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## British Euroskepticism

On January 23, 2013, Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech in which he declared himself in favor of "fundamental, far-reaching change" in the EU. Perhaps most importantly, he promised "a referendum with a very simple in or out choice". Of course this is not the first time that a British leader expresses skepticism on the EU. Yet Cameron's speech was especially forceful and Britain is the only member state so far where a separatist party like the UK Independence Party is able to poll at 25% of the electorate.

The fact is that Euroskepticism seems to have greater political traction in Britain than in other EU countries, both among political leaders and among voters. So the question is, why does Euroskepticism work so well both among British politicians and in public opinion? Is British Euroskepticism of a different nature than other national varieties of Euroskepticism – or is it a harbinger of things to come elsewhere?

The contributors to this EUSA Forum give somewhat different answers to these questions. Oliver Daddow argues that British Euroskepticism is primarily an artifact of British party politics, especially within the Conservative Party. In his reading, Cameron's invocation of a referendum is a clumsy attempt to contain the rise of the UK Independence Party. Paul Taggart also highlights the peculiarity of the Conservative Party's Euroskepticism and its capacity to hijack British politics. This leads the UK to adopt "paradoxical" stances vis-à-vis the EU – paving the way for what may turn out to be the first exit from the EU by a major member state. Simon Usherwood considers the two faces of British Euroskepticism. Although he sees ground for an "exceptionalist" interpretation, he also notes that Britain's Euroskepticism could easily become a "model" if EU institutions do not find ways to better "connect" with the peoples of Europe. Considering Britain "from the continent," Doreen Allerkamp takes a more relaxed view. She argues that British Euroskepticism has been successfully managed ever since the UK joined the EU, and will remain manageable in the future. In her reading, Britain's Euroskepticism is not of a fundamentally different nature than other national varieties of Euroskepticism.

**Nicolas Jabko**  
EUSA Review Editor

## The Ghosts of the Past: The Conservative Party and the EU Referendum Debate in Britain

*Oliver Daddow*

Unsolved European dilemmas dating back to the John Major and Maastricht Treaty years threaten to throw the Conservative Party into yet another period of rebellion and turmoil. The prominent showing of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the May 2013 local authority elections was swiftly heralded by its leader, Nigel Farage, as a 'game changer' in British politics (BBC 2013). UKIP averaged over 25% of the vote in the wards in which its candidates stood. Most of the broadcast and print media went uncritically along with Farage's characterization of the result. Never one to under-egg a pudding, the BBC's political editor, Nick Robinson, blogged: 'It is the day UKIP emerged as a real political force in the land' (Robinson 2013). UKIP's rise was particularly damaging to the Conservative Party, which hemorrhaged votes. UKIP attracted many disaffected Conservative followers disillusioned with what they see as fudge, delay and broken promises on the thorny and related questions of Britain's relationship with the European Union (EU) and immigration.

The fallout from the local elections has been that the EU withdrawal option – hitherto occupying a relatively marginal place within British political discourse – has assumed a degree of legitimacy that it did not quite possess beforehand. Some organs of the UK media, notably the Daily Express with its 'Get Britain Out' campaign, launched in November 2010, have been joined by a host of high profile opinion formers, all pushing for Britain to sever formal ties with the EU. Most notably, Conservative grandees such as Nigel Lawson and Cabinet ministers such as Education Secretary Michael Gove and Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, have started publicly to make the case that Britain is better off outside the EU, economically, politically and strategically (Morris 2013).

Accounting for the party political context of the UK's debates about Europe helps us put Farage's claims about 'change' into their proper light. Is it 'change' or a new take on an old story? 'Change' might be too grand a word for what is unfolding, although there might be some merit in the description, with two qualifications in place. First, the Conservative Party has suffered from travails over the Europe question for two decades and more, back at least as far as the Maastricht Treaty negotiations of 1991-93. What has changed is neither the issue, its framing, nor necessarily its salience to voters. Instead, what appears to have happened is that David Cameron's pledge to hold a post-renegotiation referendum in 2017 has backfired more seriously than he could have imagined after he made his Bloomberg speech in January 2013 (Cameron 2013). The biggest game changer is not that UKIP picked up so many disaffected voters, but that a Conservative Prime Minister created



such an obvious opportunity for it to do so. It should come as no shock to anyone that, given the mid-term second order election contest, the British public should wish to kick the government and warn it over its confused European policy. An overt and astute populist leader on the political right, Farage has positioned himself and his party very well to gain from Cameron's unsure handling of this sensitive topic.

Second, on the Europe question more than any other in British politics, the public and organized opposition have learnt the hard way: that decision-making elites like to keep a tight strategic grip on the pace and nature of Britain's engagement with the EU. Take, for example, New Labour's 1997 'five economic tests' on single currency membership, or its approach to the Lisbon Treaty a decade later (see Daddow 2011). Trust in politicians – never very high – is particularly thin on matters European. Promising to resolve the Europe issue on the one hand, the Coalition government has, on the other, put two arguably much more serious obstacles in the way. To begin with, Cameron's Conservatives have to win the next general election with an outright parliamentary majority. Then, there has to be a successful renegotiation of the terms of the UK's membership of the EU, which convinces Eurosceptics in particular that there will be no further encroachments on British sovereignty. This echoes the tactic used by Harold Wilson which paved the way for the 1975 referendum on continued membership of the European Economic Community. The result then was a decisive 2-1 majority in favour of staying in the club. Neither outcome looks particularly likely at the present time.

As usual in Britain, the Europe question is refracted through the prism of party politics, in this case Conservative Party management. In David Cameron, the Conservative Party found a leader who has been content to present himself as a pragmatic Eurosceptic, appealing to all sectors of the parliamentary and grass roots party. While he was riding high in the opinion polls against Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and 'winning' the 2010 election, he could just about quell the rumblings of discontent on the Conservative right. Now push has come to shove, however, he has shown himself to be a weak tactician and a not much more competent strategist. The Europe question saw off Margaret Thatcher, humiliated William Hague and it now threatens to destabilise the government's focus on arguably much more important domestic matters, such as economic rebuilding. Although a pre-2015 referendum still remains a remote possibility, one thing is certain – the Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party and beyond are sniffing blood. The ghosts of the Major years might yet return to haunt the Conservative Party.

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## The Peculiarities and Paradoxes of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom

*Paul Taggart*

We have come to accept, almost as a given, that the British relationship with European integration is difficult. It has become almost normal to expect British public opinion to remain doggedly among the most hostile to integration in Europe. And it has become an expectation that British politicians in dealing with the European Union and with other European states will be playing to a domestic audience that is, at best, sceptical and often hostile to integration. But we tend to forget how peculiar and paradoxical Euroscepticism in the UK is.

Of the many states in Europe, there are good reasons why we might expect the union that is the United Kingdom to be one of the most comfortable with a regional integration project. The United Kingdom is after all itself an integrated state made up of multiple nations with distinct identities. The union has been integrated gradually over time through a process of enlargement with different types of incorporation. The current structural arrangements represent a variable geometry of institutional powers with Westminster, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Stormont exercising very different competences, in very different ways and – increasingly – with different types of politics being associated with each of the parts. And as a whole there is a substantial imbalance with this union having one large component national unit and a number of smaller ones. But we know that the United Kingdom has remained the most persistently Eu-



rosceptical of all European states. So the first paradox is that an integrated multi-national state with unevenly sized component parts has produced such sustained opposition to the project to create an integrated Europe made up of multiple states of different size and forms.

One of the key reasons for British Euroscepticism lies in its party system and particularly in one of its parties. The British system has a peculiarity of being one of the only states to have one of its major parties govern as a 'soft' Eurosceptic party. While smaller parties of the left and right have developed Eurosceptical agendas across Europe and have entered into government (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013), they have had nothing like the importance of the Conservative Party within their systems. Even the recent spectacular rise of a British new populist party like UKIP should not blind us to the overwhelming factor of just how unusual the Conservative Party's Euroscepticism is. But this does not mean the issue is easy for Conservatives. Europe played its part in the defenestration of Margaret Thatcher, caused her successor no end of problems and recently David Cameron has come to experience the particular difficulties that Europe throws up for party and parliamentary management. The paradox remains that Europe seems a crucial issue for the party but it remains a largely toxic issue for it.

The difficult nature of the issue for party management gives rise to another paradox. For a polity so defensive of its own institutional arrangements and so protective of its forms of politics, it is paradoxical that the two major parties of Westminster have repeatedly resorted to the most un-British and un-parliamentary of mechanisms to deal with the European issue. One of the most emblematic of parliamentary systems has repeatedly resorted to referendums or pledges of them (see Oppermann, 2012) to deal with Europe. For the Labour Party the use of a referendum on the terms of British accession to Europe settled the difficult issue of party management in 1975. For Tony Blair, the pledge to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 effectively neutralised the issue at the subsequent general election. And for the Conservative element of the current coalition government the promise of a referendum has become the tool by which Cameron has sought to manage the issue. While for his backbenchers the referendum commitment has become a tool with which to attempt to beat the leadership onto a path marked exit. In the end they may succeed. The twin paradoxes of a major party advocating Euroscepticism and using referendum pledges to deal with the issue of Europe may well lead to the ultimate peculiarity of the first major EU state leaving the Union.

