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**Preparing US Students for an EU Simulation**

**Rebecca Jones**

**Introduction**

In preparing students for effective and beneficial participation in an EU simulation can be challenging. Most US students are unfamiliar with the European Union at best and completely unaware of its existence at worst. Participation in a simulation can increase cognitive knowledge (facts) but the manner that is fun and effective. However, how does one go about not only introducing the EU, but helping students arrive at a point where they are effective and engaged policy-makers within the EU simulation? And, given the potential difficulties in preparation, how would one choose to engage students in such a simulation?

Simulations are viewed as a more effective means of teaching facts and theories than traditional lectures because, as Shellman notes, students are required “to analyze specific topics, to generate hypotheses, to present evidence, to discuss, confront problems, and develop their own ideas” (Shellman 2001: 827). Dougherty agrees, pointing out that simulations comprise “a number of broad practical and pedagogical goals” (Dougherty 2003: 240). Simulating or so-called “broadhursts” in political science classes in multi-day segments across several months, and always focuses on EU foreign policy. Another prominent feature of this simulation is its inclusion of EU practitioners in the learning experience, which is important for both programs because of their focus on professional training for future diplomats and policy-makers. Scherpereel’s impressive article deals mainly with how and why this simulation is designed.

**Preparation for EuroSim**

EuroSim is a cross-continent simulation of the EU involving US and European universities, programs, and Member States’ positions are researched and discussed. Students again work on reaction papers and have a take-home exam. An additional project will be added for the Fall 2014 iteration of POLS 228. Students will create a position paper and present their position on the issue at the end of the semester. Based on results from presentation assignments in other classes, such an assignment should mean that those students participating in EuroSim will arrive at a greater understanding of the EU and its institutions and be better prepared for their participation in the simulation.

The one-credit class, POLS 229, is offered in the same semester as EuroSim, or immediately prior during the Fall 2014 iteration of POLS 228. Students will have an opportunity to gain experience working in groups, something they are used to gain a more “inside” view of the EU. In addition, such an assignment provides students with an opportunity to gain experience working in groups, something they are used to participating in EuroSim (and a good number has not traveled outside of the US prior to participating in EuroSim) and to write a position paper and present their position on the issue at the end of the semester. Based on results from presentation assignments in other classes, such an assignment should mean that those students participating in EuroSim will arrive at a greater understanding of the EU and its institutions and be better prepared for their participation.

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Students who are first-time participants have indicated that while they were more prepared than they initially believed, they also recognize that there was more they could have done themselves. This is borne out by post-simulation surveys which show that students do recognize when they have not adequately prepared (Jones 2008, Jones and Bursens 2013). Additionally, assignments such as the team presentations on individual country positions are being added to the course at the suggestion of the students.

So, how did they do?

Participation in EuroSim opens up a broader understanding of the world and how it works for US students, many of whom have not traveled beyond a two-hour radius of their hometown. When they are presented with the EU as a comparison to the US system, they appear to have an easier time grasping the differences between the two political structures. While preparing students to successfully participate in EuroSim presents challenges both in terms of understanding and time constraints, the results can be eye-opening. According to the students, the experience helps students gain practice and experience with life-skills such as interpersonal relationships, conflict resolution, decision-making, and time management. The results can be eye-opening and can be beneficial for content knowledge as well as understanding of the world and how it works for US students. The practice of deepening appreciation for other cultures and understanding of other political structures through role playing improves students’ understanding of complex political dynamics through role-playing. The instructors who lead simulations introduce their exercises by telling participants to disregard their personal opinions, predispositions, and biases; to learn as much as possible about the preferred outcomes, tactics, and resources of the actor or actors they represent; and to pursue their assigned actors’ preferred outcomes throughout the simulation – during official debates, out-of-the-record talks, press conferences, etc. No simulation can model reality perfectly, but all simulations strive to produce learning and growth through verisimilitude.

In addition to verisimilitude, many simulations have led students to: inform policymakers about their simulations and to invite “real-life” actors’ events to their events. On the first day of the Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation Consortium event [http://www.wcupa.edu/academics/sch_sba/political_science/MEUS/def2007], for example, students representing EU member states visit “their” embassies for briefings and then meet with policymakers at the US Department State on issues of transatlantic concern. The West Coast Model EU [http://ias.washington.edu/euc/mceu] typically features a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the situation in the Middle East. The Strasbourg Model EU [http://mceu-strasbourg.org] involves day-one workshops with practitioners and occasional meals or events with practitioners. In these and other simulation events, invited practitioners demonstrate their simulation experiences and proceedings to faculty organizers and student participants. Simulation topics are decided without policymakers’ involvement. Position papers and amendments are drafted without policymakers’ engagement. Negotiations proceed without policymakers’ monitoring. Position papers and amendments are drafted without policymakers’ engagement. Negotiations proceed without policymakers’ monitoring. Instructors who lead simulations and simulation activities vary from one session to the other and with the policy practitioners. In general, the simulation involves approximately 40 students—half from JMU, half from UNIFI. Faculty members and the practitioners—two long-serving professional staff members of the European Parliament—typically begin discussing potential simulation scenarios one year before the ministerial event in late spring. Because of the nature of the involved programs (the JMU program seeks to train transatlantic diplomats, political and economic professionals; the UNIFI program seeks to train diplomats, scholars, and EU policy professionals) and the expertise of the involved practitioners, the topics always revolve around EU foreign policy.

