a vote of confidence in President Jacques Chirac's social and economic policies. In Sweden as in neighboring Denmark, nationalists and anti-Europeans challenged the pro-European policies of their respective governments. Although in general pro-European, the Swedish public also deeply distrusts the EU, which is seen as a threat to the welfare state. Only in some member-states like Finland - the exception that proves the rule - have European elections not functioned as a vote of confidence in the government. Here, the issues debated included the fate of social security, EU structural funds, agriculture, and the future of non-alignment.

(continued on p. 3)

EUSA Review

The *EUSA Review* (formerly the *ECSA Review*) is published four times yearly by the European Union Studies Association, a membership association and non-profit organization (founded in 1988 as the European Community Studies Association) devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union. We welcome the submission of scholarly manuscripts. Subscription to the *EUSA Review* is a benefit of Association membership.

© 2004 European Union Studies Association

The European Union Studies Association®, Information and Ideas on the European Union®, State of the European Union®, and www.eustudies.org® are all registered trademarks of the European Union Studies Association, Inc.

Managing Editor

Joseph A. Figliuolo

Forum and Features Editor

Virginie Guiraudon (Université de Lille II)

Book Reviews Editor

R. Daniel Kelemen (University of Oxford)

Editorial Assistant

Shannon Speakman

2003-2005 EUSA Executive Committee

GEORGE ROSS, Chair (Brandeis University)

JOHN T. S. KEELER*, Vice-Chair
(University of Washington)

KAREN ALTER, Secretary
(Northwestern University)

JEFFREY ANDERSON, Treasurer
(Georgetown University)

GRAINNE DE BURCA*
(European University Institute)

VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON* (Université de Lille II)

SOPHIE MEUNIER* (Princeton University)
(* Term runs 2003-2007)

ALBERTA SBRAGIA (University of Pittsburgh)
Ex Officio

Immediate Past Chair (2001-2003)

MARTIN A. SCHAIN (New York University)

European Union Studies Association ®

415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
Web www.eustudies.org ®
E-mail eusa@pitt.edu
Facsimile 412.648.1168
Telephone 412.648.7635

From the Chair

George Ross

PLANS FOR THE March 31-April 2, 2005 EUSA Conference in Austin, TX are falling into place. There will be no shortage of exciting things to discuss as the EU continues its tumultuous changes. There are new Constitutional Treaties and Charters of Rights, tenuous ratifications, old Conventions, new member states, and a new budget package. Our contribution across the Atlantic should be new ideas. The call for paper and panel proposals is now posted on our Web site. Please help us circulate the call in your department, institution, region, continent and to other groups and organizations to which you belong. We hope for a broad representation of fields, disciplines, and perspectives. Our program committee is eager for proposals for papers and panels from the widest range of scholars, from those who study specific EU member states, those focusing on particular policy areas, to those who investigate broad theoretical questions and are trying to assess the place of the EU in the world. The participation of advanced graduate students is more than welcome, and we hope that our members will enlist their students to submit paper proposals. In addition, we welcome proposals from practitioners in business, government, and law. Austin will be awesome!

Those of you who presented and deposited papers at our 2003 Conference in Nashville, Tennessee are eligible for the Best Conference Paper Prize. EUSA is also seeking nominations for the Best Dissertation in EU Studies (in any discipline) granted at a U.S. institution. Deadline for both is September 17, 2004. In addition, at Austin EUSA will present the first EUSA Book Prize. Books published in 2003 and 2004 are eligible for this Prize and the deadline for nominations is January 15, 2005. (For nominating details and requirements for all prizes, please see p. 22 in this issue or visit our Web site.)

During the coming academic year, EUSA membership will elect new members to the Executive Committee, our governing body. Three seats will be open for terms that will run 2005-2009. Any current EUSA member (except those who have already reached the eight-year lifetime limit) is eligible to run, and may nominate him/herself or be nominated by another current member. Full details will appear in the Fall *EUSA Review*. We will also circulate details via our e-mail List Serve. Please think about whether you'd like to serve the organization as a member of our board, which meets once yearly, determines EUSA policies, and oversees programs.

We are delighted to announce the editors of the seventh volume in our distinguished series, *State of the European Union*, to be published for us by the Oxford University Press. A proposal by EUSA members Craig Parsons and Nicolas Jabko titled "What Europe for the New Millennium?" was selected and has an excellent line-up of contributors. We congratulate the editors and look forward to the new volume.

GEORGE ROSS
Brandeis University

(continued from p. 1)

Apart from the war in Iraq, Turkey's entry into the European Union was also on the political agenda in many member-states, notably in Austria, Greece, France, and Germany. Predictably, the German right CDU-CSU (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union) opposed Turkey's accession to the European Union, whereas the Socialists and Greens on the left favored it. In Germany, the domestic political calendar also had an impact on the campaigns. The European elections were the first electoral contest on a national scale since September 2002, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was re-elected. The next national parliamentary elections are only in 2006. As in Poland, where premature legislative elections are anticipated, it seemed that the German European elections would serve as an 'ersatz' for legislative elections.

As to the ten new EU member-states, eight of which are from the former Communist bloc, an eagerness to join the EU was coupled with distrust toward Brussels and the older members. Exceptions were Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, and Slovenia, all Euro-enthusiasts. The Czech and Slovak electorates, on the other hand had not overcome their suspicion of politicians and their broken promises after decades of Communist rule. In the Czech Republic, the debates revolved around the future of the European Constitution and the notorious democratic deficit. In Poland nationalists and ultra-Catholics, who demanded among other things a reference to Christian tradition in the new European constitution, set out to challenge the centre-left government. For the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Brussels seemed abstract and far away. In Latvia especially, the European Constitution, domestic political quarrels, and social security occupied the public's attention. In some of the new European Union member states, populist discourse equated Brussels with Moscow and a loss of national sovereignty.

To grab the attention of absentee voters, parties throughout the EU recruited non-professional celebrity candidates to their lists. In Italy, Finland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, for example, the candidates and their personal characteristics were meticulously scrutinized in the press, while important issues such as the European Union's budget were hardly discussed. In Estonia, Chanel supermodel Carmen Kass was a top candidate of the rightist Res Publica list, stating that she wanted to give 'Estonia a boost' on the world stage. On the French political scene, former Finnish MEP, Finnish national icon and world rally champion Ari Vatanen set up his campaign in the south of France pole-positioned by Chirac as number two on the center-right list UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire). Declaring that he was not political in the traditional sense of the term, his agenda consisted of defending the interests of the Provence wine growers and fishermen.

Due to the eastern enlargement of the European Union, the defense of the national interest took center stage in several previous member states. Top politicians, including French president Jacques Chirac and Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, expressed their concern about the diminished influence of their countries' representatives in a larger European Parliament. The new French election law was also viewed in this context. Splitting the country into eight electoral districts, it was partly designed to bifurcate the political spectrum and favor the largest parties on the left and the right, the Socialists and the UMP, while disadvantaging smaller parties. To drive the message home, Chirac appealed 'in the interest

of France' for voters to cast their ballots for big-party candidates.

In sum, with opinions split over Europe within political parties, and no visible political stakes to be fought for, election campaigns centered on domestic issues and celebrity gimmicks. Indeed, the Greens were the exception in conducting a European-level campaign. Ironically, the pan-European issues most widely discussed were Turkey's entrance into the European Union and the European Constitution - two issues outside of the European Parliament's competence. Although debates did occasionally make mention of the bigger issues of foreign policy and security, economic and social policies, and the national benefits of European Union membership, they did so only marginally. Indeed, the real political outcome of these first post-euro and post 9/11 elections will depend not on any public debate, but on how the winners organize themselves politically in the post-election phase. Will the Eurosceptics form their own political group, breaking the dominance of the centre-right EPP-ED (European People's Party-European Democrats)? For this, we will have to wait until the newly elected representatives meet for the first time on July 20, to assemble a new European Parliament.

Niilo Kauppi is Senior Research Fellow at the Academy of Finland.

The Interinstitutional Balance in the EU: What has Happened Since 1999?

Michael Shackleton

HOW FAR HAS THE delicate balance between the European Parliament, Council and Commission been affected by the events of the last five years since the 1999 European elections and the establishment of the Prodi Commission? The answer is of more than academic interest: the activity and output of the enlarged EU of 25 will be heavily influenced by the way in which the three institutions interpret their roles and their relationships with each other.

1999 could be fairly described as the first year of "Euro-parliamentarism".¹ The Parliament's role in the institutional triangle was revolutionized. In March of that year the report of the Committee of Independent Experts set up by the EP to examine fraud, nepotism and mismanagement, notably in relation to the award of contracts, prompted the collective resignation of the Commission. The resignation took place without Parliament adopting a formal motion of censure but there was good reason to believe that it would have done so and certainly the Commission thought that it would, if it had failed to act itself.

Two months later the Amsterdam Treaty came into force and reinforced substantially the legislative role of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council. The number of areas subject to the codecision procedure under Article 251 was more than doubled from 15 to 38 (later to be increased to 43 by Nice) and the procedure itself was revised to reinforce the level of parity between the two institutions. Agreement could now be reached without Council having to adopt a common position and Council could no longer re-submit its common position if negotiations in the conciliation committee (the last phase in the procedure) were unsuccessful.

These events were the prelude to five years that have transformed the institutional landscape. Above all, in the legislative

domain, where the three institutions are condemned by the Treaties to work closely together, the balance has undergone significant change. Central to this change has been the dramatic reinforcement of the interaction between the Parliament and Council. They had already started to deal with each other more intensively in the Maastricht era after codecision was introduced in 1993, obliging them to negotiate face-to-face if agreement was not reached after two readings. However, following Amsterdam the number of codecision and conciliations rose dramatically with 403 legislative acts adopted up to May 2004, some two and a half times more than had been approved in the previous five years.² 84 of these acts were adopted after conciliation between Parliament and Council at a stage of the procedure when the Commission is restricted by the Treaties to the role of mediator and can no longer withdraw its proposal. For their part, Council and Parliament were obliged to have much closer contacts as they programmed their work to meet the tight deadlines laid down in the Treaties. They had to look for ways to overcome their differences across a large number of pieces of legislation, many of them having to be dealt with at the same time.

However, it was not simply the volume of legislation that drove the two institutions together. It was also the new provision that laid down that agreement could be reached at first reading without Council adopting a common position. This proved to be much more than a residual category for non-controversial issues. Nearly 30% of all codecision legislation between 1999 and 2004 was adopted in this way, the percentage rising to just under 40% in the last year of the legislature before enlargement. Both institutions perceived that the Community's legislative procedure could be accelerated in this way. At the same time, each Council Presidency could more readily manage the legislative agenda and establish a scorecard of the acts adopted during its six-month period in office. Yet such management could only work by means of close cooperation between Council Presidency ministers and officials and Members of the Parliament, cooperation that now spreads over the whole legislative period from the emergence of Commission proposals to the final phase of conciliation.

Moreover, Council came to recognize that it needed to take into account the likely attitude of the Parliament before it moved towards a first reading common position. A classic example was the Takeovers Directive. In July 2001 Parliament rejected on a tied vote the outcome of conciliation negotiations on this highly controversial piece of legislation. As a result, the legislative procedure had to begin again with a new Commission proposal. The proposal that emerged was one that met strong resistance in both Council and Parliament but negotiations took place during the second half of 2003 that allowed a directive to be adopted at first reading.