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### **British Euroscepticism: Outlier or Exemplar?**

Simon Usherwood

One of the key questions that might be asked of euroscepticism in the UK is the extent to which is it typical of a wider pattern, as opposed to simply a special situation in a peculiar set of circumstances. Both cases have been made, but it is useful to briefly rehearse the arguments once more here.

What is not in any doubt is that there is a strong sense of insularity – in both the metaphorical and the literal senses of the word – about the British debate on European integration. The British national myth of standing apart from 'the Continent', 'of Europe, but not in Europe' in Churchill's famous phrase, recurs with a regularity that only underlines the lack of any alternative framing that is so pervasive. It plays into geography, history, legal models and even culture (especially with that 'special relationship' across the Atlantic). In this model, there is much to be proud of in being British, that to wish it away is an almost impossible demand of politicians or other public figures: there is no agenda of modernisation, post-authoritarian reconstruction or any of the other myths that have framed other countries' debates.

Beyond the insular framing, we also have to acknowledge the relative extent of the 'European' debate in the UK: it is hard to think of any other member state where the purpose, value and direction of the European Union has quite so much discussion and debate by political actors and wider civil society, referendum or accession debates elsewhere notwithstanding. In part, this reflects the lack of pervasive embedding of membership into the political elite, where scepticism was always an option, even before the 1990s. It also reflects on the role of the media in public life. Importantly, the pervasiveness of the debate should not be confused with its profundity: 'more heat than light' often feels like a generous description of a debate that often struggles to get out of the pub in which it apparently began.

This, in turn, leads to the final distinct aspect of the British debate, namely the types of options under consideration. Only in the UK is withdrawal of membership



seriously considered as a viable path for public policy. In other states, the main thrust is one of reform, rather than rejection: even figures such as Vaclav Klaus speak like this. This is tied into the frames already mentioned, where ‘Europe’ is a necessary vehicle for a bigger national project and needs to be made to work.

Set against this ‘exceptionalist’ reading, we do still need to appreciate that there is much that is not so different from elsewhere. At a mundane level, euroscepticism is now found in every member state; indeed, in every European state. Moreover, in all those states, there are exceptionalist frames, talking of national particularities, Sonderwege and the rest. To focus on the exceptions is to miss the wider structural issues raised by publics and elites.

Swinging back to the UK, it is also necessary to acknowledge that the rhetoric does not match the practice: the British government does try – as much as possible, and especially when away from the limelight – to be a constructive partner in the Union. The political culture of rigorous debate before committing to action is stylistically different from many European partners, but which has the same ultimate intent behind it. Indeed, in the context of the current crisis, it has much to commend it as an approach. From the internal market to defence to CAP reform, the UK has acted to produce more sustainable and useful integration.

But perhaps the biggest danger in seeing the UK as an outlier is that it distracts from the challenge that European integration as a whole faces. In searching for reasons why we don’t need to get too concerned about losing a country that doesn’t appear too bothered about being a member, we will miss the failure of European elites to find answers to the Laeken goals of connecting with the peoples of Europe. This is a British euroscepticism, but it is important we see it as part of a Europe-wide phenomenon, and a model that risks becoming more, not less, typical if we do not find a way to build a system of integration that works for today’s problems.

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**British Euroscepticism – A View  
from “the Continent”**  
*Doreen K. Allerkamp*

Ever since Great Britain missed – or rather, refused to get on to – the boat at Messina, its relationship with “the Continent” has been an issue almost akin to “the German question”. Yet unlike the latter, it has been more troublesome for the country concerned than for the rest of the EU. Not since Charles de Gaulle famously blocked Britain’s accession twice in the 1960s for both

economic and political reasons has any European leader seriously argued that the UK should not be part of the EU. Nor has any US administration, for that matter, even though more radical British Eurosceptics have repeatedly (but in vain) sought American support for an alternative to British EU membership along the lines of some form of enhanced Transatlanticism. Inside the UK, the picture is a different one, as both elite and popular Euroscepticism have proved enduring phenomena and the EU and its workings have been continuously subject to political controversy – if not topping the current agenda, then bubbling ominously just beneath the surface. From a Continental perspective, two points about the contested nature of Britain’s relationship with the European Union seem particularly worth making.

First, British Euroscepticism is by no means a homogenous, categorically distinct phenomenon, exclusive to the British Isles. On the one hand, it is primarily an English phenomenon, as neither Scotland nor Wales have ever been particularly Eurosceptic. Indeed, there is an argument that Euroscepticism is at the heart of English nationalism, for which European integration is a threatening and thereby uniting perspective, while it constitutes more of a political opportunity for Scotland and Wales (cf. Wellings 2012). Accordingly, the attempt by Nigel Farage, leader of Britain’s most explicitly Eurosceptic political party, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), to campaign in Scotland, received a less than warm welcome.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, other EU member states have also displayed various forms of Euroscepticism, and continue to do so to this day. Most have parties with Eurosceptic views, if not single-issue anti-EU parties. Since February 2013, even Germany has its first and only single-issue Eurosceptic party, Alternative für Deutschland, which has yet to face an electoral contest, however (at the time of writing, it is polling in the low single digits). UK public opinion on EU membership has been considerably less stable than the EU average, but other members, too, have experienced sustained periods of popular dissatisfaction with the EU, including Sweden and Denmark.<sup>2</sup> The latter, incidentally, has as many opt-outs from the EU Treaties as the UK does. Furthermore, the financial crisis has seen the EU widely blamed for its repercussions across the most affected countries, and its support has nosedived accordingly. The one aspect that appears to genuinely set the UK apart from its EU peers is the largely unchallenged predominance of a starkly Eurosceptic discourse in the print media, which not only exerts extensive influence on the formation of public and political opinion, but frames the entire debate (cf. Hawkins 2012). Yet overall, the distinctiveness of British Euroscepticism appears to be more a matter of degree than of kind.

Second, British Euroscepticism is not exactly a new phenomenon, and the EC/EU has managed to work with



it ever since Britain's accession in 1973 – as well as with the challenges occasionally presented by other member states (including, but not limited to, negative referenda on Treaties, sensitive Constitutional Courts and undemocratic tendencies). Britain's partners coped with its insistence, barely two years after entering, to renegotiate its terms of accession and have them approved by a national referendum in 1975. They postponed the first direct elections to the European Parliament for a year because domestic resistance had rendered the British government unable to pass the requisite legislation in time for the originally envisaged date in 1978. They appeased an irate Margaret Thatcher by approving, in 1984, an unprecedented rebate on British membership dues. They saw off John Major's threats of a second empty chair crisis in 1996, maintaining the BSE-induced ban on British beef for 10 years. They welcomed New Labour with open arms, accepted its step back from the single currency but denied it the coveted access to the Eurogroup. Now they are watching, with resigned apprehension, to what extent the Liberal Democrats can contain the rising tide of Eurosceptics inside the Conservative Party, their coalition partner.

But there are enough Europhiles in Britain and enough Anglophiles in the rest of the EU to remain confident that, whatever next challenge the UK offers, the Community will work with it.

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### Notes

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These tendencies can be observed by comparing the results from the Eurobarometer question, "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ...?", to which the answer options are a good/bad thing, neither, or don't know, across time and member states.

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### Comparing Theoretical Frameworks of the EU Policy Process

Nikolaos Zahariadis\*

There have been numerous attempts to systematically study EU policy. Despite considerable movement, however, there has not been much movement forward. Frameworks dedicated to explaining EU policy remain for the most part theoretically underdeveloped and empirically incomplete. Many deal more broadly with European integration. Mimicking policy studies at the national level, others operate in theoretical silos or are content to focus on functional areas, such as trade or education, with little regard or interest in developments across policy sectors.

In an upcoming special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* (2013), several members of the public policy section part ways with this way of theorizing. Contributors assess seven promising frameworks of the EU policy process in parallel, taking stock of their strengths and limitations. Key assumptions, variables, and their underlying logic are clarified and explored. Hypotheses and their key EU applications are then reviewed with an eye toward assessing the conditions under which lenses (frameworks or perspectives) enjoy high explanatory and predictive power. The aim is to help scholars make good analytical choices, addressing new and old EU problems in historically contingent environments. To help further develop robust research agendas, lenses are compared based on where they stand on issue and institutional complexity.