Organizers have been careful to construct scenarios that involve multiple EU foreign policy instruments and multiple decision-making rules. In addition to high-politics debates that require unanimity (e.g., debates about CSDP missions), for example, they have also placed issues covering trade, development cooperation, and financial/technical assistance on simulation agendas. The latter areas are governed, respectively, by Articles 207, 209, and 212 TFEU and are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure and, in addition, issues related to accession (Article 49 TFEU, requiring EP consent) have been placed on simulation agendas.

Once the simulation topics have been decided, faculty organizers and practitioners develop a plan for three-week-long simulations (this number includes the final ministerial session; the precise number of sessions depends on practitioners’ availability), spread across four to seven months. Specific learning goals and simulation activities vary from one session to the next, as described below. According to Kaunert (2009, pp. 255), one of the most important pedagogical payoffs
of well-designed simulations is cumulative learning, where "a subject is introduced repeatedly and with an increase in the levels of complexity during the course of study, which leads to an increase in the student’s capacity to remember the knowledge presented." In 2012-2013, for example, the simulation involved three discrete sessions of intense practitioner-student contact (January, March, and May).

In the days leading up to the January session, faculty organizers covered information regarding the EP’s role in scrutinizing and “nuancing” cooperation agreements with third countries and divided students into EP party groups; each party group contained multiple JMU students and multiple UNIFI students. Practitioners also circulated, prior to the session, an actual draft motion for a resolution on the conclusion of a partnership and cooperation between the EU and Turkmenistan, and students researched “their” party group’s positions on Turkmenistan, human rights abuses, and other relevant issues. During the January session, students assembled in party groups and crafted specific amendments to the draft motion. The practitioners, who had both worked on the actual dossier in question, worked closely with each party group, circulating from one to the next. In tandem with the faculty organizers, they concluded the session with specific amendments to the text of the amendments that various groups proposed. They also laid out the general “plan of attack” for the second simulation session, which would take place in March.

The second session in March sought to produce a cumulative learning experience. Students were divided into teams representing EP party groups (party group memberships were “shaken up,” but they continued to consist of students from both universities), and a draft document was distributed. This time, students considered the European Union’s legal instruments and foreign policy (the “partnership instrument”); this proposal was subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. In this round, students met before their sessions with the practitioners to propose amendments to the text. Then, during the session, they negotiated with each other over the amendments (the parliamentary process was overseen by a student serving as committee chair). By the end of the debate, they had produced viable versions of specific strategic plans that presented their approach to (and appreciation of the relationships among) the three dossiers. On the first day of the final session, each student group met individually with the practitioners and received substantive feedback on their draft amendments and strategic document that its larger practitioner-student meetings with the line commissioners and the member states, the practitioners spent extra time with the HRVP (who had been meeting with the member states during the bilateral practitioner-student meetings) to discuss the global agenda of opinion and strategies for seeking consensus. On the final day of the final session, the HRVP oversaw a vigorous debate in Palazzo Vecchio’s Salone dei Duecento, and faculty and practitioners deterred the students from too many amendments. Like most simulations, the Florence simulation involves major investments of time and energy. Coordination of multi-institution simulation events is a notoriously laborious business, which is further complicated by the fact that many students are asked to reflect on the overall simulation experience (including a self-criticism). In the previous two iterations, they have also been asked to discuss positives and negatives of the practitioners’ involvement. Feedback in these fora has been overwhelmingly positive, ranging from general approbation (“no real negatives; I think this added immensely to the simulation”) to more specific consideration (“they challenge us to think . . . not [like] students in a simulation but actually [like] political figures within the European Union”; “they know the way the institutions work and how the EU functions from a high level, so they push you to arrive at the reality rather than fantasize about how things are done”). We hope that deeper investigations will throw more light on the payoffs of this variety of simulation.
tions between the EU and the US. They are surprised to see differences in values, as reflected in different policies. A preliminary paper is due at the beginning of the debate and is designed to assure that students have enough information about the case and the EU institutions to contribute to the simulation.

Three agreements negotiated between 2002 and 2007 formed the basis for “Power Plays” a 2008 PEW case study of the EU/US PNR negotiations. The case study covers “the performance of the European Union’s institutions as they interact and compete for dominance within the EU, and then engage devices with the US — with the goal to protect against terrorism.” The PNR case was ideal to teach about the EU as it showcased changing transatlantic relations and evolving EU institutional functions up through 2007.