Does this mean that the Parliament is usurping the Commission's role as the Council's main interlocutor? Certainly the Commission is now at a structural disadvantage, less able to manage the direction of the legislative process. This is already clear at first reading where the Commission retains the right to modify or withdraw its proposal after Parliament has acted and before Council adopts a common position. Such a right is, however, somewhat theoretical if Council indicates it has a majority to adopt Parliament's amendments. To modify the proposal and thereby oblige Council to find unanimity would be likely to make the Commission extremely unpopular. The Takeovers Directive

underlined the dilemma: Commissioner Bolkestein was strongly opposed to the deal reached between Parliament and Council but the Commission as a whole was not prepared to exercise its formal right to withdraw the proposal.

The temptation for the legislative authority to ride roughshod over the Commission has also taken more overt forms. In principle, there continues to be very broad, though not universal, support for the Commission to retain its monopoly right over legislative initiative. However, in practice, there were a number of codecision files where agreement depended on the legislation specifying when and what kind of further proposal the Commission should produce. The Commission was obliged to issue statements objecting to the practice and thereby acknowledging its lack of power to prevent an assertive Parliament from imposing its wishes in this way if Council could be persuaded that this was the price of agreement.

Parliament's willingness to contemplate infringing the right of initiative of the Commission in this way can be dismissed as an aberration restricted to isolated cases. However, it can be seen as part of a wider debate about the nature of parliamentarism at the European level. The growth of interaction between Council and Parliament has proved remarkably successful precisely because it has enabled MEPs to exercise influence in a way that was not possible when it depended on the good offices of the Commission to put its position to the Council or needed Commission support for its amendments to oblige Council to find unanimity, rather than a qualified majority, to reject them. Direct contacts have necessarily reduced the sense of dependence on the Commission and increased Parliament's sense of its own improved status.

This increase in relative status contrasts with the experience of the Commission. The Santer resignation sent shockwaves through the institution, combining a sense of injustice with a readiness to respond ever more readily to requests from Parliament to keep it informed in the interests of accountability. It would be rash to assume on this basis that the Commission has therefore effectively replaced Parliament as the junior partner in the institutional triangle. The range of the Commission's responsibilities include a wide range of tasks, such as leading international trade negotiations or taking decisions on potential abuses of competition, where it continues to enjoy a substantial level of autonomy and relative insulation from the pressures of the Parliament. However, five years of "Euro-parliamentarism" have shown the difficulty of maintaining the traditional balance between the three institutions. The assertion of the democratic principle has served to undermine long-standing conceptions of the roles that they should each play in the legislative domain, with the Commission finding itself at a growing structural disadvantage in the face of a Parliament and Council, increasingly at ease with each other.

Michael Shackleton is a member of the European Parliament Secretariat, Brussels³

Transnational Party Dynamics in the EP **Olivier Costa**

SINCE 1952, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) has progressed from being an assembly, almost devoid of any real power, to being a "proper" parliament endowed with all the symbolic and institutional

attributes of an assembly in a parliamentary system. The EP has steadily increased its powers and influence during the IGCs and thanks to the efforts of the MEPs. But the electorate still does not feel really concerned, hence the significant low levels of turnout during EP elections.

Two factors may account for this phenomenon. First, the EP influence in the institutional system is hardly perceptible, mainly because there is no partisan link with the Commission. In fact, EP elections have little impact on EU politics, hence voter apathy. Secondly, the EP - and more generally speaking the EU - works in a complex and "consensus-based" way, which does not correspond to the political traditions of most member states. EU citizens are in fact shocked by the discrepancy that exists between an institutional organization close to the Westminster model and the non-majoritarian nature of EU policy-making.

For many politicians and opinion makers, the main issue is thus to "normalize" how the EP functions - through reaffirming the left-right divide, challenging compromises endlessly renegotiated between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats and creating a stable majority coalition. Political scientists should be able to provide interesting lessons. The great majority of researchers and academics have focused their attention on the study of votes and coalitions in their approach to the EP, thus collecting a vast amount of data and detailed research on the cohesion of political groups and coalition logics within the EP⁴. Even in the more comprehensive works of reference that deal with the EP's contribution to democracy in the EU, most authors tackle such issues as MEP behavior and coalition formation⁵.

These studies highlight the great level of cohesion that exists within the main EP groups - the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED), the European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group (ELDR), the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance. This may sound surprising given the very national nature of European elections and the relative weakness of the European parties. But cohesion and party discipline are particularly strong - from 60% to 70% on average, which are remarkable results even compared with national parliaments. Figures are somewhat lower for the parties with a more anti-Europe dimension, which tend to be less ideological and more "technical" - the Union for a Europe of the Nations Group, the Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities, the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left. By and large, there has been quite stable cohesion until recently - with the notable exception of the EPP-ED group in which British Conservative MEPs, first elected in 1999, vie for more autonomy.

We should not draw too hasty conclusions from such statistical studies, especially if we analyze the determining factors in MEP behavior and party dynamics. Few researchers have reflected on the very notion of a "political group" when applied to the EP. They take it for granted that once a group constituted according to the rules of procedure has shown some form of cohesion, it may then be compared to any national political group. But they tend to overlook the irreducible specificities of the EP. The EP political groups do not stem from strongly organized parties, campaigning on precise platforms and maintaining strong party discipline in support of government policies. The supranational dimension of the assembly, the absence of any genuine "European" party and the nature of the relations between the EP and the Commission

imply that parliamentary groups have other functions. They are mainly structures helping to make the functioning of the EP more rational, gathering MEPs according to their "preferences" and giving them some practical advantages in the exercise of their mandate. The role of the groups consists in helping common opinions emerge rather than to impose them, through negotiations and debates where the national delegations play a key role.

The word "party discipline" is thus inappropriate. We should rather speak of statistical cohesion, with few constraints. In fact, MEPs vote with their groups for other reasons - because common positions are the result of democratic negotiations or "package deals"; because they find it impossible to keep track of the multitude of reports submitted to the EP, and thus rely on their peers' opinions (more than 400 legislative acts were adopted during the last term of office); because the political groups are the main place for socializing; because cohesion is a necessary condition for the EP's global influence; because MEPs are influenced by the weight of national political traditions and practices.

The study of coalition formation is more complex. Generally speaking, the EU decision-making process requires flexible majorities in the EP, according to the various procedures, the issues at stake or the global context of negotiations. There has never really been any stable EP majority and majorities are formed for each vote. The original pro- / anti- Europe cleavage (particularly strong in the 80s when the PES and the EPP massively voted together thus assuming some form of "co-leadership" of the EP) gained momentum up to 1999.

There are three main reasons for this coalition. First, in most legislative and budgetary votes, an "absolute majority" of all MEPs - not only those who vote - is required. Second, in the EP institutional logic, where many actors have a "veto power", compromise seeking is the rule. This is especially true for final votes, much less so in the case of amendments. It also appears that the PES-EPP coalition is more effective on judicial and environmental problems than on economic ones. Finally, we must pay attention to converging opinions of the PES et EPP on European integration (which was initiated by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats) and on such matters as market integration, institutions or the Common Agricultural Policy.

Such a left-right alignment does not prevent political oppositions within the EP. In the 1994-1999 period, there was generally a right-wing alternative majority (an EPP-ELDR coalition) when no agreement could be found in the centre. According to analysts, the surprising victory of the EPP in 1999 meant the end of the alliance with the PES, as illustrated by the agreement passed between the EPP-ED (extended to the British Conservative MEPs) and the ELDR with a view to gaining the EP presidency which was to be held by the PES according to a "technical agreement" between the PES and the EPP.

But such an analysis should be more nuanced, for three main reasons. First, there has not been any dramatic fall in the number of joint PES/EPP-ED votes. As we mentioned earlier, both groups still vote along the same lines; this concerned 70% of the cases in the early stages of the term of office. The slightly lower rate of convergence at the end of the term may partly be explained by the approaching elections, thus inciting MEPs to give a better and more militant image of their activities, that is more in accordance with the expectations of their electorate.

Second, the PES/EPP-ED divide has widened on socio-

economic and socio-political questions, and become more explicit in single majority votes, and finally, the ELDR now plays a pivotal role.

The impression of persistent converging opinions as expressed in the way the two main groups vote may thus be misleading and should not hide a growing left-right cleavage on a greater number of issues.

It is hard to speculate on the future evolution of the EP. EU enlargement, the results of the EP elections and their potential influence on the appointment of the new Commission, together with the possible ratification of the Constitution could drastically alter partisan dynamics within the EP, both in terms of cohesion and party relations. Though a bipolar organization is unlikely, we may well witness in the short term the formation of one or several stable alternative coalitions, on various matters, and the emergence of a stronger partisanship dimension in the relations between the EP, the Council and the Commission.

Olivier Costa is CNRS research fellow at the Institute of Political Science in Bordeaux

The Prospect of 'United Centre-Right Government' in the EU **Simon Hix**

THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 European elections on the political balance inside the European Parliament was marginal. The balance between the centre-left and centre-right in the 'Sixth' directly-elected European Parliament' (2004-09) will be almost identical to the balance in the 'Fifth' Parliament (1999-04). In both the outgoing and incoming parliaments, the three groups on the centre-right (in the EPP, ELDR and UEN) control about 50 percent of the seats, and the three groups on the centre-left (PES, Greens and Radical Left) control about 40 percent of the seats.

However, the relationship between the centre-left and centre-right forces inside the Parliament and the political forces inside the EU's other two policy-making institutions - the Council and the Commission - is likely to be profoundly different in this Parliament compared to the last. There are two reasons for this.

First, whereas for most of the Fifth Parliament the Council was dominated by governments controlled by parties on the centre-left, for most of the Sixth Parliament the Council looks set to be dominated by governments controlled by parties in the centre-right. In July 1994, Social Democrats and Greens were in government in twelve of the then fifteen member states. In July 2004, in contrast, in fifteen of the now twenty-five governments are dominated by parties on the centre-right. This transformation in the political complexion of the Council is not simply a result of enlargement of the EU to ten new member states, since about half of the new member states have centre-left governments. Rather, this change results from the natural pendulum swing of government make-up in the fifteen existing EU states.

Second, whereas the 1999-04 Commission was the first to be dominated by centre-left politicians, the 2004-99 Commission will be dominated by centre-right politics. This is not simply a function of the changing colour of the governments in the Council, who pick the Commissioners. Another factor is that the next Commission will be the first to be appointed under the provisions of the Nice Treaty;

where each member state has only one Commissioner. Under the previous rules, most governments in the big member state appointed one Commissioner from the left and one from the right. Hence, even if the Council was dominated by one political force, the Commission would usually be more politically balanced. However, this time, the Commission will exactly reflect the political make-up of the Council at the time of the appointment of the Commission (in the autumn of 2004). As a result, whereas twelve of the twenty members of Prodi Commission were either Socialists, Greens, or Left-Liberals (Prodi himself), the next Commission will probably contain fifteen out of twenty-five politicians from the centre-right - and may even have seventeen centre-right politicians if new centre-right governments emerge in Poland and the Czech Republic before the Autumn.