The contributions have considerable value-added. First, this is the first systematic analysis of different frameworks of the EU policy process. Second, the contributors speak to each other and to theoretical developments in the broader field of policy studies, generating a fertile dialogue that transcends the narrow confines of EU policy. Third, choice is viewed as a menu of alternative explanations and methodologies with different trade-offs and not as a right or wrong answer to a given problem.

#### Competing or Complementary Explanations?

Allison's (1971) classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the merit of applying different perspectives to understand the same case. At one level, each perspective answers the same question. It contains a different logic of explanation and assigns different weight to relevant factors. Assessing the explanatory power of each perspective enables the analyst not only to gain a better grasp of how and why particular EU policy makers make the decisions they do, but it also

sheds light into predicting what kind of decisions other policy makers are likely to make in the future.

At another level, however, different lenses answer different questions. As Allison (1971, 251) claims:

Spectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and thus not only lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, in their summary questions, to be the same, but also influence the character of the analyst's puzzle, the evidence he assumes to be relevant, the concepts he uses to examine the evidence, and what he takes to be an explanation.

The point behind competing versus complementary perspectives is far from trivial. Most analysts who systematically assess the explanatory power of different perspectives tend to view perspectives as competing. But analyses are often pitched at different levels (Peterson 2001), making them complementary. Carefully specifying assumptions and identifying the conditions under which each perspective yields insight are crucial steps in understanding the complexity of making policy.

#### Institutional and Issue Complexity

The EU policy process is highly complex. Institutions now have to deal with 27 national systems, each with its own traditions, institutions, styles, values, and time-tables. Differences need to be addressed and somehow reconciled in order for policy to be made. Given the complexity of EU rules, procedures, and jurisdictional boundaries, what is surprising is not whether EU decisions are right (or not) but the fact that any decisions are made at all!

Complexity refers to the nature of interaction among distinct units or parts of a system. Interaction takes place horizontally (among EU institutions and transnational actors) and vertically (between EU and national and sub-national actors). Highly complex systems are characterized by free flowing information across many units with planned or unexpected feedback loops which are not immediately comprehensible (Zahariadis 2003).

Complexity has two dimensions: issue and institutional. Issue complexity refers to the amount and nature of informational linkages. How much information is needed for an issue to be properly understood? How many links are made across issues? What type of information do we need to have before we can start tackling a particular problem? Institutional complexity refers to a multitude of rules governing close interactions among a large number of structurally differentiated units across different organizational levels. It contains such design features as branching, cycling, asynchrony, multi-directionality, and overlap that provide ample op-



portunities for frames of success and failure to jump across sub-systemic boundaries.

Complexity has four implications for the study of EU policy. First, increasing complexity raises cost because more actors are involved and in different, potentially contradictory ways. Although expertise and competence affect EU agency autonomy (Wonka and Rittberger 2010), more autonomous agencies naturally place more demands on resources. Second, complexity begets complexity. Although it is monetarily costlier, it is politically more expedient to add new or more rules and processes onto existing ones especially if costs are widely distributed through national budgets. Third, higher complexity gives rise to political conflict. More information and unanticipated feedbacks create overlapping and nested institutional jurisdictions that give rise to power struggles for control of agendas and resources. Fourth, complexity safeguards diversity. If “united in diversity” is a key EU aim, citizens and their national leaders have incentives to sustain complex processes in the hope of saving national idiosyncrasies and values from the homogenizing pressures of economies of scale.

### **Seven Frameworks of the Policy Process**

The list is not exhaustive, but it contains promising frameworks: multi-level governance, advocacy coalitions, punctuated equilibrium, multiple streams, policy learning, normative power Europe, and constructivism. Selection was based on the range of assumptions each framework makes, the number of articles and/or books that have used the lens, ability to speak to the broader policy literature, and the potential scholars claim it has in explaining EU policy. We did not include principal-agent approaches largely because there are very good reviews already in print (e.g., Pollack 2007; Kassim and Menon 2003). Readers are familiar with some of the hypotheses and strengths of each lens. They are invited to reflect on the limitations and the robust research agendas outlined by each contributor.

Lenses fall into one of four quadrants of institutional and issue complexity. Multi-level governance (MLG), principal-agent models, and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) assume high levels of institutional complexity and low levels of issue complexity. Stephenson highlights the trajectory of the MLG lens, noting the different phases and comparative applications utilizing the concepts of institutions, identity, and delegation. Interestingly, Rozbicka reveals the similarities in terms of handling institutional complexity but also notes ACF's contribution of belief systems in forming coalitions that cut across institutions.

Conversely, Saurugger showcases constructivism's capacity to handle issue complexity with relative ease. Adding nuance to the large epistemological tent

occupied by constructivists, Saurugger discusses the various ways actors use ideas to act strategically in EU policy. Although institutional complexity does not feature prominently in constructivist work, several ways are identified to link ideas to institutions.

Princen argues that punctuated equilibrium (PE) is perhaps the only approach that can handle both institutional and issue complexity quite well. He notes, however, its limitation exists thus far in methodological pitfalls and diversity of conceptualizations of policy change. Sharing similarities with PE, multiple streams reinforces its ability to handle issue complexity. But the latter's limitation, as Ackrill, Kay, and Zahariadis discuss, lies in its relative inattention to the EU's institutional complexity.

Finally, Radaelli and Dunlop investigate four examples of policy learning and draw implications for the study of EU policy. One lesson that permeates their analysis points to the need for institutional design as a mechanism facilitating and constraining learning. Coming from a different theoretical tradition but sharing constructivism's focus on normative framing, Birchfield examines the analytical utility of the normative power Europe approach. Although somewhat limited to mainly transnational issues, the approach nevertheless highlights the great value and considerable difficulty with investigating complex institutions and issues. All contributors stress the need to use additional lenses to supplement the explanatory power of each individual framework. But how can we do that?

### **Which Way Forward?**

Richardson (2006, 25) claims “the complexity of the EU policy process means that we must learn to live with multiple models and learn to utilize concepts from a range of models in order to help us describe it as accurately as possible.” John (2003) prefers a synthetic approach to studying policy whereby analysts utilize an eclectic mix of concepts. We chart a third way. It specifies which lenses to use and when based on what the different frameworks say through the filters of institutional and issue complexity.

The strategy begins by identifying areas of similarities and differences among lenses. Frameworks that share critical assumptions on one or both dimensions may be viewed as competing explanations of the same phenomenon. Explanatory or predictive power may be empirically assessed by testing lenses side by side in an effort to ascertain which lens explains and predicts more with less. Frameworks with significant differences may be considered complementary because they ask fundamentally different questions. They may not be fruitfully compared because they illuminate different aspects of policy and are applicable under different conditions. For example, multi-level governance and



punctuated equilibrium approaches may be viewed as competing on issues involving higher institutional complexity. Policy learning and multiple streams are complementary as they diverge on assumptions about complex institutions and issues.

Research may test and replicate the empirical validity of our claim. This can be done with a nested “most/least likely” case design similar to Jubilee, Caporaso, and Checkel’s (2003) two dialogues: domain of applicability (to fully specify conditions and expectations) and then competitive testing (to assess explanatory and predictive power). Our contribution lies in proposing complexity as the lynchpin that holds the agenda together. The design involves selecting cases where the lens is expected to fit and then a range of cases where it does not. For example, constructivism and multiple streams may be positioned to explain the highly complex issue of the current financial crisis. They can then be paired to examine employment schemes under cohesion policy, an area of high institutional complexity, and decisions to save endangered species, an area of lower institutional complexity. Results isolate the effects of institutions and highlight limitations regarding issue complexity. The aim is to identify limitations under similar conditions in order to clearly ascertain the trade-offs each lens makes between explanatory and predictive power. Competing lenses can then be rank-ordered, subsumed, or discarded.

The next step is to improve what each lens lacks by relaxing its assumptions and using different analytical techniques to clarify its logic or confirm its hypotheses. Complementary lenses may be used to more clearly describe different aspects of the same issue and more accurately explain or predict policy outcomes. Not everyone will agree with our choices and claims, but we are convinced the effort to prove us wrong will not only advance the state of policy theory but also help build better frameworks of the EU policy process.

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### **Income Inequality, Parliamentary Elections, and the Recent Economic Crisis** *Florence Bouvet and Sharmila King*

There has been general increasing dissatisfaction with the growing income gap between the rich and poor in Western countries. In a recent study conducted by the World Economic Forum<sup>1</sup> in 2013, severe income inequality is ranked one of the biggest risks facing the world. One example of the dissatisfaction among the electorate is the “Occupy Wall Street” protests that emerged from the recent US banking and financial crisis. The slogan of the “Occupy” movement - “We are the 99% and we will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%” - is indicative of the frustration among many with the electoral process. In Europe, the financial crisis was soon followed by a debt crisis which is still unresolved to date. There protests have emerged following the austerity measures undertaken in order to receive bailout funds from the European Troika (European Union, International Monetary Fund, and European Central Bank), as some government redistributive policies have been cut, which could possibly lead to an increase in income inequality.