The “Power Plays” case study has a simulation format, where students divide into groups and play the parts of major institutions such as the US Department of Homeland Security and the EU Commission. It also contains appendices with details about each institution and a chronology of events, starting in 2001 and continuing through the 2007 PNR Interim Agreement. Most of the EU institutions, including its rotating Presidency, were involved in these PNR negotiations. Although the US felt that it made significant compromises by the time of the 2007 agreement, the Europeans saw little improvement. New negotiations were necessary, and an addendum to the 2007 case, containing information about PNR negotiations held from 2007 to 2012, now exists for use in class simulations.

The instructor and students used the manual “The ABCs of Case Teaching” were used, and examples from simulation models, and active learning exercises were included. The purpose is to get everyone involved in discussion because they are playing a role. Case studies allow students to see that decisions could be reached at all, despite the multiple actors. Students gain a firmer understanding of the problems facing their institutions and what their institution or actor wants to gain from the negotiations.

Playing the Game

To prepare, students are placed on teams representing the institutions (both EU and US). They answer a short questionnaire to gage their knowledge of the EU. The simulation is divided into 4 stages, each of which ends in some kind of agreement between the EU and the US. The early stages are described in the “Power Plays” case study, and the last stage comprises the period between 2007 and 2012. Before the stages begin, groups meet together to decide on their goals and policy positions. There may be different EU and US institutions meeting during each stage. Students discuss their goals and positions before each stage, keeping in character. They need to know what their institution does, what power it has, and what role it plays in governing or regulating. Members of each EU institution group regularly consult the other groups.

Stage one begins in 2002 at the start of official transatlantic negotiations between the US and the EU. For each stage, students need to be aware of the problems facing their institutions and what their institution or actor wants to gain from the negotiations. Each stage has an allotted time period to negotiate (15 to 25 minutes), and students must reach an agreement within that time period. Conclusions of each stage are read in the form of press releases. The groups not involved in the negotiations at the time prepare press releases commenting on what occurred and on their own platforms. These were used to gather information that will help them play their specific parts better.

Students say, and studies support this idea, that when they have to act a part, they read the case differently and get more involved in discussions. They begin to think differently about how and why institutions and other actors make decisions.

What students learn

The early US proposals violated EU laws, and it was obvious from the start of negotiations, that the US had more negotiating power and a clearer chain of command, making it easier to negotiate transatlantic decisions. Acting out the scenario in stages, allows students to see the changes in the negotiating power and strategies of both sides. They see that the US made compromises, and that the EU’s negotiating skills develop. After simulation play ends, students participate in another debriefing discussion. A final paper is due at the end of the simulation and should also contain a debriefing section so students can reflect on the purpose and value of PNR negotiations to study the EU’s decision-making processes. Students have stated that they are surprised to discover that both countries changed tactics, and that each side confronts obstacles that they want to overcome. Because they are actually playing roles, they witness more closely the changing negotiating techniques from the 2007 case study to the more recent 2011-2012 negotiations.

The EU’s complex decision-making process calls into action its competing institutions, and student comments indicated that they were surprised to see that decisions could be reached at all, despite the multiple actors. Students gain a firmer understanding of the problems facing their institutions and what their institutions and actors want to gain from the negotiations. Each stage has an allotted time period to negotiate (15 to 25 minutes), and students must reach an agreement within that time period. Conclusions of each stage are read in the form of press releases. The groups not involved in the negotiations at the time prepare press releases commenting on what occurred and on their own platforms. These were used to gather information that will help them play their specific parts better.

The new PNR Agreement strengthened privacy provisions for EU citizens.
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has come to view cyber threats and cyber crime as relevant challenges to the completion of its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (European Union, 2013; Koons, 2012). Given European societies’ increased reliance on borderless and decentralized information technologies, this sector of activity has been identified as an easy target for a variety of different actors such as organised criminals, hackers, state agencies or terrorist networks (Bendick, 2012). Such an analysis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the fight against unlawful online activities, namely through increased cooperation among law enforcement authorities (both national and extra-communitarian), the approximation of legislations, and public-private partnerships (European Commission, 2012, 2011; European Parliament, 2012; Mendez, 2005).

Such impetus reflects both a perceived increase in Internet-related risks and the policy expansion of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) itself (Rijisma, 2010). As the fastest growing policy field of the European Union in the past 15 years, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has increasingly been governed through agencies, whose traditional role has been to support Member States and to facilitate cooperation (Monar, 2006; 2001). Such role however seems to be currently evolving in the direction of a more centralised regulatory approach (Carrapico & Trauner, 2013; Busuioc et al. 2011; Egeberg & Trondal, 2011; Ekelund, 2010). In other words, EU institutions seek to promote a greater involvement of the agencies in the development and implementation of Justice and Home Affairs policies (European Commission, 2008).