Hence, for most of the 1999-04 Parliament the EU experienced by what scholars of US government would call 'divided government', or what scholars in France would call cohabitation: with a Parliament dominated by the centre-right and the Council and Commission dominated by the centre-left. This had significant implications. In this period, the largest party in the Parliament, the EPP, behaved like the 'official opposition' in the EU: opposing policy and legislative initiatives from the Council and EPP as a matter of principle. This was exacerbated by the fact that the dominant national party in the EPP, the German Christian Democrats (who controlled the leader of the EPP and many of the most senior figures in the party group) were furious with the Gerhard Schröder for picking two left-wing Commissioners from Germany. Hence, the largest national delegation in the European Parliament, in the largest party group, was not represented in either the Council or the Commission.

In contrast, in the 1999-2004 Parliament, the PES group behaved like a 'minority government': eager to support proposals from 'their' Commission and Council, but lacking political support in the Parliament to push these through. Not surprisingly, this period was marked by several high-profile political battles between the Commission and the Council, on the one side, and the Parliament on the other: such as the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive, the Takeovers' Directive, and the Workers' Consultation Directive. Against the expectations of much of the theoretical research on the EU legislative process - which assumes that the Parliament is more 'integrationist' and 'regulatory' than the Council, and so is likely to accept most agreements between the Commission and the Council - in this period, the majority in the Parliament was often less regulatory than the majorities in the Council and Commission, and so was potentially closer to the Status Quo than a more 'left' proposals from the other institutions. For example, in the adoption of the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive - which set new environmental standards in the manufacturing and recycling of cars - the more 'free market' EPP-ELDR-UEN majority in the Parliament successfully watered down the highly regulatory legislative framework that had been agreed by the 'Red-Green' coalition in the Commission and Council.

Relations are likely to be dramatically different in the Sixth Parliament. For the first time since the first direct elections of the Parliament, all three legislative institutions of the EU will be dominated by a centre-right (Conservative-Liberal) majority. The prospect of such 'united government' could potential produce a dramatic change the EU's policy agenda. A centre-right coalition, led by a centre-right Commission President, an EPP or ELDR

President of the Parliament, together with a few key centre-right/neo-liberal heads of government, could give real teeth to the 'Lisbon agenda' of structural economic reform. So far, the method of implementing the Lisbon agenda through intergovernmental agreements outside the EU's legislative procedures has produced few results. However, a centre-right coalition across the EU's legislative institutions could use the legal instruments in the EU Treaty, for example by adopting a Directive harmonizing labor market regulations for small and medium-size enterprises.

An 'oversized majority', under the qualified-majority rules, would still be required in the Council to adopt such legislation. But, in contrast to the previous parliament, any (liberalizing) legislative proposal from the Commission and the Council would almost certainly pass through the Parliament with only minor amendments. Also, a Liberal-Conservative coalition would not hold together on all issues on the EU's legislative agenda. Whereas Liberals (in the ELDR in the Parliament, or in the Council or Commission) might support Conservatives on market liberalization issues, they would probably join with the Socialists to block a social conservative agenda: such as restrictive EU immigration policies, or anti-environment policies.

If such 'united centre-right government' is able to push through more market liberalizing policies at the European level, what European voters will think is uncertain. On the one hand, the centre-left, who have gradually become more pro-European than the centre-right in most EU member states, may return to their positions of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Socialists opposed the EU in fear that market integration in Europe would undermine the social democratic model in many member states. A liberalizing EU might be more popular in the UK, but centre-left parties in Continental Europe and Scandinavia might gradually return to seeing the nation-state as a means of protecting social and labor regulations against global capital.

On the other hand, if the EU begins to push a particular political agenda for a period, Europe's citizens will be more aware of what the EU does and that 'politics' in the EU can make a difference. They might even react against the EU governing coalition's neo-liberal policies by supporting left-wing parties in the 2009 European elections - in other words, using European elections to try to influence the policy agenda of the EU rather than the political agenda of national politics!

Simon Hix is Reader in European Union Politics and Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science

NOTES

¹ Cf. Renaud Dehousse (2000) '1999: An 1 du Parlementarisme européen' in *Pouvoirs*, 93, 197-207.

² For figures quoted here see Activity report 1 May 1999 to 30 April 2004 of the delegations to the Conciliation Committee presented by Vice-Presidents Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Charlotte Cederschiöld and Renzo Imbeni (PE 287.644) under Conciliations in the European Parliament Website.

³ The views expressed here are strictly personal and do not represent the official position of the European Parliament.

⁴ For instance: S. Hix, A. Kreppel, A. Noury, "The Party System in the EP: Collusive or Competitive?" *JCMS*, 41(2), 2003, 309-331; A. Kreppel, *The EP and the Supranational Party System*, Cambridge University Press, 2002; T. Raunio, *The European Perspective: Transnational Party Groups in the 1989-1994 EP*, Ashgate, 1997.

⁵ B. Steunenberg et J. Thomassen (ed.), *The European Parliament: Moving Toward Democracy in the EU*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.

Results of Recent Parliamentary Elections

[chart here](#)

EDD-Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities

ELDR-Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party

Greens/ALE-Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

PES-Group of the Party of European Socialists

PPE-ED-Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats

UEL/NGLO-Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left

UEN-Union for Europe of the Nations Group



European Union Studies Association
Ninth Biennial International Conference
March 31-April 2, 2005 Austin, Texas
Hyatt Regency Austin on Town Lake

The European Union Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe and the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for its 2005 Ninth Biennial International Conference. The Program Committee plans to promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches, disciplinary perspectives and research agendas. The Committee would particularly welcome proposals that examine the impact of the EU's recent enlargement on the functioning of the Union and on the politics and societies of its new and existing member states, as well as proposals that address aspects of the EU's ongoing constitutional debate. Please note the following:

- We welcome both paper and panel proposals, particularly those that foster transatlantic dialogue.
- The Program Committee reserves the right to make changes in panels, including their composition.
- All those appearing on the conference program must be current EUSA members.
- Participants are limited to two appearances on the conference program (two papers or one paper and one discussant role; chair roles do not count toward the appearance limit).
- We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree to be available from 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, March 31st through 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 2nd.

The 2005 Program Committee is:

Mark A. Pollack (University of Wisconsin), Chair
Gráinne de Búrca (European University Institute)
Terri Givens (University of Texas - Austin)
Liesbet Hooghe (University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill)
Jolyon Howorth (Yale University)
Frank Schimmelfennig (University of Mannheim)

The firm deadline for **receipt** of paper and panel proposals in the EUSA office is **Friday, October 15, 2004**. We regret that we cannot consider proposals received after this date. You will be notified of the Program Committee's decision regarding your proposal by December 15, 2004.

We will once again have a **poster session** option available for those (1) whose work is not yet ready for a formal paper, (2) whose paper proposals are received after the proposal deadline, and/or (3) whose paper proposal could not be coherently accommodated on an available panel.

How to submit a paper or panel proposal: All proposals must be accompanied by the appropriate cover sheet, posted on our Web site at www.eustudies.org/conf2005.html, and the appropriate abstract (see cover sheet). Proposals must be mailed to:

European Union Studies Association
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

We do not accept proposals via facsimile, e-mail transmission, or delivery to the EUSA office in person. Address all questions about the proposal process to e-mail eusa@pitt.edu or by telephone to **412.648.7635**.

Essay

Ireland, the EU Presidency and the Constitutional Treaty: A Triumph for Irish Diplomacy

Nicholas Rees

THE IRISH PRESIDENCY CULMINATED in triumph with an historic agreement on the constitutional treaty and a standing ovation for the Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern at the European Council on 17-18 June.¹ Member states and their leaders paid tribute to Bertie Ahern, Minister Dick Roche and Irish officials for their skilful and diplomatic handling of the negotiations. For federalists this marked the culmination of a long march from the early days of the draft treaty on European Union, while for intergovernmentalists it preserved the prerogative of the member states. That the agreement could be viewed as a victory by the differing sides perhaps suggests the degree to which the long journey ended in a deal acceptable to all parties. The Irish Presidency progressively narrowed the gap on a number of thorny issues, moving forward in a manner that ensured that issues were closed and not subjected to further debate. However, it was accepted that 'nothing was agreed until everything was agreed'.²

What challenges, then, did the sixth and possibly last Irish Presidency face, what were its principal objectives, and what did it achieve? The Presidency faced a busy agenda, inheriting from Italy the unfinished business of the constitutional treaty, as well as the final stages of the enlargement on 1 May, appointment of the next Commission President, European Parliament elections in early June, and preliminary discussions on the EU financial perspective. In deciding on the particular priorities for the Presidency, the annual operational programme and the Council's multi-annual strategic programme (2004-06) had to be taken into account.³ The Presidency chose in its programme, *Europeans – Working Together*, to focus on four priorities: completing a successful enlargement to include the ten new member states, the Lisbon Strategy to make Europe a more competitive economy (Working Together for Economic Growth), initiatives in the area of justice and home affairs (a Safer Union) and a range of external actions (global engagement) - with a special focus on improving transatlantic relations.⁴

Above and beyond its stated agenda, the Irish Presidency faced the challenge of moving the Union forward on a range of other issues and ensuring that the member states worked together towards their commonly agreed goals. At times this proved difficult, given the fundamental nature of the issues under discussion in the IGC, and the desire of many states to defend their national interests. The German, French and UK mini summit held in Berlin on 19 February heightened concerns that the big three were conspiring to move ahead on their own and some states accused them of undermining the Union. However, the differences between the three states probably ensured that there was little likelihood of this happening. Similarly, meetings of the smaller states in the IGC format proved equally difficult, reflecting the shifting alliances and interests, depending on the issue under discussion.

The IGC and the Constitutional Treaty

The December European Council requested that the incoming Irish Presidency consult with partners and consider whether there

was likely to be progress if the IGC was reconvened.⁵ The Irish Presidency mandate was to listen, assess and report back to the March European Council. The Presidency faced a difficult challenge and it sought very deliberately to minimize expectations arising from this 'listening phase'. At the same time, however, it was well understood that for the Presidency getting agreement on the constitutional treaty took priority over many of the other issues on the agenda. If 80% of the constitutional treaty was agreed, the Irish Presidency was faced with dealing with some of the more difficult issues in the remaining 20%.

The first six weeks were dedicated to a series of bilateral meetings with all member states at the levels of head of government, foreign minister and officials. The objective of the Presidency was to build trust in the Irish Presidency and among the states. It had established by the European Council on 24-25 March, that agreement was possible among the states and that the IGC could be concluded by June. In its report to the European Council, the Presidency recommended reconvening the negotiations.⁶ This was largely based on the view that the political will now existed to reach an agreement, after the change of government in Spain and the resulting willingness of the Polish government to adopt a more flexible position. Following the appointment of the new Spanish government, the Presidency engaged in a further listening phase, considering the concerns of all the states. The objective was to hold sufficient meetings to resolve issues, but not too many, to reduce the number of issues under discussion and to close off a number of issues. Early discussions between the foreign ministers took place on 16-17 April in Ireland, where the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced the timetable for the renewed negotiations. There was a further series of bilateral meetings during May, with the Taoiseach touring national capitals and meeting the heads of government. Formal IGC sessions were held at foreign minister level on 17-18 and 24 May, and on 14 June, as well as one meeting of the focal points network of officials on 4 May in Croke Park, Dublin. Prior to these meetings a mix of closed and open papers was circulated to the member states, with the objective of progressively closing off issues.