As a result, the recent economic crisis played a significant role during the last elections in the US and Europe. Between 2008 and 2012, out of the 35 parliamentary elections were held in the 27 OECD countries, only 8 incumbent leading parties have remained the first parties in their respective national governments.<sup>2</sup> However, during times of severe economic crisis, the electorate may not hold the incumbent party as accountable, especially if the crisis is viewed as an exogenous event. Rather, voters may vote prospectively and support the party with policies that best solve or mitigate the crisis (see Palmer and Whitten (2011), Anderson and Hecht (2012), Bellucci et al. (2012) and Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2012), Scotto (2012)).

While there is an extensive literature on economic voting (see Lewis-Beck, 1988 and Lewis-Beck and Steigmaier, 2000 for a review of this literature) that finds that economic developments, notably economic growth, unemployment, and inflation, affect electoral outcomes, no paper has extensively examined the relationship between income inequality and election outcomes. To fill this gap in the past literature, we use data on parliamentary elections in OECD countries between 1975 and 2012 to analyze the relationship between the vote shares of incumbent government parties and income inequality. Income inequality is measured with

Gini coefficients obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study. In addition to our measure of income inequality, we assess the economic performance of the country with four macroeconomic variables typically included in voting function: the inflation rate,<sup>3</sup> the unemployment rate, the growth rate in per capita real income, and the openness to trade.<sup>4</sup>

Besides economic outcomes, we also control for three national institutional dimensions. The first one is a measure of government fractionalization. It is equal to the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. It is used to control for the complexity of government coalition. The more fragmented a government is, the more difficult it is for the voters to hold a specific party accountable for the national economic performance. An alternative strategy would consist on including a dummy variable for single-party or a dummy for coalition governments (Chappell and Veiga, 2000). However, the latter for instance would not distinguish between a two-party coalition and a four-party where political responsibility is relative less easy to establish. We also control for multi-level governance by adding a dummy variable equal to one when a country includes autonomous regions, and zero otherwise. “An autonomous region is recorded if a source explicitly mentions a region, area, or district that is autonomous or self-governing. Furthermore, they must be constitutionally designated as “autonomous” or “independent” or “special”.” (Keefer, 2010, page 21).<sup>5</sup> If regions are self-governing, it is then more difficult for voters to assess whether the central/federal government or the regional governments bear more responsibility for the economic outcomes of the country (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Finally, we control for the number of years a government has been in office, as “older” governments should be held more accountable (Chappell and Veiga, 2000).

We use the aforementioned dataset to test four hypotheses. First, we expect to find evidence of economic voting, and more particularly, that voters are less likely to vote for an incumbent party if the unemployment and inflation rates increased, and if the country experienced an economic downturn during their term. Second, we expect an increase in income inequality to lower the vote share to incumbent parties. Our third hypothesis relates to the political impact of trade openness. Insofar as more open economies are more likely to be affected by external shocks, their incumbent governments should be held less accountable for the performance of the national economy than in countries with relatively more closed economies (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Palmer and Whitten, 2011). To test this hypothesis, we interact the openness to trade variable with the inequality measure (Gini coefficient)

and the other three macroeconomic indicators (the unemployment rate, inflation rate, and annual growth rate in real per capita income). If our null hypothesis is true, then the coefficients on the interaction terms with unemployment, inflation, and income inequality should be positive, while the coefficient on the interaction term with economic growth should be negative.

Because the recent economic downturn has been the longest and the most severe recession experienced by OECD countries over the last 30 years, this crisis and notably its global dimension has “severely challenged the capacity of governments to steer the national economy and has had a strong impact on their electoral support” (Bellucci et al., 2012; page 469). Since 2008, only 8 incumbent leading parties in the countries included in this analysis have remained the first parties in their respective national governments. With these stylized facts in mind, we examine whether the recent economic crisis induced a shift in economic voting, and whether this shift is affected by the degree of openness of the national economies. To that end, we add to our model a time dummy variable equals for 2008 and onwards. We then interact this dummy variable with the macroeconomic variables and the inequality variable, as well as with the interaction terms between the openness variables and the other four economic variables. A negative coefficient on the crisis dummy variable would indicate that, everything else equal, incumbent parties have benefited from less support since 2008, and thus that there is some asymmetry in economic voting. This leads to our fourth hypothesis. On the one hand, if the crisis exacerbates economic voting, then the coefficients should be negative on the interaction terms with unemployment, income inequality, and inflation, while it should be positive for economic growth. On the other hand, if voters judge that the global dimension of the crisis diminished the capacity of governments to steer

the national economy, and should therefore be held less accountable, then the coefficients would have opposite signs to those discussed above.

Given the numerous interaction terms included in the specification, we report in the table below the overall effects of the macroeconomic indicators and of the crisis dummy variable.

Starting with the crisis dummy, we find that, holding everything else constant, the vote share of government parties was 29.6 percentage points lower than before 2008. Turning to the central variable of our paper, namely income inequality, we find that prior to the recent economic downturn, a change in income inequality is negatively associated with the total vote share of government parties: a 1-percentage point increase or one unit in the Gini coefficient (which is a 3.2% increase) is associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease (equivalent to a 3% decrease) in vote share. For the period starting in 2008, we find that a 1-percentage point increase or one unit increase in inequality, everything else constant, is associated with an increase by 8.6 percentage points and almost 9 percentage points in the vote share of government parties and of the leading party respectively. Consequently, voters have not been penalizing incumbent governments for rising income inequality. As suggested in Palmer and Whitten (2011), “During periods of severe economic crisis, however, economic voting might be attenuated as a result of voters discounting the economic outcomes as being disconnected from past policy choices” (page 428).

Out of the other three macroeconomic variables, the unemployment rate appears to be the most robust element of economic voting, before and after the crisis. Before 2008, a one-percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with a 0.98-percentage point decrease in the vote share for the government. Following the recent economic crisis, voters have held

### Vote share of all government parties

|                   |             |                        |
|-------------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Unemployment      | before 2008 | -0.984                 |
|                   | since 2008  | -12.584                |
| Income Inequality | before 2008 | -1.264                 |
|                   | since 2008  | 8.625                  |
| Inflation rate    | before 2008 | Statist. insignificant |
|                   | since 2008  | Statist. Insignificant |
| Economic growth   | before 2008 | Statist. Insignificant |
|                   | since 2008  | 33.140                 |



incumbent governments even more accountable for increases in unemployment. A one-percentage point increase in unemployment is now associated with a 12 percentage-point decrease in vote share for all the parties in the incumbent government. Because unemployment rose significantly in Europe's periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Greece), we checked whether this last result was driven by unemployment developments in these four countries. When we exclude them from our sample, we find that since 2008, a one-percentage point increase in unemployment rate is associated with a 22 percentage point decrease in vote share for all the parties in the incumbent government.

We find no statistically significant relation between vote share and the inflation rate, which is not due to multicollinearity because correlations with economic growth and unemployment are low. This lack of significant statistical relationship might be due to the relatively low and stable inflation rates that most OECD countries have enjoyed since the late 1980s. Finally, while growth in real per capita income was not determinant prior to 2008, it becomes so during the downturn: a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of per capita income is associated with an increase in the vote share by 33 percentage points for the government parties. This large effect indicates that votes would have strongly rewarded a government able to deliver economic growth during the global recession. Regarding our third hypothesis, the positive coefficients on the openness-unemployment interaction terms indicate that, before and during the crisis, economic voting on the issue of unemployment is smaller, the more open the national economy. The negative coefficient on the crisis-openness-Gini interaction term reveals that the opposite is true for income inequality.

Overall, the downturn might have augmented economic voting in terms of unemployment and economic growth by heightening the salience of these issues, notably because this recession is one of the most severe economic downturns that these countries have experienced since WWII. Our analysis suggests that voters did not discount the recent economic crisis as a complete exogenous shock, since they held incumbent governments more accountable for the deterioration in national labor markets conditions. Yet, they acknowledge that international economic interdependence potentially undermines the efficiency and efficacy of domestic stabilization policies. This result suggests that a severe economic crisis does not necessarily result in voters removing an incumbent party from office.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> <http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013>
- <sup>2</sup> Canada in 2011, Chile in 2009, Greece in 2012, Japan in 2009, Mexico in 2009 but then lost in 2012, Netherlands in 2012, Turkey in 2011 and the USA 2012.
- <sup>3</sup> The inflation rate is measured as the annual percentage change in the consumer price index (the OECD: <http://stats.oecd.org>). To avoid that few outlying observations drive our results, we exclude from the estimations inflation rates higher than 50 %.
- <sup>4</sup> Openness to trade is the sum of exports and imports expressed relative to total GDP, from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012).
- <sup>5</sup> The following countries included in our sample have autonomous regions: Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, and the USA.