The literature on EU regulatory agencies has been paying attention to these bodies since the end of the 90s (Levi-Faur, 2011). It has mainly focused on two topics: The proliferation of EU-level agencies as a mode of governance (Dehousse, 1997) and the agencies’ autonomy and accountability (Busuioc et al. 2011; Wonka & Ritterberg, 2010). The arguments looking at why the model of agencification has developed so rapidly throughout the EU have so far proposed a number of alternative accounts: (i) EU agencies have been created in order to provide a higher degree of professionalism, neutrality and credibility to the process of policy-making, creating a distance between the agencies and political bodies (Majone, 2000, 1997; Dehousse, 1997); (ii) the expansion of agencification is related to a broader liberal trend towards ‘regulatory capitalism’, whereby agencies are considered to be the most efficient means of governing sectors of activity (Levi-Faur, 2005); (iii) the growth in agencies can be related to an attempt on the side of the European Commission to indirectly increase its influence over policy-making (Kelemen, 2005).

The literature focusing on the work of these agencies has concluded, firstly, that the formal mandate of agencies tells us very little about their actual autonomy and their day to day policy-making practices (Busuioc et al. 2011), and secondly, that the way agencies work and operate is likely to have an effect on various dimensions of governance (Ekelund, 2010). Finally, the literature on accountability has concluded that there is an important tension between the need for democratic accountability and the technocratic way of functioning of agencies, which lacks transparency due to the non-existence of solid frameworks for oversight (Busuioc et al. 2011). Insights from this literature, however, have only rarely been applied to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies. As a result, most research on Justice and Home Affairs agencies, such as Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, the EMCDDA, ENISA, and others, has tended to focus on their institutional development, accountability procedures, levels of legitimacy, and operational contribution, rather than their potential capacity to shape policy (Busuioc et al. 2011; Den Boer & Bruggeman, 2007; Deflem, 2006).

Bearing this background in mind, this short review wishes to present a set of exploratory findings, which relate to our on-going work exploring the role of EU agencies in the governance of digital spaces based on two case studies: ENISA, the EU’s cyber security agency, and the EC3, Europol’s cyber crime unit. The project considers the evolution of these agencies’ activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, their positioning as experts in the field, the possible development of regulatory capacities, and the potential implications from this trend vis-à-vis the evolution of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The case study on the EC3, Europol’s cyber crime unit, is based on previous work on Europol’s capacity to influence policy-making in the area of organised crime (Carrapico & Trauner, 2013; Parkin, 2012) and on recent fieldwork (Interviews in the Hague, November 2013). The EC3 constitutes the European Union’s most recent step in the fight against cyber crime. The new unit is largely a continuation of pre-existing structures at Europol, albeit a centralised form (RAND, 2012). It also reflects Europol’s attempt to become more competent in an area that is increasingly
ingly more demanding, thus enhancing the visibility and relevance of the agency for the cybercrime law enforcement community (interview with Europol official, 2013). The EC’s proposal is to ensure a coordinated response to a specific area of criminality, serve as the European cyber crime information focal point, provide support to Member States in their cyber crime investigations and promote meetings with cyber crime experts (European Commission, 2012). Although no direct references to policy-making are made in any official document, interviews reveal that there is an explicit ambition to influence policy, in particular by becoming the leading voice for the law enforcement community on cyber and by reflecting at EU policy level the ongoing national discussions and concerns (Interview with Europol official, 2013). Such goals should not come as a surprise given the work already developed by Europol in other areas of activity. Although it is officially considered to be a platform for information exchange and for coordination of member states’ investigations, it has come to acquire a much more influential role in policy-making than what its legal mandate would suggest (Carrapico & Trauner, 2013). Europol has clearly evolved from the periphery to the core of EU policy-making in the area of organised crime, as illustrated by the growing influence of Europol’s Organised Crime reports on EU organised crime policies and initiatives (Council, 2012; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2004). So in actual fact, being a ‘policy shaper’ is a role that ENISA was expected to play of a certain size. However, the Agency had other priorities during its first few years, mainly awareness raising, the promotion of best practices and the establishment of networks of expertise in member states (Voudouris, 2005). Indeed one of the stated reasons behind Europol’s mandate amendment was to better align the agency to the Union’s regulatory processes and enhance its capacity to provide MS and European institutions with assistance and advice (European Commission, 2010). So there seems to be a clear link between ENISA’s stakeholders to, not only provide it with more resources to solidify its position in the cyber-security arena, but also to formally invite the agency to have a stronger say on European cyber-security policies.

ENISA has willingly assimilated this policy entrepreneurship role. It has formally recognised that, the new mandate ‘foresees a more proactive role’ for the organisation in supporting the development of policy and legislation in this field (ENISA, 2013). We must note that the drive to incorporate ENISA into the Union’s policy and regulatory process had already started before the 2013 reforms. The 2010 Commission proposal already highlighted some of these trends. It described how the Council had already started addressing ENISA directly in Resolutions and how the EP and the Council had assigned NIS-related tasks to the Agency in the regulatory framework on electronic communications (European Commission, 2010). ENISA had also presented policy positions at EP Committees and participated in High Level Panels and Working groups with representatives of EU institutions. In fact, the very same year the director of the agency confirmed that one clear way for ENISA to deliver added value was to provide guidance to the European Commission in the legislative process (UK House of Lords, 2010). Therefore, although the enhancing of its mandate showed the agency to be better prepared to act as a policy-shaper, there was already existing evidence of ENISA’s capacity to inform decisions in the cyber-security arena.