By the summit the political climate was conducive to a political agreement. Possibly, the UK decision on 20 April to hold a referendum on the treaty facilitated forward movement on the treaty, perhaps reflecting a feeling that it was 'now or never', with concerns that the treaty would not be acceptable to the UK public unless the UK government was seen to have maintained its position. Ahead of the meeting a smaller number of major open issues remained for discussion at the final IGC including the size of the Commission, voting thresholds in the Council, the number of seats in the European Parliament, a number of economic governance issues, and some minor changes in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In the lead-up to the June European Council, the foreign ministers further discussed the remaining open issues in a revised paper on Monday, 14 June. On Wednesday, 16 June the Presidency tabled an open document detailing unresolved issues for consideration by the member states. The IGC was formally convened at 2:00 pm on Thursday, 17 June for approximately 1½ hours. This was followed in the evening by two dinners (at heads of government and foreign ministers level), at which the leaders failed to agree on a new president for the Commission and it was reported that the atmosphere was tense. By late evening there were positive signs that the number of open issues were being successfully narrowed

down and officials worked on a final document to 4:30 am. On Friday morning the European Council convened for one hour at 10:00 am, quickly completing its business on a pre-agreed number of items, following which the IGC convened again at 11:30 am and continued over lunch. The Taoiseach and officials spent the rest of the day meeting individual or groups of member states. Following a break the IGC was reconvened in plenary session at 10:00 pm and early statements by the member states favored agreement on the constitutional treaty, except for Poland. However, by 10:30 pm, after the Presidency proposed to meet the Poles halfway, the delegations supported the agreement, with a standing ovation for the Taoiseach.

The outcome was represented as being successful by all sides. The UK government was able to report that it had successfully defended its position on the now famous 'red line issues', such as QMV in relation to taxation and justice and home affairs. Equally other states, such as Poland were also able to claim that they had retained their voting weight in the Council.⁷ Most importantly, perhaps, French and German concerns had been addressed (the Germans, in seeking to maintain good relations with France, offered to accept a maximum of 98 seats in the EP). The smaller states could declare that their concerns over the composition of the Commission had been taken into account, on the basis that all states would be treated on an equal basis, with regard to rotation of Commissioners after 2014.

On the issue of the Commission President, however, it proved impossible to reach agreement on any initial candidate. The two most widely discussed candidates, Guy Verhofstadt (Belgium), and Chris Patten (UK), did not attract sufficient support and withdrew their names from consideration leaving potentially seven other names.⁸ The matter was left undecided, with a proposal to consider reconvening on 29 June if it appeared that agreement could be reached on a candidate. Following further consultation by the Irish Presidency and bearing in mind the parameters for the appointment (ideally a centre-right candidate, from a smaller country, preferably northern Europe) agreement was reached on Jose Barroso, the Portuguese Prime Minister. His appointment was approved at a specially convened European Council meeting on the eve of the Dutch Presidency.

The future of the constitutional treaty, however, is far from assured, given that it must now receive the approval of 25 European states by Autumn 2006, some of whom must hold referendums. If turnout in the European Parliament elections (10-13 June), which was at an all time low at 45.5%, is in anyway a reflection of interest in Europe, political elites will face an uphill battle. The rise of Eurosceptic and Eurocritical parties in France, Sweden, the UK and Poland, amongst others, and the election of some of their candidates as MEPs, highlights new levels of distrust and opposition to Europe.

Enlargement

The Irish Presidency presided over the largest ever enlargement of the Union, culminating on 1 May with the accession of 10 new member states and a day of celebrations. As if to make-up for Ireland's earlier no vote on the Treaty of Nice, a day of welcomes in Dublin and throughout the country, aimed to involve citizens in the enlargement and make newcomers welcome to the Union. There were similar celebrations held around Europe in the existing and new member states.

Ongoing enlargement negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania reached a critical stage during the year, with most chapters closed with Bulgaria, but slower progress made on closing chapters with Romania. It was believed that the negotiations could be concluded by the end of the year and that the drafting of the accession treaty might begin in July. There were, however, warnings that the two countries would need to be prepared to assume the obligations of membership and therefore need to intensify their efforts to be ready for membership. There was progress with Turkey, wherein the adoption of a series of constitutional, political, legislative and administrative reforms have paved the way for future accession negotiations to begin in December 2004. Notably, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus was overshadowed by the failure of the UN Secretary-General's plan to resolve the long-standing conflict on the island, although the Turkish government was praised for making a positive contribution in trying to reach a settlement. Finally, the European Council in June endorsed the Commission's favorable opinion in opening accession negotiations with Croatia.

Initial comments on the effects of the enlarged Union have been positive with officials noting the willingness of new and old members to work together and avoid potential stalemates. In effect, there would appear to be a growing recognition that a Union of 25 states requires considerable self-control and that grand standing will only lead to gridlock. Hence, as a matter of practice, the usual *tour de table* has been abandoned in some areas, allowing work to proceed in a more efficient manner. Enlargement has, however, fundamentally changed the nature of the Union, and there is a growing realization among member states that some of the original groupings and alignments are changing. Notable trends would seem to include a closer level of cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states, as well as among the Visegrad states and Austria, as well as renewed Franco-German cooperation. Equally, Britain has been more closely cultivating links with the new accession states, recognizing that these states share many of its security concerns, lean towards the Atlantic alliance, and are likely to be staunch defenders of national sovereignty.

The Lisbon Strategy⁹

The Presidency's focus on the Lisbon strategy reflected a desire to make progress on economic issues, jobs and social cohesion. It was, perhaps, a relatively safe agenda for the Irish Presidency, and an area in which other member states might share a common interest in prioritizing employment, competitiveness and the like. There was also a concern in other European states that the Lisbon process was stalled, as member states were not implementing policy and measures to ensure that the objectives of the process could be attained. It was an agenda that suited the Fianna-Fáil/Progressive Democrat government, as it matched their domestic economic priorities, with Ireland's desire to stimulate further European economic growth after the economic down turn of 2000-02 in the Irish economy.

The Spring European Council in March, while overshadowed by the Madrid bombing and the discussions concerning the reconvening of the IGC, did make progress on the Lisbon Strategy focusing on delivery and implementation. It was agreed that a high level group to be chaired by Mr. Wim Kok, the former Dutch PM, would make recommendations on measures to ensure that the objectives of the process be achieved. In June the European Council endorsed the draft update on the broad economic policy guidelines,

which included references to the Eurozone and the draft employment guidelines. The Presidency also recorded progress in a number of areas relating to the Lisbon agenda including the financial services action plan, European health card, legislation relating to the mobility of citizens, businesses and services, intellectual property rights (but not on a Community patent), consumer protection, environmental protection, and infrastructural development (e.g. TENs). The European Council supported a proposal to establish a European Gender Institute and requested the Commission to draw up proposals to move this initiative forward.

Financial Perspectives

The Presidency was responsible for initiating discussions in the Council on the future financing of the European Union after 2007, based on the Commission communication of 10 February. The Presidency's main task was to undertake preliminary discussions on the financial perspective, consider the views of the member states, and identify key issues. In December six of the member states in a letter to the Commission demanded that EU expenditures not exceed 1.0% of GNI thereby reducing the EU budget and effectively limiting their own contributions.¹⁰ The Commission in its February communication proposed a 'large' budget of 1.14% of GNI, rising to 1.24% of GNI (2007-13), in order to meet the increased costs of enlargement. The budget proposals focused on three priorities that included the Lisbon agenda, the completion of an area of freedom, justice and security and Europe as a global partner. The Commission defended its position, arguing for a larger budget, at the European Economic and Social Committee conference in May. The June European Council noted the Irish Presidency's Analytical Report on the issues and positions of the member states and on its feedback to the Commission. In essence, the member states remain divided over the future budgetary perspective and opposed to any European tax, although a political agreement will need to be reached on a new financial perspective by mid-2005, as it must be adopted by December 2005.

Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The Presidency achieved a number of its objectives in relation to building a common area of freedom, security and justice as part of the commitment to the Tampere programme. The objectives of the programme included creating a common European asylum system, strengthening law enforcement cooperation and the fight against crime and terrorism, and improved access to justice for citizens of the Union. During the Presidency, agreement was reached in the area of immigration and asylum on a new directive on Asylum Qualifications and political agreement on an Asylum Procedures directive, as well as agreement on a directive on the admission of third country nationals for studies and related purposes (research). Other measures adopted included a regulation on a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims and agreement on a framework decision concerning mutual recognition of confiscation orders. The Presidency progressed work on the creation of a European Borders Agency, which should be up and running by 2005, and proposed that the implementation of a plan for the management of maritime borders be reviewed.

In relation to terrorism, and on foot of the Madrid bombings, the European Council at its March meeting adopted a Declaration on Terrorism (25 March). The Presidency appointed a EU counter-terrorism coordinator, Mr. Gijs de Vries, a Dutch politician, to im-

prove the coordination and the visibility of the EU's actions.¹¹ Commenting later in the year, de Vries was critical of member states for failing to implement the counter-terrorism measures. The June European Council agreed that it would review every six months the Action Plan/Roadmap to ensure that progress was being made in fighting terrorism and to give impetus to the process. Other initiatives agreed included the completion of work on a directive to compensate the victims of crime; a regulation on new functions for the Schengen Information System, and a Council decision on a new Visa Information System. The Counter-Terrorism Task Force (Europol) was re-established (although no head was appointed) and it was agreed that the heads of the security forces would meet on a regular basis in a group format. Whether renewed efforts in these areas will lead to implementation by the member states remains to be seen, given that past experiences with the European arrest warrant have not been very positive.

Finally, the June European Council endorsed the report by the Secretary-General/High Representative on integrating into the Council Secretariat an intelligence capability in relation to terrorist threats. Notably the Austrian and Belgian proposal for a European intelligence agency and the Commission proposal for an information exchange were rejected, reflecting the sensitivity of this area. Instead, the EU chose to expand the Situation Centre (SitCen), extending its remit to assessment of external as well as internal threats.

External Relations

The Presidency made progress on a number of policy areas. On the near abroad, the European Council formally endorsed the Commission's proposals for a new European neighborhood policy at its June meeting, marking the Union's intention to create a zone of security, stability and prosperity on its doorstep on the basis of partnership and shared ownership and building on the values of democracy and human rights. It was agreed that action plans be negotiated with all Euro-Mediterranean partnership countries that have association agreements with the EU. The European Council endorsed the Presidency's report on the EU's Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East. In relation to the Western Balkans, it adopted a comprehensive policy on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There was progress on EU-Africa dialogue at the Ministerial Troika meeting on 1 April in Dublin and further support for the African Union (including the launch of the African Peace Facility). The Presidency also hosted a Ministerial Conference on HIV/Aids in Europe and Central Asia in February in Dublin Castle and led to a Declaration calling for effective leadership prevention, help for those suffering from HIV/AIDS and a partnership approach. Issues that continued to be of particular concern included the situation in Sudan, where the EU supported the efforts of the African Union, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where continued fighting and violence threatened the fragile peace agreement.

At its June meeting the European Council adopted a declaration on Iraq affirming its commitment to the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and its support for the UN resolution 1546 and supported the Commission's communication on "The EU and Iraq – a Framework for Engagement". The European Council welcomed developments in the Middle East Peace process, especially the prospect of Israeli withdrawal for the Gaza Strip, but expressed

concern at the humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian Territories.