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## Transforming European Diplomacy Abroad: Insights from Washington

Heidi Maurer

The emerging system of European diplomacy, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its impact on Brussels have gained considerable attention by researchers. This short contribution, in contrast, focuses on the transformation of European diplomatic practice on the ground in Washington. By drawing on empirical insights from 40 interviews,<sup>1</sup> the paper highlights emerging coordination mechanisms and the role of the EU Delegation in the upgraded system of European diplomatic representation towards the US.

### High-profile European presence in Washington's competitive diplomatic environment

Washington is the most important diplomatic representation for many countries, and the presence of one of the largest diplomatic corps adds to Washington's special political flair, with deliberations moving rapidly from one topic to the next. Gaining attention of the US administration and remaining visible thus results in a constant "beauty contest" among diplomats.

In terms of European diplomatic presence, Washington is one of the few capitals next to Beijing and Moscow (Austermann 2012: 3) where all EU member states are represented. There are close to 700 European accredited diplomats in Washington (27 member states plus Croatia),<sup>2</sup> with numbers varying considerably between member states. Germany (136), the UK (116) and France (56) hold the strongest diplomatic presence, followed by Italy (41), Spain (35), and the Netherlands (32), while Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus account for 2-4 diplomats each. Additionally, it is the four biggest member states embassies that have a vast number of seconded experts and local staff at their disposal: considering overall embassy personnel, the UK reaches up to 450 staff, France close to 300, Germany 250 and Italy up to 230.

It was also in Washington, where the ECSC had in 1954 opened its first external presence, before the EC delegation received full diplomatic status in 1971. Washington became also the first upgraded EU delegation post-Lisbon (EU Observer 2010). With close to 35 diplomats and a total of 90 staff, the EU delegation compares to a medium-sized member states embassy, ranging after the UK, France, Germany and Italy clearly ahead of other member states.<sup>3</sup>

The EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to announce the online publication of the first EUSA Biennial Conference Special Issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* (JEPP). This Special Issue includes seven (revised) papers selected by peer review from amongst those nominated by discussants and chairs as among the best presented at 2011 Biennial EUSA conference. The Special Issue can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com>. The paper version is now available.

We look forward to continuing this collaboration between JEPP and EUSA in the future and expect that 6-8 papers from the 2013 EUSA Conference, May 9-11, 2013, to be held in the Baltimore/Washington DC metro area, will again be selected for publication in a future special JEPP/EUSA issue.



## The system of European diplomatic representation in flux

The Lisbon Treaty was meant to provide for a more coherent, more efficient and more unitary presence of the EU in international affairs. With the creation of the EEAS, former European Commission delegations were upgraded to EU delegations, which represent the EU abroad and “shall act in close cooperation with Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions” (Art. 221 TFEU).

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the two separately kept strands of European interest representation showed hardly any interaction in Washington: the rotating presidency represented the EU-27 politically towards the US and was in charge of member states coordination, while the Commission delegation represented EU competences (especially trade). Putting an end to the external representation by the rotating presidency after Lisbon, these tasks were shifted to the EU delegation. It was, however, not predetermined how this new arrangement would impact on existing diplomatic practises on the ground.

The appointment of former Commission president chief of staff Vale de Almeida as EU ambassador to the US in autumn 2010 caused resentment with some member states who would have preferred to see a national diplomat at this post (EU Observer 2010). Yet, and perhaps even because of this difficult starting position, Almeida repeatedly emphasised during his first weeks in Washington that he is not intending to interfere with member states bilateral relations (Washington Times 2010) and that the post-Lisbon arrangement would only work if the “new” delegation were of use to member states. Hence, instead of just working “in close cooperation” with member states, the EU delegation in Washington situated itself deliberately and strongly as service provider for member states.

### **“To be of service to the member states”: a new role for the upgraded EU delegation**

In the past, presidencies had organised regular meetings of ambassadors and deputies (Taylor 1980). The quantity and quality of those meetings, however, depended largely on the commitment and the resources of the country holding the presidency. During 2010, the delegation gradually took over the organisation and chairing of those meetings and extended this practice into an elaborate and institutionalised system of coordination, with regular meetings at various diplomatic levels.

Meetings on the highest level remained: once per month the EU ambassador invites member states ambassadors for a breakfast meeting at his residence. Yet, it is the weekly meetings of the deputy chief of mis-

sions that are now considered the linchpin of member states coordination. In addition, the regular meetings on sectoral issues were reinvigorated, to provide a forum for member states discussion of specific questions, but even more so for debriefings of member states by US administration guest speaker on current topics. Press officers, consular diplomats and other sectoral formations meet now at least once per month, while economic counsellors meet every two weeks. Most regularly, at least once per week, political counsellors convene, although their schedule is heavily influenced by external events, with possible 3-4 meetings during busy weeks.

European diplomats appreciate this regular possibility to stay informed about current issues and to get to know member states positions. But even more so, they emphasise the added value that debriefings with US guests have for their daily work in providing an efficient and timesaving way to gather information. Especially diplomats from small and medium-sized embassies would not be in the position to cover on their own the vast array of different topics. Additionally they highlight that the “EU-27 convening power” provides them with access to higher-ranking US officials, which they would not gain in a bilateral approach and would not be able to organise in such a regular manner. Member states appreciate, moreover, the increased sharing of reports by the delegation, about political US developments, discussions in Congress, or also recent developments in Brussels. Also debriefings organised after meetings of EU actors with US officials are valued highly by member states diplomats.

### **Conclusion**

Considering the political importance of Washington for member states, the historically strong stance of the delegation in trade issues and thus the potential for conflict within the changing system of European diplomatic representation, the transformation in Washington during the last three years has been perceived as rather smoothly by involved actors. The latter also highlight the need for more patience to let the new system get fine-tuned and fall fully into place. Member states also pragmatically assess the fact that small and medium-sized embassies profit considerably more from the new service-orientated role of the delegation. Also they emphasise that the new development must not be mistaken for integration or diminishing of bilateral diplomatic efforts. Rather the European diplomatic presence in Washington post-Lisbon should be perceived as transforming into a multi-layered and multi-dimensional system that is based on regular and intense coordination mechanisms between EU actors (i.e. member states and EU delegation). The question thus is not if the



EU delegation in Washington in specific terms is able to take over from member states, but rather how bilateral member states efforts, EU delegation activities and a close coordination of both is going to represent the EU and its member in the best positive manner in the US.

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### Notes

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<sup>2</sup> Data taken from the Diplomatic List of the State Department (version fall 2012, retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/198844.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> In 2010 the European Parliament, additionally, established the European Parliament Liaison Office in Washington, with up to 9 staff members, with the objective to establish fruitful and favourable relations with Congress, also in order to strengthen the transatlantic legislators' dialogue.

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## Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World

*David Garcia Cantalapiedra*

The European Union is embarked in a difficult and tortuous path in defining itself and its role in a changing international system that, dubiously, will respond to the international framework built by Western countries since the end of the Second World War and after the end of the Cold War. As Hedley Bull wrote about the different orders in the international system, an International Order and World Order, the latter seems not to be structured as he established in his book *The Anarchical Society* 35 years ago, on a system based on Western values, rules and principles.<sup>1</sup> Because of this, the next months will be a key momentum in Europe for different reasons: the German Parliamentary election and the European Council in December could mark the fate of the Euro, the EU economic and institutional project, and the EU's role in the World.

As the presentation of the report says, “the European Global Strategy project was initiated by the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden in July 2012 in a bid to foster and structure debate about the European Union's role as a global actor at a time of sweeping international changes”. This effort tries to reflect some debate and, to a certain point, guidance, from the academic and civil society point of view. The final result has been a report called “Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a changing World.”<sup>2</sup> Thus, there has been an effort from 20 European foundations and think-tanks but carried out mainly by four of them: International Affairs Institute (IAI), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PI SM), the Elcano Royal Institute (RIE) and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI ). The document is trying to offer a view about the challenges faced by the EU and some ideas about the role and policies that the EU should undertake to firmly establish the European Union in that changing international system. Thus, the effort to develop a proposal for a “Grand Strategy” for the European Union must be recognized and congratulated for the difficulty of the task, the creation of working groups at this level and the conciliation of ideas, mentalities, perceptions, interests and procedures across Europe. To summarize, the report is structured in three main parts:

- An introduction and a chapter for Values and Interests. Both offer a world vision that is necessary for a Grand Strategy.
- Then, the largest part and the core of the report, Strategic Interests.
- Finally, a part related to Capabilities and Instruments.