All things considered, it is safe to say that the expectation is that ENISA will continue having a role to play in cyber-security decision-making in the near future. This can be easily gathered from official documents: the recent high-profile proposal for an NIS directive does, for instance, call upon ENISA to work with the Commission and MS in the development of a Union NIS cooperation plan defining cooperation mechanisms to counter risks and cyber-incidents (European Commission, 2013). A key difference between Europol and ENISA is that, in the agency can already be to exert policy influence beyond its narrow mandate by making its threats assessments a point of reference. Thus, although the EC3 may be a recently formed unit, its potential for policy shaping rests on the position it has achieved by Europol. In contrast, ENISA’s mandate included the possibility to participate in decision-making, but in practice this has never been one of its main priorities until recently.

The findings of these two case-studies are particularly relevant both for the cyber security policy field and for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. On their own, they provide an insight into cyber security decision-making and some if its drivers. More interestingly, however, is what these case-studies reveal in terms of the larger on-going trend in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, where the traditional model of the cooperation agency is slowly being replaced by regulatory policy shaping agencies.

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Area of Freedom, Security and Justice); 2) international cooperation (identifying European Neighbourhood Countries as priority and the need to address old and emerging trafficking in Western Africa). The first initiative to search, information, monitoring and evaluation (tough the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction –EMCDDA–) (EU, 2013).

Even the main approach adopted in the region for reducing demand is the harm reduction model, member states still have different opinions about drug policy and priorities, and there are still gaps in the antinarcotics actions, specially among countries such as Italy, Spain and some eastern European countries, where criminal groups are more active. These differences make it difficult for the EU to adopt common positions in international bodies and in discussions with third parties, including Latin America. (Gratius, 2012).

Latin America War on Drugs
An assessment of the “war on drugs” in Latin America shows its limits: between 1999 and 2010, coca leaf and cocaine production decreased by 50% in Colombia, but has increased in Peru and Bolivia (during the same period the land used for drug cultivation practically double in Peru); there has been a worrying increase in cocaine consumption in South America, especially in Brazil (the annual prevalence of cocaine users among college students increased by 3% and among the general population 1.75%) followed by Argentina and Chile, and drug trafficking is one of the main factors behind increased criminal violence in the region, particularly in Central America, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia. With figures of 100,000 murders per year, Latin America is the most insecure region in the world. (UNODC 2013, UNDP, 2013).

The complex problem of drug trafficking in Latin America has generated a variety of responses at national, sub-regional and hemispheric levels. It is important to note that in all cases, the need to promote comprehensive policies to combat this threat is recognized, but historically governments have privileged the key areas of cooperation. How the EU identifies LAC as “strategic partners” against drug trafficking, insists on the importance of strengthening bi-regional cooperation and promote comprehensive policies against illicit drugs; reality shows that the Europeans prefer sub-regional and bilateral agreements and programs, centred in controlling cocaine and synthetic drugs production and trafficking. In a study for the European Parliament, Susanne Gratius (2012) revealed, that most of the EU programs in LAC are designed to reduce drugs supply. According to her data 102 out of 135, are focused on reducing supply, whereas only 22 are focused on reducing demand.

In a context which anti-drug policies are being evaluated, Brazil required in 2003, the European model of “harm reduction” remains a benchmark for Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, the EU-LAC partnership could contribute to outline a new global drug policy. Though, any initiative would also need close coordination and cooperation with the United States.

Bi-regional cooperation
Latin America and the European Union share values and principles that are the core of the bi-regional partnership. On the issue of illicit drugs, both regions agreed that fighting against drug trafficking and corruption, require a regional cooperation and comprehensive policies. For Latin America, the partnership with the EU on illicit drugs issues is particularly relevant, facing their strong relationship with the United States.

As mentioned before, since the Action Plan of Panama (1999) both regions have been working in key areas of cooperation. However, when we analyse the EU-LAC cooperation programs on drugs during last decade, we can identify the pre-eminence of law enforcement, drug interdiction and control, the main threat to national security and the armed forces have been incorporated into a variety of activities in the war on drugs: border enforcement, interdiction activities, arrest of criminal leaders and public security. With their respective differences, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Brazil and Colombia are examples of these policies. For other countries, like Chile or Uruguay, the drugs problem remains on the agenda of public security, even, the Uruguayan Government has gone beyond to decriminalize cannabis, regulating their production and trade.

At hemispheric level, since the 1980s Latin American countries have promoted regional coopera- tion against drug trafficking in the framework of the Organization of American States. The first initiative were intended to create multilateral mechanisms against U.S. unilateral policies, such as the famous “counter-narcotics certification”. In particular, emphasis was on illegal narcotics-related principle and promote regional counter-narcotics cooperation. The establishment of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) in 1986, the approved of the first Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere in 1996 and the creation of the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism in 1998 responded to this logic (Chanona, 2011).