A key objective of the Presidency was to improve and enhance transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the war on Iraq. The Irish Presidency was well placed, as a trusted US partner, but not a military ally, to move the agenda forward, especially on economic and business issues. Notably, Ireland saw itself playing a bridging role in encouraging the USA to work in cooperation with the UN and support multi-national cooperation. The success of UN resolution 1546 on Iraq was seen as highlighting the US's willingness to participate in the UN. Ireland has played an important part in trying to rebuild US-EU confidence, although domestically this was problematic for the Irish government. The EU-US summit, hosted in Dromoland Castle on 26 June, while met with public protests and adverse media commentary in Ireland, was diplomatically a success. However, at an international level, holding the summit in Ireland provided the US with an opportunity to stress its commitment to international obligations, and to highlight its support for the European Union.

Aside from these issues the Presidency hosted and participated in number of high-level summits including the EU-Canada Summit (18 March), the EU-Russia summit (21 May), EU-Latin American and Caribbean Summit (28-29 May) and the EU-Japan Summit (22 June).

ESDP

At the outset the Irish Presidency was tasked with making concrete proposals in relation to the European Security Strategy. Initial work focused on developing effective multilateralism with the UN; the fight against terrorism; a strategy towards the Middle East; and a comprehensive policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In relation to multilateralism, the Irish Presidency contributed to the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in Support of a strengthened UN and also made significant progress on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. In relation to the latter, the Presidency hosted a conference to consider in what ways the EU might support crisis management operations, including the possible provision of a rapid reaction force and/or an 'over the horizon force'. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Cowen, at the end of the Presidency (22 June), met with Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York to brief him on developments during the Irish Presidency, reviewing the EU's contribution to the High Level Panel and considering how the EU could militarily help the UN with peacekeeping.¹²

The Presidency also addressed the issue of capabilities endorsing the Headline Goal of 2010, whereby the Union will be able to deploy a 60,000 rapid response force for crisis management and furthering discussions on the battle groups concept. Progress was made on an Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Management (a conference on conflict prevention and the role of NGOs and civil society was held 31 March – 2 April in Dublin), as well as further actions in support of conflict prevention (e.g. EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and a strategy for the implementation of EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict). The European Council agreed on how sanctions might be used more effectively in support of multilateralism. The Council agreed a Joint Action leading to the establishment of the agency in the field of defense

capabilities, development, research, acquisition and armaments.

Further progress was made on the establishment of a civilian/military planning cell within the EU Military Staff, on the establishment of a small EU cell at SHAPE and NATO liaison arrangements with the EU Military Staff. It was agreed that further work should go ahead on establishing an operations centre and this should be available by 2006 (see European Council conclusions on "European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations"). Such a facility, however, is not seen as a standing HQ and national HQs remain the main means for managing autonomous military operations.

At an operational level, agreement was reached on launching the EU's first Rule of Law mission in Georgia and further preparation was made for an anticipated ESDP operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, depending on agreement being reached at the Istanbul NATO summit (28-29 June) to terminate the SFOR operation. The European Council endorsed progress made during the Presidency on combating terrorism, including the March Declaration and concrete actions on asylum, border controls and drug trafficking. The meeting committed the EU to fighting weapons of mass destruction and supported its report on the implementation of EU policy on proliferation.

Conclusion

As Irish officials pack their bags for the summer, they will undoubtedly feel that the Presidency was a success, both in making progress on the presidency's priorities, and in concluding the negotiations over the constitutional treaty; a not inconsiderable achievement and a triumph for Irish diplomacy. Equally, as their counterparts in other member states and the EU's institutions clear their desks (except for the Dutch!), they will also conclude the Irish did a good job and lived up to their reputation as skilful negotiators. Ireland's partners have been fulsome in their praise of the Irish Presidency, with President Chirac commenting that it has been the best-run presidency he has ever witnessed. It was a well-run presidency and the diplomatic corps did an incredibly good job with relatively scarce resources. For example, Ireland had only three officials working on the IGC negotiations, whereas Sweden had six officials assigned to this task. As has been the case in the past, small states have often been more successful in managing the presidency than have been some of the larger states.

*-Nicholas Rees, Jean Monnet Professor,
Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies,
University of Limerick, Ireland*

Notes

¹ For an early evaluation see David Phinnemore, 'The Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe: an overview' The Royal Institute of International Affairs, June 2004 (accessible at www.riia.org).

² Planning for the Irish Presidency began in 2001 and was undertaken by means of an interdepartmental planning group working on the logistics, while a further group worked on the policy issues. Each group reported to the Cabinet Committee on European Affairs, chaired by Dick Roche, Minister for European Affairs. Notably the staff in the Permanent Representation in Brussels was doubled to 160 people for the Presidency.

³The European Council at its meeting in Seville (June 2002) agreed to adopt multi-annual work programmes to improve continuity between presidencies. The Council's first multi-annual programme, agreed by the six presidencies for the period 2004-06, was prepared by the six member states in consultation with the Commission. The annual operating programme, "The Union in 2004: Seizing the Opportunities of the Enlarged Union", was the second such programme, building on the experience of the Greek and Italian Presidencies (Council of the European Union, No. 16195/03, 19 December 2003).

⁴ See Irish Presidency Web site: www.eu2004.ie, as well as that of the Institute of European Affairs (Dublin), www.iea.com and the UK Federal Trust www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu_constitution.html, for further commentary on the Presidency and IGC negotiations.

⁵ See the Institute of European Affairs (Dublin) *Irish Presidency Updates* on www.iea.com.

⁶ See Report on the Intergovernmental Conference, European Council, 25-26 March 2004, (CIG 70/04).

⁷ The new agreement means that decisions will require a double majority of 55% of member states representing 65% of the EU population from 2009, with the support of at least 15 member states. For further details see Phinnemore (Footnote 1).

⁸ See the *Irish Times*, 21 June 2004.

⁹ The Lisbon Process aims to make the Union the most competitive economy by 2010. The Lisbon Process, which is largely intergovernmental, involves a mix of peer review, exchange of best practice and the open method of coordination.

¹⁰ The six member states are the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium. See *European Voice*, 10-16 June 2004.

¹¹ The position resides in the Council of Ministers and operates under the Secretary-General/High Representative.

¹² See report in the *Irish Times*, 23 June 2004.

The *EUSA Review* follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas:

- Winter:** EU-Related Academic Programs-degree or certificate-granting, worldwide;
- Spring:** EU-Related Web Sites;
- Summer:** EU-Related Organizations (academic and professional associations or independent research centers with significant EU aspects in their missions);
- Fall:** EUSA Members' Research Notes (EUSA members' current EU-related research projects, with particular attention to funded projects).

We list EU-related conferences and calls, fellowships and scholarships and publications (books, journals, working papers) in every issue of the *Review*. Send brief announcements by e-mail to eusa@pitt.edu or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA.

EUSA Lifetime Membership

What is it?

Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment to EUSA of US\$ 1500.

What does it include?

The Lifetime Membership includes all regular membership benefits for life. Among those benefits currently are subscription to the quarterly *EUSA Review*, receipt of occasional EUSA monographs, discounted registration rates at the EUSA International Conference, subscription to our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA interest sections.

Are there any other benefits?

By making a one-time membership payment, you not only avoid the task of renewing each year, but gain the twin advantages of securing lifetime membership at today's dollar values *and* avoiding future dues increases.

Who should do this?

Any person wishing to support the endeavors of the European Union Studies Association—the fostering of scholarship and inquiry on the European integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional benefit is a receipt for a one-time \$500 charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law (reducing your tax liability for the year in which you become a Lifetime Member).

How do I become a Lifetime Member?

Simply mail your check, in US\$ and made payable to "EUSA," to the European Union Studies Association. (We can not accept lifetime membership payments by credit card.) We will send you a receipt and letter of acknowledgment.

Will my Lifetime Membership be publicly recognized?

Yes, EUSA Lifetime Members will be listed in the *EUSA Review* and in our printed, biennial Member Directory.

Place Ad here

Book Reviews

Desmond Dinan. Europe Recast: A History of European Union. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, 371 pp.

WELL KNOWN TO THE *REVIEW*'S READERS for his keen insight into the ongoing IGC's and for his excellent textbook on the European Union (*Ever Closer Union* – in its 3rd edition), Desmond Dinan now provides us with a very detailed history of essentially the entire project of European integration. He brings his strong credentials and intergovernmentalist perspective to highlight the arduous process of developing European institutions and policies. Noteworthy is the subtitle of the book: "History of European Union". This is not a history of the European Union. Rather, it is highly informative account of the high-level politics surrounding the debates, negotiations, and hard bargaining that has brought twenty-five states of Europe "ever closer" to union

Dinan's account is one focused on states and their leaders; his analytical eye is trained squarely on the level of nation states. The book is punctuated with references to the interests of this or that state and to the personalities and beliefs of the leading figures of Europe's history over the last fifty-five years: Monnet, Adenauer, and Schumann; DeGaulle, Hallstein, and Wilson; Giscard, Schmidt and Thatcher; Kohl, Mitterand, and Delors – a veritable who's who of the European project. Strong emphasis is placed on the pivotal events and moments of the Community's and Union's development (or, on occasion, the lack thereof). There is a strong emphasis on the dominant power players, in particular Germany and France (much of the book could read as an analysis of the Franco-German axis, with discussion of the British acting as the occasional third leg of the axis). There is plenty of detail for those who relish the intricacies of negotiations and last-minute compromises of EU summitry. Taken together as a whole, this is a persuasive state-centric account of the nearly sixty-years of European integration.

The organization of the book is appropriately straight-forward. Dinan works his way through eight chapters starting with the debate over What Kind of Union? (Chapter 1) and the Europe of the Communities (Chapter 2). It is in these two chapters that one finds much to relish. Dinan's original treatment of this defining moment of European cooperation highlights and clarifies the key points in the early debate: how to deal with Germany, the necessity of economic integration for the reconstruction of Europe, the important role of the U.S. in these early years, the internal French debate over the need and direction of a European defense project. One emerges from these two chapters with a renewed sense of awe at the leaders of this time and the importance of their contributions to the peaceful political and economic development of Europe.

The rest of the tightly-written chapters move through the

EUSA members interested in reviewing recent EU-related books, please contact the reviews editor:

Dr. R. Daniel Kelemen
Lincoln College
Oxford University
Oxford OX1 3DR UK
E-mail daniel.kelemen@politics.ox.ac.uk
Fax 44.1865.279.802

Publishers should send two review copies of books directly to Dr. Kelemen.

early days of the Community, the difficulties associated with DeGaulle (and CAP), the enlargement from six to nine (with most time spent on British accession), the ups and downs of the 1970's, the transformation of the Community through the 1980's, and finally leading up to the achievement of European Union culminating in the Maastricht Treaty. For undergraduates or graduate students (and anyone else trying to figure how Europe came from total war and destruction to a single currency and common foreign and security policy), Dinan's account is a must read. Indeed, from my own perspective, I wish I had had this text when I started my own studies of European Union as a graduate student fifteen years ago.