As the executive summary establishes, there are six “European vital interests” identified in the report. These will be secured by 11 strategic objectives. From this point of view, this analysis goes across the board and also tries to debate the relation among some of the conceptions established there. One of the key elements of the report would be what is the EU’s world vision and mission; how the EU sees the international system and what the EU stands for. This probably should be the most important part of a Grand Strategy because it will define values and vital and strategic interests, and the policies and strategies to defend and carry them out. It is notable also what the report does not say. For example, EU “doctrinal” language has almost disappeared from the report: normative power, civil power, soft power, and human security.

The first “programmatic” problem is that at the very beginning of the introduction, the European Union is defined as an economic bloc, with a large population and the EU/Member States duality. To define Values and Interests, it is necessary to talk beyond the economic and structure realm. Although there are some useful approaches later, it is imperative to reaffirm the present and future strengths of the integration process toward “more Europe”, but not perhaps in terms of more institutionalization but more democratization through a real elected presidency and parliament, demonstrating a clear political will and the wish to lead. This is not only the problem of the “identity”, but the management of this “identity” and other actors’ perceptions. Images and symbols are related to power and capabilities, at least for certain rising actors. In this vein, the term “influence” in the main title of the report would not work only in terms of values or capacity to set rules and regimes, where the EU has had a powerful capacity until now, which in this new international dynamic could be starting to vanish. The ability to influence does not demonstrate multipolarity per se either. The will to lead shows ability and capabilities to decide, and this could create, to certain point, “other centres of power”, a feature found in multipolar systems. This posture held by the report is problematic because the use of the term in International Relations Theory and for political practitioners has been widely discussed, and its meaning or even usefulness, criticized.<sup>3</sup> However, even in both realms, it is still profusely used, in terms of the negation of unipolarity and /or to reaffirm the EU and other rising actors’ role. The report really sides with the idea of a trend to multipolarity, but it also envisages a strong regional vision, rather than a global vocation, not only for the concept of “Strategic Neighborhood”, but for the deployment of the concept. There are other strategic visions as the US Pivot or the “Greater Middle East”, the Russian “Near Abroad” or the Chinese “Strategic Fron-

tier”, but as instruments of power projection or global capacity, not as a limiting mechanism of responsibility and capability, although the report seems to express ideas of interaction not only with states but also with non-states actors and societies. This posture could be realistic at short term, due to the economic crisis but is strategically blind in long term vision, due to the overlapping areas of interest (and friction) with other powers as Middle East-Persian Gulf, Caucasus-Central Asia or even the Mediterranean, Sahel-Horn of Africa. In this situation, and from a realist perspective, the report faces the necessity to reinforce or re-create alliances with the United States or with other members from the former West (Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, etc). This is very interesting because the creation or re-creation of alliances respond to an idea for rebalancing the system against a hegemonic challenger, a coalition of states, for security or for influence, among others. The idea is to reinforce the former “Unipolarity Club” (the former “West”), and to accommodate when needed (lack of support or interest by the United States) to other great powers as Russia and China. This posture in vital regions as Middle East-Persian Gulf and Caucasus-Central Asia is not sustainable. The lack of real capacity in these areas, as demonstrated during the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, demonstrates a lack of coherence between Vital Interests, Strategic Neighborhood and Capabilities and Instruments.

Thus, regarding this last chapter and the security conceptions found in the report, the main problem is not to define the structure of the international system as multipolar. It is to recognize that the security environment has changed dramatically, not only because of several challenges, threats and different actors, but because the turn to an offense-dominance world, due to, above all, cyberwarfare and its integration with space systems, WMD, conventional global strike capabilities, and battlefield robotization and nanotechnology. This has changed for instance, the meaning (or even the utility) of deterrence and the ability for offense-defense differentiation. This, in a very dynamic international system, with new alliances and alignments, lack of incentives and reduced interest convergence, and increased competition, makes the international system prone to more offensive visions and doctrines, and aggressive postures even from an economic point of view. Thus, it is strange that these areas and their integration are not discussed in the report. In this vein, the second EU Vital Interest, a secure and resilient EU, security challenges and security threats are mixed: armed aggression, state failure, regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and natural hazards. This could be a threat misperception when a well-focused comprehensive security concept



is needed. It is not clear if it is a threat-centered or capabilities-centered concept, although the use of a comprehensive approach is expected. However, it seems the EU is to relinquish real operative capability to NATO. This final posture takes us again to the start of the report and of this analysis. Some of these ideas are not helping to create an image of a more proactive EU; it could also be more realist than in the past, but in certain positions, it prefers to accommodate.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> He defined "World order" as "the regimes of values, morals, and rights that extend to all mankind and infuse the international order with a sense of justice and purpose. It connotes the complex of Western liberal international law and economics that is currently institutionalized through international organizations, like the United Nations. Bull, Hedley (1977) *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd edition. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 18-21.

<sup>2</sup> The project website ([www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu](http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu)) contains all the materials gathered to date

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, in these different categories, some interesting reflections. Roberts, Adam. "International Relations after the Cold War". *International Affairs* vol. 84: n°2, 2008. Jervis, Robert. "Unipolarity. A Structural Perspective ". *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009). Hass, Richard. "The Age of no Polarity". *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 2008.

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**Balfour, Rosa.** *Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy. The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt.* London and New York: Routledge, 2012.

One of the enduring challenges for the study of EU foreign policy is the gap between aims and actions. While EU trade practices display a very explicit rationale of pragmatism, the promotion of human rights and democracy poses the dilemma of taking actions based on ethical premises or pragmatic interests. The international actorness of the EU has often been baptized as civilian, normative, transformative, smart or soft power. However, the EU performance is frequently evaluated negatively due its reluctance to criticize human rights failures in the world. This gap between goals and actions is the focus of the book published by Rosa Balfour.

After outlining the structure of her research in the introduction, Balfour explains the analytical framework to study the discourse and the practices of human rights and democracy promotion in the EU foreign policy. The following six chapters symmetrically compare the case studies of Ukraine and Egypt by describing not only the implementation of human rights and democracy in both countries in areas such as elections, press freedom and torture, but also by analyzing the EU foreign policy towards both countries.

While the book provides several contributions to explain the gap between goals and actions, three explanations are highly relevant. The first is the selective application of the human rights clause in the EU foreign policy. In the view of the author, this clause has been invoked in cases where countries are of little economic or geostrategic interests to the EU, thus making the pursuit of a normative position costless for its member states. The second significant explanation is the clarification of the mismatch between the rhetoric and the action of the EU in responding to human rights and democracy shortcomings in Ukraine and Egypt. By supporting the status quo in Kiev and Cairo, the EU has placed strategic interests over human rights and democracy promotion. The position of the EU towards Ukraine takes into consideration its relationship with Russia as well as its position as a transit country for Europe's energy sources. In the case of Egypt, the author argues that the stability of Mubarak's regime and his mostly friendly relations with the Arab, Islamic and non-Islamic worlds was a driving force in EU's muted response to human rights abuse and non-democratic practices. In this point, policy makers will find this book pertinent as a reminder of the damage caused by the gap and contradictions



between political discourses and tangible actions.

The third relevant explanation in the book is about the sources of the limits of the use of democracy and human rights promotion in the EU foreign policy, which stems from the logic of diversity of foreign policy goals among the member states. In the cases of Ukraine and Egypt the position of the EU members could be grouped as follows: a) the Northern EU states have been fairly consistent in pushing the EU to adopt strong normative positions; b) the new members states from Central Europe further strengthened the Northern position; and c) France, together with other countries like Italy and Spain, has been far less committed to developing normative positions and have valued the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and preferred privileged cooperation. This logic of diversity is also affected by the role that the European Commission can play as a policy shaper, while the EP can use its limited leverage through parliamentary questions.

The empirical analysis of Balfour leads her to emphasize the explanatory power of classical realism from the International Relations Theory and embrace the intergovernmental perspective of Integration Studies. Thus, the role of member states as more effective agenda setters than the European Parliament or the European Commission is underscored in the conclusion. While the book is a contribution to the study of EU foreign policy in general and democracy and human rights promotion in particular, it may leave a sense of dissatisfaction to scholars who emphasize constructivist perspectives. Even from that angle, the evidence presented by Balfour makes it clear that the transformative power of the EU is undermined when the promise of future membership is out of the table of negotiation. In sum, the perspective provided by this book gives scholars a chance to conduct further research by comparing more cases in order to enhance the understanding of the limits of the EU in promoting democracy and human rights across the globe.

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**Appel, Hilary.** *Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalization, Regional Integration and the Democratic Compromise.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.

Taxation is a core-power of the state and key for the development of modern democracies. Traditional party lines developed along the question who in society had to pay how much to finance public spending. And yet the transformation of communist states into capitalist democracies saw very little partisan politics where

tax policy was concerned. Professor Appel, who has published widely on fiscal politics in post-communist countries, starts from this puzzling observation and argues in her book that external factors have mostly shaped “Tax Politics in Eastern Europe”.