The principle of share responsibility, the promotion of multilateral cooperation and the commitment to adopt comprehensive policies against drug trafficking, are common elements of the Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime (2006); the Hemispheric Drug Strategy (2010) and the Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs 2011-2015 (2011). Nevertheless, until now the hemispheric cooperation against drug trafficking and consume has its limits, there is still a lack of mechanism of coordination and sub-regional initiatives have been playing a more important role against organized crime.

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Aid Effectiveness Meets Domestic Politics – the Case of the EU’s Budget Support Policy

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The EU’s ability to formulate well-coordinated and coherent policies and positions is considered a key prerequisite for its effectiveness on the global stage. However, regarding budget support policies and in particular the non-communist policies, the EU faces the continuous struggle of achieving internal consensus and coordination among member states and EU institutions without losing sight of the effective and coordinated representation of the impact of the EU. This is also true for development policy, for which the level of internal coordination between 28 bilateral policies plus the aid programme of the European Commission (EC) is often considered insufficient. Greater internal cohesiveness, however, is required in order for the EU to remain a relevant and effective actor in development, in particular against the background of geopolitical and economic power shifts that decrease – or at least limit – the EU’s potential influence (Koch 2012). In this context, the degree of convergence between the preferences of the EU’s member states and the EU institutions has been highlighted as key for the EU’s actoriness (Carbone 2013). More recently, scholars have also started to adopt a liberal foreign policy perspective to explain how preferences of member states are determined by domestic political dynamics that hinder or support aid coordination. This article uses the case of the EU’s budget support policy – one of the most prominent aid instruments – to explore how domestic political dynamics in the member states have led to severe coordination problems and, secondly, how effectiveness concerns have fallen prey to domestic politics and internal conflicts among member states and the EU. The last decade, budget support – that is, the direct transfer of aid resources to a developing country’s treasury – has become a very popular, yet contested aid instrument. It originated as a result of critiques of traditional forms of foreign aid, which was instead (mostly) through projects. Over 40 years of experience revealed severe flaws of project aid and showed that it was too fragmented, creating parallel structures and high transaction costs for national administrations in developing countries, without having a lasting impact on development. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness thus aimed at setting new principles for the provision of foreign aid. According to these principles, it was expected of donors to respect recipient countries’ ownership and lead in the recipient’s development, to use recipient countries’ own administrative systems for channelling aid, and to better harmonise and coordinate donor aid instruments. Budget support has been conceptualised in an enabling context within EU foreign policies in order to implement these principles and to make aid more effective.

From the outset, the EC was among the most dedicated supporters of budget support in the EU and considered it to be ‘the most effective instrument in the EC’s toolbox’ (EC 2008). Moreover, while budget support is meant to finance partner countries’ national development plans, the perception of budget support as an innovative and effective aid instrument was, however, not shared uniformly by European governments and aid bureaucracies. Sceptics as well as the wider public quickly denounced it as a “blank cheque to corrupt regimes” and as an instrument that bears high political and fiduciary risks. Over time, these different perceptions led to severe tensions. It became obvious that, within the EU, different preferences prevailed with regards to when and how to provide budget support. Some bilateral donors were very cautious and selective from the beginning (e.g. Germany) and highlighted the need to tie budget support to political governance issues. In contrast, however, the EC’s recipient countries (e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were strong supporters in the beginning, but they gradually reduced their use of the instrument and started to attach stricter political conditionalities to budget support. More generally, while some member states were determined by domestic political preferences for budget support – and in particular to the perceived risks of the instrument – thus led to highly uncoordinated actions by the EU. The case of budget support provision shows that these different preferences and degrees of risk- averseness are not just randomly distributed among European donors but driven by at least three key factors. First, the historical power dynamics among European donor countries: (i) partisan politics, (ii) the economic context and (iii) bureaucratic interests (Faust / Koch 2014). Differences in party ideology are significant in determining how sceptical or supportive European concerns of their own domestic interests. As outlined above, conservative and right-wing a government is, the less budget support it disburses. This is also in line with findings from public opinion research that shows that conservative constituencies are more sceptical about the waste of foreign aid due to corruption in developing countries (Baur / Charron / Nasiritousi 2013). In addition, budget support suffers most in times of economic crisis, as it is less visible and considered to be more risky than other aid modalities. The case studies of Germany and the United Kingdom furthermore suggest that the institutional set-up of a donor’s foreign aid system impacts on its preferences for budget support. In Germany, powerful implementing agencies of technical cooperation opposed the provision of budget support as it would have led to stricter political conditionalities for budget support, whereas in the United Kingdom no such opposition existed, which made it easier for the government to disburse increasing amounts of foreign aid as budget support (Faust / Koch 2014). The analysis thus shows how political factors within donor countries shape member state’s preferences and the provision of particular aid instruments and undermine efforts for better aid coordination.