The final historical chapter (The Challenges of European Union) addresses the last ten years or so of the EU project. This chapter is a bit longer than the others (perhaps too long) and indicates that the author had a more difficult time delineating the "end" of the historical project - as it still continues. As a result, in comparison to the other historical chapters, this almost topical chapter does not quite fit with the others. We may need another 3-4 years and some more hindsight to fully grasp the historical meaning of these changes. Then, perhaps, the chapter could be divided into two – before 9/11 and after 9/11 – as 9/11 has altered the internal and external landscape within which Europe operates.

This is but a minor point. Overall the book is richly referenced and researched and written in a style understandable to even the non-specialist (and American undergraduates). The occasionally conversational style may turn some off ("Adenauer disliked Macmillan (the feeling was mutual)...” p. 100), but I found the language refreshing and appropriate. There are maps, historic photos, and appendices appropriate in number and quality given the topics addressed. Moreover, many of the debates back then on CAP, the budget, enlargement, EMU, and the European Defense Community are relevant for understanding the debates that engulf the union today, especially over a European constitution.

The primary critique of this book would come from those who believe that the European project (and the institutions and policies surrounding it) has a life of its own and follows more closely the precepts of the (neo) functionalist school. Dinan is determined to focus on the big picture – the grand story of European Union through the eyes of state interests and the dominant personalities that articulated these interests. While

the historical detail is copious, given the overriding preoccupation with the larger picture (the forest), one wonders if the trees are lost in this account. For example, in Chapter 5, a mere 3 pages is given to the activism of the European Commission in the late 1970's and early 1980's as it pursued policies in steel, high technology and the push to complete the internal market. The origination of environmental policy is given one paragraph on p. 152 (Ludwig Erhard has as many references as environmental policy). The third pillar is given a page toward the end of Chapter 7. In contrast, scholars of EMU - with its emphasis on the grand state bargain of Maastricht - will find around 50 pages of material.

Nonetheless, Dinan persuasively defends his approach in the introduction and conclusion of this book. He is well aware of the theoretical debates and the possible omissions and oversights that his approach will, by definition, make. He also acknowledges the influence of other factors on the development of the EU. As a result, his is a fascinating account that is not dull and dry, but rather full of idealism, bureaucratic intrigue, personalities and political entrepreneurs, ideological struggles, and fluctuating international complexities and environments. Dinan masterfully brings these all together to provide an excellent treatment of the European Community's and later the European Union's institutional and policy development. Given the increasing difficulties and tensions between Europe and the U.S., this book is important reading, not only for academics, but policymakers in D.C. as they seek to understand this critical partner.

Peter H. Loedel, West Chester University

R. Daniel Kelemen. *The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004, 244 pp.

DANIEL KELEMEN'S EXCELLENT STUDY asks how federalism itself shapes policy outcomes. Comparative federalism is not on its face a sexy topic, nor is regulatory politics. Yet this book will speak to scholars interested neither in federalism nor regulatory politics, scholars who care about policy issues that are implicitly regulatory in nature – like environmental policy, health care policy, consumer protection policy etc. – and anyone interested in how political institutions influence political outcomes.

Kelemen explores how different federal systems regulate their economy, examining the EU as a federal regulatory state. Kelemen describes a 'normal' trajectory of policy-making in federal systems. Even if the federal government does not have explicit competence over certain regulatory policy issues, the federal government will often be asked to intervene to correct the "flaws" in existing policy, with the argument that the policy issue affects the common market or somehow transcends state borders. The ensuing debate inevitably raises disagreements over competence – which level has authority over the issue – disagreements which become operationalized politically in terms of debates about where policy discretion should reside. These disputes are not mere turf battles; they actually involve differ-

ent policy interests because actors at different levels of governance – the federal government, state governments, and courts – have different political constituencies and can be influenced differentially by actors in society. Kelemen seeks to explain variation in how federal governments intervene – whether they try to limit state discretion, or facilitate state discretion in the drafting and implementation of centralized policies, and whether or not federal courts become central actors interpreting legislation to limit state discretion and creating new political venues to influence policy-making and policy implementation.

The book's thesis is provocative. The greater the number of veto players, the more a federal government will try to lock in their policy-preference by limiting state discretion and the more courts will be involved in regulatory politics. The reason is that centralized federal powers – e.g. political systems governed by Westminster style parliamentary and unicameral systems – know that they can change a policy if they do not like how it is being implemented. Fragmented federal governments – e.g. governments characterized by a separation of powers and by bicameral systems – know that they are unlikely to get another shot at changing the legislation, and thus they need to lock in their policies in ways that ensure that actors below them (state governments, and courts) or subsequent federal governments do not hijack the policy leading it where they do not want.

The argument is examined by comparing environmental regulation in the EU, US, Germany, Australia and Canada. There is also a chapter on Food and Drug safety regulation in the EU. The cases studies are concise – in some ways too concise. To test the thesis, Kelemen mainly needs to know about the level of specificity in the federal regulatory policy and the degree to which courts are involved in environmental regulatory disagreements. Lost is what is at stake – variation in the actual policy, or which environmental interests are served.

The Rules of Federalism is not heavy handed in its application of principal-agent theory, though the book's argument is animated by the central concern in principal-agent theory, namely that there will be agent slack (what Kelemen calls "bureaucratic and political drift"). Here Kelemen also makes a contribution. Drift is not always a concern, Kelemen finds. Regulators, including the federal government, generally prefer to allow significant discretion. Only when the federal government has great difficulty re-regulating at the federal level will it be concerned about discretion and drift, because the government knows that it may not be able to "correct" unwanted policy implementation, or because it wants to lock in its own policy while it can.

The argument has many potentially interesting implications. Kelemen himself draws out insights for the "politics of competence" (where regulatory authority comes to reside), for regulatory styles (funded v. unfunded mandates, etc), and for variation in the legal "rights revolution" generated by regulatory politics. But there are more implications one could draw. In Kelemen's argument, judges play differing roles, sometime aiding the federal government in exerting control over states and regulatory agencies, yet sometimes undermining federal regulators

in their active involvement limiting and reviewing how discretion is exercised. This is a much more nuanced take on the role of the judiciary than one usually finds in principal-agent analyses, one that the focus on federal politics is able to bring into relief. Also, the implication of Kelemen's story is that the timing in which policy is made may be crucial. We know that where discretion resides will come to greatly shape the content of the policy and the mechanisms through which policy changes. Kelemen suggests that there may be 'federal moments' in fragmented federal systems, moments that may be more difficult to revisit compared to centralized federal systems because the fragmented federal system's moment locks-in certain constituent's influence and policy preferences. The study also suggests that these regulatory 'moments' may themselves be different in federal politics compared to non-federal politics.

For people who need to think about how federalism matters, Kelemen's answer that "the influence of federalism varies" is an important insight to remember. The book also has general implications for debates about politics within multi-level politics, and of course for debates about regulatory politics. It is a sign of the intriguing nature of the thesis that the findings apply well beyond the putative subjects of the book – federalism and regulatory politics. Indeed this is a book that anyone who studies federalism, who compares across federal and non-federal states, who studies regulatory politics (which is in reality what most of EU politics is), or who themselves uses institutional analysis should really read.

Karen Alter
Northwestern University

Peter Norman. The Accidental Constitution: the Story of the European Convention. Brussels: EuroComment, 2003, 406 pp.

FOR ALL THOSE WHO WANT TO KNOW what happened during the Convention on the Future of Europe, this is the book for you. Thorough, detailed, and painstaking in its attempt to uncover the minutiae of this unique process, it is the definitive factual guide.

Norman's account is fascinating in several respects. His account illustrates not only the variations between successive drafts of the constitutional treaty, but also the way in which factors ranging from the reports of the working groups, the reactions of plenary sessions and the tastes, preferences and actions of key actors shaped the wording as the document evolved. Thus, Giscard's draft institutional articles, presented to the presidium in the afternoon on 22 April 2003 met with almost unanimous fury from presidium members, the convention as a whole and the Commission. As a result, the text was significantly reworked, going through several further iterations prior to being presented to the Heads of State and Government at Thessaloniki.

Second, the author also clarifies the reasons why the European Commission proved so ineffective at shaping the Convention outcome. Internal divisions, incompetent leadership and

the farce of the so-called 'Penelope' document all conspired to render the institution a marginal, largely reactive figure during the crucial stages of the Convention's deliberations.

Third, the book casts an interesting light on the frustrations involved in dealing with the British in an EU context. Norman illustrates clearly how the Presidium, and Giscard in particular, went out of their way to accommodate London's concerns. For all this, however, Peter Hain, the hyperactive and hugely effective UK Government representative, appended his signature (without the Prime Minister's approval) to the appeal circulated by Alfonso Dastis, Spanish government representative, to maintain the Nice package for Council voting arrangements. Hain himself later made it clear (p. 281) that he had done so not because of any concerns over voting weights but, rather, as a purely tactical measure to strengthen the British position on tax. Unsurprisingly, (p. 269) Giscard's sentiment was one of betrayal.

Finally, – and to the relief of this author – the book reveals that others, too, make mistakes with their computers, sometimes with significant consequences. Thus, an email intended for the secretariat was circulated to all permanent representatives, whilst a draft paper on simplification written by a secretariat member was wrongly circulated to all convention members because someone clicked the wrong email icon.

For all its attention to detail, however, the book suffers somewhat from its failure to undertake a sustained analysis, as opposed to description, of the events between March 2002 and July 2003. Perhaps surprisingly for a journalist, Norman is strikingly uncritical in his approach. Take his portrayal of Convention President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The famously aloof former French President made a strange choice of figurehead for the Union's first attempt to undertake treaty change via a process of supposedly open and democratic consultation. Norman, however, sees things differently, commenting that although Giscard had a reputation for haughtiness, 'he could be extremely charming, particularly when talking to an attractive woman' (p.27).

More importantly, the lack of real analysis extends to both the convention process itself and the text it produced. With regard to the latter, Norman merely states that (p. 327) 'it delivers a clearer definition of who does what, that will make the Union more accountable to its citizens and parliaments and governments in member states'. Not only is this far from convincing, because unsupported by evidence, but it also fails to address the crucial question of whether the new text will adequately equip the Union to function effectively with twenty-five member states.

If a lack of sustained attention to the nature of the final text is perhaps understandable – after all, the book appeared as the Intergovernmental conference was in the process of revising it and the proof of the pudding as far as effectiveness goes will be in the eating – less forgivable is the paucity of reflection on the impact and significance of the 'Convention method'. In general, Norman seems to have a positive opinion of the undertaking. Thus, (p. 128) he comments on the different style of negotiation that it engendered, pointing out that whilst a sover-

eign 'no' in an intergovernmental conference was 'just that', in working groups the government representatives were forced to debate and explain their thinking. Of course, the problem with this is that the bare facts as reported by Norman cast doubt on such claims. There is little evidence, for instance, that the behavior of Britain's Peter Hain, reflected constraints on his ability simply to say 'no' to initiatives of which he disapproved.

Moreover, for all its pretensions to be an open, more democratic forum than the intergovernmental conferences normally charged with treaty reform, Norman's own description of the workings of the Convention illustrate how far this was from the reality. During its closing weeks, as the debate about institutions heated up, John Kerr, the wily old former Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office who had been selected as head of the secretariat resorted 'to his old tricks' (p. 337) of holding back documents, and keeping tight control over agendas. Even before then, the influence of 'normal' convention members had been shown to be limited by the fact that most of the working groups reported too late for their ideas to be taken into account in the discussion on the floor of the plenary, by the way the idea of a President of the European Council found itself into the final text despite overwhelming hostility in the plenary and by the way Giscard in particular succumbed to the wishes of the large member states and especially, as we have seen, the British. (His visit to Downing Street on 19 May 2003 led to several revisions to the draft text).