The main part of the book sets out with a description of the early post-communist period and the challenges politicians faced in transforming their economies. Under Soviet rule the state financed itself mainly by taxing large state-owned enterprises, which required little administrative capacity. The transformation towards a capitalist system, in which private economic activity by many actors had to be taxed, was further complicated by bad macro-economic conditions. Yet, politicians in Eastern Europe managed to implement revenue-generating tax systems without crippling economic growth. What factors influence which economic activities were taxed how much – national politics or international constraints?

Appel offers a vivid description of the development of three major tax types. Relying both on interviews with major stakeholders as well as on statistical evidence she shows how distinct international influences shaped these – leaving almost no room for national politics in the case of value-added taxes (VAT) and corporate income taxes (CIT), yet allowing partisan differences to matter for personal income taxes (PIT). Chapter three illustrates with great detail how indirect taxation was almost not politicized at all. European integration required all member states to have a similar VAT system, thus the Eastern Europeans adopted the West European system with only a few, temporary exemptions (p. 52f). Regional and international integration also had a strong influence on corporate taxes. In four country studies (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) Appel highlights how politicians from all over the political spectrum lowered corporate tax rates to attract foreign investment. Chapter five tells the comprehensive story of the introduction and spread of the flat income tax. Although Appel depicts the diffusion of the flat tax via policy learning as a way to compete in an international context with mobile capital, she emphasizes the role partisan politics played. Different to VAT and CIT, mostly politicians from the right introduced flat taxes, whereas politicians from the left were opposed to what they saw as progressivity reducing.

In her last substantial chapter, Appel discusses the evolution of the tax system in Russia. Due to its size and oil wealth Russia is the least influenced by international factors.

The book is very well-written and nicely combines qualitative and quantitative evidence to arrive at a full picture of tax politics in Eastern Europe (and Russia). Having a background in comparative politics with a fo-



cus on tax competition in the OECD, I read it with great interest. Hilary Appel provides much needed detail on tax policy outside the usually analyzed suspects. In line with newer research on spatial diffusion and tax competition, she also makes an important contribution by highlighting the role that international interdependencies play for national policy making.

Yet, while I learned much from the main chapters, I cannot help but disagree with some of her bolder statements at the beginning of the book – although to be fair she weakens them in her own conclusion. As she herself states there was broad popular support for European integration (p. 152). Thus, the adoption of a VAT illustrates not “how the democratic process became hollow due to external priorities” (p4), but rather a domestically demanded policy. Also the lowering of the corporate tax and the introduction of a flat income tax to attract foreign investors does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that (domestic) politics do not matter. As Appel herself notes, the Eastern European economies broadly gained from the increasing inflows of foreign capital (p.73, 79). In a democracy, parties can have common policy ideal points. Furthermore, learning from outside actors actually enhances domestic policy choices and as such is very different to international competition as again is coercion. Lastly, fiscal policy is much broader than tax policy. While external factors might constraint the way in which governments generate revenue, domestic politics can still determine its spending.

In sum, Hilary Appel’s book on tax politics in Eastern Europe is an enjoyable read that paints a very detailed picture on the national and international challenges politicians in post-communist countries overcame to create the tax systems that we see today. The book has much to offer for the interested reader, as well as for scholars with a focus on Eastern Europe, European integration, tax politics or spatial interdependencies.

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**Marquand, David.** *The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, Europeans have had to confront a number of difficult questions about the future of the EU. According to David Marquand, those questions that have most occupied Europeans have been fundamentally the wrong ones – the same type of wrong questions, moreover, that have distracted Europeans for decades. *The End of the West* offers Marquand’s critical assessment of what Europe-

ans have done – and haven’t done – as the project of integration has drifted from its moorings. The result is a thought-provoking reflection on those existential questions – What is Europe? What does it mean to be European? What purpose a European Union? – that made the European project a vision and a movement rather than simply the set of paradoxical and absurd institutions and administrative practices that Marquand claims it has become. In his “Preface to the Paperback Edition”, Marquand suggests an answer to the questions that Europeans have lately failed to ask; noting that such crises as the acute one that struck the Eurozone in late 2011 “create opportunities”, he advocates a “European New Deal” that “would entail fiscal union, governed and legitimized by democratic institutions in place of the current technocratic ones.” (xvi) This can only be possible, however, once Europeans have sorted out the thornier issues of identity and purpose. While frequently striking a bitter and disillusioned tone, Marquand also shows that he really hasn’t given up on Europe.

Marquand begins with a sweeping review of “the West” as a concept framing identity and difference from the days of the Greeks and following a continuous thread through the Cold War. This rhetorical narrative assured those who identified with it “where” they were and “who” they were – “the home of reason, efficiency, and evolutionary success” – particularly in relation to “an unenlightened and backward ‘East’”, assumptions that “had always been patronizing and misleading” now proven to be “patently absurd.” (19) The end of the Cold War eroded some of the certainty that the assumption provided by neutralizing the tension between opposing poles upon which it was partly based; the recent financial collapse has effectively undermined it altogether. Marquand uses this prologue to establish the perception of “the West” as a myth that global society has outgrown, especially given that Europeans no longer have the leverage to impose it on others. He contends that it is now incumbent upon Europeans to consider themselves and their society more realistically and with the kind of boldness exhibited by Jean Monnet and the other founding architects of integration.

Marquand expresses admiration for these founders, who conceived a Europe transformed by ideas and ideals in response to the endemic threats of internecine war and murderous ethnic nationalism. He writes “as a committed friend of the European project, not as a foe,” (25) having participated himself in the evolution of that project during the late 1970s as Chief Advisor to the European Commission’s president, Roy Jenkins, and depicts the early decades of integration as inspired success. Since the collapse of Soviet communism and the apparent triumph of “the West”, however, Europe



has become mired in a slough of its own ambiguities. These relate to insufficiently examined questions of identity and ethnicity, governance and authority, territory, and – suffused through the others – politics, each the successive topics for the remaining three chapters. Embedded in the European project from its inception, recent developments have exacerbated them to the point that these unresolved ambiguities now serve, in Marquand’s analysis, as the sources for the disconnect, division, and uncertainty currently afflicting Europe.

The chapter on identity and ethnicity is the most stimulating among those addressing the ambiguities that Marquand identifies. He observes how globalization, the very success of integration itself, and a “neo-medieval provincialism” privileging rediscovered sub-national cultural identities equally undermine the power and legitimacy of the states – legacies of the Westphalian system – upon which European integration was based but which it also sought to transcend. Europeans’ multiple identities do not nestle into each other neatly like Russian dolls – they are fluid, evolving, and most importantly potentially explosive. Marquand spends half of the chapter reflecting upon an especially complicating feature of this ambiguity – Muslim Europeans, communities of which have existed since nearly the beginning of Islam itself but which were never integrated into the mythical image of “the West” that has now collapsed under closer scrutiny. He provocatively characterizes Islamophobia as “the true twenty-first equivalent of the Judaeophobia and eventual anti-Semitism that culminated in the horrors of the twentieth” (91) and challenges the political and personal tropes – from both right and left – that project a monolithic Islam threatening the putatively integral identity of the “European West.” No such identity actually exists, of course, which is the point that Marquand develops in the first part of the chapter; recognizing and reckoning with that truth, he suggests, forces Europeans to reconceive what it means to be “European” and thus avoid repeating the nightmarish history of ethnic violence.

Marquand insists that doing so involves a political as much as a cultural and intellectual process, since the fundamental question that Europe must confront, for him, is “how to grow a European demos that can sustain a European federation.” (177) The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 was “a staging post on a journey . . . , not the destination itself, an opportunity to take stock and look ahead, not an excuse for dodging the great questions of purpose, principle, and power that now press in on European peoples and elites.” (103) Those questions especially concern Europe’s ambiguous political identity stuck between federalism and confederalism, between democracy and technocracy. The Lisbon ratification process represents a missed

opportunity for a European-wide debate – similar to the one that led to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789 (not 1788) – rather than the serial dramas that played out in individual member states. This was emblematic of the democratic deficit that disconnects Europeans from the institutions that increasingly govern them and keeps them divided as European peoples, not a European people. He accuses the European elites of shirking from “high politics” with its profound questions of legitimacy and moral authority, preferring to focus instead on the “institutional nuts and bolts” (114) of “low politics” that has nevertheless led to such contradictions as a monetary union side by side with fiscal disunion and the promotion of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe while remaining democratically deficient in its own processes. Marquand advocates a democratically elected European presidency and European-wide referenda on such questions as the admission of member states as possible openings for generating a more integrated democratic culture – Europe is as Europe does.