Most importantly, these preferences not only have shaped individual donor policies but also impact on the EC’s budget support policy. Development policy is a shared competency in the EU, and member states focus mainly on how they can influence the EC according to their own preferences and priorities rather than promoting joint European approaches that accept influence from Brussels over individual domestic development policies. Recent analysis has shown that, if preferences of member states are largely homogenous, or if powerful coalitions are formed among members, the EC’s policies tend to follow national interests rather than its own goals (Schneider / Tobin 2013). This is also apparent in the case of budget support, in which a large number of member states raised an increasing number of concerns and exercised pressure on the EC to change its position, often successfull or speak with a single voice. The different preferences for budget support – and in particular towards the perceived risks of the instrument – thus led to highly uncoordinated actions by the EU. The case of budget support provision shows that these different preferences and degrees of risk-averseness are not just randomly distributed among European donors but driven by at least three key factors. First, the historical power dynamics among European donor countries: (i) partisan politics, (ii) the economic context and (iii) bureaucratic interests (Faust / Koch 2014). Differences in party ideology are significant in determining how sceptical or supportive European concerns of their own domestic interests. As outlined above, conservative and right-wing a government is, the less budget support it disburses. This is also in line with findings from public opinion research that shows that conservative constituencies are more sceptical about the waste of foreign aid due to corruption in developing countries (Baur / Charron / Nasiritousi 2013). In addition, budget support suffers most in times of economic crisis, as it is less visible and considered to be more risky than other aid modalities. The case studies of Germany and the United Kingdom furthermore suggest that the institutional set-up of a donor’s foreign aid system impacts on its preferences for budget support. In Germany, powerful implementing agencies of technical cooperation opposed the provision of budget support as it would have led to stricter political conditionalities for budget support, whereas in the United Kingdom no such opposition existed, which made it easier for the government to disburse increasing amounts of foreign aid as budget support (Faust / Koch 2014). The analysis thus shows how political factors within donor countries shape member state’s preferences and the provision of particular aid instruments and undermine efforts for better aid coordination.

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Bibliography


Nathan Cambien


Economic Crisis in Europe explains how the financial crisis moved from an economic crisis to a political crisis, and how it affected the various regions with in Europe and Russia. The interdisciplinary approach appeals to economists and to political scientists. The editors’ deep knowledge of the region is evident in the expert scholars and relevant articles that they have assembled in this volume. This review discusses aspects of the economic crisis and its relationship to politics in the EU, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in particular, and Russia. Giving thorough attention to the new Member State post-communist countries and Russia, this volume assesses the crises at multiple levels: national, EU, and broader regional. The interplay of economics and politics at these levels affects the impacts of the crisis in the near-term and the long-term.

This timely book provides the wisdom of hindsight, taking into account the events that transpired in three phases from 2007 to 2012. The crisis that began in the US in the real estate sector in 2007 and was fully taken hold in Europe after the collapse of financial markets in the autumn of 2008. In the first phase of the crisis, governments responded to falling economic growth with liquidity and stimulus programs throughout 2009. These measures entrenched national debts, as countries struggled to foster upward growth in the face of rising unemployment. In the second phase, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was established in early 2010 and countries continued to use monetary policy to stimulate fiscal union and economic development. The third phase entered in full with the sovereign debt crises in the Mediterranean countries and Ireland. This resulted in the downsizing of public debt in 2011, as countries continued to struggle with economic growth and unemployment. By 2011 surveys from most countries indicated declining levels of trust in EU institutions, and, as the chapter by Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammel explains, national elections that year favored the challengers ousting incumbents from power.

In Part I “The Economic Crisis in the European Union,” there is analysis of how the EU has dealt with the democratic deficit, the future of the project for regional integration, the European Monetary Union (EMU), and the potential for fiscal union. Impacts of the crisis have been felt not only by increasing debt levels, but also by banking regulations as part of the new EU institutional governance provided by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance signed by 25 Member States in June 2012. There have been varying effects from the crisis on debt, budget, and employment policies across the region of Europe and Russia.

In Part II “The EU’s Global Role and International Institutions,” there are three policy areas that receive close attention. They each have a dedicated chapter on the topics international trade, climate sustainability, and the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Crina Viju and William A. Kerr assess the mechanisms of the common trade policy in the EU that have contributed to the weakening of protectionist

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DeBardlebne, Joan and Crina Viju (eds.). Econom-

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the EU that have contributed to the weakening of protection-
ist trends amid the financial crisis. Matthew Paterson considers the place of the EU as a leader in global cli-
mate sustainability, addressing policy challenges such as the Emissions Trading System (ETS). Patrick Con-
way analyzes the historical comparative advantage of
the IMF as “a lender of last resort” and as a driver of
reform in this economic crisis.