Given that Norman begins his account by stating that the Union had failed to 'find a place in peoples' hearts' it seems somewhat strange that he does not comment on the fact that the Convention failed entirely to address this situation. Both the forum and the Youth Convention were unsuccessful in their attempts to engage a broader public. For a cynic like myself, this merely confirms earlier suspicions that the rhetoric of national leaders about the need for greater openness and consultation was simply that. After all, when push came to shove, crucial parts of the treaty were drafted in camera by certain members of the presidium (Kerr in fact did some drafting at Giscard's house in Paris), often guided in their thinking by the views of especially the larger member states. And, of course, the Convention itself was succeeded by an IGC during the course of which the member states have not shied way from amending the Convention's draft.

So perhaps the author could have done more to tease out the conclusions that seem implicit in his analysis. Yet for all his failure to do so, the fact remains that he has produced the single most comprehensive guide to what happened during the Convention. The book is and, in my opinion will remain, the best source from which to learn about what was, whatever its shortcomings, a unique experiment.

Anand Menon
European Research Institute
University of Birmingham

Craig Parsons. *A Certain Idea of Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003, 249 pp.

FOR OVER A DECADE, scholarship on the role of ideas in shaping policies and institutions has constituted a major aspect of European Union studies. It is also one of the areas in which EU-studies has successfully added to general debates in international relations theory and political economy. And yet, the ideational research program has had many detractors who raise concerns about the method and theoretical arguments informing this body of literature. Craig Parson's excellent *A Certain Idea of Europe* does the most complete job to date in addressing the chief concerns among detractors of the ideational research program. In the process, he offers new insights into the study of the EU and opens up new avenues for research in the constructivist vein of international relations.

A Certain Idea of Europe examines the process of European integration through the lens of French domestic debates over what kind of Europe the country ought to promote. These debates were shaped by three competing models of integration, which Parsons terms the traditional, confederal, and community models. He goes to great length in showing that no model was hegemonic in the early post-war years and that the coalitions that formed around each alternative were politically and economically heterogeneous. According to Parsons, it was the reality of weak and heterogeneous coalitions that allowed a small political elite under the leadership of Jean Monnet to re-fashion France's relationship to its European neighbors and to lay the foundation for what became a long historic commitment to the community model among the French. Though political elites at later stages had the opportunity and often expressed the ambition to shift the course of French policy—typically with a preference for the traditional model that was based on a strong commitment to an intergovernmental structure of integration—they repeatedly opted for the community method. Why they chose not to reverse course is one of the major puzzles that Parsons seeks to resolve.

Parsons explanation for why the community model "won out" is anchored in claims of the role of political entrepreneurs in promulgating well-defined ideas by institutionalizing their preferences in concrete policy-making structures. He views ideas as means (rather than ends) and as "strategies of action" to which political entrepreneurs attach values and symbols. Once these are institutionalized, they reduce the ability of competing entrepreneurs to substitute their own ideas for existing ones. In Parson's view, the causal role of ideas lie not in some "osmosis-like" process by which they gain the adherence of individuals through passive processes of diffusion and reception, but rather in their ability to redefine extant interests and to "crowd out" alternatives. In other words, the ideas that come to define political organization do not gradually diffuse in a polity and then determine social groups' choices. Rather, once the ideas of a few inform institutions of a collectivity, the ideas of that small group will reshape the calculations of actors that originally held different ideas. The evolution of French policy toward Europe after 1945, then, was a process in which Jean

Monnet and a small group of like-minded individuals gained early acceptance for their preference of the community model and were able to steer the French toward gradually accepting that the traditional and the confederal models were not in the country's interest.

One of the strongest chapters examines the validity of Parson's ideational explanation in accounting for President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward Europe. The General is famously known for his unwillingness to cede authorities to supranational institutions in general, for his reluctance to support the EEC in particular, as well as his strong commitment to a Europe of states. Yet, once in office, de Gaulle reversed course: he accepted the delegation of further authorities to European-level institutions, came to support the EEC, and watered-down his insistence on a strictly intergovernmental model of integration. To Parson, de Gaulle's reversal was a function of a new strategic landscape—different from that during which he had formed his views—that led the General to conclude that he would be better served by cautiously accepting the community approach. Parson's discussion of the process by which this conversion took place is first rate. Among the many aspects of his discussion of de Gaulle, we learn that the empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compromise that are so closely associated with de Gaulle were far from major reassertions of the traditional model of integration in French policy vis-à-vis Europe. Rather than representing attempts by de Gaulle to replace the community method, they were something more akin to an attempt by the General to reduce the speed of integration.

The chapter on de Gaulle and the other empirical chapters—which include studies of the origins of the ECSC, the Rome Treaties, the European Monetary System, the 1992 project, and the Maastricht process—suggest a historical institutionalist argument about the role of path dependency. Yet, Parson rejects such interpretations as overly structural and as neglectful of political agency. For example, he asserts that, “At no point in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s did institutional path dependence generate any broad forward pressure in integration” (p.234). He may be correct that there was nothing inevitable about what outcome was about to emerge in any one of the three decades. Yet, a historical institutionalist explanation anchored at the micro-level, one that identifies and studies the actions of individuals, is perfectly consistent with the account Parson presents. His unwillingness to acknowledge that the historical institutionalist tradition has moved, just like the constructivist literature recently, from emphasizing broad structural logics to studying theories of individual action, is a missed opportunity to extend his argument. Drawing more explicitly on microlevel theories of path dependence would have enabled Parson to more fully explore variations in French institutional preferences at the European level. For example, such an account could lend nuance to why French institutional preferences over European competition and industrial policy each remained highly consistent since the early stages of integration despite having been governed by different decision-rules for most of the period. But a missed connection like this one does little in reducing the value of *A Certain Idea of Europe*.

It is a book that is extremely conscientious in its discussion of how ideas may influence policy-making and institution-building. Parson's focus on a single country ought not detract from the nature of his ambitions. For example, he notes in the introduction that his “ambitions extend beyond a fundamental revision of the EU histories offered by Haas, Milward, or Moravcsik” and that he seeks to “revise the prevailing standards for social science theorizing” (p.28). On the former, Parson is not entirely successful. The path breaking studies by Haas, Milward, and Moravcsik were more comprehensive in scope, but more importantly, they were written at historical junctures when the course of the EU-studies field was yet to be determined. As such, the importance of Haas, Milward, and Moravcsik lay in large part in their ability to define the questions that preoccupy the discipline at critical junctures in the evolution of the integration process. The strategic advantage that these scholars had in defining the field exists no more: EU-studies is now a mature academic discipline with its own journals, and it shapes debates beyond its own empirical subject matter. While Parson's book will surely inform discussions of the causal role of ideas in the international relations discipline, his ability to match his own ambition hinges upon his capacity to replace the strategic advantage that earlier studies had in defining the questions that the EU-field asks and the theoretical traditions it draws upon. Achieving such goals depends in large part upon the course of integration shifting or upon introducing an entirely new theoretical lens to the subject; the former is beyond Parson's control, and the latter is increasingly more difficult in what now is a multi-disciplinary field. It is therefore difficult to say that Parson is able to furnish a “fundamental revision” that will define future debates in ways that Haas, Milward, or Moravcsik have for previous generations.

However, in his ambition to move beyond prevailing ideational approaches in EU studies, Parson meets and exceeds his ambitions. In an elegantly executed, beautifully written, and theoretically sophisticated book, he has offered a new and high standard for the ideational literature on European integration. No study will be able to address the role of ideas, certainly not within the EU-context, without contending with the rigorous standards promulgated by Parson. It is on this basis—on the ability of the book to set a new standard and to refine the important debate on the role of ideas—that the merits of the book ought to be judged. And on that score, the book is an excellent achievement that will remain a defining milestone in the field.

Orfeo Fioretos
University of Wisconsin—Madison



Now Available from Oxford University Press!

The State of the European Union, 6: Law, Politics, and Society

Co-edited by EUSA members **Tanja A. Börzel**, University of Heidelberg,
and **Rachel A. Cichowski**, University of Washington

426 pages, 234 mm x 156 mm, September 2003
Hardback 0-19-925737-X, paperback 0-19-925740-X

THIS IS THE SIXTH AND latest addition to our book series, *State of the European Union* (launched in 1991 with Lynne Rienner Publishers). The contributors to this volume take the dynamic interaction between law, politics and society as a starting point to think critically about key recent events in the European Union, while bringing to the forefront why these developments matter for ordinary citizens. Contents and authors:

Section I: EU Law and Politics: The State of the Discipline

1. Rachel A. Cichowski and Tanja A. Börzel: Law, Politics, and Society in Europe
2. Alec Stone Sweet: European Integration and the Legal System
3. Gráinne de Búrca: The European Court of Justice and the Evolution of EU Law

Section II: Structures of Governance

4. Fritz W. Scharpf: Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration
5. Adrienne Héritier: New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political Efficiency and Policy Effectiveness?
6. Lars Hoffman and Anna Vergés-Bausili: The Reform of Treaty Revision Procedures: The European Convention on the Future of Europe

Section III: EU Citizen Rights and Civil Society

7. Stephen Day and Jo Shaw: The Evolution of Europe's Transnational Political Parties in the Era of European Citizenship
8. Kenneth A. Armstrong: Tackling Social Exclusion Through OMC: Reshaping the Boundaries of European Governance

Section IV: EU Law in Action

9. Tanja A. Börzel: Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commission
10. R. Daniel Kelemen: The EU Rights Revolution: Adversarial Legalism and European Integration
11. Lisa J. Conant: Europe's No Fly Zone? Rights, Obligations, and Liberalization in Practice

Section V: Innovation and Expansion

12. Kate R. McNamara: Towards a Federal Europe? The Euro and Institutional Change in Historical Perspective
13. Elena A. Iankova and Peter J. Katzenstein: European Enlargement and Institutional Hypocrisy
14. Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke: EU Immigration Policy: From Intergovernmentalism to Reluctant Harmonization

Section VI: Researching and Teaching the EU

15. Stacy A. Nyikos and Mark A. Pollack: Researching the European Union: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches
16. Michael Baun and Phil Wilkin: Web Teaching the European Union: Online Sources and Online Courses

Section VII: References

Section VIII: List of Contributors

In the Americas, order from Oxford USA on-line at www.oup-usa.org/isbn/019925740X.html

or call toll-free (USA & Canada) 1-800-451-7556

In Europe, order from Oxford UK on-line at www.oup.co.uk/isbn/0-19-925737-X

or e-mail book.orders@oup.co.uk

EU-Related Organizations

Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe provides expertise on the new EU policy on immigration and asylum and internal law of the member states.

Universite Libre de Bruxelles
CP 137
Avenue Roosevelt 50
B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 650 38 90 www.ceps.be

Asia-Europe Foundation seeks to promote better understanding between the peoples of Asia and Europe through greater intellectual and cultural exchanges.

31 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119595, Singapore
T 65 68749700
www.asef.org

BMW Center for German and European Studies is devoted to the interdisciplinary study of Europe, and features an intensive program of graduate instruction.