But where does Europe begin and end? Here the question of governance folds back again onto that of identity. Marquand criticizes the European elites for pushing forward with expansion without adequately contemplating the consequences for either the EU or the new member states. The result has been a further muddling of European identity – such as it was – in that the accession of the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe changed the very entity they joined by the very act of joining it. Europe has become broader without getting deeper, Marquand claims. He cautions against extending membership to Turkey until that country has sorted out its own issues of identity – not because Turkey is poor or because it’s Muslim, but because “it is one of the last redoubts of ethnic nationalism”: “Atatürk’s aggressive secularist legacy is the problem, not Muhammad’s religious one.” (175) To borrow a phrase out of context, Marquand is counseling “smart growth” in Europe as opposed to headlong expansion.

Marquand admits early on to offering no “ready-made blueprint for the future, still less a toolbox of institutional quick fixes” (25), but he does call attention to important questions linked to a grander vision – and engages them in a compelling way. His book is a passionate meditation written by one who appears critical only because he still believes so much in a movement that has become disoriented. It should be required reading for all who care about the European project, the challenges it faces, and the direction it’s headed.

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**Givens, Terri and Maxwell, Rahsaan** (eds.). *Immigrant Politics: Race and Representation in Western Europe*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012.

Studies on immigrant integration into West-European societies represent a growth area in comparative European research. This trend is not surprising, given the opportunities and challenges it brings forward across key analytical domains: institutional arrangements governing citizenship and naturalization, policies of multiculturalism and welfare inclusiveness, and the political integration of immigrant communities through representation and participation in politics. Despite the presence of several important recent publications, immigrant political integration has remained relatively underresearched. By presenting an in-depth examination of a variety of electoral and policy-relevant issues pertaining to the political representation of immigrant-origin ethnic communities in Western Europe, *Immigrant Politics* makes an unequivocal contribution to the literature and outlines new directions for research, analysis, and comparison.

The book explores the political integration of immigrant communities on the example of the countries with the largest nonwhite immigrant populations in Western Europe: Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. It then turns to examine the role of race and equality in the legislative politics of the European Union and presents a concluding discussion of the findings through the lens of transatlantic comparisons. While the analytical focus is on the party establishment (chapter by Jonathan Laurence and Rahsaan Maxwell on political parties and diversity in Western Europe), the empirical findings and conclusions refer to the broader context of party competition established by the distinctiveness of electoral institutions which determine the relative openness of domestic political space to the inclusion of immigrant-origin minorities, relationships between the state and societal actors, and the process that links party politics to the systems of social provision.

The richly contextualized analysis of the successes and failures of the political integration of immigrant communities across Western Europe (chapters by James Hampshire on the UK, Vincent Geisser and El Yamine Soum on France, Karen Schönwälder on Germany, and Laure Michon on the Netherlands) applies a variety of coherently pursued research strategies in order to determine whether and how the electoral process has contributed to increasing immigrant participation in politics: a supply-demand framework for the examination of party systems interactions and minority claims, the reference to race as a category of political analysis, the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation which lie at the core of the argument about the differentiated process of immigrant integration into

West-European politics, and the study of its European dimension as a political response to the rise of the radical right in key European states, with critical input on behalf of transnational advocacy and EU institutional actors.

The book contributes valuable insights into the complexity of the political integration of immigrant-origin communities by tracing the missing link between the gradual improvement of their descriptive representation and the slow pace of substantive representation, both in terms of formulation of minority demands by grassroots groups and candidates, and their effective influence on policy making. The case studies find that while cross-national convergence in the descriptive representation of immigrant-origin ethnic minorities in West-European politics may be improving in parallel with their growing contribution to expanding the electoral base for political parties, national immigration policies are becoming more restrictive. The cases thus validate the proposition of a multidimensional, differentiated, and contingent process of immigrant integration into politics.

The examination of the European dimension of immigrant-minority political participation opens up a new analytical perspective and strengthens the country case study analyses. The chapter devoted to the role of race in the evolution of the normative order of the European Union (Terri Givens and Rhonda Evans Case) traces the interactions between EU institutional actors and transnational advocacy groups which have led to a treaty revision and established racial equality and non-discrimination as a foundational EU policy. The concluding discussion (chapter by Martin Schain) reinforces the comparative insights of the study by elaborating on the significance of the links between the institutional and political dimensions of representation and public policy, and by introducing a transatlantic perspective. While the individual contributions to this volume point to persisting variation in the national models of immigrant minority integration, they also demonstrate that as a result of inclusive public discourse and reliable national and EU-based anti-discrimination legislation guaranteeing equality, the political representation of immigrant-origin communities in Western Europe has been able to make gradual, however noticeable advances.

In summary, by elucidating important aspects of immigrant political participation through case study analyses of trends at the European, national, group, and local level of politics, the book presents a multidimensional discussion of the categories of race, equality, and immigrant integration into West-European societies. *Immigrant Politics* is an important resource for academic audiences, researchers, experts, policy makers, and institutions.

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**Liebert, Ulrike and Trezn, Hans-Joerg** (eds.). *The New Politics of European Civil Society*. London: Routledge, 2011.

The academic interest in 'European Civil Society' increased in the past decade, based on the EU's highlighting of its role in delimiting the democratic deficit, and the seemingly exploding number of NGOs and other public interest associations voicing their claims. The scholarly literature on this topic is similarly expanding, but conceptual clarifications, realistic normative assessments and empirical studies regarding the specifically 'European' nature of the diverse groups assembled under the term 'civil society' are still required. It is here that Liebert & Trezn's carefully edited volume makes a useful contribution to the field.

Liebert, a well-known professor at the Center for European Studies, University of Bremen, and Trezn, a research professor at the University of Oslo's ARENA Center for European Studies, assembled a team of mostly senior scholars in this particular research area to explore questions of the constitution(alization) of civil society in the process of European integration, and its impact on the democratic quality of the EU. They argue that the way transnational civil society has been implicated in EU integration in the past decade has led to genuinely new loci of power and legitimacy in the EU's governance system: "we intend to conceptualize and normatively and empirically analyze the innovate ways in which civil society has made inroads into EU governance, be it as loyal partner or critical counterpart (7)." This means that a strengthening of civil society through the EU has brought additional challenges for the legitimacy of, for instance, powerful INGOs that are in danger of being co-opted, but also for the EU institutions that have to respond to claims made by such groups. In the course, normative evaluations of what is considered appropriate and 'civil' in the process of integration appear as well.

The first part dealing with conceptual clarifications centers on the untangling of the umbrella term 'civil society'. In it, Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat present in a meta-analysis a survey among fellow academics regarding their conception of civil society. They find that not only a representative aspect, but also a participatory notion is present, each of which exhibits a different degree of inclusion of the various civil society actors. Klaus Eder, in his sociological analysis notes how civil society can be 'imagined', 'practiced' or 'staged' and thus attain a symbolic-performative character in a play in which it shares the stage with other (supra-)national governance actors. Part Two comprises of two normatively oriented chapters: one by Kohler-Koch examines three different configurations of civil society (as intermediaries, as stakeholders and as social constituency) that are less based on the expressive will of

these associations alone, but rather are connected and conditioned by the degree of "participatory engineering" (68) of the Commission's consultation scheme. Stijn Smismans compares European citizenship and European civil society notions and advocates that these two interlinked concepts should be viewed as complementary practice as they have similar participatory objectives in the Union. In the last, empirical section based mostly on interview data, Liebert suggests that the "dual nature" (119) of European civil society oscillates between being a critical partner by voicing public concerns, and also becoming a loyal partner for the EU polity. Trezn et al., in their cross-sectoral survey of German civil society, confirm the representation of civil society organizations (CSOs) as promoters of European unificatory ideals. Carlo Ruzza's chapter on 'uncivil society' distinguishes it to anti-politics and right-wing parties but makes clear that even those groups that are "in contraposition to a universalistic ethos" (148) often link up to political parties with similar goals. The last two substantive chapters highlight the particularities of civil society in the post-communist 'new' EU member states. One, by David Ost, argues that its decline is based on its co-emergence with the capitalist model, and thus not seen as radical-emancipatory anymore. And Heiko Pleines finds that while CSOs from post-communist member states are formally adequately integrated in EU governance, they still lack leverage to independently effect policy change in Brussels. Finally, Andrew Arato offers his reflections on the contributor's chapters.

The results of the normative and empirical analyses of this volume contribute to a more differentiated picture of civil society as influenced by governance institutions, competing movements and parties as well as by contested normative (self)perceptions. Hence this book nicely highlights the conditioning interplay between civil society actors and EU institutions and the impact such interaction – and linkage - has on the legitimacy of a European constitutionalization process written large, although an investigation of few more determining variables (such as access/accreditation, or funding by the EU) could have provided for more robust assessments. Overall, however, this volume succeeds as an updated compendium of recent developments in European civil society.

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