In Part III “The Crisis in Central and Eastern Euro-
pe,” there is a closer look at the CEE countries and
Russia. By 2010 the CEE countries were in a bet-
ter position with public debt, having had more moder-
ate debt positions at the start of the crisis, and their at-
titudes towards the EU were more positive. In Russia
the financial crisis in 1998 was pivotal and in following
the sovereign debt default that year’s devaluation of
the rouble brought about domestic economic growth.
In the first phase of the recent crisis, the decline in
the price of fossil fuels reduced the surplus from exports,
and Russia thus became a concern given trade depen-
dence on demand from

Adeptly explaining how what started as an
strategy of several years prior.

time analyzes the historical comparative advantage of
as the Emissions Trading System (ETS). Patrick Con-
way takes stock of what has been overall put forward – recollecting the theoriet-
ical frameworks primarily depicted. Facing an increas-
ingly challenging atmosphere, chiefly vis-à-vis the
long-lasting economic and financial crisis, the authors argue
for economic and political reform within the
EU, and for reform in this economic crisis.

Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the
University of Siena

Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the most “didac-
tic” parts of the book, in that they look at the principal
EU institutions’ roles and functions (ch.3) or at other
important policy actors, such as European Agencies
or the Member States’ domestic institutions. Much ap-
preciated the mention to the enhanced role of national
parliaments. But the latest developments in the
future, this book contributes to the literature on European politics and political
by serving as a guide to
to navigate the recent events and their differentiated
impacts across countries in the region.

Beverly Barrett
University of Miami

Notwithstanding the existence of a burgeon-
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processes. To be sure, the thin and one-sentence
valid assumption, namely that this matter should not
be approached in a monolithic fashion. Rather – in
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constantly evolving learning processes, alongside with
a physiological extent of variation, shall be the key
points of departure for any kind of examination aimed to
assess what the EU does, and how and why it does it.

Related to this, the authors happily decided not to rigidly divide the book into thematic sections: in fact, chapters fluidly flow one another, with a view to
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In particular, the first two chapters are dedi-
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a so-called “federal integration approach” is set out.

In a nutshell, the latter draws on economic integration and federal approaches; acknowledging the limitations of established mainstream political science-based theo-
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Buonanno, Laurie and Nugent, Neill. Policies and
Policy Processes of the European Union,The Eu-

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Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the most “didactic” parts of the book, in that they look at the principal EU institutions’ roles and functions (ch.3) or at other important policy actors, such as European Agencies or the Member States’ domestic institutions. Much appreciated the mention to the enhanced role of national parliaments. But the most recent developments in the future, this book contributes to the literature on European politics and political by serving as a guide to navigate the recent events and their differentiated impacts across countries in the region. Adeptly explaining how what started as an economic crisis led to political crises within the EU and Russia, the contributors have provided the reasons for the differential impacts across the region, with particular attention to the CEE countries. This allows for the financial crisis in the EU to be seen in relation, inside and outside the EU. The varying impact and pace of recovery across countries makes it challenging to find a unified approach in the ongoing efforts for European integration and social cohesion. With full recovery from the economic crisis still in the future, this book contributes to the literature on European politics and political by serving as a guide to navigate the recent events and their differentiated impacts across countries in the region.
the continent. Part 6 tackles the issues of migration—special attention should be given to Andrew Geddes’ chapter on the admission and asylum of developing countries’ nationals—and identity. Hartmut Mayer’s chapter on the admission and asylum of developing countries’ nationals contributes to the overall organization of the book. It clearly lays out the key dimensions – level of centralization, functional and territorial extension actually vary within the EU by state preferences, bargaining power, domestic ratification constraints, and . . . autonomy costs and benefits” (p. 77). The driving factor of differentiated integration in constructivist theory is “imperfect ideological consensus” across states and policy areas (p. 99).

In the next four chapters, Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig tested these theories. Using extremely detailed, qualitative case studies, they examined integration across four policy areas, the Single Market, the Economic and Monetary Union, security and defense policy, and freedom, security, and justice policy. This piece is extremely well done qualitative work, and does not suffer from any of the problems commonly attributed to small N studies. There is significant variation in the four cases chosen, and the cases show no overt signs of selection on either the dependent or independent variables.

The authors point out that they began this work with the assumption that each of these theories can be used to develop a synthetic theory of integration, and the findings bore out this assumption. In some cases, one theory was clearly superior in explaining integration processes and differentiation. If these costs are high, one should see preference convergence, and further integration. If these costs are high, one should see differentiation or stagnation in integration.

Clearly, the greatest strength of this work is the synthetic theory developed in the concluding chapter. This theory allows researchers to move beyond questions concerning the correctness of each paradigm, and presents an interesting starting point for future empirical studies of integration processes and differentiation. Readers are left with a set of theoretical expectations concerning the progression of integration. This, in turn, leads to multiple research questions, such as, do particular contexts exist in which the effects of autonomy and identity costs are increased? In sum, this, the EU as an institution, is enlightening study that highlights and attempts to explain differentiated integration; at the same time it furthers research on European integration by presenting an improved theoretical paradigm.

Christopher J. Williams
Maastricht University
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