Georgetown University
ICC-501
Washington, D.C. 20057
T 202.687.5602
www.georgetown.edu/sfs/cges/

Centre for European Studies at Lund University is a network organization for co-operation between departments and researchers whose aim is to encourage research and education in European Studies.

P.O. Box 52
S-221 00 Lund, Sweden
T 46 222 97 77

Center for Transatlantic Relations engages international scholars, students, government officials and other opinion leaders on contemporary challenges facing Europe and America.

Johns Hopkins University
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 525
Washington, D.C. 20036
transatlantic@jhu.edu

Council for European Studies promotes the interdisciplinary research and study of Europe in the social sciences and humanities. It holds the Conference of Europeanists, gives pre-dissertation fellowships, publishes a newsletter, and more.

Columbia University
1203A International Affairs Bldg.
420 West 118th Street, MC 3310
NY, NY 10027 USA
T 212 854 4172 www.europenet.org

Euro-Atlantic Institute of International Integration Studies brings together academics involved in research in the areas of federalism and international integration.

T 202.374.5437 www.euroatlanticinstitute.org

European Community Studies Association is a project of the European Commission developed to be an umbrella for associations of EU scholars, primarily in EU member states. It promotes the study/teaching of European integration and cooperation among its member associations.

67, Rue de Trèves
B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 230 54 72 www.ecsanet.org

European Research Institute acts as a catalyst for research and postgraduate study in European Studies across many departments and schools within the University of Birmingham.

University of Birmingham
Edgbaston
Birmingham
B15 2TT
T 0121-414 6928
www.eri.bham.ac.uk/index.htm

European Union Studies Association is the premier scholarly and professional association, worldwide, for all those following EU affairs. With 1600+ members in more than 40 countries, EUSA publishes a quarterly journal, a book series, (*State of the European Union*), and a printed Member Directory, holds international conferences, gives awards, has member-based special interest sections, and much more.

415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
T 412 648 7635 www.eustudies.org

Institute for European Environmental Policy is a center for the analysis and development of environmental and related policies in Europe.

28 Queen Anne's Gate
London
SW1H 9AB, UK
T +44 (0)207 799 2244
www.ieep.org.uk/

National Centre for Research on Europe provides academic support and outreach services for those in New Zealand and the Pacific interested in EU studies.

University of Canterbury, New Zealand
T 64 3 364 2634
www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz

Study Group for European Policies encourages study and research on European issues in Belgium, and responds to the growing need for political reflection on integration.

11 Rue d'Egmont
B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 545 04 61 www.tepsa.be

University Association for Contemporary European Studies brings together academics researching Europe with practitioners in European affairs.

King's College London, Strand
London WC2R 2LS, UK
T 44 20 7240 0206 www.uaces.org

EUSA Prizes

THE EUSA'S 1997-1999 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE established prizes to be awarded at each EUSA Biennial Conference. The selection committees are comprised of EUSA Executive Committee members and established EU scholars. We seek nominations for the following:

EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper

The EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper will be awarded in 2005 to an outstanding paper presented at the 2003 Biennial Conference in Nashville. All those who presented an original paper at the Conference and who deposited copies of their paper with the EUSA at the time of the Conference are eligible. The prize carries a cash award of \$100.

To apply for the prize, please mail three paper copies of the version of the paper that you presented at the 2003 EUSA Conference to the EUSA Administrative Office (address below). Deadline for **receipt** of nominated papers for the EUSA Prize for Best 2003 Conference Paper is **September 17, 2004**.

EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation

The EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation in EU studies will be awarded in 2005 to a dissertation on any aspect of European integration submitted in completion of the Ph.D. at a U.S. university between September 1, 2002 and August 31, 2004. The student must have defended and deposited the dissertation and graduated during this period, and the dissertation must include a signed, dated dissertation committee approval page, and the dissertation nomination must be submitted by the department chair. Only one dissertation per department at an institution may be nominated for this prize. The prize carries a cash award of \$250.

Department chairs should mail one paper copy of the dissertation with a cover letter from the department chair to the EUSA Administrative Office (address below). Deadline for receipt of nominations for the next EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation is **September 17, 2004**.

EUSA Book Prize

The 2003-05 Executive Committee of the European Union Studies Association is pleased to announce the launch of the **EUSA Book Prize**, to be awarded at each biennial EUSA conference, for a book in English on any aspect of EU studies and published in the two years prior to the EUSA Conference. This prize carries a cash award of \$US 300 to the author(s). For the 2005 EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded in Austin, Texas, books published in 2003 and 2004 will be eligible. Authors or publishers should submit one (hard) copy of the nominated book with a letter of transmittal to EUSA Book Prize, European Union Studies Association, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. Deadline for receipt of nominated books in the EUSA office is **January 15, 2005**.

Send Best Conference Paper, Best Dissertation Prize and Book Prize nominations to:

European Union Studies Association
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

Conferences

September 6-8, 2004: "The European Union: New Neighbors, New Challenges," UACES 34th Annual Conference and 9th Research Conference, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. See www.uaces.org/D410401.htm.

September 9-11, 2004: Outside Looking In: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the EU," Christchurch, New Zealand. Organized by the Asia-Pacific European Union Studies Association. See www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz

September 15-19, 2004: "European Integration: Local and Global Consequences," Brno, Czech Republic. Organized by Mendel University. See www.pef.mendelu.cz/conf.

September 16-18, 2004: "Turkey's Accession Process to the European Union," Istanbul, Turkey. See www.tunaecs.org.

September 18-19, 2004: "The Atlantic Community Unraveling? States, Protest Movements, and the Transformation of U.S.-European Relations, 1969-1983," Nashville, TN. Contact matthias.schulz@vanderbilt.edu.

October 1, 2004: 12th International Conference of the Center for European Studies of Havana, Cuba. The conference recognizes the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Center for European Studies. See www.cee.cubaweb.cu/conferen.htm.

October 27-30, 2004: "Democracy and Culture in the Transatlantic World," Maastricht, Netherlands. Organized by Vaxjo University and the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies. See www.vxu.se/conference/mcts2004.

November 18-19, 2004: "European Construction through the Prism of the June 2004 European Parliamentary Elections," Strasbourg, France. Organized by the Groupe D'Analyse Electorale, GAEL, Groupe Europe de L'Association Française de Science Politique, AFSP and L'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Strasbourg, GSPE. For information contact dominique.bellec@urs.u-strasbg.fr.

March 31-April 2, 2005: 9th Biennial International Conference, European Union Studies Association, Austin, Texas, USA. See www.eustudies.org/conf2005.html.

Publications

- Apap, Joanna (ed.) (2004) *Justice and Home Affairs in the EU: Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Arikan, Harun (2003) *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Biondi, Andrea, Eeckhout, Piet and Flynn, James (eds.) (2004) *The Law of State Aid in the European Union*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Caloghirou, Yannis, Vonortas, Nicholas S. and Ionides, Stavros (eds.) (2004) *European Collaboration in Research and Development: Business Strategy and Public Policy*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Cameron, Fraser (ed.) (2004) *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Dobson, Lynn and Follesdal, Andreas (eds.) (2004) *Political Theory and the European Constitution*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Keating, Michael (ed.) (2004) *Regions and Regionalism in Europe*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kelemen, R. Daniel (2004) *The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Koutrakou, Vassiliki N. (ed.) (2004) *Contemporary Issues and Debates in EU Policy: The European Union and International Relations*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Mahant, Edelgard (2004) *Birthmarks of Europe: The Origins of the European Community Reconsidered*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Menendez-Alarcon, Antonio (2004) *The Cultural Realm of European Integration: Social Representations in France, Spain and the United Kingdom*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso (2004) *Europe, A Civil Power: Lessons From EU Experience*. London, UK: The Federal Trust.

Slodka, Anna (2004) *Eco Labelling in the EU: Lessons for Poland*. SEI Working Paper 75. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.

Sofer, Catherine (ed.) (2004) *Human Capital Over the Life Cycle*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Talani, Leila Simona (2004) *European Political Economy: Political Science Perspectives*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.

EUSA News & Notes

Planning for **EUSA's Ninth Biennial International Conference** (March 31-April 2, 2005) is well under way. The Program Committee has been convened; our Call for Proposals appears in this issue on p. 8 and is posted on our Web site. Please circulate the call widely. Key deadlines to note: for receipt of conference proposals at the EUSA office, **Friday, October 15, 2004**; to get the early registration rate and to appear in the final printed program, **Monday, February 7, 2005**.

Please plan to attend our Austin, Texas gathering. Our conference hotel is the Hyatt Regency Austin on Town Lake. Austin is the Texas state capital, and the state legislature will be in session—and open to the public for observation—during the dates of our conference. Free guided tours are available of the stunning capitol building, built in 1888 of pink granite. Across the street is the Texas Governor's Mansion (free guided tours also available), home to Texas' "first family" since 1856. Austin's oldest building is the French Legation, constructed in 1841 for the French *charge d'affaires* to the Republic of Texas, and now a small museum on lovely grounds. Austin has many historical linkages to Europe, especially to Germany, as the German Free School and the Scholz Garten (Texas' oldest *biergarten* and Austin's oldest restaurant) attest.

Austin's population is approximately 1.25 million people, and Austin is 235 miles from the Mexican border. The city is home to the University of Texas main campus, one of the largest state universities in the United States—thus Austin's reputation as a young city. Nicknamed "live music capitol of the world," Austin has over 100 live music venues and is home to the well-known "Austin City Limits" concert studio. More details about our Conference and about Austin as a destination are posted on our Web site at www.eustudies.org.

Don't forget to list the **European Union Studies Association** and our Web address on your course syllabi as an important EU resource for your students. For those of you whose syllabi are posted on your institution's Web sites, please include a hyperlink to us. The full URL is <http://www.eustudies.org>.

Are you moving? We know that many EUSA members move frequently. Please drop an e-mail to the EUSA office at eusa@pitt.edu in advance, to let us know your new address. Six weeks' advance notice is ideal.

Inside the Summer 2004 *EUSA Review*:

EUSA Review Forum: The European Parliament: Taking Stock After the June 2004 Elections

“Europe’: A Side Issue in European Parliamentary Election Campaigns”	Niilo Kauppi	1
“The Interinstitutional Balance in the EU”	Michael Shackleton	3
“Transnational Party Dynamics in the EP”	Olivier Costa	4
“The Prospect of ‘United Centre-Right Government’ in the EU”	Simon Hix	6

Call for Proposals: EUSA’s 9th Biennial Conference **8**

Essay: “Ireland, the EU Presidency and the Constitutional Treaty: A Triumph for Irish Diplomacy”	Nicholas Rees	9
--	----------------------	----------

Book Reviews	15
EU-Related Organizations	21
EUSA Prizes; Conferences	22
Publications; EUSA News and Notes	23

Founded in 1988 (and formerly called the European Community Studies Association), the European Union Studies Association is a non-profit academic and professional organization devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union.

How to Support the European Union Studies Association



Lifetime Membership

\$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of \$500

EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund

to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference

EUSA Endowment Fund

to ensure the long-term viability and independence of our non-profit organization

Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies

to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies

Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Donors of \$25 or more receive a receipt for income tax purposes and will be listed in the *EUSA Review*. Include a contribution with your membership renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu